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REVISITING BOUDON, ZNANIECKI, AND POLISHPEASANTS

Micha uczewskiInstitute of Sociology, Warsaw University

There is one concept which occurs scores of times which seems

to fill a long-felt want. Znaniecki uses the term axiological

[] It can be freely predicted that this word will be widely

used in spite of its six syllables.

Ellsworth Faris

There are striking affinities between Raymond Boudons concept

of axiological rationality and a theory of values developed by

Florian Znaniecki (18821958), the American-Polish scholar who

in sociological literature is customarily addressed either as a neglected

classic (Plummer 1983: 34, 44), or an unrecognized forerunner

(Haas 1994).1 One of dominant figures in American social sciences of

the pre-war period, the eminent representative of the Chicago school and

the Columbia circle of scholars (Haas 1990, 2006, Rawls 2003: 139),

Znaniecki seems now to have been deselected in todays tumultuous mar-

ketplace of scientific ideas not only as a classic, but also as a sociologist

in general (cf. Ritzer 2003). Except for formulaic references to The Polish

Peasant, which Znaniecki co-authored with W.I. Thomas, he has fallen

into disgrace. While in the forties and fifties of the 20th century many

distinguished sociologists Howard Becker, Robert K. Merton, C.W.

Mills, Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schutz, among others still used to rec-

ognize and pay tribute to intellectual influence he exerted on their work,

with the advent of next generations Znaniecki came into utmost oblivion

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RAYMOND BOUDON A LIFE IN SOCIOLOGY

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(Haas 2006). In this, he shared hapless lot of the Chicago school and

especially of two other once foremost American-European sociologists:

Robert MacIver and Pitrim Sorokin (Haas 2001).

BEYOND ANOMIC DIVISION OF LABOR

Yet I believe that this despicable as I will show deselection of

Znanieckis work is reversible. In other words, there are good reasons

to hope that fruitfulness of Znanieckis theory though not as high as

that of individualism, equality, and democracy is still higher than that

of slavery or despotism, which if Boudon is right were deselected

irreversibly. More still, I expect that with the surge of interests in sociol-

ogy and philosophy of values (Calhoun 1991, Hechter 1992, Hechter et

al1993, Jonas 1999, Taylor 1989, White 1993),2 which was spurred to a

large extent by Boudons oeuvre (e.g. 1976, 1989b, 1997a, 1997b, 2001,

2005, 2006), Znanieckis reselection becomes very probable.

In our efforts of coming to grips with the nature of values and ratio-

nality as well as relations between them, the author ofThe Polish Peasant

seems to be an indispensable companion. This is not least because as

Boudon (2001: 1314) writes a good theory of values should draw

insights from classical literature, for classics did not care much about

disciplinary boundaries and, as a result, did not suffer from anomic

division of labor between philosophy and sociology which is plaguing

social sciences nowadays. Particularly harmful effects of this division

we are further informed are to be found in axiology.

Thus Znaniecki, a philosopher by training, versed in neo-Kantianism,

Bergsonism and pragmatism, comes as a much-needed ally (Wiley 2007,

Wocial 1987). The more needed as in his work he combined ambitions

of a general philosophy of values with a diligent analysis of sociological

materials. Under the influence of W. I. Thomas, I have learned he

wrote (Znaniecki 1920: 195) to appreciate much more the value of

concrete monographic research [] that for a time I thought of giving

up philosophy for sociology. But [] I began to miss in sociological

work [] the generality of fundamental problems, the wide intellectual

horizons which constitute for me the charm of philosophy; and thus I

finally decided to continue both types of investigation. Aristotle and

Polish peasants, Bergson and personal documents, Kant and Wladek


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MICHA UCZEWSKI REVISITING BOUDON, ZNANIECKI, AND POLISH PEASANTS

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that was a very unusual intellectual mixture which was to bring about

a research program that can be labeled empirical philosophy of values

or in Znanieckis phrasing culturalism.

Znaniecki (1919: IXX) set the stakes very high. On his view, sig-

nificance of values for philosophy is exactly parallel to that which the

problem of causality has for science. The main purpose of this project

was to establish a methodological foundation for future investigations,

thanks to which it might have begun to develop an independent, empiri-

cal, philosophical knowledge. That was the program which Znaniecki

tried to realize for almost half a century.

