British Parana 1845

7/30/2019 British Parana 1845

1/21

Trade, Politics and the Navy in LatinAmerica: The British in the Parana,184546

David McLean

When military conflict and economic disruption in the river Plate region led to a British

naval occupation of the river Parana in 1845 46, traders from many nations followed the

warships upstream hoping to conduct business in the Argentine interior and with Para-

guay. Since the 1920s historians have uniformly disparaged this Parana expedition as a

commercial failure, insisting that the foreign intruders found neither trade nor

welcome among the local populations. In Argentine historiography, the episode is consist-

ently presented as a successful assertion of national identity in the face of European imper-

ial assault. Research here, however, demonstrates not only the expeditions economic

success but, again contrary to established opinion, its military and strategic achievements,before the British government abandoned its policy of armed intervention. The Parana

was eventually opened to foreign navigation by international treaties in 1853.

Fashionable or not, historical detail usually reasserts itself as a challenge to generalis-

ations about the past and in few areas do scholars try harder to reconcile such tensions

than when debating the relationship between economic benefit and political policy in

nineteenth-century European expansion. Imperialism of free trade entered the

lexicon of British historiography more than half a century ago; in that time a

copious literature has provided both theoretical analyses and specific studies of econ-omic and political interaction.1 For the first half of the nineteenth century Britains

expansion in the world has been linked to opportunities for trade: the need either

for materials to feed the growth of industry or, more frequently, for markets for its

manufacturers upon whose profits the prosperity of the nation increasingly depended.

Thus when recession loomed or when conditions for international trade deteriorated,

governments responded to effective lobbies or to the need to alleviate social distress

and avoid unrest by taking a more active role in breaking down such barriers to unim-

peded enterprise abroad as state monopolies or protective tariffs and in guarding

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 351370

Correspondence to: Professor David McLean, Department of History, Kings College London, Strand, London,

WC2R 2LS, UK. Email: [email protected]


2/21

commercial freedoms already established. In the 1830s and 1840s in particular,

whether by treaty, diplomatic persuasion or by force, the merchants interest was

secured in regions as diverse as Turkey, China, West Africa, Texas, Egypt and Latin

America.

With respect to Latin America, British naval exploits, with the French, in the riverPlate in the mid-1840s have often been cited as the most blatant assertion of such

interests. Platt in 1968 suggested that this was the only case of active intervention

which fits the imperialism of free trade model.2 It came about, Rock in 1986 and

Cain and Hopkins in 1993 maintained, because Britain and France, in the throes of

severe economic depression, were conducting an aggressive drive for new foreign

markets.3 The Plate estuary was certainly perceived as a region of considerable poten-

tial. Through this great waterway the rivers Parana and Uruguay disgorged into the

Atlantic; being navigable for hundreds of miles, these river systems gave access to

vast tracts of the south American interior, rich in hides with which to pay for theinflow of European manufactures. The commerce of the Plate was conducted

largely through the competing entrepots of Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The

former served its Uruguayan hinterland, while the latter, by the 1840s, enforced its

authority over the fourteen states which comprised the Argentine Confederation by

requiring clearance for all shipping at the port of Buenos Aires. Admittedly, trade

with the Plate, as with the whole of Latin America, was but a small part of Britains

international commerce in the mid-nineteenth century. About a hundred British

trading houses operated at Buenos Aires and Montevideo by the 1840s, with

exports to the former amounting to roughly 700,000 annually between the 1820s

and 1850s, while to the latter they were worth about 250,000 a year. Britainsglobal export trade totalled 150 million in 1845. About 10 per cent went to Latin

America, of which at most one fifth found its way to the river Plate.4

Modest, in this context, as the value of British trade with the region was, James

Murrays Foreign Office memorandum in 1841 has often been cited as evidence of a

greater will to intervene in Latin American affairs.5 Murray urged a reappraisal of

policy towards the warring regimes which had emerged there since independence

and proposed a more interventionist role for diplomacy to safeguard British trade.

Furthermore, as the Spanish empire dissolved in the early nineteenth century, the

Royal Navy increasingly assumed the mantle of protecting Pacific and Atlantic sealanes and, after 1821, of transporting much of the bullion accrued by merchants,

legally and by contraband, away from western Mexico and Peru to Europe.6 Beyond

that, the usually prompt and occasionally energetic protection given to British mer-

chants who suffered loss or maltreatment at the hands of indigenous authorities

understandably gave rise to uncertainty about where, in the minds of British govern-

ments and their representatives, support for aggrieved individuals ended and that for

wider trading advantages began. The fact that naval vessels were rarely used in defence

of British interests did not mean that the threat was not perceived. When British dip-

lomats and consuls spoke of commercial rights and treaty obligations there could be

no surety in Latin America that they neither held, nor could readily acquire, instruc-tions to call upon a man-of-war to emphasise their arguments.

352 D. McLean


3/21

Generally, however, the official mind in London did not seem to worry much

about Latin America beyond the need to keep its markets open and its politics inde-

pendent of undue influence from either France or the United States.7 Off the eastern

seaboard, the British did aspire to stop the Brazilian slave trade but otherwise wanted

little beyond a strategic maritime base in the south Atlantic, the latter achieved in 1833with the re-occupation of the Falkland Islands.8 Murrays wider vision of alliances with

Britain to help bring stability to the continent, though welcomed by some officials on

the spot, usually had little appeal to foreign secretaries preoccupied with European

affairs and wary of being drawn into the complexities of either national or inter-

national politics in the New World. Lord Palmerston, when foreign secretary,

claimed that Latin American politics changed both so rapidly and so frequently that

it was futile to try to regulate events and that any benefit from so doing would be

minimal in relation to the effort expended.9 Only when justice for its nationals was

denied did the British government appear willing to use the power at its disposal.In 1840 Palmerston reproached the charge daffaires in Peru for preventing the navy

from harassing Chilean shipping when a claim on behalf of a British subject

wounded by Chilean soldiers remained outstanding. In the same year he asked the

Admiralty to detain Peruvian vessels until another case for injury was settled.10 But

even here the record was patchy. Frederick Chatfield, vice-consul in central

America, complained in 1844 that the navy totally neglected British interests: only

fourteen warships had visited the coasts of central America in the last ten years.11 Con-

sidering the extent of Britains economic and military power, it may not be unreason-

able to conclude that governments in London in the nineteenth century exercised

considerable restraint in their dealings with Latin America.12

When the British had been more forceful prior to the 1840s the actions taken had

usually resulted from unauthorised initiatives on the part of local officials or naval offi-

cers rather than directions sent from London. The military occupations of Buenos

Aires in 1806 and Montevideo in 1807 were cases in point. Both were disowned. So

too was the seizure of Peruvian bullion by British warships off Callao in 1830:

despite claims outstanding against the Peruvian government, Palmerston reproached

the naval commander and recalled the two vice-consuls responsible for such high-

handed behaviour.13 There were, however, some precedents for official intervention

in Latin American politics. British diplomacy had brokered the peace betweenBrazil and the Argentine Confederation in 1828 which created an independent

Uruguay. In 1837 Britains consul-general in Peru, Belford Wilson, succeeded in

halting a Chilean invasion: three men-of-war with 500 crew lay offshore in case

anyone should think the British governments attempt to mediate, and thereby to

protect British property, insincere. Two years later, after the Peru-Bolivian Confedera-

tion was again invaded, Palmerston eventually overcame his reluctance to take a stand

and, albeit too late, sent a warning to the Chilean government that Britains effort to

promote peace might transcend diplomacy if troops were not withdrawn.14 With a war

between Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation also beginning in 1839, the

Foreign Office once more faced the dilemma of how best to secure British interestsamid international hostilities.

