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Political Risk Letter Jun-2011 1

Vol. XXXIII, No. 6 June 2011

Political Risk Letter World Business Opportunities

Political & Economic Forecast Table ........................................................................................... 8

In This Issue

Group

P R Sessential information for strategic global planning

Highlights from New Reports ................................................................................................... 2

Updates to Recent Reports....................................................................................................... 6

BOLIVIAPressure for Populist Policies

CUBAReforms Move Forward, Slowly

FINLANDBailout Issue Will Test Coalition Unity

INDIAStalled Agenda

INDONESIAYudhoyono Losing His Mojo

PERUNo Mandate for Radicalism

POLANDTusk Risks Being Too Cautious

SWEDENMinority Status Limits Scope for Reform

UNITED ARAB EMIRATESSo Far, So Good

BANGLADESHPressure to Deliver

BULGARIABorisov Expected to Ride out the Storm

DOMINICAN REPUBLICDecits Cloud Outlook

HONDURASReturn to Normalcy

JAMAICAUnwelcome Distractions


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2 Jun-2011 Political Risk Letter

Managing Editor:Benedict F. McTernan

Production Manager:Patricia Elliott

Special Adviser:William D. Coplin, Ph.D.

Senior Advisers:Goodwin Cooke Professor of International

Relations, Syracuse University

Robert Hardgrave, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science,

University of Texas, Austin

Llewellyn D. Howell, Ph.D.Emeritus Professor ofInternational StudiesThunderbird, The Gavin School

of International Management Jane Hughes, M.A. (Emeritus) Adjunct Professor of Economics,

Brandeis University

Richard Hull, Ph.D. (Emeritus) President, African

Consulting Associates

Christopher McKee, Ph.DEditor-in-ChiefInternational Country Risk Guide

Richard L. Millett, Ph.D.EmeritusProfessor of History,Southern Illinois University

Larry A. Niksch, Ph.D. Specialist on Asian Affairs,

Congressional Research ServiceLibrary of Congress

Bernard Reich, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science

and International Affairs,George Washington University

Daniel WagnerStrategy & Business Development

2011, The PRS Group, Inc. Political Risk Letter (ISSN: 0887-7629) is published monthly. An annual subscription, 12 monthlyissues, costs $489. Reproduction without written permission from the publisher is strictly prohibited. All rights reserved. Directall inquiries to Patti Davis, 6320 Fly Road, East Syracuse, NY 13057-9358, U.S.A. TEL: +1 (315) 431-0511. FAX: +1 (315)431-0200. (Business Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time.) We can also be reached with comments on our Internet site:http://www.prsgroup.com, or send e-mail to [email protected]. Printed in USA.

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Highlights from New Reports

BOLIVIAPressure for Populist Policies

President Evo Morales has suffered

a series of political setbacks in recentmonths, the most notable being hisU-turn on planned fuel-price hikesin the face of widespread protests atthe end of 2010, and, in April 2011,an acrimonious and sometimes vio-lent 11-day strike over wages by thecountrys main labor organization.The walkout was ended with minorconcessions from the government, butproduced lingering resentment amongthe unions.

The confrontations are evidence of

Morales loss of credibility among theorganizations that have provided thebedrock of his support throughout histumultuous presidency, a developmentthat is corroborated by his plummet-ing approval rating, which accordingto one recent poll has fallen to near30%. All of which poses a dilemmafor the president, as his willingnessto acquiesce in the face of strongpublic pressure will likely encourageother aggrieved groups to aggressivelypress their demands, and his decliningpopularity will make it that much moredif cult for him to resist such pressure.

The governments position is notimmediately threatened, as MAS stillcontrols a two-thirds legislative major-ity. However, both the president andhis party have taken a major hit to theirpopularity, and the possibility of desta-bilizing tensions within the governingparty cannot be ruled out.

In a bid to repair ties with his base,Morales has declared his intention todismantle the market-based regula-tory framework established by decreeamid an economic crisis in 1985. Theplanned changes will require the over-haul of rules for investment and trade,as well as revisions to the regulationsaffecting key industries, including hy-

drocarbons, mining, power generation,banking, and telecommunications.

A massive new gas find holdsthe potential to attract sizeable newinvestment from those foreign com-panies that have remained aloof sinceMorales declared state ownership of the countrys hydrocarbons depositsin 2006, but the uncertainty created bythe proposed remaking of the regula-tory framework may dampen interestin the near term. Likewise, suggestionsthat the government is prepared to re-nationalize mining operations that wereprivatized in the 1990s could deterinvestment in that sector, with nega-tive implications for the governmentsplans to exploit its substantial lithiumreserves.

CUBAReforms Move Forward,Slowly

A PCC congress held in April 2011,the rst in 14 years, con rmed the gov-erning partys commitment to movingahead with a program of economic lib-eralization aimed at realizing PresidentRal Castros stated goal of perfectingsocialism by transitioning from aneconomic model based on centralizedstate control to a mixed economy witha signi cant private sector that operatesaccording to market principles. Partici-pants approved more than 300 changesto existing economic guidelines that,if fully implemented, will ultimatelyreduce the states role in non-strategicsectors to that of regulator. At thesame time, while the plan envisionsthe maintenance of a substantial socialsafety net, the government will nolonger guarantee lifetime employment,housing, and access to basic goods andservices at heavily subsidized prices.

However, the government is mov-ing forward with a great deal of cau-


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tion. Tellingly, a plan to lay off some500,000 state workers by the end of March 2011, rst announced in Sep-tember 2010, has been put on hold, aspolicy-makers instead focus on estab-lishing the legal foundation for a rapidexpansion of the private sector, whichwill be crucial to absorbing the largepool of unemployed Cubans createdby what amounts to a 20% reductionof the public-sector work force.

Although more than 220,000 newprivate business licenses have beenissued since the rules for obtaining thepermits were relaxed last fall, the gov-ernment remains rmly in control of the manufacturing sector, and the tinyscale of many of the new businesses,which are concentrated in the dining,retail, and personal services industries,limits their potential to generate a largenumber of jobs. No doubt with suchlimitations in mind, the governmenthas also discussed the possibility of transferring responsibility for thedelivery of some state services to theprivate sector.

Officials have also stepped upefforts to attract foreign investmentin key economic sectors, especiallyin tourism, where a signi cant risein investment would generate rapidgrowth of construction jobs in the near

term, while also creating the potentialfor a large number of permanent jobsin a variety of enterprises catering toforeign travelers.

The government will have littlechoice but to court foreign partners fornickel mining and oil exploration, bothof which will require outside expertise,capital, and technology if they are tobe developed successfully. However,in areas where foreign involvement isnot deemed essential, the governmentwill continue to play a dominant role.