NEW SCIENCE OF VALUES

Begin with stating the basics. Znaniecki is the founder of sociology of val-

ues. In The Polish peasant in Europe and America he formulated the first

sociological definition of that concept (Spates 1983: 29; see Timasheff

1952: 183),which proved to be both powerful and consequential.By

a social value he wrote in the Methodological note we understand

any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of

some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be

an object of activity (Thomas i Znaniecki 1918: 21).3

Of course, the notion of values gradually gained currency well

before The Polish peasant. Already in the forties of the 19th century it

traveled from political economy to German philosophy, where thanks to

Rudolf Hermann Lotze it rose to prominence to the extent that philoso-

phy itself was defined as the theory of values. Further advances into other

disciplines as well as popular culture were made with Nietzsches procla-

mation of the transvaluation of all values and Weberian Werturteilsstreit

(see Schndelbach 1984). In American sociology, however, in contrast

to European sociology, the question of values were still neglected (Haas

2006: 269).

Despite the fact that already as early as 1990 we can find Simmels

Chapter on the Philosophy of Value in The American Journal of

Sociology, these early treatments still perceived value in terms of politi-

cal economy. It was only during the first world war that this concept was

christened by sociologists, as for example John E. Boodins (1915:

69) who defined it, rather vaguely though, as the congruity of an object


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of activity with the organized tendencies of the will which seeks realiza-

tion in terms of the special situation. This must mean congruity with the

instinctive and temperamental tendencies as intellectually organized into

the social network of definite relations.

Such examples notwithstanding, it is Znaniecki who should be con-

sidered as the foremost sociologist of values. Not only did he introduce

and define this notion, but also combined it with W. I. Thomass concept

of attitude into a powerful theoretical framework developed first in the

Methodological Note and, then, executed throughout the pages ofThe

Polish Peasant. In consequence, it was applied to the empirical mate-

rial, whose richness and detail was not to be paralleled in near future.

Indeed, The Polish Peasantturned out to be the first great classic and

the magisterial, defining work of American empirical sociology, which

rejected psychological and biological reductionisms, set new standards

in methodology, and opened up new fields of explorations. Chosen by

Social Science Research Council as one of the six most important social

science works published after the first world war, it was set on a par with

achievements of Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto (Abbott and Egloff 2008,

Bulmer 1986: 4546, 58).

This is not to suggest that this first formulation of sociology of val-

ues was satisfactory, nor in particular that the concept of (social) value

was defined with clarity and grace, which Herbert Blumer was quick

to notice in his celebrated Appraisal of Thomas and Znanieckis The

Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1939 [1979])4. From very early

on it was obvious that both authors were not very much convinced by

this theoretical framework. One of the most used formulations ofThe

Polish Peasantwas the doctrine of attitudes and values. Znaniecki uses

the word value continually, but repudiates explicitly the concept atti-

tude, while Thomas, in his later work, has made large use of attitude,

but apparently dislikes the word value. (Farris 1927: 532) This was

also openly acknowledged by Znaniecki (1948: 767): When I tried to

synthesize not very successfully his theory of attitudes with my

theory of values [], he agreed, but did not find much use for the latter

in his subsequent sociopsychological research.5

Whereas Blumers critique was justified with regard to Thomas and

Znanieckis work, it was not so much to Znanieckis. The latter author

was constructing a very refined theory of values for years before he met

Thomas. First he developed it in a series of articles published in Poland,


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which immediately made his name as one of the most promising phi-

losophers of his time,6 he then went on to present it to the international

audience in an article, The Principle of Relativity and Philosophical

Absolutism (1915) and, in the most mature form, in a treatise Cultural

Reality (1919).7 Subsequently he applied his ideas directly to psychology

(Znaniecki 1925) and sociology (Znaniecki1934, 1936). Since he intro-

duced there notions of axiological object, axiological significance,

axiological order, axiological other, not only value, but also axi-

ological was considered to be Znanieckis signature concept and recog-

nized as his innovation of huge theoretical potential (Faris 1926; House

1936). Judging from the perspective of Boudons axiological rationality,

this prophecy has been fulfilled.

AXIOLOGY OF AN AXIOLOGIST

Sciences would be impossible if it were not for Wertbeziehung. Without

basic commitment the scholar would loose bearings in the chaos of facts.

This goes for natural sciences (Bartley 1962, Laudan 1984, cf. Grobler

1990) and even more so for social sciences (Topolski 1999). Axiological

level, as Larry Laudan calls it, or theoretico-ideological, in Topolskis

coinage, guides our further research. Now, if we are interested in a theory

of values of a given author, we should always ask first: what is axiology

of an axiologist?