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 353


4/21

The war which developed in the river Plate from 1839 was, at times, hard to

distinguish from the civil conflict also raging within the Argentine Confederation,

in consequence of which the dictator general Juan Manuel de Rosas came to assert

his control of the territory from his capital at Buenos Aires. With death squads on

the streets, his enemies defeated, and his hold over the inland states tightened byclosing the river Parana to trade in 1841, Rosas turned his attention to Uruguay

where his surviving opponents had fled and where he hoped to avenge a military

defeat suffered in 1839. For this purpose, and to cripple its capital as a rival trading

emporium, he supported the claims of the exiled Uruguayan general Manuel Oribe

to the countrys presidency by blockading the port at Montevideo, invading with

8,000 of his best troops, destroying a Uruguayan government army in December

1842 and laying siege to Montevideo by land after February 1843. Widely regarded

as an illiberal danger to all foreign commerce, Rosas now threatened not only to dom-

inate the Argentine states but, if Montevideo fell to Oribe, to control both sides of theriver Plate by virtue of the puppet regime he would install in Uruguay. As the siege of

Montevideo dragged on throughout 1843 and 1844 there was a growing clamour from

British commercial houses doing business in the region, and in the London press, to

stop him.

By the end of 1841 the British legation at Buenos Aires had twice offered its govern-

ments good offices to Rosas to help resolve the dispute with Uruguay. Neither offer

had been accepted. With trade now disrupted in the river Plate, the British and

French governments co-ordinated their diplomacy and proposed a joint mediation

in August 1842. Rosas, however, refused to withdraw his soldiers from outside

Montevideo; his Argentine naval squadron was effectively strangling Montevideoscommerce and his army was on the point of overrunning the citys dwindling defences.

Convinced, nevertheless, that they could restore peace to the region, by force if necess-

ary, an Anglo-French fleet was sent to the south Atlantic in 1845 in support of a fresh

political initiative. The diplomats chosen for this mission, whereby Argentine

regiments were to be required to leave Uruguay as a precondition for peace nego-

tiations, were William Gore Ouseley and Baron Anton Deffaudis. Before they could

reach Buenos Aires, though, Rosas delivered what appeared to be the final blow by

routing the last Uruguayan army in the field. With Montevideo apparently at his

mercy, and believing that Britain and France would soon fall out over what to donext, Rosas was less inclined than ever to compromise.15

Ouseleys instructions, in the event of a diplomatic rebuff, were not specific; his pri-

orities, however, were to maintain the independence of Uruguay and to work closely

with his French colleague.16 Naval measures had been considered in London; these

Ouseley and Deffaudis initiated once it became obvious that their negotiations with

Rosas had failed. In August 1845 their combined fleet closed Oribes supply ports,

took possession of the island of Martn Garca at the confluence of the rivers

Parana and Uruguay, impounded the Argentine navy and assisted Uruguayan forces

to recapture the town of Colonia. In September an Anglo-French blockade was

thrown onto the port and coastline of Buenos Aires and in October more than 600British soldiers were deployed to help the 250 British and French marines already

354 D. McLean


5/21

on the defensive lines in Montevideo. With the Uruguayan capital thereby secured,

Ouseley could claim, with some justification, that he was doing no more than his

instructions required. But forcing the Argentine army out of Uruguay, which he

insisted was essential for protecting the latters sovereignty, required something

more. Ouseley and Deffaudis therefore devised a grand strategy for carrying the warto Rosas by sending the Royal Navy to destroy Argentine fortifications in the

Parana and to open the river.

The Parana flowed up between the Argentine states of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre

Rios and Corrientes, and then on to the land-locked territory of Paraguay: to force the

river by a display of naval power, followed by the continued cruising there of British

and French warships, would not only foster an economic revival at Montevideo and

permit merchant craft of all nations to reach markets in the Argentine interior, but,

most importantly from a military and political perspective, would cut off Rosass

army in Uruguay and allow contact with regimes in the states up river which wereunhappy with the isolation imposed upon them from Buenos Aires. It was an auda-

cious plan whereby not only did Ouseley interpret his instructions, drawn up nine

months earlier, in the widest sense, but which, at every turn, risked embarrassing

reversals. If all went well an expedition into the Parana could be commercially profit-

able and might decide the war and quickly restore peace. Given that the objectives were

clear enough, gauging success or failure for the naval squadron and the flotilla of

trading vessels which accompanied it into the Parana might seem straightforward.

Unfortunately, however, the judgements of both contemporaries and historians have

long indicated otherwise. The problem is rooted in the politics and historiography

which surround events in the river between October 1845 and July 1846.

I

Misunderstanding is inevitably compounded when errors are passed from one scholar

to the next and earlier verdicts conveniently accepted. What is incontrovertible is that

Captain Charles Hotham, commanding the Anglo-French squadron, destroyed Argen-

tine batteries at Vuelta del Obligado in the Parana on 20 November 1845 thereby ush-

ering merchant vessels up river. It is also unquestioned that, when British warships left

the Parana, engaging newly constructed Argentine batteries at San Lorenzo on 4 June1846, 110 merchantmen were conveyed down the river, into the Plate and towards

Montevideo. With regard to the fortunes of those traders, every history of the

expedition considers it to have been an economic failure. Kirkpatrick in 1931

judged it disappointing as to commercial results and Pivel-Devoto said the same

in 1945.17 In 1960 Ferns wrote that commercially the venture was a fiasco. Sales

were poor, he continued, an appraisal echoed by Morgan in 1975.18 In 1981 Lynch

stated that the expedition found no promising inland markets in Entre Rios and Cor-

rientes: as for the sales drive, the market was poor and many merchants returned with

their cargoes unsold. Lynch conceded that some trade may have occurred, though in

1985 he reiterated his view that sales had been sluggish and that this attempt to inau-gurate direct trade with the Argentine interior had not been well received.19 Weighty



6/21

authorities on Latin American history have thereby all painted a remarkably consistent

picture. References lead back, one to another, but ultimately are traceable to research

by Cady in 1929 who first designated the expedition a dismal failure from a commer-

cial standpoint and decided that many of the merchant vessels returned from the

Parana with their entire cargoes untouched.20

It was pioneering work, but did Cadychoose his sources wisely?

Cady was influenced by Argentine historiography and a selective use of north Amer-

ican material, attached to both of which were political agendas. Argentine scholarship

traditionally permits criticism of Rosas as an oppressor of his people yet adheres to a

nationalist ideal whereby he inspired the normally quarrelsome states of the Confed-

eration to resist an imperialist onslaught. It is likewise axiomatic that, faced with exter-

nal challenge, the inland population resented the invader, fought valiantly wherever

possible to defend their freedom and spurned any economic advantage to be gained

by trading with an enemy. Saldas in 1911 and Caillet-Bois in 1944 saw such resistanceas instrumental in bringing home to Britain and France that they could never force

open internal Argentine waterways for the benefit of their traders, and Irazusta

took the same line in 1961.21 Levene insisted that the foreigners found no business

among a loyal population up river and even Pivel-Devoto, writing from Montevideo,

conceded that, while a rebellious regime in Corrientes, serving at best the interests of a

collaborating elite, may have been sympathetic to aggressors in conflict with Rosass

government at Buenos Aires, nonetheless the people were hostile to them.22

Popular antipathy to the intruder demonstrated a bed-rock for Argentine national

identity. To suggest otherwise called into question the instinctive patriotism of a

proud people and reopened old divisions about federal authority versus provincialautonomy over which so much blood had been shed since independence from Spain.