FINLANDBailout Issue Will TestCoalition Unity

The center-right KOK won a nar-row victory at the April 17 generalelection, securing 20.4% of the vote,

compared to a 19.1% share obtainedby both the center-left SDP and thenationalist PS, which took advantage of strong anti-incumbent sentiment and acollapse in support for KESK, the leadparty in the previous government, toposition itself as a legitimate contenderfor political power. KOK leader JyrkiKateinens task of forging a majoritycoalition was greatly complicated bythe refusal of the PS to abandon its ada-mant opposition to any considerationof further bailouts for debt-burdenedeuro-zone countries and the clear voteof no-con dence in KESK, which ef-fectively made the inclusion of eitherparty a less-than-ideal prospect.

After prolonged and intense ne-gotiations, Katainen managed to pulltogether a six-party coalition that in-cludes the left-leaning SDP and VAS,the VIHR and the SFP (both of whichparticipated in the previous KESK-led government, and the conservativeKD. The unwieldy and ideologicallydiverse coalition, which took of ce inlate June, has committed to implement-ing an economic program that includesa mix of tax hikes and spending cutsaimed at restoring scal discipline,along with tax cuts designed to spur

job growth and stimulate economicactivity.

Responsibility for implementingthe governments scal consolidationprogram falls to SDP leader Jutta Ur-pilainen, who was appointed ministerof nance, the post held by Katainenin the previous government. Beyondcatching the inevitable ak producedby the tax increases and spending cuts,she will also have to face down theunions over wage restraint, which willbe essential to boosting the countryscompetitiveness.

But Urpilainen will face a more im-mediateand potentially more signi -canttest of her political leadershipover the issue of extending a second nancial lifeline to Greece. Duringthe campaign, the SDP pledged thatFinlands support for future bailoutswould be conditioned on ensuring thatprivate creditors shared at least someof the cost (and the risks) of proppingup the debt-burdened peripheral euro-zone states. Given the enormous risks

associated with a strategic default, theSDP will likely face pressure to retreatfrom that position, and it is far fromclear that Urpilainen possesses theleadership skills required to ensurethat her party acts accordingly.

INDIAStalled Agenda

The strong showing of the UPAbloc of parties at the 2009 general elec-tion freed Prime Minister ManmohanSinghs government from its depen-dence on the Communist-dominatedLeft Front, boosting expectations thatthe regimes reform efforts would gainmomentum during its second term.However, those hopes faded amidrising tensions between the dominantINC and its smaller coalition partners,and the results of a recent round of state elections appear to have all buteliminated any chance of progress onreform measures that are seen as cru-cial to Indias economic development.

Although the INCs generally dis-appointing performance in the statecontests does not necessarily portendthe partys defeat at the general elec-tion that falls due in 2014, the results

in West Bengal, where the TrinamoolCongress crushed the incumbentCommunist government, and in TamilNadu, where the DMK was trouncedby its main rival, suggest that PrimeMinister Singh can expect dif cultieswith two of the more important juniorpartners in the federal coalition overthe coming months.

The Trinamool Congress has notbeen an especially cooperative part-nerit has consistently opposedefforts to loosen restrictions on stateland acquisition for economic devel-opmentand there is little reason toexpect that the party will become moreof a team player after having been sogenerously rewarded by voters for itsindependent stance. For its part, theDMKs post-defeat soul-searchingwill no doubt include serious consider-ation of whether the party has anythingto gain from continuing its partnershipwith the INC.


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Even if the collapse of Singhsgovernment were to trigger an earlyelection, there is little evidence tosuggest that the main opposition BJPis prepared to take advantage of theINCs troubles, and the poor showingof the Communists at the recent state

elections indicates that the chances of a Left Front victory are slim to none.The diminished appeal of both the

INC and the BJP points to the potentialfor greater fragmentation of politicalpower following the next generalelection, with smaller regional partiesgaining at the expense of the two domi-nant rivals. Such a scenario impliesnot only greater political instability,as achieving a parliamentary majoritywill require the formation of ever moreunwieldy coalitions, but also the risk

that federal elections could be decidedon the basis of local issues, a develop-ment that would make it increasinglydif cult to achieve consensus on anational agenda.

INDONESIAYudhoyono Losing His Mojo

Public dissatisfaction over highunemployment, rising commodityprices, and a lack of progress in ef-

forts to battle government corruptionhave contributed to a slide in popularsupport for President Susilo BambangYudhoyono, whose approval rating hasfallen below 50% for the rst time inhis presidency. Yudhoyono has re-peatedly back-pedaled on reforms inthe face of threats to the unity of hissix-party coalition, with the result thatonly 17 of 70 targeted bills were passedin Parliament last year.

All six parties signed on to a newcoalition agreement in late May that

is designed to promote cohesion andenforce discipline, but a provisionrequiring the unanimous consent of the coalition partners to any Cabinetreshuf e suggests that the pact willdo little to improve the governmentsproductivity.

At the same time, there is a grow-ing risk of at least a partial reversalof the domestic security gains made

under Yudhoyono. The governmenthas succeeded in weakening the JIterrorist network, but smaller extremistgroups operating independently of JIare growing in number, and appear tobe foregoing high-pro le attacks onforeign targets in favor of more lim-

ited operations designed to exacerbatesectarian tensions. To the extent thatthe change in tactics poses a threat tobroader internal stability and socialharmony, the development has nega-tive implications for the risk to foreignbusinesses, especially if the presidentsloss of popular support discourages anaggressive response to the threat.

What the president might do toimprove public perceptions of hisgovernments handling of the economyis unclear, as the fundamentals are

actually quite strong and the economyis performing at a high level. Solidgrowth of private consumption, xedinvestment, and exports contributedto real GDP growth of 6.5% (year-on-year) in the rst quarter of 2011, onlyslightly off the 6.9% pace of expan-sion in the nal quarter of 2010. Thedisruption of trade with Japan willdampen growth in the second and thirdquarters, but the economy is neverthe-less forecast to expand by close to 6%this year.

PERUNo Mandate for Radicalism

On June 5, Peru held a presidentialrun-off election that pitted OllantaHumala, the candidate of the left-wingPeru Wins alliance, against Keiko Fu-

jimori, the leader of the right-leaningForce 2011. In a contest that for manyPeruvians was an exercise in determin-ing the lesser of two evils, Humala

prevailed, winning 51.5% of the vote.Having lost the 2006 presidentialelection after being linked in the mindsof moderate voters to Venezuelascontroversial leftist president, HugoChvez, Humala this time made a pointof toning down his leftist rhetoric.During the run-off campaign, he piv-oted away from the more radical ele-ments of his campaign platform, such

as nationalization of strategic indus-tries, focusing instead on more broadlyappealing promises of social inclusionand improved public services.