Without beating about the bush, Znaniecki (1920: 194) defined

his credo simply as the pursuit of the highest values which humanity

has developed, i.e. pure science, intellectual and moral freedom, and

cultural idealism. He saw himself as liberal (in a European, classical

sense), cosmopolitan, progressive member of world-wide la republique

des lettres (Znaniecki 1920: 195198; see Znaniecka-opata 2000).8 On

the other hand, however, he was not a type of armchair-sociologist, being

strongly committed to the cause of science both in America as well as in

Europe (Haas 1990).

Putting bombastic rhetoric aside, we will find exactly the same

axiology in Boudons defense of sociology as science, his liberalism and

anti-relativism, and finally, in his mild progressivism and universalism

(see Boudon 1997a, 1997b, 2001, 2002, 2005). Just as Boudon believes

in the coming of world based on the universal principle of human dignity,


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so did Znaniecki. Since his early essays he had preached international

cooperation, which should eventually bring about a common philoso-

phy of values which pivots around the question of the true meaning of

progress. Not surprisingly, this meaning is constituted by the ideal of dig-

nity of man, which still unaccepted in the Communist block, was already

common throughout most nations (Znaniecki 1952a: 143184).

METHODOLOGY

Coming from the same mildly progressive theoretico-ideological prem-

ises, Boudon and Znaniecki arrive at similar methodological conclusions.

They both vehemently disagree with two dominant positions of their

time: relativism (values are subjective) and realism (values are objective).

Interestingly enough, these currents kept on resurfacing under many guis-

es, taking on different labels, but their basic content remained the same

(see Boudon 1997a: 186). While relativism was represented by natural

sciences (for Znaniecki) or anthropology (for Boudon), and realism by

Lotze/Windelband/Rickert (for Znaniecki) or Habermas/Rawls/Wilson

(for Boudon), this was still the same realism and relativism. As a result,

after several decades Boudon faced two rivaling camps which Znaniecki

would have found very familiar.

The distinguished authors not only dealt with the same opponents,

but also developed the same positive strategies. In specific, their shared

purpose was to reconcile relativism and realism, for they saw in these

currents both serious limitations as well as viable insights (Znaniecki

1919: X).

Let us deal with Znanieckis stand in greater detail. Blending two

philosophical traditions, neo-Kantianism (realism) and pragmatism (rel-

ativism) (Wiley 2007, Wocial 1987), he criticized Kantianism on the

pragmatic grounds and pragmatism on the Kantian grounds. For one

thing, in line with relativists he agreed that values are effects of historic

evolution; and for another, he did not want to accept relativistic con-

sequences of such a view and strove to redeem idealistic suppositions,

derived from Rickert and Windelband, as to the objective and rational

nature of values.

All in all, the opposition between those two positions was for

Znaniecki a false one (see also Znaniecki 1932). That they both were


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seen as exclusive rather than complimentary Znaniecki (1919: 8788)

explained as hyperbolic effects of human reasoning: When people dis-

cover that values are not absolute they often go to the other extreme

and claim that there is only a chaos of valuations whose only justifi-

cation is their existence. Still in either case we fall wide of the mark.

While realists instead of understanding why values differ across groups

and societies, condemn this variety, relativists justify it without trying

to understand.

What was, then, Znanieckis solution? The fundamental and dis-

tinctive characters of cultural data [] were [] formulated negatively,

in terms of opposition to naturalism or idealism, instead of being for-

mulated positively in terms of their own (1919: 12). His main pur-

pose was thus to understand culture as a phenomenon in its own right.

For Znaniecki, culture was a dynamic system of actions and values,

whereas values were described as objective and relative at the same time

(Znaniecki 1919: X). In his work, he tried to reconstruct their logic, just

as natural sciences reconstruct the logic of things.9

Let us emphasize that by no means was this project tantamount

to relativism. We must not conflate Znanieckis culturalism with those

relativistic currents which are developed under a heading of the cultural-

turn (see Boudon 1997b, Boudon and Bourricaud 1982).10 Contrary

to postmodern fads, the author of Cultural Reality time and again

underscored objectivity and rationality of values. First, for human

agents themselves values are real and objective, they are not merely

reactions of living beings to their environment, [] but objective ideal

values as the moralist, the artist, the religious man, etc., assumes them.