Although Cady both drew from and subsequently contributed to this historiogra-

phical strand, the sources on which he principally relied were not Argentine but

north American. First, Cady placed reliance on reports from the river Plate appearing

in the National Intelligencer in Washington. These were of questionable accuracy

because the informants themselves were either merely guessing or else derived their

data from notoriously pro-Rosas English-language publications in Buenos Aires. On

23 June 1846 the National Intelligencer indeed declared that the traders in the

Parana

had found no profits, but it asserted this amid fallacious accounts of howthe whole expedition was breaking up since the warships had sustained heavy casual-

ties and were set to abandon the river.23 Cadys other source were despatches from the

United States charge daffaires at Buenos Aires, William Brent, again used selectively

and with little regard for Brents credibility.

Brent was an obsessive Anglophobe who saw the whole intervention as but a cover

for expanding British control in south America. Without the authority of his govern-

ment he had offered Rosas United States mediation in the latters dispute with the

European powers and had so undermined diplomatic efforts to induce Rosas to with-

draw his troops from Uruguay that the British government made an official protest in

Washington. But it was not only in London that Brents behaviour was questioned.Edward Hopkins, American special envoy to Paraguay in 1845, was totally

356 D. McLean


7/21

disillusioned with his colleague. Brent was constantly being humiliated by Rosas.

Certain it is that Mr. Brent is a mere child in his hands, Hopkins reported, and

that with him he is utterly unfitted to assert or support the dignity of his position

or his country.24 American citizens in Buenos Aires were demeaned by Brents

fawning to the Argentine dictator. Under pressure from London and so advised byits own agent, the United States government finally faced up to Brents partisan inept-

ness and recalled him in June 1846.

Partiality alone might have discredited Brents accounts of the Parana expedition.

More damaging still to his credibility was the fact that, while the British and French

diplomats and naval commanders were in Montevideo and all the shipping was orche-

strated there, Brent himself was in Buenos Aires with no access to uncensored infor-

mation. As late as April 1846 he confided that he still had no real knowledge as to the

effectiveness of the Anglo-French blockade of the port and coast of Buenos Aires.25

Similarly, days after the warships actually entered the Parana

in November 1845Brent had still been speculating on their number and how many merchantmen had

assembled at the rendezvous.26 It was only on 16 January 1846 that he felt able to

report that the batteries at Obligado had been engaged even though the outcome

was known in Montevideo in mid December 1845.27 Details of the expeditions pro-

gress thereafter became more sketchy still and at the end of January 1846 the steamer

HMS Alecto was sent up river because nothing had been heard of the convoy, even in

Montevideo, since it left Obligado to move on to Corrientes six weeks earlier. Isolated

more than ever in Buenos Aires, therefore, Brent was certainly in no position to

announce in mid-January that as far as the mercantile speculations have been con-

cerned, there has been a total failure. Upon going up to Corrientes they found no-one to purchase.28 Given his ignorance of events and that the convoy remained

trading in the Parana for at least a further four months, Brents assessment was

wishful thinking and, as an historical record, worthless.

Even worse, Brents despatches to Washington had to disguise a further embarrass-

ment; he was at loggerheads with many of his compatriots and with the American

consul at Montevideo, Robert Hamilton. While Brent, Hopkins and Henry Wise,

United States minister to Brazil, all tried to present their nation as supporting a

sister republic in the New World against bullying European imperialists and took

stands broadly consistent with the Monroe doctrine, Hamilton and other Americancitizens in the region were more than happy to throw in their lot with Ouseley and

Deffaudis and to make money both out of the blockade at Buenos Aires and of

opening the Parana. This should have come as no surprise to Brent. North American

shippers had been involved in smuggling in the river Plate since the 1780s and had

expanded their activities spectacularly in the early nineteenth century. The American

merchant community in Buenos Aires had supported the British occupation in 1806,

seeing it as an opportunity to increase business, and in 1843 one prominent American

merchant, Silas Burrows, had profited, under his neutral flag, by allegedly ferrying

Uruguayan soldiers and certainly smuggling fresh meat and contraband goods into

Montevideo in defiance of the Argentine blockade. Indeed, Brent had argued withAmerican naval captains about the protection which, in practice, they afforded for



8/21

such illicit trade.29 Hamilton, his consular duties aside, was a partner in the Montevideo

trading house, Southgate & Co., and willingly authorised merchant craft to join the

Parana expedition. Much to the chagrin of all three American diplomats, six such

vessels, three named as Creole, Hannah and Cumberland, went up river with

Hotham. The English know that we are from nature and principle hostile to her inter-vention in American affairs, Hopkins complained to Washington, but they see with

joy that there is a want of unanimity amongst our officials.30 Hamilton should have

followed the example of his Brazilian counterpart who refused to allow any Brazilian

vessels to leave Montevideo for the Parana. Instead, Hamilton had sent his son,

Thomas, into the river as a passenger aboard one of the British warships.

Hamilton, however, did not stop there. He arranged the chartering of American

merchant vessels to the British, flag and all, Hopkins discovered, whereby the

owners received the value of the vessel in return for a term of four or five years oper-

ating in the Parana

or elsewhere as Ouseley required. He worked with an accomplice,his compatriot consul Pendrick in the Brazilian port of Rio Grande, who used his own

and other ships to conduct a cattle-smuggling business supplying the beleaguered city

of Montevideo where Hamilton was his consignee. Pendricks captains were known as

violent men who abused their crews, but they enjoyed the implicit protection of

American consular staff. His whole conduct whilst filling the office of consul of the

U.S. was a gross outrage upon the rights of American citizens, Hopkins wrote of

Pendrick. I have been told by many Americans and others, the State Department

learned, that the most outrageous system of running blockades and prostituting the

American flag has been carried on.31 On 29 October 1845 Rosas protested to Brent

about vessels flying the stars and stripes assembling with the convoy at Mart n Garcaand informed him that such participation would be interpreted as unfriendly. Brent

could only reply meekly that American craft joined Hotham at their peril and that

his government would make no claims for any loss or damage incurred.32

II

Accounts of the number of merchant vessels which joined the warships in the Parana

vary, most likely because they did not all enter the river at the same time and because

some traders were already trapped there from when Rosas had last allowed navigationbetween August 1844 and the early months of 1845. Saldas and Caillet-Bois mention

fifty merchantmen passing Obligado after the fortifications were dismantled whereas

another Argentine historian, Pomer, refers to ninety.33 Ouseley was quick to confirm

the cosmopolitan nature of the convoy as soon as it had assembled; it was, he mused, a

host of merchant vessels of all nations, and flying as wide a variety of national flags as

he could muster.34 Against the strong current in the Parana, however, progress for

sailing ships was slow. Aside from difficulties manoeuvring, by February 1846 some

of the convoy crews were also starving; indeed, so helpless had the craft become

that Alecto took a number of their boats in tow towards the town of Goya in Corrientes

where fresh beef and vegetables might be readily obtained. But there was no need totake the boats as far as Goya. On 17 February Alecto anchored still off the littoral of

358 D. McLean


9/21

Entre Rios where a well-stocked estancia had been spotted. We were immediately

assured of its being a friendly place by boats coming off to us, Lieutenant Lauchlan

Mackinnon observed, and not only telling us all the latest news from the armies

but likewise bringing huge and fat quarters of beef. All the boats we had towed up

with us returned to their proper vessels loaded to the gunnel, he recorded.35

Thiswas not the hostile reception of the invader subsequently enshrined in Argentine

history.