Although the strategy worked, theinternational business community(along with many Peruvians) is wait-

ing to see which Humala will take of- ce in late July. Will it be the radicalnationalist whose party platform ini-tially included a pledge to nationalizekey industries, or the more moderateHumala, who promised during therun-off campaign to achieve socialistends by implementing market-basedeconomic policies?

The legislative arithmetic suggeststhat it will be the latter. The Peru Winsalliance, headed by Humalas PNP,won just 47 seats in the 130-mem-

ber Congress. The new governmentcan only achieve a majority with thesupport of centrist and center-rightparties, none of which will endorsea radical departure from the liberalpolicy course established over thepast decade. Moreover, Humalalacks anything approaching a popularmandate for radical reform. The factthat the two most extreme candidatesadvanced to the run-off election waswholly attributable to the division of the centrist vote among three candi-dates, who won a combined 45% of the rst-round vote.

In short, most of the signs point toHumala steering a relatively steadypolicy course. His government may bemore accommodating of pressure fromlabor unions and his sensitivity to thegrievances of the indigenous popula-tion could have negative implicationsfor investors in the extractive sectors.However, in general, Humalas gov-ernment is not expected to deliber-ately provoke or alienate internationalmining rms, whose production willcontinue to be the lifeblood of theeconomy.

POLANDTusk Risks Being Too Cautious

Prime Minister Donald Tusk hasmade it clear that action on promised


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administrative and labor-market re-forms will not be a high priority aheadof parliamentary elections scheduledfor October 2011, and doubts aregrowing as to Tusks willingness tomeet the challenge head-on, even inthe likely event that the main govern-

ing PO secures another term. Tusk hasadopted a similarly relaxed approachto laying a foundation for long-term scal stability, as the government willrely on solid growth and proceeds fromprivatization to narrow the budgetshortfall in the near term. There isalready widespread skepticism that thegovernment will meet its obligationto reduce the de cit to less than 3%of GDP by the end of next year. TheEU has criticized the governmentsreliance on one-off revenue measures,

and is pressing for spending cuts, sofar to no avail.The prime minister is taking a

rather big risk. Failure to quickly reinin the budget de cit, which expandedto 7.9% of GDP in 2010, would in-crease the potential for a slide in thevalue of the zloty against the euro, adevelopment that would not only hurtindebted households carrying euro-denominated mortgages, but wouldall but certainly push the total publicdebt burden above the 55% of GDPthreshold at which the constitutionrequires the implementation of painfulausterity measures. Indeed, the debtlevel is already dangerously close tothe threshold, and could surpass itby the end of 2011 even if the zlotyholds rm.

Longer-term fiscal stability willrequire aggressive steps to contain thegrowth of non-discretionary spending,which accounts for more than two-thirds of all state expenditures. Thepresent stable economic conditionshave inclined investors to give Tusk the bene t of the doubt, but it is widelyunderstood that far-reaching reformof the pension and health systems isessential, and there is a risk that con -dence will weaken if Tusk downplaysthe need for structural reforms duringthe upcoming campaign.

SWEDENMinority Status Limits Scopefor Reform

The handicap created by the minor-ity status of the center-right Alliancefor Sweden government headed byPrime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt hasbeen compounded by a decline in thecoalitions popularity and a revival of support for the center-left Red-Greenbloc of opposition parties. In mid-March, the opposition dealt the Alli-ance its rst legislative defeat since theSeptember 2010 election by securingparliamentary approval of legislationblocking the sale of government stakesin mortgage lender SBAB, utility Vat-tenfall, the post of ce, and telecomoperator TeliaSonera.

The setback points to dif cultiesimplementing other key items on thegovernments agenda, including taxcuts and labor-market reforms. Amajor test will come in September,when the government submits its 2012budget for parliamentary approval. If the budget becomes hung up in theParliament, Reinfeldt will come underpressure to call an early election.

Poll data showing increased sup-port for the Sweden Democrats is apotential silver lining for the Alliance,

as the center-left parties will be waryof provoking an early election thatmight result in further gains for thefar-right party. However, the prob-ability is growing that Reinfeldt mightseek to bolster his governments posi-tion by reaching an agreement underwhich the Sweden Democrats wouldsupport the Alliance on con denceissues in return for the governmentsendorsement of legislation tighteningimmigration restrictions, similar to thearrangement that has kept a minority

center-right government in power inDenmark since 2001.A combination of weaker external

demand, inventory drawdown, andmonetary and scal tightening willslow the pace of real GDP growth to3% this year. The Riksbank has hikedinterest rates five times since July2010, and monetary authorities havesignaled that the pace of tightening

will increase over the coming months.In addition to slowing the torrid paceof investment and inventory accumula-tion, higher interest rates will reinforceupward pressure on the krona, withnegative implications for export com-petitiveness.

UNITED ARABEMIRATES

So Far, So GoodDomestic conditions in the UAE

have remained remarkably stablein 2011, in contrast to the ongoingupheaval elsewhere in the region. Ina gesture aimed at pre-empting callsfor sweeping political reform, federalof cials have agreed to expand thefranchise for elections to the FederalNational Council (FNC) later this year,but any expansion of voting rights willbe too limited to have a signi cant ef-fect on the composition of the FNC,which in any case is only an advisorybody.

President Khalifa Bin Zayed AlNahyan, who is also the emir of AbuDhabi, can count on the unwaveringsupport of the other emirs in the Su-preme Council of Rulers, and there is

little evidence to suggest that anti-gov-ernment sentiment is so widespread asto create a real danger of mass protestson a scale that might produce seriouspolitical instability.

Notwithstanding Dubais highlypublicized debt troubles, the federalgovernment has enormous nancialresources at its disposal, and will re-spond at the rst hint of trouble withan increase in already generous statespending, an approach that should besuf cient to keep a lid on unrest. That

said, the UAE has cracked down onthose expressing even mild dissentand has lent military assistance to thebesieged regime in Bahrain under theauspices of the GCC, a clear indicationthat the royal leaders in the UAE aretaking nothing for granted.

Dubai has made progress towardaddressing the debt troubles of state-owned conglomerates, most notably


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BANGLADESHPressure to Deliver

Political stability is unlikely to bethreatened to any signi cant degreein the near term, as the governingGrand Alliance claims more than two-thirds of the seats in the 330-memberNational Assembly, and the dominantposition of Prime Minister HasinaWazeds Awami League, which con-trols a majority of seats on its own, allbut rules out the danger that divisionsamong the governing parties mightendanger the survival of the regimebefore the completion of its term inJanuary 2014.