(Znaniecki 1919: 5) Next, although values, as we experience them,

may belong to incommensurable cultural systems, their existence in

itself is universal. There is no human world without values. Further,

regardless of variety of cultural systems, there is always the same logic

of internalization (subjectivation) and externalization (objectiva-

tion) of values. (Znaniecki 1919: VXIV, 339351) Finally, Znaniecki

(1952a) expected that in foreseeable future the human race will be able

to extract from incommensurable cultural systems values which will be

valid universally. Historicity of values did not lead him then to value-

relativism.


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DEFINITION OF VALUES

When they step down from the level of axiology and methodology,

Boudon and Znaniecki part. Since there is no covariation between

levels of scientific theory, sharing similar political and methodological

assumptions does not necessarily preclude that we will see the reality in

the same way. True, if we share similar axiology, it is probable that we

would share similar methodology, and if we share similar methodology,

we might arrive at similar definitions, yet we cannot now it beforehand.

(Laudan 1984)

Znaniecki set out to provide a new conceptualization of values.

The great mistake he noted (Znaniecki 1919: IX) [] was to

treat the problems of values [] as ultimate and self-sufficient, instead

of taking them only as starting-points of future investigations. Thus he

described values on two levels: content (ability to become an object of

experience either sensual or imaginative) and meaning (Haas 1990).11 In

his relational perspective, meaning of a given value depended on its rela-

tions with other values. Simply put, the meaning is the relation. Here in

turn the author distinguished three dimensions of relations (or connec-

tions, as he called them), which then can be divided into subgroups:

I. Quality

a. Strength (relations can be stronger or weaker, more or less

stable, more or less compelling and important)

b. Axiological significance (relations can be positive or negative,

more or less desirable)12

II. Scope

a. Single relation (value-value)

b. Numerous relations (value-values)

III. Objects being related

a. Relations I: value vis--vis self (so-called humanistic coeffi-

cient)13

b. Relations II: value vis--vis other values

From this follows that to define a value is to define each of its three

dimensions. In contrast to neo-Kantians and Max Weber, for whom

values were givens not to be scrutinized further, Znaniecki provided

highly interactive and thus powerful and inspiring definition. Whereas


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neo-Kantians associated values with content only, thanks to pragmatism

Znaniecki was able to show that much more important dimension is its

relational meaning.

RATIONALITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF VALUES

On Znanieckis account, instead of speaking of rationality and objectiv-

ity of values, we should rather speak of rationalization and objectiva-

tion of values (1919: 151156). In the style reminiscent of T.S. Eliot he

stated: Between subjectivity and objectivity, between irrationality and

rationality, between chaos and order, the passage is continuous. (1919:

148) Thus the main bulk of Znanieckis analyses was devoted not to the

question of rationality and objectivity, but to that of rationalization and

objectivation of values.

Values as such are neither rational, nor objective. In line with neo-

Kantianism, the author ascertained that the world of historical objects

taken in its concrete totality or any concrete fragment of this world is

an irrational chaos (1919: 145). His fundamental premise was that

rationality is not a quality of values out there, but of values which are a

part of human world. It is social agents who bestow rationality on val-

ues. How so? The source of all rational organization of the system is

human intentional activity, whether reflection or action, i.e. conscious

creation of a new object with the help and on the ground of pre-existing

objects. (1919: 156)

As values do not exist in abstracto, but always in human experience,

in studying reality [] we must proceed from experience to more and

more objective rational reality and not vice versa. (1919: 54) According

to the above conceptualization of relations, a value possesses a minimum

level of rationality and objectivity, if at the very least (a) it is linked via

single relation with the self (a necessary and sufficient condition for a

value to exist; dimension IIb and IIIa); if (b) there is a minimal level

of strength (a value is not central, compelling and important; Ia); and,

finally, if (c) there is a minimal level of axiological significance (relation

is neither positive, nor negative; Ib) (Znaniecki 1919: 53144). To give

a simple example; when for the first time in history of mankind a fleet-

ing thought about human rights crossed ones mind, but it was neither

important, nor did it arouse any axiological emotions, such an idea had


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a minimal level of rationality and objectivity, i.e. could be perceived by

others, if not by the agent, as irrational and subjective.

Znaniecki tackled the question of rationalization and objectivation

of values from two complimentary perspectives: (a) relations value-self

(IIIa) and (b) relations value-values (IIIb).

Now, on the first account (IIIa), the idea of human rights, to con-

tinue our example, will become more rational and more objective, if it

has numerous relations (IIb) with the self (IIIb), and if it is, further, com-

pelling and axiologically significant for the self (Ia and Ib).