Mackinnon was in the Parana almost continuously from February until Alecto

returned to Montevideo in June 1846 and his account has been used by several scho-

lars. But reference to his chronicle has not always done Mackinnon justice. Irazusta

cites Mackinnon as evidence that the populations of Entre Rios and Corrientes were

suspicious of foreigners but in doing so misquotes him. Mackinnon certainly expected

an unfriendly reception but, when put ashore, was pleasantly surprised. This revelation

ill-suited Cadys history; the latter, however, solved that problem by simply deemingMackinnon to be untrustworthy.36 In fact, there is much to suggest that Mackinnon

was a highly credible source: he was a discerning observer who appreciated the embar-

rassing position into which the Royal Navy had been thrust by Ouseleys policy. In per-

petrating the war in the river Plate Mackinnon acknowledged that Britain and France

were possibly acting contrary to the law of nations and were certainly sustaining a

regime in Uruguay which, backed financially by unscrupulous foreign speculators,

had little to commend it. Mackinnon also noted that the coastal blockade was of

limited effectiveness, with many commodities, even luxury goods, remaining

cheaper at Buenos Aires than they were in Montevideo so much so, he recalled,

that in procuring its stores in Montevideo the navy was paying through the nose.37

Unconvinced by what was being done in the name of his country, unenthusiastic

about the Parana expedition and grateful only when Alecto left the river, Mackinnon

had no inclination to exaggerate its success.

If the inland states of the Argentine Confederation were unwelcoming places that

was not necessarily because the people spontaneously identified a foreign enemy.

Hopkins, travelling overland in November 1845 in order to take Americas message

of friendship to Paraguay, confessed that it would have been insane for him to have

attempted the journey alone. For ten years past the whole area had witnessed war

and outrages of every description; even with a trusty companion he slept in hissaddle, so great was the need for vigilance.38 Mackinnon was suddenly confronted

with the same prospect three months later when Alecto ran aground and he was

ordered to ride over eighty miles with urgent despatches to Hothams headquarters

in the town of Corrientes. Terrified and alone, he was soon confronted by a bunch

of gauchos escorting the commandant of a nearby village. They were extremely

civil and obliging, Mackinnon recorded with relief: not only did the village provide

horses for Mackinnons journey but the commandants son and a burly friend

accompanied the young lieutenant to his destination. As for Alecto, still struggling

to get off a sandbank, the commandant asked to be allowed a courtesy visit and

offered to supply its crew with as much beef as they wished, refusing any payment.As they approached Corrientes, where news had clearly spread fast, the local soldiery



10/21

and townsfolk turned out and mobbed us, Mackinnon noted with astonishment.39

Having delivered his despatches and met the governor, he then explored the back-

streets and market of the town in complete safety before returning downriver to

Alecto in one of Hothams boats.

Mackinnon was understandably anxious, but even a week before his sojourn overlandthere had been signs that British naval vessels in the Parana evoked no sense of hostility. On

12 February 1846, forced into a deep-water channel close to the Entre Rios shoreline,

Alecto encountered a party of armed horsemen all of whom had very clear shots and

the potential to do the ship some damage while it was so hopelessly exposed. Yet, as the

ships officers soon realised, they were not at all unfriendly. By 25 February Alecto had

made it up to Corrientes where the whole population turned out to cheer the novelty

of a modern steamer. Crowds lined the banks and in the town every rooftop and

window was crammed with spectators. As soon as the heat of the day had passed, the

people began to swarm on board and speedily the whole vessel was thronged, Mackinnonrejoiced; the gun room was opened to visitors and cherry brandy was served to all. Ashore

in the town again, he was frequently invited into houses and regaled with mate and cigars.

On 27 FebruaryAlecto held another open day, attended first by the governor, dignitaries

and their families, but then, as before, by hoards of local people. The vessel was literally

crammed; engine room, cabins, paddle-boxes, and in fact every place capable of holding a

human being, Mackinnon wrote. But such times could not last: Alecto was soon ordered

back down to Goya and beyond. Goya, he knew, was the last place where we could expect

to land with safety. Fifty miles below lay the territories of Santa Fe and Buenos Aires boast-

ing newly fortified positions. Well stocked with food and supplies, on 6 March the little

warship was on its way again leaving the friendly country behind us.40

Favourable receptions among the populations of the interior were not restricted to

the warships. The expedition also brought much welcomed opportunities to trade and

the merchantmen, having struggled so far up the Parana, in the end were not to be

disappointed. The reason for that was not hard to find even in the sources and his-

tories which have sought to disparage the expeditions commercial results. Hopkinss

assessment of Paraguay in November 1845 applied equally to the states of Corrientes

and Entre Rios: the energy of the country is festering to death and her productions

rotting in the warehouses.41 In return for American and European manufactures,

the upper reaches of the Parana

could supply the world with precious metals,leather, horn, tallow, tobacco, rice, sugar, molasses, cocoa, India rubber, wax, dye-

stuffs as well as medicinal ingredients such as Peruvian bark, sarsaparilla and a

range of herbs. There were 700,000 hides awaiting shipment in Corrientes alone,

one correspondent of the Morning Herald wrote from Buenos Aires in April 1846.

Caillet-Bois confirmed that large stocks of hides had accumulated in Corrientes

since Rosas closed the Parana.42 Hamilton eagerly anticipated any opportunity to

trade there as early as August 1845: if the British forced the river, he advised Wise,

then Entre Rios and Corrientes will be enabled to find a market for their produce

at Montevideo.43 By the spring of 1846 trade was easy for American merchants, as

for others who had followed Hotham the more so after the capture of the armedArgentine whaleboats which Rosas had licensed as privateers to harass unprotected

360 D. McLean


11/21

merchant craft. Seeing a chance to swell its coffers, the government of Corrientes

quickly doubled its import tariff and raised the duty imposed on exported hides.

This was unfair, the supercargoes complained. Hotham was petitioned to make it

plain to the Corrientes authorities that if the duties were not returned to their original

levels then the convoy would pass on to Paraguay and do business there.44

Hundreds of miles inland, communication with Montevideo was sporadic and the

exploits of the expedition thereby remained largely a matter of rumour. As late as

April 1846 there was no certainty of any commercial success and even at the beginning

of June the correspondent of a Philadelphia newspaper wrote from Montevideo that the

convoy have made a losing concern of it.45 Up river, however, another naval drama was

slowly unfolding. A motley collection of merchantmen wishing to leave the Parana was

given a place for rendezvous in May four miles north of Argentine batteries command-

ing the river at San Lorenzo. They were of all nations and all sizes, Hotham observed;

more to the point, they were lumbered with enormous deck-cargoes.