That said, rising public dissatisfac-tion over chronic power shortages andhigh in ation has made the govern-ment more vulnerable to a campaign of political protest organized by the mainopposition BNP. The chief concernin that regard lies not in the threat of generalized upheaval (although thatpossibility cannot be ruled out), butrather the possibility that fear of pro-voking street protests could discourageHasinas government from pursuing

the reforms required to create a moreinviting business climate, which is es-sential to the regimes chances of evenpartially making good on its pledge toreduce poverty.

The government has taken steps toboost the power supply, but efforts tocontain in ation will fall short as longas global food and fuel prices remainhigh. Financial support from the IMF

and other multilateral agencies willreduce the risk of a sharp slide in thelocal currency. However, inevitable

pressure from unions for steep wageincreases to offset the erosion of pur-chasing power will create the potentialfor scal slippage that could jeopardizethe timely disbursement of funds, withpotentially signi cant implications forboth currency stability and in ation.

BULGARIABorisov Expected to Ride out

the StormAlthough the opposition parties

know full well that there is little chanceof toppling Prime Minister BoykoBorisovs minority government as longas he retains the backing of a bloc of independent allies in the Parliament,the BSP and the ethnic Turkish DPSare applying heavy pressure on thegovernment as voters prepare to electa new president in October. Whetherthat strategy will undermine the gov-erning partys chances of winning the

presidency, or boost the oppositionschances of returning to power whenparliamentary elections are held in2013, is an open question, but it willcertainly create an obstacle for theprime minister as he seeks to rebuildhis badly dented popular support.

Regardless of how the presiden-tial election turns out, Borisov willbe happy to see the departure of the

incumbent, Georgi Parvanov, a for-mer leader of the BSP. Parvanov hasthrown obstacles in the path of Finance

Minister Simeon Djankovs proposalto enshrine a commitment to strict scal discipline in the constitution.Following a meeting with the presidentto discuss the proposal in early June,Djankov announced that a parliamen-tary vote on his plan would be delayeduntil after the October elections.

But neither Borisov nor Djankovcan blame an ideologically hostilepresident for their failure to reviveBulgarias struggling economy, whichis the main reason for the govern-

ments slumping approval rating. Theadministration has drawn re over itsabysmal absorption of EU funds, andthere is reason to doubt that a Cabinetreshuf e carried out in May will leadto an improvement.

DOMINICANREPUBLIC

Decits Cloud Outlook

With the withdrawal of First LadyMargarita Cedeo from considerationfor the governing PLDs presidentialnomination, the upcoming primarycontest is almost certain to be wonby Danilo Medina Snchez, who isexpected to face off against the op-position PRDs Hipolito Meja in areplay of the 2000 election. Mejawon the previous matchup, but barring

Updates to Recent Reports

in the form of a deal to restructurenearly $25 billion of debts owed byDubai World. Even so, some $18 bil-lion of debt is due to mature in 2011,and especially troubled rms will face nancing obstacles. A prime candidatefor dif culties is Dubai Holding, a nancial services unit of state-ownedDubai Group, which was forced torestructure a $550 million loan in De-

cember 2010, after missing a paymentthe previous month.

The federal government has pledgedto implement the reforms required toobtain an emerging-market designa-tion from MSCI, which is crucialto salvaging the countrys hopes of becoming a regional hub for equityinvestors. However, of cials haveconditioned moves to ease restrictions

on foreign ownership in some sectorson the agreement of participants in theDoha Development Agenda, a free-trade initiative sponsored by the WTO,to reduce tariffs on the federations keyexports, including petrochemicals andaluminum. Whether the necessaryprogress might be made before theMSCI next takes up the UAEs casefor a status upgrade is debatable.


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a fatal misstep by the PLD candidate,a major scandal within President Leo-nel Fernndezs administration, or acrippling economic downturn, noneof which is likely, the positions of thetwo candidates are very likely to bereversed this time around.

Medina has implored PLD support-ers to put aside their disappointmentover the unful lled promises of theincumbent administration, and insteadfocus on what they stand to lose if Meja is returned to the presidentialresidence. That is likely to be a centraltheme of next years election cam-paign, given the Fernndez govern-ments failure to make much headwayin tackling the chronic problems of electricity shortages and corruption,boosting investment in education,or reversing the tide of violent drug-related crime, all of which were as-signed high priority at the start of thecurrent term.

The one undeniable bright spotfor the government has been the ro-bust growth of the economy, whichexpanded at an average rate of 7.1%during 20062010, even posting com-paratively strong growth of 3.9% amida global recession in 2009. But unem-ployment, while falling, has remainedstubbornly high, in ows of FDI have

been trending downward, and boththe scal and current account de citsremain uncomfortably large.

The failure to hit the 2010 scaltarget and delays in achieving struc-tural benchmarks resulted in a delayin completing the fth review underthe governments standby agreementwith the IMF, but the combined fthand sixth reviews were initiated inMay. A positive review by the IMFwill clear the way for the release of a $171 million disbursement that hadbeen expected in March, and will alsobe essential to the success of a $500million bond issue approved by thelegislature in late May. Any furtherdelays could jeopardize the countryscredit rating, which received a boostin January, when Fitch changed thecredit outlook from stable to positive,signaling a possible ratings upgrade inthe coming months.

HONDURASReturn to Normalcy

Although it has taken nearly twoyears, the political tensions generatedby the forced removal of President

Manuel Zelaya in June 2009 have nally begun to dissipate. Key recentdevelopments in that regard includethe countrys restoration to member-ship in the OAS, and the success of a

joint effort by Venezuela and Colombiato broker a political agreement that hascleared the way for Zelayas returnhome. But while these are welcomedevelopments, President PorfirioLobos agreement to pursue constitu-tional reforms demanded by Zelayassupporters creates the potential forrenewed political con ict in the secondhalf of his term.

Economic policy will focus on sat-isfying the terms of an 18-month, $202million standby agreement concludedwith the IMF in October 2010. If fully implemented, the required scaland nancial-sector reforms hold thepotential to bring an added measureof macroeconomic stability whilefreeing up resources to be appliedtoward productive investment. Evenso, security concerns and corruptionwill continue to pose an obstacle toattracting foreign investment. Evenassuming a combination of favorableweather, steady world prices for majorexports, and sustained economic aid,real GDP growth will fall well shortof the level required to reduce theeconomic hardship endured by a sub-stantial proportion of the population.

JAMAICAUnwelcome Distractions

More than a year later, the botchedeffort to apprehend a drug kingpinthat resulted in 73 deaths continuesto cause political problems for Prime

Minister Bruce Golding, whose ef-fective exoneration by a commissioninvestigating wrongdoing on the partof the government may not be enoughto dispel popular suspicions that theentire asco was caused by the govern-ing JLPs attempts to shield a criminalwith ties to the party.