On the other hand (IIIb), the idea of human rights becomes objec-

tive and rational, if it creates with many other values a stable, coherent

cultural system (Ia and IIb), possibly hierarchized in a logical manner

with regard to some utmost value like dignity of man. In such instances,

Znaniecki spoke of ideological model or axionormative order.

(Znaniecki 1943, Timasheff 1957: 250)

The value reaches the highest degree of rationalization and objec-

tivation (i.e. rationality and objectivity per se), if it combines rationality

and objectivity on these two levels, that is, if it is rational and objective

with regard to the self as well as to other values. In other words, the

value is rational and objective, if there is a match between subjective

and systemic level.

CONSEQUENCES

Such a perspective on values and rationality has several important con-

sequences for further research.

First, dynamism of values. The value is an object which develops

historically. By its very nature it is not fully real at once, but realizes

itself more and more in its entire historical existence, as simultaneously

or successively produced or reproduced by various individuals at various

moments (1919: 94). Reconstruction of the logic of values entails the

genetic dimension as well. We have to analyze it over the course of time,

using historical methods and asking how a system of values emerged, i.e.

how it became an object of experience.

Second, stabilization of values. Values are not givens, but they

can become ones. How so? No rational system can last empirically

without special efforts to maintain its organization (1919: 150). In


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other words, there has to be an agent, which in the long run stabilizes

meaning of a given value. In his description of national development,

Znaniecki (1952a) showed that the agent can be constituted by individu-

als, groups and finally institutions, including the state and international

organizations (UNESCO), which prove to be the most powerful stabiliz-

ers of meaning. For this reason, we have to trace micromacro relations

between the value and its institutional background.

Third, understanding human actions. On the one hand, values are

effects of human actions (i.e. human experience, reflection, emotions

and activity), and on the other their cause. As Znaniecki stated, the

problem of the meaning as conditioning human activity is the central

point of the theory of values (Znaniecki 1919: 87). Therefore we have

to practice methodological individualism, as the locus of rationality is in

the individual. (see Mucha 2006, Znaniecki 1954)

Fourth, personal documents. We cannot stipulate whether a given

value is rational or not, unless we know its relations with other values

and human subjects. Alternatively, if we want to define whether some

actions are rational or not, first we have to get to know what are the

values shared by the agent. But how can we achieve this? In The Polish

peasant, Thomas and Znaniecki famously suggested that the best way is

provided by an extensive use of personal documents.14

* * *

Although Boudon and Znaniecki share the same axiology and meth-

odology, their definitions of values as well as objectivity/rationality are

different. First, it seems that Boudon in line with Weber takes values as

givens and focuses not on their nature, but on the question whether they

are rational or not. If this is so, he underestimates the fact that values

change their meaning with every new relation. For example, the idea of

human rights can become also a part of different system, such as eco-

nomic one, and consequently it can start being treated instrumentally as

a source of revenue, which contradicts the very idea of human rights.

(Znaniecki 1919: 79) Further, with proliferation of human rights (a right

to orgasm, a right to abortion, human rights for apes) the meaning of

this concept can become incoherent and thus loose its rationality. Finally,

the idea of human rights can also be subjugated to some higher values,

as for example hedonistic ones, and in consequence loose its meaning


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altogether. It seems thus that Boudon does not pay sufficient attention

to the possibility of reformulation of meaning of values.

Second, in comparison with Znaniecki, Boudons notion of good rea-

sons is underspecified and at times misleadingly straightforward: People

believe in norms and values because they make sense to them, and more

precisely because they have reasons to endorse them. Axiological

convictions are experienced as evident because they rest upon system of

reasons that, though often half-conscious, are perceived as objective.

(Boudon 2000: 32, 44) Though the author finds definition of strong

reason unnecessary, if not simply nave (Boudon 2001), we do not have

to take his word for that. Since the rational and objective value refers

to many spheres of persons life, which at the same time are central and

axiologically significant, it means that the person will draw good reasons

from central and significant spheres. For example, to support a religious

belief, we could refer to arguments concerning our body, health and fam-

ily (we pray for moms recovery, religion gives us strength to endure

misfortunes), morality (those who go to church are as a rule moral),

kids (kids have to know what is good and wrong) etc. Arguments of

these types would then concatenate into a series of good reasons.

Last but not least, focusing on good reasons, Boudon underesti-

mates historicity of values, and in specific their embeddedness in social

groups and institutions. (see however Boudon 1989a) For Znaniecki, in

turn, the true stabilizer of meaning of values are institutions. Without

them values would be subjective and irrational, prone to constant refor-

mulations.