46

Trade,indeed, had been brisk in the Parana in the early months of 1846. Some of it arose

from distress sales as British and American ranchers liquidated their stock and saw

the convoy with its armed escort as a last chance to get out what they could. But in

Goya again at the end of April, Mackinnon also noted how, as elsewhere in Corrientes,

merchants were frantically exchanging the European and American goods brought up

river for local produce and were loading their vessels. On 6 May he watched anxiously

as several of the tail of the convoy were left at Goya, some of them on shore, which ren-

dered it doubtful whether they would all make their appearance at the appointed ren-

dezvous.47 On 4 June the 110 merchantmen present were finally marshalled into line

as the men-of-war began bombarding the Argentine guns. Distracted by this and byrockets shot from an island mid-stream, the Argentine fire became scattered and in

the melee and without casualties Hotham whisked the convoy past on a rushing

current. Strange to say, it was at this moment of greatest danger that the commercial

outcome of the expedition became apparent.

So heavily laden were the trading craft that their crews often could not control them.

A French vessel, hopelessly entwined in a mat of weed and debris, was salvaged only

when sailors from two British steamers ejected its piles of hides, thereby lightening

the vessel sufficiently to tow it clear. When the barque Caledonia, out of Hull, ran

aground with one Paraguayan and two Uruguayan schooners on sandbanks underArgentine fire desperate efforts to offload their heavy hides, mate, wool, amber, yerba

and tobacco failed and the vessels were eventually burnt. A further Paraguayan ship

was disabled and drifted until Alecto boarded her and forced a panic-stricken crew to

drop anchor, thereby saving both the vessel and its valuable hides. So many bales of Para-

guayan tea were dumped in the river to reduce ships weight that the officers of Alecto

helped themselves as they floated past and Argentine gunners on the cliffs above mistook

them for the bodies of sailors killed and reported the supposed accuracy of their fire

accordingly. Hoping to remain as inconspicuous as possible, most craft hoisted their

flags only after they were out of range but not so the Americans, one merchant

boasted.48

That almost proved a disaster. When Creole limped into Philadelphia inAugust 1846 she carried a 13-pound cannon ball cushioned in a stack of hides.



12/21

Creole was indicative not only of the convoys luck but also of its commercial for-

tunes and, when enthusiastically describing its cargo of hides, yerba and tobacco,

the Philadelphia press reproduced a letter from a correspondent in Montevideo

who had watched some of the vessels enter port prior to 14 June 1846. There is

not such a large quantity of hides come down as was expected, he reflected, butthere is a large quantity of yerba, tobacco, and wool. Salt hides none. Small quantity

of tallow, packed beef, one cargo horse hair, a great deal of timber and etc.49 Hamilton

was also waiting in Montevideo for Creole and the other vessels to return. Creole, he

wrote to Wise, brought down from Corrientes 17,000 hides costing only six and a

half cents per pound which ought to leave a profit in the U.S. of at least $20,000;

the cargo she carried up netted out cost and charges.50 But this was only half the

story. Only the larger vessels from the convoy had returned to Montevideo by 14

June; the rest had to shelter from bad weather at Martn Garca and, as the bulk of

the convoy came in, trade began to revive spectacularly in Montevideo. Theimmense arrival of produce from Corrientes and elsewhere was just beginning to

produce most beneficial results in business generally, The Times reported by way of

correspondence leaving the port in mid-July.51 For the time being, Montevideo no

longer had the air of a city under siege.

Although he had never doubted it, Hamilton wrote elatedly that the Parana

expedition has, contrary to expectation, turned out a lucrative business.52 Deffaudis

reported to Paris in similar vein. He had estimated that 350,000 hides might be

traded for in the Parana; in fact, by mid-July 1846 the total was nearer 450,000 and

his assumptions regarding other commodities required adjustment in proportion.

So worthwhile had the Parana venture proved to be that a group of traders was con-sidering another expedition, at their own risk and without escort, relying for security

only on the fact that British and French warships would still be cruising in the river.

The jump in the customs receipts at Montevideo from a monthly average of about

10,000 Spanish dollars before June 1846 to about 115,000 afterwards was astonishing;

almost all of this, Ouseley insisted, was due to the great importation from the Parana

and Entre Rios. More than 500,000 worth of produce had been shipped out of the

Parana and many commercial men believed that there were still considerable quan-

tities detained in Paraguay, Corrientes and Entre Rios.53 When Hotham later recalled

his feat of bringing so many merchantmen safely out of the river in 1846 he confirmedthat his squadron left behind sufficient cargo for a second convoy.54

III

In a sense it was ironic that Ouseley and Deffaudis should have occasion to applaud the

commercial achievements of the expedition for, in planning it, the trade of the Parana

had never been their primary concern. For them, extending opportunities for com-

merce to all nations was a respectable cover for what they hoped would prove a deci-

sive military strategy. Having their warships in the Parana not only threatened the

supply line for Oribe and his allies surrounding Montevideo but also offered materialas well as political support for the regimes inland which were at war with or in revolt

362 D. McLean


13/21

against Rosas. As with its commercial outcome, so once more the existing historiogra-

phy condemns the Parana expedition as an embarrassing failure. But even in its

strategic and military objectives did Hothams venture really accomplish so little?

Ouseley and Deffaudis calculated that the outcome of the war in Uruguay depended

on the actions of the governor of Entre Rios, Justo Jose de Urquiza. If he could be per-suaded to join with Corrientes and Paraguay, recently allied in war against Buenos

Aires, and to end his support for Oribe, then Rosas would face a tide of revolt

within the Argentine Confederation led by a general of great talent. Deeply resentful

of the way in which Rosas had closed off the riparian states from international trade

and aspiring to overthrow the tyrant at Buenos Aires when opportunity allowed,

Urquiza nonetheless faced accusations of treachery if he openly sided with foreigners

and Argentine historians ever since have sought to question or defend his nationalist

credentials within that framework. From Urquizas perspective, of course, the presence

of British and French men-of-war in the Parana

was a veiled threat of reprisal as well asa hint of support, and once the expedition sailed in November 1845 Urquiza broke

with Oribe and withdrew his remaining Entre Rean troops from Uruguay. Urquizas

neutrality was plain when he sent officials to Montevideo to meet with Ouseley and

Deffaudis in June 1846 and when, within weeks and to Rosass fury, he came to an

accommodation with the rebellious regime in Corrientes.55

Ouseley never disguised the political dimension to the Parana expedition. As early as

July 1845 he advised his government that we must not discourage the detachment of Cor-

rientes and Entre Rios from the Argentine Confederation.56 Not only that, but an integral

part of Hothams mission was to journey on to Paraguay and to enter into discussions, at

Ouseleys behest, with the nations president. Together, Corrientes and Paraguay couldraise more than 60,000 men, Hotham estimated; he even saw international realignment

in this part of south America whereby Corrientes and Entre Rios would eventually

sever ties with Buenos Aires and form, with Paraguay, a new republic. The moment is

remarkably opportune, he wrote assuringly from Corrientes on 31 January 1846: the

de facto independence of Paraguay is menaced; now she will gladly seek those European

alliances to which a year ago she was indifferent.57 In response to Hothams discussions

at Asuncion the president sent two political agents down river to meet with government

officials in Montevideo, both conveyed aboard Alecto in March 1846. Here, for Ouseley

and Deffaudis, was the ultimate prize: a regrouping of the Platine states which mightensure that the tributaries of the river Plate were kept open to international commerce

and, more immediately, would overthrow Rosas and secure the independence of

Uruguay. Meeting with Urquizas representatives, Ouseley confessed that I did not discou-

rage the idea of a final separation from the Argentine Confederation.58

Aboard the warships ascending the Parana it was clear that once alongside the

shoreline of Entre Rios there was little to fear. For some reason, not clearly explained

or publicly understood, Mackinnon recorded, the governor of this province, general