Goldings government now facesthe challenge of repairing its damagedreputation, a task that will be compli-cated by extensive local press coverageof the contents of some of the con den-tial US diplomatic cables made publicby Wikileaks, highlight many of the aws in the countrys political systemthat have long troubled Jamaican vot-ers, including a lack of political cour-age on the part of the countrys leadersand the lack of con dence in eitherthe JLP or the opposition PNP amongkey interest groups, most notably thedomestic business community.

Polls indicate that the PNP is notbene ting from the JLPs troubles,but Goldings diminished credibilityhas contributed to a signi cant drop insupport for the government. If the JLPdoes win another term (the probabilityis no better than even) in 2012, thelikely reason will be the turnaround inthe economy, which is showing signsof life after contracting for 14 consecu-

tive quarters.In mid-March 2011, the PlanningInstitute of Jamaica (PIOJ) unveiled astrategy for inducing growth over themedium term. The plan calls for tax re-form to free up resources for economicdevelopment, steps to lower the cost of energy and capital, enhanced coopera-tion among business sectors, improve-ments to infrastructure, a program of community renewal, and public-sectormodernization. The PIOJ has notedthat implementing such a plan willrequire forceful leadership and a strongpolitical will. It is debatable whethereither Golding or PNP leader PortiaSimpson Miller is capable of meetingthose requirements.


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COUNTRY TRANS- INVEST- REAL GDP CURRENTREGIMES AND PROBABILITIES TURMOIL FER MENT EXPORT GROWTH INFLATION ACCOUNT

Political & Economic Forecast TableNext to each country name is the date of our last economic update, followed by the 18-month (2nd line) and 5-year (3rd line) plikely to hold power and their PROBABILITIES, risk ratings for TURMOIL (low to very high), and risk ratings (A+ the leadirect INVESTMENT, and EXPORT to the country. When a forecast has changed, the previous rating appears in parenthesregime. Our most recent economic data and forecasts include a previous ve-year average, a one-year forecast or estimate, REAL GROWTH of GDP and INFLATION are expressed as percentages, and CURRENT ACCOUNT gures are in billio

Algeria 2/01/11 2006-2010 2.9 4.3 20.08Bouteika 45% Very High B C B- 2011 3.5 4.8 7.30

*Reformist Coalition 45% Moderate B+ B- B 2012-2016 4.1 5.0 8.50Angola 5/01/11 2006-2010 12.1 13.2 4.27MPLA 85% Moderate B- B B- 2011 7.3 14.8 3.10MPLA 85% High B- B- B- 2012-2016 6.9 11.1 1.40

Argentina 4/01/11 2006-2010 6.8 9.0 7.67Divided Government 45% Moderate C+ B- C 2011 6.0 11.2 3.60Divided Government 50% Moderate C B- C+ 2012-2016 4.1 9.5 1.30

Australia 5/01/11 2006-2010 2.8 2.9 -44.37Minority ALP 50% Low A+ A- A 2011 2.4 3.3 -33.90

*ALP 45% Low A- A A- 2012-2016 3.0 2.6 -42.60Austria 5/01/11 2006-2010 1.5 1.9 12.45SP-VP 65% Low A A A 2011 1.7 2.6 5.40SP-VP 50% Low A+ A A 2012-2016 1.8 1.9 8.50

Azerbaijan 3/01/11 2006-2010 16.9 10.6 11.07YAP 60% High B B- B 2011 3.8 6.4 21.70YAP 50% High B B- B 2012-2016 4.6 5.2 17.80Bangladesh 6/01/11 2006-2010 6.2 7.7 1.81AL-led Coalition 75% High C+ C+ B- 2011 5.9 9.7 0.85AL-led Coalition 60% High C+ C C+ 2012-2016 6.0 7.1 -1.30Belgium 3/01/11 2006-2010 1.1 2.0 2.11*Center-Left Coalition 40% Low B+ A- A- 2011 1.4 3.1 4.10*Center-Right Coalition 40% Low A- B+ A- 2012-2016 1.6 2.2 -1.30Bolivia 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.6 6.6 1.33Morales 60% High B B- B- 2011 4.3 9.5 0.76Center-Left Coalition 55% High B- C B- 2012-2016 4.0 7.0 1.35

Botswana 4/01/11 2006-2010 3.1 9.3 0.70BDP 85% Low B+ A A- 2011 5.8 8.2 0.10BDP 65% Low B+ A- B+ 2012-2016 5.0 6.0 0.45

Brazil 3/01/11 2006-2010 4.5 4.7 -16.97Center-Left Coalition 60% Moderate B B+ B 2011 4.2 6.3 -63.10

*Divided Government 40% Moderate B- B B- 2012-2016 3.6 4.8 -78.40Bulgaria 6/01/11 2006-2010 2.8 6.7 -6.80Center-Right Minority 55% Low A- A B+ 2011 2.5 4.5 -1.50

*Center-Right Coalition 55% Low B+ A- B+ 2012-2016 3.6 3.0 -3.10Cameroon 3/01/11 2006-2010 2.8 3.5 -0.41RDPC 85% Moderate B+ B+ B 2011 3.0 3.3 -1.15RDPC 75% High B B- B- 2012-2016 3.8 3.0 -0.65

Canada 4/01/11 2006-2010 1.2 1.7 -9.31Minority CPC 55% Low A+ A A+ 2011 2.2 2.0 -41.70Minority CPC 50% Low A A+ A 2012-2016 2.5 2.1 -34.30

Chile 5/01/11 2006-2010 3.3 3.9 4.02Divided Government 50% Low A- A- A- 2011 5.8 3.9 -0.43

*CPD 45% Low A- A- A- 2012-2016 4.9 3.4 -3.40China 5/01/11 2006-2010 11.3 3.0 332.31Pragmatists 80% High B B B- 2011 8.5 4.5 290.00Pragmatists 75% High B+ B- B- 2012-2016 8.3 4.1 300.00

Colombia 5/01/11 2006-2010 4.3 4.7 -5.97Centrist Coalition 60% High B- B B- 2011 4.5 3.8 -8.20

*Divided Government 55% Moderate B B- B 2012-2016 4.8 4.0 -11.40Congo 6/01/11 2006-2010 5.4 5.4 -0.50PCT-led Coalition 85% Moderate A- B- B+ 2011 8.2 5.7 2.30PCT-led Coalition 80% Moderate B B B 2012-2016 6.0 4.4 0.35


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Congo DR 2/01/11 2006-2010 5.0 23.9 -1.36Kabila Majority 65% High B- C C+ 2011 6.1 15.6 -2.70Kabila Majority 65% High C+ C+ C+ 2012-2016 5.8 13.5 -1.90

Costa Rica 5/01/11 2006-2010 4.5 9.6 -1.45Divided Government 70% Low B A- A- 2011 4.0 5.8 -1.65Divided Government 65% Moderate B B B 2012-2016 4.3 6.3 -2.40