If I am right, this means that we can reinforce Boudons concept

of axiological rationality with Znanieckis insights. This should be done

with a view on constructing a theory which can explain instances when a

given value is accepted by reference to the individuals strong reasons.

On the basis of our reflections let me now briefly sketch what such

a theory might look like. From what has been said so far, we can draw

the following principles of process of accepting the value: (a) the value is

a part of coherent system; (b) the value refers to many spheres of agents

life; (c) those spheres are axiologically significant; (d) and important; (e)

whereas the value is supported by strong social institutions. Those prin-

ciples can be subsumed under one principle of coherence: (1) valueval-

ues coherence; (2) valueagent coherence; (3) valuesocial institution

coherence.


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POLISH PEASANTS

As I revisited theories of values of the two sociologists, now I would like

to revisit, armed with their conceptual tools, the village ofmica.15 Byway of illustration I want to show that the concept of axiological ratio-

nality can help us analyze emergence of national ideologies, i.e. peasant-

into-Pole processes. (Stauter-Halsted 2001, Struve 2005)

mica is an ideal place for such an exercise, as it is arguably a com-munity, which was an object of the longest period of uninterrupted stud-

ies in the history of social sciences. For the first time it was researched

as early as 1901 (Bujak 1903). A book that followed mica. Wiepowiatu limanowskiego. Stosunki gospodarcze i spoeczne [mica. Avillage of the Limanowa county. Economic and social relations]was

soon applauded as the first scholarly mature village-monograph in social

sciences in East-Central Europe. The impact of Bujaks publication was

twofold. First, it launched tradition of monographic studies that along

with analyses of personal documents was to become a distinguishing

mark of Polish empirical sociology. Second, it was a point of reference for

consequent revisits ofmica, the most important being a monographby Zbigniew Wierzbicki (1962), which is to date widely considered to be

the most exhaustive and comprehensive community study in Polish soci-

ology. All in all, due to these monographs, mica has become not onlyan object of classic studies, but also a classic site itself. (see Luczewski

and Bukraba-Rylska 2008)

Let us take into account the nationalizing agents, i.e. bearers of

national values which together constitute a system of national ideology.

In the course of the 19th century, there were two waves of nation-

alizing activity directed at Polish-speaking peasants in Galicia. The first

one, which took place in the thirties and forties, was led by radicals.16

Since at that time the international order, which included non-existence

of Poland as a state, was sealed by the Prussian, Austrian and Russian

emperors as well as the Catholic church, Polish patriots out of necessity

fervently opposed to those powers. Anti-Catholic and anti-imperial ideol-

ogy was thus the most popular among the national elites in exile.

Still, at the same time, there was a tiny minority of the so-called

ultramontanes, who derived their ideas from de Maistre, de Bonald, and

Lammenais.17 Unlike radicals, they tried to combine Polishness with

fidelity to the Church and the Austrian Emperor. As these goals seemed


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incoherent for the vast majority of the Polish elites, it was no wonder that

the ultramontanes were continuously condemned as papists, loyalists and

traitors of the national cause in general. In consequence, their movement

gradually lost its influence and eventually dissolved in the seventies.

Long before that, however, in 1846, the radicals turning a deaf

ear to the Ultramontanes warnings prepared a national uprising in

Galicia, which was to free peasants from serfdom and win them to the

national cause of overthrowing the Austrian rule. If peasants supported

the uprising, there was a high chance of Poland regaining independence.

Yet contrary to these expectations, peasants instead of supporting their

self-proclaimed saviors, slaughtered them in the name of the Emperor. A

very good indicator of peasants hostility was the fact that over fifty years

afterwards one of the radicals, who tried to mobilize mica populace,was still very much hated as a Pole. (Bujak 1903: 35) The massacre of

1846 dealt a heavy, if not lethal, blow to the Polish national movement,

which did not regain its momentum until the seventies.

It was only around that time that a charismatic priest, Stanisaw

Stojaowski, managed to gradually nationalize village elites in most of

Galicia.18 This was not any easy task, as Stojaowski dealt with peas-

ants who were still hostile to national ideals. As late as the beginning of

the 20th century Franciszek Bujak (1903: 131) reported that in mica:national identity has not advanced as far as to make local community

renounce fundamental hostility and mistrust towards those wearing

suits [=Poles from cities; surduciarze]. There are many in mica andits environs who when asked who they are (what is their nationality),

answer on second-thoughts that they are Catholics in contradistinction

with Lutherans or Jews, or that they are peasants or, finally, that they

belong to emperor [cysarscy]. Against such unpromising background,

the courageous priest succeeded in combining Polish patriotism with then

dominant anti-Polish peasant ideology. How so?

