RYLE, Gilbert (1939) - Parmenides (Mind, 48 190)

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Plato's ̀ Paramenides'Author(s): Gilbert RyleSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 48, No. 190 (Apr., 1939), pp. 129-151Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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VOL. XLVIII. No. igo.] [April, 939.

MAINDA QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.-PLATO'S ' PARMENIDES.'

By GILBERT RYLE.

THE followingbservationsre argumentsn favour f a certaininterpretationf Plato's dialogue,the Parmenides. Accordingto this interpretationhe dialogue s philosophically erious, nthe sensethat its authorthought hat its argumentswerevalidand that its problemwas one of philosophical mportance.Further, t will be maintained hat he was righton the latterpoint ndpredominantlyight ntheformeroint. Theproblemis importantnd mostoftheargumentsrevalid.

It willbe suggested hatthe obviousobscurityfthe dialogueis due to a verynaturalcause, namely hat Plato could notwiththe logical apparatus accessibleto himpropound n set termswhat is the generalconclusionor even the main driftof thedialogue. For theconstructionftherequired ogical apparatuscould not be takenin hand untilafterthe inevitability f thesorts fantinomies hich hedialogue xhibits ad beenrealised.

If this nterpretations correct,reven f someinterpretationofa kindred ype s correct,hentheinterpretationuggested yBurnetand Prof.A. E. Taylor s wrong. Mymainobject is toshowwhatthetrue nterpretations,but a brief esume fotherreasons forrejecting he Burnet-Taylor heorymay not be outofplace.

Burnet and Prof.Taylordeclarethe dialogue,or the dialec-tical part of it, to be a joke. Plato's object was to ridiculecertainphilosophersr philosophasters y parody. None of its

9







130 GILBERT RYLE:

arguments re valid or thoughtby Plato to be so. And itspretendedproblemor set of problems s a sham one. Thebutts of the ridicule re eitherthe philosophersf theEleaticschoolor those of the school ofMegaraor both. Theymeritedsuch ridiculebecausethelogicemployed y themwas vexatiousand fallacious. They had exercisedthis corrupt ogic againstcertaindoctrineswhich Plato accepted; consequently lato inthisdialogue s payingthemback in their wn coin.

The main objection to such a theory s of course that theargumentsfthedialogue reeither alid,or elseplausible nough

fortheir uthor o have takenthemto be so. Otherobjectionsare as follows. If the intendedbutts of the alleged mockerywereParmenides nd Zeno, t is hard to explainwhy n thetwoadjacent dialogues,the Theaetetusnd the Sophist,Plato goesout of his way to expresshis admiration or the former; orwhy the Zenonianmethodofargument y antinomy s declaredby Prof. Taylor himself (I think c'orrectly) o be thatrecommended o philosophers y Plato in the Republic s wellas in theSophist.

Moreover, Prof. Taylor recognises not only that Platothought hat the Zenonian patternof ratiocinationwas valid,but also that t is valid. He recognises,oo,that t is important,sinceby means of it Zeno had shownthat there were hiddenabsurditiesin the premissesof Pythagorean mathematics-which absurditieswere acknowledged nd partly remediedbyPlato's own circle.

In the Sophistand the Politicus he leader of the discussionis describedas an Eleatic, stranger, nd his arguments re

notoriouslyntended o be taken seriously. And the Megarianphilosopher uclides is introduced s a sympathetic haracterat the openingof the Theaetetus.The Eleatic Strangerwhoconductsthe argument f the Sophist s expressly raised as agenuine philosopher nd not a mere tripper-up f unsubtlepersons.

So slight partdoes Socratesplay in theParmenides, ophistand Politicus, and so slight also is the positive role given toany known ocratic heoriesn thosedialogues r n theTheaetetus,that the natural nferencewould surelybe that Plato had dis-coveredthat certain mportant hilosophic ruthsor methodswere to be creditednot to Socratesbut to the Eleatics. Zenois theteachernowand notSocrates.

Doubtless there were (long afterthe time of Parmenides)Megarian hinkers ho oved to lay logicaltrapsand pose logical

1 In Plato: TheMan andhisWork, . 290.







PLATO S 'PARMENIDES'. 131

riddles. Maybe omeof hem rosecutedhis earch rommotivesof mischievousness,houghgenerally he collectors f fallacies

and puzzles in logic (like Lewis Carroll)do so from he moreserious motive of desiring o discoverthe rules of logicwhichwillprovide he rebuttal f thefallacies nd thesolution ftheriddles. But thetheme f the Parmenides as (unlikeAristotle'sTopics and De Sophisticis lenchis)no obvious connection ithany such posers. Nor could Plato have preservednyhistoricunitiesand represented armenides s the victim ftheposersgarnered y this yetunbornband offormalogicians.