Cte dIvoire 4/01/11 2006-2010 2.3 2.9 0.75

*National Unity Coalition 60% High B- B- C+ 2011 -1.4 6.5 0.12*National Unity Coalition 50% High B- B- B- 2012-2016 3.5 3.0 0.40Cuba 6/01/11 2006-2010 5.4 3.6 -0.33Ral Castro 70% Low D- C D+ 2011 2.2 3.6 0.15Ral Castro 55% Moderate C+ C+ C+ 2012-2016 3.7 3.9 -0.45

Czech Republic 5/01/11 2006-2010 2.7 2.8 -3.98Center-Right Coalition 50% Low B+ A A- 2011 1.6 2.1 -7.20Center-Right Coalition 40% Low A- A B+ 2012-2016 3.1 1.9 -6.40

Denmark 3/01/11 2006-2010 0.4 2.1 9.99*Center-Left Coalition 50% Low A- B A- 2011 1.8 2.4 17.30*Center-Left Coalition 40% Low A+ B+ A- 2012-2016 1.9 2.2 11.70Dominican Republic 6/01/11 2006-2010 7.1 6.4 -2.91PLD 55% Moderate B- B+ B- 2011 4.2 8.3 -5.45PLD 55% Moderate C B- C+ 2012-2016 4.8 5.5 -3.70

Ecuador 5/01/11 2006-2010 3.6 4.5 0.50Correa 50% High C- C C 2011 3.1 3.3 -0.77Correa 45% Moderate C+ C- C+ 2012-2016 3.5 4.0 -0.60

Egypt 6/01/11 2006-2010 6.2 11.7 -0.77*Military-Civilian 45% High B- B B 2011 1.8 13.8 -11.30*Military-Civilian 40% Moderate B- B- B- 2012-2016 5.0 8.9 -4.70El Salvador 6/01/11 2006-2010 1.8 3.5 -0.86Left-Right Coalition 45% Moderate B- B B 2011 1.8 3.3 -0.72

*Divided Government 55% Moderate B- B- B 2012-2016 2.9 3.4 -1.05Finland 6/01/11 2006-2010 1.1 1.9 8.41Broad Coalition 55% Low A+ A- A 2011 3.1 3.2 4.40Broad Coalition 45% Low A A A- 2012-2016 2.2 2.3 4.90

France 5/01/11 2006-2010 0.7 1.5 -39.82*Divided Government 40% Low B A- A- 2011 1.3 2.3 -58.90*Divided Government 45% Low B B+ B 2012-2016 1.4 1.5 -75.10

Gabon 3/01/11 2006-2010 2.7 2.3 1.79Reformist PDG 50% Low B B+ B 2011 5.9 3.9 2.20Reformist PDG 50% Moderate B+ B+ B+ 2012-2016 4.3 3.3 1.40

Germany 6/01/11 2006-2010 1.2 1.6 207.38Center-Right Coalition 55% Low B+ A- A 2011 2.6 2.2 118.00

*Grand Coalition 40% Low A- B+ A- 2012-2016 2.0 1.8 136.00Ghana 6/01/11 2006-2010 6.6 13.6 -2.11NDC 60% Moderate C+ B B- 2011 9.3 12.3 -1.80NDC 50% Moderate B- B B- 2012-2016 7.0 9.2 -1.30

Greece 3/01/11 2006-2010 0.9 3.2 -38.65PASOK 65% Moderate C+ A- B 2011 -3.6 3.1 -17.30PASOK 45% Low B- B B- 2012-2016 1.0 1.1 -5.30

Guatemala 6/01/11 2006-2010 3.6 6.2 -1.22Divided Government 60% High B- B+ B 2011 2.8 6.3 -2.30Divided Government 60% High C+ B- B- 2012-2016 3.0 6.4 -2.75

Guinea 6/01/11 2006-2010 2.2 20.9 -0.40*Broad Coalition 55% High D+ B- C- 2011 3.6 15.9 -0.48*Broad Coalition 45% High C- B- C 2012-2016 4.2 10.4 -0.75Guyana 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.2 6.4 -0.21PPP-C 65% Moderate B- B B- 2011 3.3 5.1 -0.22PPP-C 65% Moderate B B- B- 2012-2016 3.8 6.0 -0.20

Haiti 6/01/11 2006-2010 0.8 8.6 -0.45Divided Government 65% High B- B- C+ 2011 4.3 9.0 -1.50Divided Government 55% High C+ C C+ 2012-2016 2.0 6.8 -0.95

Honduras 6/01/11 2006-2010 3.5 6.8 -0.94PN 55% High B- B B 2011 3.5 7.5 -1.25PN 45% Moderate B- B- B- 2012-2016 3.8 7.1 -1.40


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Hong Kong 3/01/11 2006-2010 3.9 2.3 22.47Limited Autonomy 85% Low A+ A A+ 2011 5.0 4.3 21.70Limited Autonomy 80% Low A+ A A 2012-2016 4.2 2.9 24.30

Hungary 6/01/11 2006-2010 0.0 5.4 -5.47Fidesz-MPS 80% Low B- B+ B+ 2011 2.5 4.2 -0.40Fidesz-MPS 55% Low B- B+ B 2012-2016 3.0 3.0 -3.80

India 6/01/11 2006-2010 8.4 8.7 -29.14

UPA-led Coalition 50% High B- B B 2011 8.3 8.2 -57.00UPA-led Coalition 40% Moderate B B B 2012-2016 8.4 5.9 -52.40

Indonesia 6/01/11 2006-2010 5.7 8.6 7.59Yudhoyono Majority 55% Moderate B- B B 2011 5.9 6.3 10.30*Reformist Coalition 50% Moderate B B+ B+ 2012-2016 6.1 6.5 12.70Iran 3/01/11 2006-2010 4.2 15.6 20.81Conservative 50% High C C C 2011 2.5 18.7 12.70Conservative 45% High C- C- C- 2012-2016 3.0 15.3 6.50

Iraq 2/01/11 2006-2010 4.8 17.4 -1.92National Unity Coalition 65% Very High C+ C C 2011 5.0 4.9 -6.20National Unity Coalition 45% High C+ C C+ 2012-2016 5.5 5.7 7.10

Ireland 3/01/11 2006-2010 -0.1 1.5 -9.91Fine Gael-Labour 80% Low B A- A- 2011 -1.3 -0.4 4.30Fine Gael-Labour 55% Low B B+ B- 2012-2016 1.1 1.0 5.40

Israel 2/01/11 2006-2010 4.0 2.7 5.28Right-Wing Coalition 45% High B+ B+ B+ 2011 3.9 4.3 3.50