Urquiza, although a nominee of Rosas, did not take an active part to keep the convoy

back.59 In April 1846 Mackinnon was again struck by how vulnerable the ships were to

shots fired from cliff tops along the coast of Entre Rios, yet none was ever heard.Ouseley wrote to London in May that Urquiza had given a furlough to the greater



14/21

part of his army and now encouraged merchantmen out of Montevideo to trade

directly with Entre Rios without prior clearance at Buenos Aires. Hotham, above

all, was acutely aware of the importance of Urquizas compliance: indeed, without it

he felt that the naval expedition would have been nigh impossible. Looking back on

Urquizas conduct, Hotham reminded the Admiralty that in 1845 he allowed thesquadron under my command to sail up and down the Parana unopposed by artillery

on his side of the river and although holding positions of strength sufficient to have

rendered our efforts abortive, limited his resistance to an interdiction of landing. I

might multiply instances of his good will to trade in general, Hotham concluded;60

in short, it suited the interests of both men to avoid a confrontation.

Ouseley highlighted the expeditions strategic success in April 1846. In short, it had

obliged Urquiza to abandon the war in Uruguay; specifically, the Parana expedition

caused the withdrawal of general Urquiza and thus diminished the Argentine army by

5 or 6,000 men.

61

Furthermore, Urquizas neutrality after November 1845 also encour-aged Ouseley and Deffaudis in their plan to send arms and military supplies to support

the armies of Paraguay and Corrientes. This topic soon arose at Asuncion in January

1846. My son communicated to me by letter from Corrientes a matter of some import-

ance being that you had offered to supply Paraguay with arms, the president told

Hotham. Can that be done? Hotham retreated from any promise of direct supplies.

However, he replied, if you require our help, no doubt we can assist you, and at Rio

they are to be purchased extremely reasonably.62 It was widely believed in Buenos

Aires that the British and French navies were gun-running to Rosass enemies and

what Mackinnon witnessed certainly gave grounds for suspicion. Alecto set off from

Montevideo at the end of March towing three heavily-laden schooners. Two carriedstores for the squadron in the Parana, but the third transported soldiers from Montevi-

deo sent to join the fight in Corrientes. Inevitably, Hotham was best placed to judge the

expeditions work and indeed its reception, not only by the political leadership but also

among the populace. In Paraguay we were almost borne on the shoulders of the people,

he revealed. There and in Corrientes, he continued, the cry was everywhere general

when will the convoy arrive and what do they bring. From the highest to the lowest I met

with but one feeling. The inhabitants of the province of Entre Rios also entertain the

strongest desire for free commercial relations, he concluded, and once the river had

been forced they began an extensive trade with Montevideo.

63

Hotham returned toMontevideo a hero in June 1846. He had, it seemed, turned the tide of the war.

IV

With the possible exception of the unsanctioned occupations of Buenos Aires and

Montevideo in 180607 there was no precedent for British intervention in Latin

American affairs on the scale witnessed in the river Plate in the mid-1840s and

certainly no other case in the nineteenth century where diplomatic agents and naval

officers acted so forcefully in consequence of instructions. Back in London,

however, by late 1845 the view at the Foreign Office was that by landing troops in Mon-tevideo and by sending the Royal Navy to force open the river Parana Ouseley had far

364 D. McLean


15/21

exceeded his authority. Sent to restore peace, Ouseley had instead extended the war in

a partisan fashion and thereby brought even more disruption to international trade in

the region than had existed prior to his mission. Even while the expedition was still

in the Parana the British government sent another diplomat to negotiate a compro-

mise with Rosas. Confronted by complaints from both British and foreign merchantswhose livelihoods depended on the trade of Buenos Aires and increasingly suspicious

of French duplicity and colonial ambitions in Uruguay, the Foreign Office recoiled

from its intervention policy and effectively left the defenders of Montevideo to their

fate.64 In 1847 Ouseley was recalled and the British blockade of Buenos Aires was

lifted. Nevertheless, aided by French subsidies, Uruguayan troops and foreign volun-

teers held out until 1851 when Urquiza at last felt confident of challenging for mastery

of the Argentine Confederation. Leading a military coalition from Entre Rios,

Corrientes and, crucially, Brazil, Urquiza relieved the siege at Montevideo and

forced the surrender of the Argentine army. In February 1852 the same coalitiondeposed Rosas at Buenos Aires. All this, of course, was without any contribution

from the British whose armed intervention, in hindsight, appeared to have been futile.

Ouseley was understandably indignant at his treatment in 1846 and 1847 and con-

sidered himself to have been made the scapegoat for an embarrassing volte-face in

British government policy. Whatever the overall judgement on Britains efforts to

restore peace to the region, Ouseley was always popular in Montevideo where his

actions in 1845 had been instrumental in averting disaster. Holding the city,

though, was never enough for Ouseley and Deffaudis. Believing it to be consistent

with their governments wishes, even if not specifically provided for in their instruc-

tions, they intended to deliver Uruguay from Rosass clutches by seizing the initiativeand taking the war into the Argentine interior. It was not their enterprise which had

failed, they argued: it was politicians in Europe, and especially in London, who had

lost their nerve and lacked a proper sense of urgency. Deffaudis, whose initial instruc-

tions from Paris in 1845 had been identical to those issued to Ouseley, rebuked the

French government in July 1846 for refusing to acknowledge that since the littoral

of the state of Buenos Aires extended along the lower reaches of the Parana then at

least that portion of the river had to be patrolled by allied warships in order to inter-

cept Oribes military supplies. Only by controlling the river, he implored, did the two

diplomats neutralise Urquiza and confine his troops to Entre Rios.

65

Indeed, Ouseleyconfirmed, as soon as it became known that the British government had disapproved

the Parana expedition Urquizas attitude began to change. Beyond these political con-

siderations, however, reopening trade with the inland states had revitalised the

economy of Montevideo and offered the prospect of prosperity to the populations

of Entre Rios, Corrientes and Paraguay. The only maritime operation that has been

effective and important in its results is the expedition up the Parana, Ouseley insisted

in April 1846.66 That his own government had thrown him over and reneged on the

armed intervention never dimmed the judgement of Ouseley and his supporters that

the Parana expedition was anything other than a triumph.