But in any case the supposedjoke wouldhave been a very

poorone. For Parmenides nd his followersre supposedto berendered laughing-stocky theascription o Parmenides' wnlips of argumentswhich he neverused. He is made to talknonsenseby Plato. Yet this okewouldonlyhave succeeded-and thenhow lamely -if the wordsput intohis mouth werealmostparallelto words whichhe was knownto have uttered.The comicality ftheformer ould be transferredo the latterby the closenessof their analogies. But Parmenides s notknownto have producedeitherfallaciousor valid specimens fZenoniandialectic, nd Zeno is known to have producedvalidspecimens f t. Was Plato perhapsbeing sillyenough o pokefun at a valid methodof ratiocination,mistakenly hinkingtto be fallacious Thiswouldhave made onlyPlato ridiculous.

Moreover, armenides n the dialogue, o far frombeing an.innocentvictim,unwittinglyntrammelledn an absurd argu-ment,himself raws attention o the untenability f certainofthe conclusions f the dialectic. It is he who bringsout and.

draws attentionto the contradictionswhichhe has deduced.,He underlinesheantinomies ere as vigorouslys Zeno under-lined the antinomieswhich he disclosed as resident n the.Pythagoreanpremisses. He is a poor butt who is both theauthorofa joke and thecommentatorpon tsabsurdities.

It is small wonder that it took two and a half millenniabefore nyonewas found o givevent evento a laboured huckleat the supposed fooling. Further, n the Sophist,which isaccepted as a soberdialogue,a certainstretch f the dialectic

of the Parmenides s echoed as a constituent f the argument.Was it conscious ophistryn theParmenides nd serious eason-ing n theSophist

Later on we shall see that the central crux of the secondpartofthe Parmenideswas recognised y Aristotle o have beena seriousphilosophical uzzle,and one whichhe thinkshe can,with he aid ofhis logicalapparatus, esolve. This will also be







132 GILBERT RYLE:

evidence hat this ssue was nota sham ssue and theintricacies

oftheargument otgratuitously anufactured.The one piece of internal evidencewhich seems to be infavour of Prof. Taylor's theory s the passage where Par-menidesprefaceshis antinomian perationswith the expression' since we have committed urselvesto the laborioussport'.I thinkthatwat&ia is here play takenas exercise r practicerather than ' fun in the sense of ' jest or ' ridicule. Buteven if it were taken n the lattersense,the whole alleged okewouldbe killed. Parmenides ould not be the unwitting utt

ofridiculewhilehimself ecognisinghathe was beingridiculed.Don Quixotedoesnotsay Let me pretend or un o be a gallantknight'. He is a figure f fun because he takes his acts andattitudes eriously.

Finally,thefirst art of thedialogue,whereSocrates s beingcross-questioned,s taken by Prof. Taylor to be serious. Heholds that the argumentswhichsilence Socratesare not reallyconclusiveinwhichpoint think hathe is mainlywrong), utthat the discussion s one which has a genuine philosophical

problem nd moves by a methodwhich s meantto be takenseriously. It is thereforenlythe secondand longer art of thedialoguewhich has to be construed s a parody. Yet so farfrom herebeing nydetectable elaxation ere n thesobriety fthe dialogue, t is generally eltthat liveliness and dramaticqualities,not to speakofhumour, anishfrom he verybeginningofthis secondpart.

It reads as if it were sober, professional,ystematic, ridand in conformity ith set rules-and it reads so, I suggest,because it is so. Moreover,here s a clearconnection etweenthe two parts. In the firstpart Socrates several times overproclaims challenge, nd Parmenidesmore than once declaresthat he takes it up. What the challenge s, we shall see later.But if n a seriouspartofthedialogue task is set,and if n thesecondpart the task is performed,t is hard to rejectthe in-ferencehat thesecondpartofthedialogue s also serious.

It is now time to give an analysisand interpretationfthe

dialogue based upon the assumption hat Plato thought hatit dealtwith a real problem nd that its argumentswere valid.I shallbeginwith a discussion f the first art ofthedialogue,whereParmenidess indiscussionwith heyoung ocrates.