*National Unity Coalition 40% High B B B 2012-2016 4.4 2.8 9.10Italy 5/01/11 2006-2010 -0.4 1.9 -63.29Center-Right Coalition 50% Moderate B- A- B 2011 0.6 2.5 -78.00Center-Right Coalition 55% Moderate B- B B- 2012-2016 1.0 1.9 -69.40

Jamaica 6/01/11 2006-2010 -0.2 12.4 JLP 50% High C+ A- B 2011 1.3 8.1 -1.85

JLP 50% Moderate C B C+ 2012-2016 1.6 8.8 -1.30 Japan 6/01/11 2006-2010 0.2 -0.1 1

Divided Government 50% Low A- A- A+ 2011 -1.0 0.5 175.00*DPJ Coalition 40% Low A A- A 2012-2016 1.4 1.0 195.00Kazakhstan 6/01/11 2006-2010 6.2 10.2 -0.79Nazarbayev 70% Low B- B- C+ 2011 5.6 7.2 5.30Nazarbayev 65% Moderate B- (B) B B- (B) 2012-2016 5.8 6.6 8.70

Kenya 3/01/11 2006-2010 4.5 12.8 -1.61*Divided Government 45% High B+ B B 2011 3.9 7.8 -2.95Broad Coalition 40% High B- C C+ 2012-2016 5.0 6.5 -1.65

Kuwait 3/01/11 2006-2010 2.8 5.4 44.18Al-Sabah Family 60% Moderate A B A- 2011 4.0 6.2 60.40Al-Sabah Family 55% Low A B+ A- 2012-2016 4.8 4.6 49.20Libya 3/01/11 2006-2010 4.6 5.0 23.14*Military 50% Very High C D+ D+ 2011 -11.0 7.8 4.80*Military-Civilian 50% High C C- C 2012-2016 3.8 8.4 8.80Malaysia 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.5 2.7 30.81UMNO-led Coalition 75% Low B B+ A- 2011 5.0 3.3 30.30UMNO-led Coalition 65% Low A B+ A- 2012-2016 5.1 3.0 39.70

Mexico 6/01/11 2006-2010 1.9 4.4 -8.43*PRI 70% High B B+ B 2011 4.8 4.2 -20.10*PRI 60% Moderate B- B B 2012-2016 3.6 3.8 -31.30Morocco 4/01/11 2006-2010 4.9 2.2 -2.77Mohamed 75% High C+ B B- 2011 3.9 2.9 -10.40Mohamed 70% Moderate B- B B 2012-2016 4.5 2.8 -4.80

Myanmar 3/01/11 2006-2010 3.6 19.5 0.68Military-Civilian 60% Moderate D+ C+ C- 2011 3.3 17.9 0.68Military-Civilian 45% Very High C D+ C- 2012-2016 3.8 13.4 0.20

Netherlands 3/01/11 2006-2010 1.4 1.5 47.68*Center-Right Minority 50% Low A+ A A 2011 1.5 1.9 45.80*Broad Coalition 45% Low A A B+ 2012-2016 1.7 1.6 35.20New Zealand 4/01/11 2006-2010 1.2 2.8 -7.57National Minority 50% Low A- A- A- 2011 1.5 4.5 0.30National Minority 50% Low B+ A- B+ 2012-2016 3.0 2.9 -8.30


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Nicaragua 3/01/11 2006-2010 2.6 9.8 -1.00Divided Government 45% Moderate B+ B+ B+ 2011 3.8 8.3 -1.00Divided Government 45% Moderate B- B- B- 2012-2016 3.3 7.8 -1.25

Nigeria 5/01/11 2006-2010 6.7 10.1 25.79PDP Majority 55% Very High C+ C+ C 2011 5.8 12.7 34.00PDP Majority 40% Very High C C C 2012-2016 6.4 9.9 22.90

Norway 3/01/11 2006-2010 1.2 2.3 60.03

Center-Left Coalition 65% Low A+ B+ A+ 2011 1.5 2.6 56.20Center-Left Coalition 50% Low A+ A- A+ 2012-2016 2.1 2.4 55.10

Oman 5/01/11 2006-2010 6.2 5.7 3.85Qaboos 75% Low A A- A 2011 4.2 4.6 4.50Qaboos 75% Low A+ A- A 2012-2016 5.2 4.2 3.30

Pakistan 5/01/11 2006-2010 4.4 12.8 -7.35PPP-led Coalition 45% Very High D+ B- C- 2011 2.3 11.1 -4.20PPP-led Coalition 40% High D+ C C- 2012-2016 3.8 7.5 -7.30

Panama 4/01/11 2006-2010 8.4 4.2 -1.51Centrist Coalition 60% Moderate B+ A- B+ 2011 5.8 5.7 -3.30Centrist Coalition 50% Moderate B- B+ B 2012-2016 5.3 4.4 -3.60

Papua New Guinea 4/01/11 2006-2010 5.8 5.4 0.16NAP Coalition 50% Moderate B- B B- 2011 6.7 7.3 0.03

*Unstable Coalitions 60% Moderate B B- B 2012-2016 5.7 5.6 0.10Paraguay 4/01/11 2006-2010 5.7 7.0 -0.10Divided Government 75% Moderate B+ B+ B 2011 5.0 9.5 -0.53Divided Government 55% Moderate B B- B 2012-2016 4.2 6.2 -0.39

Peru 6/01/11 2006-2010 7.3 2.8 -0.51Divided Government 55% Moderate B (B+) B (B+) B- (B) 2011 5.6 3.5 -3.20Divided Government 55% Moderate B B- (B) B- (B) 2012-2016 5.4 2.7 -4.80

Philippines 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.9 5.1 6.67Reformist Coalition 55% Moderate B- B B- 2011 5.2 5.5 7.20Divided Government 60% Moderate B- B- B- 2012-2016 5.3 4.8 9.50

Poland 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.7 2.9 -16.14Center-Right Majority 60% Low B- A A- 2011 4.0 4.3 -19.10Center-Right Majority 60% Low B B+ B 2012-2016 3.7 2.8 -15.90

Portugal 4/01/11 2006-2010 0.6 1.8 -24.69*PSD Coalition 40% Low B A- B+ 2011 -1.6 2.6 -15.30*PSD Coalition 40% Low B B+ B 2012-2016 0.2 1.3 -10.30

Romania 2/01/11 2006-2010 2.5 6.2 -14.65*Left-Right Coalition 50% Moderate B- A- B+ 2011 0.3 5.0 -9.40*Left-Right Coalition 45% Low B- B+ B 2012-2016 4.0 3.7 -14.40Russia 4/01/11 2006-2010 3.5 10.3 79.34United Russia 85% Moderate B C+ B 2011 4.3 9.1 89.70United Russia 75% Moderate B C+ B- 2012-2016 4.4 7.1 51.70