For many naval men, action in the river Plate was difficult to understand. Unaware, ofcourse, of whether Ouseley was in breach of his instructions or not, some saw it in any



16/21

case as a distraction from the moral imperative of suppressing the Brazilian slave trade

while others sensed that Britain was degraded by fighting on behalf of a regime in Mon-

tevideo dominated by foreign speculators in the course of which Argentine territory was

unlawfully violated and its internal politics manipulated. Hearing of fresh diplomatic

proposals for peace in the region in July 1846, Mackinnon expressed quiet satisfaction:everyone concerned, he noted, is quite tired of warfare against the wretched people of

La Plata.67 A fellow naval officer evinced great relief when his ship was redeployed later

that year: Thank God! We are fairly out of the river Plate, its dirty waters, and no less

dirty and disgraceful work.68 But unpopular did not mean unsuccessful, as Hotham was

aware. With Rosass power waning in 1851 and the prospect of negotiations which might

lead to a permanent opening of the Parana to the trade of all nations, Hotham was quick

to reiterate his offer to serve as an official envoy. Writing to the Admiralty in 1851, he

reaffirmed the economic potential of the riparian states which five years earlier he

had seen with his own eyes. A trade, he urged, which gave full employment to 140or 150 merchant vessels during the few months of the English and French occupation

is not to be despised.69

Invariably willing to press opportunities for opening the worlds navigable rivers to

unrestricted commerce, the British government agreed. A year later Urquizas regime

in the Argentine Confederation recognised the major tributaries of the river Plate as

international waterways and by the end of 1852 Hotham was back in the Parana on

another mission to Paraguay. Old ties were not forgotten. Hotham took Ouseleys son

as his attache and, as if in recognition of American participation in his original

expedition, invited the American charge daffaires at Buenos Aires to accompany him

too. As for Ouseley, he was knighted in 1852 and soon afterwards it was acknowledged,at least privately, that much of the criticism heaped on him when recalled in 1847 had

been unjust. Hotham concluded an Anglo-Paraguayan agreement in March 1853, facil-

itating also treaties between Paraguay and France, the United States and Sardinia. Within

weeks he had signed a further convention with the Argentine authorities guaranteeing

access for British traders up the river Parana to Paraguay and to markets in the Argentine

interior.70 Had Ouseleys bold vision of 1845 been adhered to, his supporters responded,

those longer-term benefits for trade and to the region might have materialised earlier.71

Politically inspired though the expedition was, the commerce conducted in the Parana in

1846 had unquestionably revealed a widespread enthusiasm for trade and contact withthe British however unwelcome, for some, that message might be.

Notes

[1] Stemming largely from Gallagher and Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade. More recent

coverage is by Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism; Porter, The Oxford History of the British

Empire; Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire; and Owen and Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory of

Imperialism. More succinct are Cain, Economic Foundations; Porter, European Imperialism;

and Louis, Imperialism.

[2] Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, 323.

[3] Rock, Argentina, 111; Cain and Hopkins, Imperialism, 99n. An interpretation suggested earlier

also by Morgan, French Policy in Spanish America, 313.

366 D. McLean


17/21

[4] British trade with Latin America has been evaluated differently over the years. The recent esti-

mates most cited are by Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade. These are

discussed in Miller, Britain and Latin America, 7178. See also Platt, Latin America and British

Trade, 2831.

[5] British commercial policy has been extensively investigated in Williams, British Commercial Policy.

For possible linkage betweenthe 1841 memorandum and British activity in Latin America, see also

discussion by Miller, Britain and Latin America, 51; Mathew, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 565;

Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics, 32122; and Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 253 55.

[6] The Royal Navys role off the west coast of central and south America has been explored in

detail by Mayo, Consuls and Silver Contraband; and Gough, Specie Conveyance. Admiralty

records, however, do not reveal comparable activity in the river Plate.

[7] A concept analysed in Mayo, The Impatient Lion.

[8] Britains strategic interest in the south Atlantic is considered extensively in Gough, Sea Power

and South America, The Falkland Islands and The British Reoccupation and Colonisation of

the Falkland Islands.

[9] Morgan, French Policy, 313.

[10] Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 91.[11] Gough, Specie Conveyance, 423.

[12] A conclusion reached by Bethell, Britain and Latin America, 12. Extensive analysis of the

British in Latin America is also to be found in Miller, Britain and Latin America; Bethell,

Spanish America after Independence; and Platt, Business Imperialism. More specific to the

river Plate are Winn, British Informal Empire in Uruguay; and Ferns, Britains Informal

Empire in Argentina.

[13] See Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 3652.

[14] British diplomacy with respect to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation is discussed in Mathew,

The Imperialism of Free Trade, 567; and more extensively in Wu, Generals and Diplomats,

7687. See also Miller, Britain and Latin America, 51.

[15] Events in the river Plate and the background to the warfare which engulfed the region in the mid-nineteenth century are most recently analysed in McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire

and Garibaldi in Uruguay. For the career of Juan Manuel de Rosas and the internal struggles of

the Argentine Confederation, see Lynch, Argentine Dictator and The River Plate Republics.

[16] French policy towards Latin America generally is explained in Morgan, French Policy. For

French activity in the river Plate see also Morgan, Orleanist Diplomacy. The more specific

theme of relations with the British is explored in Morgan, Anglo-French Confrontation.

[17] Kirkpatrick, A History of the Argentine Republic, 155; Pivel-Devoto, Historia, 145.

[18] Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 274; Morgan, Anglo-French Confrontation, 327.

[19] Lynch, Argentine Dictator, 283, and River Plate Republics, 346.

[20] Cady, Foreign Intervention, 158.

[21] Saldas, Historia, IV, 26162; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 43334; Irazusta, Vida Politica, V, 138. Seealso Munoz-Azpiri, Rosas frente al imperio ingles.

[22] Levene, Historia, II, 251; Pivel-Devoto, Historia, 145.

[23] National Intelligencer, 23 June 1846.

[24] Hopkins to Wise, 27 March 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 33235.

[25] Brent to Buchanan, 4 April 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 35058.

[26] Brent to Buchanan, 14 Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 30312.

[27] Brent to Buchanan, 16 Jan. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 31416.

[28] Brent to Buchanan, 16 Jan. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 31718.

[29] The history and extent of smuggling by north American shippers and merchants in the river

Plate and Brents disagreements with American naval officers there is revealed in Cooney,

Doing Business in the Smuggling Way; and Randall, Captains and Diplomats.

[30] Hopkins to Buchanan, Feb. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 8085.



18/21

[31] Ibid.

[32] Arana to Brent, 29 Oct. 1845, and Brent to Arana, 27 Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic

Correspondence, I, 299300, 31214.

[33] Saldas, Historia, IV, 253; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 430; Pomer, Conflictos, 69.

[34] Ouseley to Canning, 13 Nov. 1845, FO 6/106; and Ouseley to Aberdeen, 31 Oct. 1845, FO 6/105, The National Archives, London.

[35] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 10102.

[36] Irazusta, Vida Politica, V, 137; Cady, Foreign Intervention, 157n.

[37] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 12; II, 47, 9597.

[38] Hopkins to Buchanan, 10 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 91 95.

[39] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 111, 146.

[40] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 76, 16869, 171, 182, 193.

[41] Hopkins to Buchanan, 31 [sic] Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 6376.

[42] Morning Herald, 27 June 1846; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 42930.

[43] Hamilton to Wise, 10 Aug. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 30405.

[44] Morning Herald, 27 June 1846.

[45] Morning Herald, 29 Aug. 1846, reproducing correspondence from the United States Gazette.[46] The Times, 23 Sept. 1846, reproducing Hotham to Inglefield, 7 June 1846.

[47] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 26869.

[48] National Intelligencer, 1 Sept. 1846.

[49] Morning Herald, 17 Aug. 1846, reproducing correspondence from the Philadelphia North

American.

[50] Hamilton to Wise, 9 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 347.

[51] The Times, 23 Sept. 1846.