Socrates has been listening o the readingof an argumentwritten y Zeno,in whichZeno had been controvertingertainopponents f the MonismofParmenides y demonstratinghattheirpositionentailedthat one and the same subjecthad in-







PLATO S 'PARMENIDES 133

compatiblepredicates. Namely,they maintained he existence

of a plurality no matterof what), and Zeno argues that themembers of a pluralitymust exemplify oth similarity nddissimilarity; and as these are opposite attributes, t is im-possiblethat there houldexist a plurality.

Socrates then urges that Zeno's argument s answerable.For according o the theory fForms, inceForms and the in-stancesof them are distinguishable,t is possible fortheretoexist thingswhich are instancesof severalForms at once andeven, in a certainfashion, nstancesof opposite Forms at the

same time. Thingsmay exemplifyimilaritynd dissimilaritytthe sametime,orunity nd plurality, s a person s one personbut a plurality f limbs and bodilyparts. It is to be noticedthat Socrates does not try to explode the apparent contra-dictionsby distinguishingelationalfromother predicates,distinction fwhichPlato is wellaware n otherdialogues. Hemighthave shown hat there s no contradictionn sayingthatsomethings bigger hanone thing while smaller han another,or similarto one thingand dissimilar o another,while there

would be a contradictionn describing thing s having nd nothaving a givenqualityat the same time. Instead the youngSocratesmaintains hat the apparent contradictions anishorlose theirmenacewhen t is seen thatForms and their nstancesare to be distinguishedrom ne another nd that a particularmay, without bsurdity, e an instance of several Forms andevenopposing orms at the same time.

However, ocratesrepeats four imesbetween129b and 130athat he would be gravelyperturbedf it wereshownthat notthe nstances fFormsbutForms hemselvesnderwentppositepredicates'. And we shall see that in the second part of thedialogueParmenides akesup just thischallenge.

Meanwhile, owever, ocrates' heory fFormshas to undergoan examination. And as Socrateshas proposed o upsetZeno'sassertion hat the existence f a plurality ntailsthat themem-bers of such a pluralitywould have opposite predicates,byreferringo the relation betweenForms and the instancesof

Forms, t is to thisallegedrelation hat chief ttention s paid.Socrates accepts as specimens of Forms similarity, nity,plurality,magnitude,,ustice,beauty and goodness. He bogglesat the suggestion hat thereare also Forms of hair-ness,mud-ness and dirt-ness,nd is uneasyeven about Formsof naturalkinds such as men,fireand water would be instancesof. Heis advised not to be squeamish, but the general theoreticalquestion s at once embarked n: What sort of a relation s it







134 GILBERT RYLE:

whichholdsbetweennstances nd whattheyare instances f ?

To put it roughly, Form is takento be somethingnsweringto anygeneralpredicate, oun,verbor adjective, n such a waythat any significantbstractnounwill be the propername ofsucha.something. And t is becausethere xistsuchsomethingsthatmanyordinary bjects can be characterisedy a commonpredicate. To ascribe predicate o somethings to assertthatthis something tands in some relation to a Form. So if athing s an instanceof something,hereexisttwo objects,theinstance nd that ofwhich t is an instance. And there s the

special relationbetween hemwhich constitutes he formerninstanceof the latter. For example,my body,beingonebody,exemplifies r is an instanceof unity. This, according o thetheory,ntails hatthere xisttwothings, amelymy body andunity, nd thereobtains too therelation nswering o theword'exemplifies or the phrase ' is an instance of . We mightsay, for nutshell ffect, hat the theory f-Forms s the theorythatabstractnouns reproper amesorthatbeing-an-instance-ofis a proper elation.

Wihat ort of a relation s this relation of exemplificationSocrates essaysdifferentnswers o this question, ll of whichcollapse. We shall see later that any answermust collapse,since the question itself is logically vicious, which entailsthat the theoryof Forms, in its presentshape, is logicallyvicious.

Socratesfirstuggests hat therelations that ofparticipation,and Parmenides roceeds o examinethe conceptexpressedbythisword taken n its naturaland literal ense. To participatein somethings to possessor occupy a part ofsomething. Youand I participaten a cake ifyoutakehalfof t and I take theotherhalf. So ifto be an instance fsomethings to participateinit, t mustbe to possessoroccupy fragment. If a tho-usandobjects exemplify ircularity y being circular,then on thisliteralrendering f 'participation' each must somehow haveone-thousandthf circularity.Now it already sounds absurdto speakof fractionsfattributes,uchas slices ofyellownessr

quotas of similarity. But Parmenidesdoes betterthan relyuponour nose for heridiculous;he explores setof caseswherethe notiongenerates latcontradictions. He operates,namely,upon predicatesof magnitudeand relative magnitude. Forexample, the existence fmanylargethingswould imply thateach possessed very mallfraction f argeness, fraction erymuchsmaller hanthatof which t was a fraction. Andthingsequal in size willpossessfragmentsfequalitywhichare much








smallerthan and so not equal to equality. Smallness will

vastly xceed ndimensionshefractionsf tself hatrenderheirpossessorsmall.Our reactionsto such reasoningnaturally ake two forms.