Saudi Arabia 5/01/11 2006-2010 2.8 5.3 83.42Older Al-Saud 60% High A B A- 2011 5.7 8.3 117.90Older Al-Saud 55% Moderate A- B- A- 2012-2016 4.6 4.9 44.80

Singapore 6/01/11 2006-2010 6.4 2.6 40.04Lee Hsien Loong 85% Low A+ A- A+ 2011 4.2 4.5 43.90Lee Hsien Loong 80% Low A+ A A+ 2012-2016 5.2 2.1 46.70

Slovakia 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.9 2.9 -4.01Center-Right Coalition 55% Low A- A A- 2011 3.5 2.6 -3.10Center-Right Coalition 45% Low A- A- (A) B+ 2012-2016 4.0 2.4 -3.40

South Africa 4/01/11 2006-2010 3.2 6.9 -15.14Pragmatic ANC 55% Moderate B B B+ 2011 3.5 5.0 -19.80Pragmatic ANC 45% Moderate B- B- B- 2012-2016 3.8 4.7 -18.30

South Korea 4/01/11 2006-2010 3.8 3.0 15.27GNP 45% Moderate A- B B 2011 4.5 4.3 29.40GNP 45% Moderate B B B 2012-2016 4.0 3.1 23.10

Spain 5/01/11 2006-2010 0.9 2.4 -111.13*PP Minority 45% Moderate B B+ B+ 2011 -0.3 1.4 -51.20*PP Minority 50% Moderate B- B+ B 2012-2016 1.2 1.5 -55.70Sri Lanka 4/01/11 2006-2010 6.4 11.4 -1.96SLFP-led Coalition 85% Moderate C+ B+ B 2011 8.0 8.4 -2.70SLFP-led Coalition 80% Moderate C+ B+ B 2012-2016 7.3 6.2 -3.40


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Additional Data is available online for all countries covered in the Political Risk Letter at www.prsgroup.com.Current and historical nancial, economic, and social data is just a click away.


Sudan 3/01/11 2006-2010 7.5 10.6 -3.72*Unstable Transition 60% High C B- C 2011 3.8 12.0 -5.20*Military-Civilian 60% High C+ C+ C+ 2012-2016 4.6 8.3 -4.40Suriname 6/01/11 2006-2010 4.2 7.8 0.31MC-led Coalition 55% Moderate B B- B+ 2011 5.0 12.3 0.75MC-led Coalition 45% Low B+ B B 2012-2016 2.8 9.0 -0.10

Sweden 6/01/11 2006-2010 1.5 1.6 36.10

Center-Right Minority 55% Low A+ A A 2011 3.8 2.1 30.10*Center-Right Coalition 40% Low A A A 2012-2016 2.4 2.3 27.70Switzerland 5/01/11 2006-2010 2.0 0.9 48.47Centrist Coalition 60% Low A+ A- A 2011 1.6 1.0 62.40Centrist Coalition 60% Low A+ A- A 2012-2016 1.7 1.3 41.20

Syria 4/01/11 2006-2010 4.9 7.4 -0.30Assad 55% High C C+ C 2011 3.4 7.4 -2.30Assad 50% Moderate C+ C+ C+ 2012-2016 4.0 5.7 -0.80Taiwan 3/01/11 2006-2010 4.2 1.2 34.50KMT 60% Low A- A- A- 2011 3.8 2.2 35.40KMT 60% Low A+ A A 2012-2016 4.1 1.7 34.90

Thailand 3/01/11 2006-2010 3.6 3.0 11.11Unstable Coalition 65% Moderate B- B B- 2011 4.2 4.0 10.20Unstable Coalition 50% Moderate B B B 2012-2016 4.5 2.6 12.40

Trinidad & Tobago 3/01/11 2006-2010 3.4 9.2 5.13UNC-led Coalition 70% Moderate A B+ A 2011 1.8 7.3 3.10UNC-led Coalition 55% Moderate A- B A- 2012-2016 3.3 6.0 3.70

Tunisia 5/01/11 2006-2010 4.5 4.1 -1.32*Reformist Coalition 45% Moderate C+ B C+ 2011 1.0 5.1 -3.90*Reformist Coalition 40% Moderate B B+ B 2012-2016 4.0 3.5 -2.40Turkey 5/01/11 2006-2010 3.3 8.9 -35.09AKP 55% Moderate C B+ B- 2011 4.1 7.5 -44.60AKP 55% High C- B- C+ 2012-2016 5.3 5.6 -54.50Ukraine 3/01/11 2006-2010 1.3 14.5 -4.85PR-led Coalition 75% Moderate C B C+ 2011 4.3 11.9 -4.80PR-led Coalition 60% Moderate C B- C 2012-2016 4.1 8.6 -5.70

United Arab Emirates 6/01/11 2006-2010 3.4 7.0 19.41Union 85% Low A- (A) A- A (A+) 2011 3.5 2.6 26.00Union 85% Low A (A+) A- A- (A) 2012-2016 5.4 2.9 19.20

United Kingdom 3/01/11 2006-2010 0.4 3.1 -56.80Conservative Coalition 55% Low B+ A A 2011 1.2 3.9 -52.40*Conservatives 40% Low B+ B+ B 2012-2016 1.5 3.2 -41.40United States 5/01/11 2006-2010 0.9 2.2 -607.65Divided Government 80% Low B A- A- 2011 2.4 1.3 -630.00Divided Government 45% Low B- B+ B 2012-2016 2.2 2.3 -610.00

Uruguay 5/01/11 2006-2010 6.5 7.2 -0.41FA 65% Low B+ A A- 2011 5.5 7.9 -0.70FA 50% Low B+ A- B+ 2012-2016 4.7 6.5 -1.20

Venezuela 4/01/11 2006-2010 3.7 24.3 20.97Chvez 65% High C- C- C- 2011 0.9 29.4 18.40Chvez 55% High C- D+ C- 2012-2016 2.8 27.6 15.20

Vietnam 6/01/11 2006-2010 7.0 11.0 -5.56CPV Mainstream 55% Low C+ B- B 2011 6.2 15.2 -4.20CPV Mainstream 55% Low B- B B- 2012-2016 7.0 9.3 -7.20

Zambia 5/01/11 2006-2010 6.4 10.7 -0.55MMD 50% Moderate B+ B+ B+ 2011 6.5 7.3 -0.32MMD 40% Moderate B- B B- 2012-2016 5.7 6.7 -0.85

Zimbabwe 6/01/11 2006-2010 -2.9 1005333371.1 -0.86National Unity Coalition 45% High D- C- D+ 2011 3.0 5.2 -0.38National Unity Coalition 40% High D C- C- 2012-2016 2.2 17.0 -0.50

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