[52] Hamilton to Wise, 9 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 347.

[53] Deffaudis to Guizot, 14 July 1846, and Ouseley to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1846, FO Confidential

Print, 260; Morning Herald, 11 Sept. 1846. Montevidean customs receipts are cited in

Acevedo, Anales Historicos, II, 20001. See also Braconnay, La Legion Francesa, 244.[54] Hotham to Malmesbury, 20 Feb. 1852, FO 59/2.[55] For the career and politics of Urquiza and his antagonism towards Rosas see Bosch, Urquiza

and Los Tratados.

[56] Ouseley memorandum, 5 July 1845, FO 6/104.[57] Hotham to Inglefield, 31 Jan. 1846, DD HO 10/7, Hotham Papers, University Library, Hull.[58] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 6 June 1846, FO 6/119.[59] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 18 19.

[60] Hotham to Baring, 13 June 1851, NP5/1/3/6, Northbrook Papers, ING Baring, London.[61] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 16 April 1846, FO 6/117.[62] Hotham to Inglefield, 31 Jan. 1846, Hotham Papers, DD HO 10/7.

[63] Hotham to Auckland, 29 Sept. 1846, Hotham Papers, DD HO 10/8.[64] For analysis of the British governments changing attitude towards the intervention in the riverPlate see McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, 78 81, 86 100.

[65] Deffaudis to Guizot, 25 July 1846, enclosed in Ouseley to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1846, FO Confi-

dential Print, 260.

[66] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 7 April 1846, FO 6/117.[67] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, II, 56.

[68] Diary, 13 Nov. 1846, FIT/3, Fitzgerald Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.[69] Hotham to Baring, 30 June 1851, Northbrook Papers, NP5/1/3/6.[70] For the opening of Paraguay to international trade see Tate, Britain and Latin America in the

Nineteenth Century; and Williams, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic. See also

Kiernan, Britains First Contacts with Paraguay.

[71] See Hadfield, Brazil, the River Plate, and the Falkland Islands, 238, 343.

368 D. McLean


19/21

References

Acevedo, E. Anales Historicos del Uruguay. 6 vols. Montevideo, 1933.

Bethell, L., ed. Spanish America after Independence c. 1820c.1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1987.

. Britain and Latin America in Historical Perspective. In Britain and Latin America: A Chan-ging Relationship, edited by V. Bulmer-Thomas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1989.

Bosch, B. Los Tratados de Alcaraz. Buenos Aires, 1955.

. Urquiza y su tiempo. Buenos Aires, 1971.

Braconnay, P. La Legion Francesa en la Defensa de Montevideo. Montevideo, 1943.

Cady, J. Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, 1838 50. Philadelphia, PA: University of

Philadelphia Press, 1929.

Caillet-Bois, T. Historia naval Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1944.

Cain, P. Economic Foundations of British Overseas Expansion, 18151914. London: Macmillan, 1980.

Cain, P. and Hopkins, A. British Imperialism. London: Longman, 1993.

Cooney, J. Doing Business in the Smuggling Way: Yankee Contraband in the Rio de la Plata. TheAmerican Neptune 47 (1987): 16268.

Davis, R. The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade. Leicester: Leicester University Press,

1979.

Ferns, H. Britains Informal Empire in Argentina, 18061914. Past and Present 4 (1953): 60 75

. Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.

Fieldhouse, D. Economics and Empire, 18301914. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973.

Gallagher, J. and R. Robinson. The Imperialism of Free Trade. Economic History Review6 (1953): 1 15.

Gough, B. Specie Conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico in British Warships c.18201870: an

aspect of the Pax Britannica. Mariners Mirror 69 (1983): 41934.

. Sea Power and South America: The Brazils or South American Station of the Royal Navy

18081837.The American Neptune

50 (1990): 2634.

. The British Reoccupation and Colonization of the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, 1832

1843. Albion 22 (1990): 26187.

. The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: The Contest for Empire in the South Atlantic. London:Athlone, 1992.

Hadfield, W. Brazil, the River Plate, and the Falkland Islands. London, 1854.

Irazusta, J. Vida Politica de Juan Manuel de Rosas: a traves de su correspondencia. Vol. 5, La agresion

Anglo-Francesa. Buenos Aires, 1961.

Kiernan, V. Britains First Contacts with Paraguay. Atlante 3 (1955): 17191.

Kirkpatrick, F. A History of the Argentine Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931.

Levene, R. Historia de la Nacion Argentina. Vol. 7, Rosas y su epoca. Buenos Aires: 1950.

Louis, W., ed. Imperialism. New York: New Viewpoints, 1976.

Lynch, J. Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 18291852. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

. The River Plate Republics. In Spanish America after Independence, edited by L. Bethell.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Mackinnon, L. Steam Warfare in the Parana. 2 vols. London, 1848.

McLean, D. War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 18361853 .

London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

. Garibaldi in Uruguay: a Reputation Reconsidered. English Historical Review 113 (1998):

35166.

Manning, W., ed. Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 18311860.

Vols 1, 2, 10. Washington, DC, 1932, 1938.

Mathew, W. The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 182070. Economic History Review 21 (1968):

56279.



20/21

Mayo, J. The Impatient Lion: Britains Official Mind and Latin America in the 1850s. Ibero-

Amerikanisches Archiv9 (1983): 197223.

. Consuls and Silver Contraband on Mexicos West Coast in the Era of Santa Anna. Journal of

Latin American Studies 19 (1987): 389411.

Miller, R. Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries . London: Longman,

1993.

Morgan, I. Anglo-French Confrontation and Co-operation in Spanish America, 18361848. Ph.D.

thesis, University of London, 1975.

. French Policy in Spanish America: 1830 1848. Journal of Latin American Studies 10 (1978):

30928.

. Orleanist Diplomacy and the French Colony in Uruguay. International History Review 5

(1983): 20128.

Munoz-Azpiri, J. Rosas frente al imperio ingles: historia intima de un triunfo argentino. Buenos Aires,

1960.

Owen, R. and B. Sutcliffe, eds. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. London: Longman, 1972.

Pivel-Devoto, J. Historia de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, 18301930. Montevideo, 1945.

Platt, D. C. M. Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 18151914. Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1968.

. Latin America and British Trade 18061914. London: A & C Black, 1972.

. ed. Business Imperialism, 18401930. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Pomer, L. Conflictos en la Cuenca del Plata en el siglo XIX. Buenos Aires, 1984.

Porter, A. European Imperialism, 18601914. London: Macmillan, 1994.

. ed. The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 3, The Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1999.

Randall, R. Captains and Diplomats, Americans in the Rio de la Plata, 18431846. The American

Neptune 46 (1986): 23039.

Rock, D. Argentina, 1516 1982. London: I. B. Tauris, 1987.

Saldas, A. Historia de la Confederacion Argentina. 5 vols. Buenos Aires, 1911.Tate, E. Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Paraguay, 18111870.

Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv5 (1979): 3970.

Williams, J. B. British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion 17501850. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1972.

Williams, J. H. The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 18001870. Austin, TX: Institute of

Latin American Studies, 1979.

Winn, P. British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century. Past and Present73 (1976):

10026.

Wu, C. Generals and Diplomats: Great Britain and Peru 1820-40. Cambridge: Centre of Latin

American Studies, 1991.

370 D. McLean


21/21

British Parana 1845

Documents

Transcript of British Parana 1845