1. Valuevalue coherence. Being a heir to the ultramontanism, blend-

ing loyalism, Catholicism and patriotism, he simply tried this ideology on

peasants. In the long run, it turned out that whereas the ultramontanist

ideology was highly unsuccessful among national elites, it was very reso-

nant with rural population. This was because for peasants it was in itself

coherent; and unlike the radical one, it did not entail contradictory claims

such as abolishment of serfdom (an important goal for peasants) and fight

against the Emperor and the Church (goals which were unacceptable).


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2. Valueagent coherence. Further, Stojaowskis ideology was both

compelling and positive. It related nation with central issues for peasants,

such as usury, landlords economic and political domination, widespread

alcoholism, giving them simultaneously viable clues as to fight against

negative phenomena troubling the Galician countryside. On the other

hand, Stojaowski did not undermine peasants values particularly

loyalism and Catholicism but affirmed them.

3. Valueinstitution coherence. Finally, the priests success was not

only a matter of changing target of his ideology from elites to peas-

ants, but also of stabilizing meaning of the ideology. To this, he kept on

founding peasant-newspapers, extending the network of correspondents,

increasing circulation, establishing self-help organizations, which gave

cheap loans, raised level of rural education and, eventually, allowed

peasants to represent their own economic and political interests both at

local and national level. As a result, in less than two decades, Stojaowski

developed a highly efficient institutional machine.

These three elements allow us to explain why, unlike the radicals

and the ultramontanes, Stojaowski succeeded in final instance. With the

help of Boudon and Znaniecki we can summarize our argument by say-

ing that Stojaowskis ideology was resonant because values he advanced

were both objective and rational for his constituency, that is peasants

had very good reasons to embrace them. (see Table 1)

CONCLUSIONS

In his later essay, Znaniecki (1952b) asks whether sociologists should be

also philosophers of value and answers that not only they should, but

Table 1

Coherence

National ideologies

Radicals Ultramontans Stojaowski

Valuevalue + + + + + +

Valueagent +/ + + + + +

Valueinstitution + + +


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also they have to. Whether they want it or not, they are guided in prac-

tice of their research by values, and even their theoretical enterprises are

grounded in values. But despite the fact that sociologists should be phi-

losophers of values, crossing the disciplinary boundaries does not come

smoothly. The danger is claims the author that even the most bril-

liant sociologists become shallow once they enter the field of philosophy.

In fact, Znaniecki sees only two sociologists who have made an original

contribution to both sociology as well as axiology: Robert MacIver and

Pitrim Sorokin. With a benefit of hindsight we should be safe to add to

this alarmingly short list two other names: Znaniecki and Boudon.

Let us go one step further. At one point, Boudon (2001: 3), some-

what tongue in cheek, reveals that Foucault was a French Nietzsche,

Derrida a French Heidegger, Bourdieu a French Marx and

Lacan a French Freud (see Ferry and Renault 1985). From The Art

of Self-Persuasion we know who might possibly be a French Simmel.

Lecture ofThe Origins of Values and The Poverty of Relativism gives us

an idea as to a French Weber. Is not high time, then, we asked who

could be a French Znaniecki?

NOTES

1. The sociological work of Znaniecki has been extensively analyzed in recent col-

lections edited by Gubert and Tomasi (1993), Haas (2000), and Liao and Haas

(2007).

2. In effect, it is no longer true that while in the sixties values still occupied a

central place in all of the social science disciplines [], use of the concept

has declined precipitously in each discipline. (Hechter 1992: 215; see Spates

1983).3. Next to social values, Znaniecki distinguishes also hedonistic, technical, religious,

aesthetic, cognitive, legal, symbolic, intellectual values etc. (Znaniecki 1927:

529) These all kinds of values the author claims (Znaniecki 1936: 71-110)

become social values if they are included in the system of social action.

4. Herbert Blumer (1979: 25) stated: Vagueness of a similar sort seems to mark

a social value. The imprecision and ambiguity is reflected in the confusion

between the two terms [value and attitude] as they are employed by the authors

in their analyses.

5. For his part, W.I. Thomas (1939: 84) acknowledged: It is true that the con-

crete materials of the volume are not adequately correlated with the method-ological scheme. It is a fact that the methodological note in Volume One was

prepared just before the first two volumes went to press. It was a combina-

tion of assumptions which I had made for several years in a course on Social


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Attitudes and some standpoints developed by Znaniecki in a volume in Polish

on Values.

6. In Cultural Reality, Znaniecki (1919: XI) pointed to the following articles: The

Problem of Values in Philosophy (Warsaw 1910); Humanism and Knowledge(Warsaw 1912); The Significance of Evolution (Warsaw 1914) and a seriesof articles published between 1909 and 1915 in the Philosophical Review ofWarsaw. (see Znaniecki 1987).

7. Although this book was published by the Chicago University Press and was initial-

ly perceived as a characteristic product of the (Western) American Sociological

School (Schiller 1919: 488), in the long run it was not incorporated into socio-

logical curricula. This was mainly due to the its being badly written, a fact, which

was noticed very early on: As it stands, it is too painfully clear that it is of the

books written for professors by professors when they are seized with apprehen-

sion lest their subject should degenerate into popularity. (Schiller 1919: 489).8. Znaniecki (1920: 196) wrote: I am not in the slightest measure inclined to politi-

cal, social, moral, or religious revolutionism of any kind, and was considered in

Europe, even by the most radical conservatives, a perfectly inoffensive, mildly

progressive intellectualist.

9. In a similar vein, Boudon (2005: 34) stated: Values are not facts. But when it

is observed that a value is held in one context but not in another, this is a factthat can be observed, which it would not be illegitimate to try to explain scien-

tifically.

10. From this point of view, Znanieckis choice to term his theoretical stand as cul-

turalism was not a felicitous one. On the one hand, though probably he wasthe first to introduce this concept to philosophy and sociology, if not even to

invent it, he was not recognized as such by later-day culturalists (Haas 2006).

This was something to be expected, for Znanieckis insistence on objectivity of

values, progress and universalism is irreconcilable with the premises of contem-

porary culturalism. On the other hand, this term is nowadays so much encum-

bered with relativistic connotations that realists, like Boudon, would not seek

under this label any theoretical insights. More still, Boudon sees culturalism

and culturalist approach as his main intellectual opponents, which dominate

over social sciences and spread to the public. However, what Znaniecki calls

culturalism, Boudon calls axiological rationality. In this, Znanieckis position issimilar to that of Durkheim, as elaborated by Boudon (2006).

11. A value differs from a thing in that it possesses both a given content, which dis-

tinguishes it as an empirical object form other objects, and a meaning, by which

it suggests other objects those with which it has been actively associated in the

past (Znaniecki, 1934: 41; cf. Haas 1990). We saw this definition already in

The Polish Peasant(Thomas and Znaniecki 1918: 18).12. When a value is taken with reference to a particular system, it may appear as

desirable or undesirable, useful or harmful, etc., in connection with

the other values involved in it and from the point of view of its realization. We

call this character of a value its positive or negative axiological significance(Znaniecki, 1934: 42; cf. Haas 1990).

13. The principle of humanistic coefficient was formulated in Znaniecki (1927, 1939;

see Haas 1990).


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14. We are safe in saying that personal life-records, as complete as possible, consti-

tute the perfect type of sociological material, and that if social science has to use

other materials at all it is only because of the practical difficulty of obtaining at

the moment a sufficient number of such records to cover the totality of sociologi-cal problems, and of the enormous amount of work demanded for an adequate

analysis of all the personal materials necessary. (Thomas and Znaniecki 1958:

1832).

15. With 600 hundred inhabitants, mica belongs to small rural settlements placedin Polish Western Galicia. This region has been always an overpopulated, rural

and poor. For centuries it was a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

until 1772, when after the Commonwealths partitions Galicia was incorporated

into the Habsburg monarchy for 150 years. Together with the whole region in the

XIXth century, mica witnessed rapid, contested, and seemingly belated process

of nationalization of the populace. Within less than one century from 1846 to1945, an ethnically Polish population (speaking Polish and being Catholic) which

was initially hostile to Poles (associated with the gentry oppressing the serfs)

became fervently nationalistic. (see uczewski and Bukraba-Rylska 2008).

16. Kieniewicz (1950, 1951).

17. Matusik (1998), Szlachta (1996), Zieliski (1990).18. Kcki (1937), Kudaszyk (1998: 19-45), Szlachta (1996).

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