We object at once that of course concepts like magnitude,equality, mallness nd the restdo not themselves ave magni-tudes. Bigness is not biggeror smaller than anythingelse,nor equal in size to anything lse. It is nonsenseto ascribepredicates of size to concepts of size. Attributes uch asquantitativedimensions,re not instances of themselves. In-

deed, ikeProf.Taylorand Mr.Hardie,we are ready to declarewith confidencehat no 'universal', i.e., no quality,relation,magnitude, tate, etc., can be one of its own instances. Cir-cularity s not circularnor is proximity djacent. Nor evenare such conceptscapable of being nstancesof otherconceptsof the same family s themselves. It is nonsenseto describecircularity s circular rof anyother hape; and it is nonsenseto describe edness s ofanycolour, r equality s ofany dimen-sions. We are right o make such objections. The theoryof

Forms s logically icious f t implies hat all or someuniversalsare instancesof themselves r of otheruniversals f the samefamilywith themselves. And Plato had, apparently, oncethought that beauty was beautiful and goodness was good;maybehe had thought hatcircularitynd circularitylonewasperfectlyircular.

But that suchdescriptions fqualities,magnitudes,elations,etc.,are illegitimate as to be shown nd notmerely elt. Platois either howing t or on theway to showing t in thispart ofthedialogue. The verynextstage n theargument rovesthatno universal an be an instance f tself.

Another bjection hat we feeldisposed omakeis thatPlatois treating uch conceptsas smallness, quality,similarityndotherness, s ifthey werequalities, nstead of seeingthat theyare relations. To be small is simply o be smaller han some-thing,or than mostthingsor than some standardthing. Butwe are here tradingulpon he distinction,worked out in part

by Aristotle, etweenuniversalsof differentorts. Yellow isan universal n the category f quality,equalityis one in thecategoryof relation. But how do we establish uch categorialdifferences Not on the authorityof Aristotle r by nativeinstinct r whim,but by exhibiting he contradictionsr otherabsurditieswhichresultfrom reatinguniversals s all of onetype. The theory fForms was logicallyvicious n so far as itdid, unwittingly,reatall universals s iftheywereof onetype.







136 GILBERT RYLE:

Plato is proving he need for distinction etween he different

typesofuniversals.In 132a Parmenides rieflyhowsthat ifinstances f large-ness and that of whichtheyare instances re alike consideredand compared n respectof largeness, n infinite egress s atonce set on foot. If largeness s a largesomething,t must bean instanceof largenessNumber2, and this will be an instanceoflargenessNumber3 and so on forever. So 'largeness' willnot be thename ofone Form but of an endless eriesof Forms.It is only our generalisation f this to say that it is logically

viciousto treat any universal s one of its own instances. Weshallsee that interestingonsequences ollow rom his.Socrates nowtoysfora moment, tillwithin he confines f

theparticipationheory, ith he conceptualistheory hatFormsare thoughts r notions, o that the relationbetween nstancesand that of whichtheyare instances ither s or is a species ofthe relationbetween our thinkings nd what we thinkabout.To this Parmenides ivestwo differentutboth fatal objections.The thinking f that of which nstances re instancesmust be

thethought fsomething,nd that which s the objectofsuchthinkingmustbe real or exist. And this will be a Form, theexistenceof which will not be the occurrence f that thinkingbutpresupposed y it as itsobject. Moreover,funiversalswerebits of thinking, heir instances on the literal participationtheory)willbe fragments f those bits. So everything hatso-ever will be a piece ofthinking, nless we are ready to swallowthe alternativeof sayingthat there exist thoughtswhich areneverthought. The latterof these objections would notholdnecessarily,fsome accountof being-an-instance-ofother hanthe literalparticipation ccount weregiven.

Socrates now abandons the literalparticipation heoryandsuggestsn its place the similarity heory. For one thing o bean instanceof a Form is for t to copy or resemble t in one ormore respects or if there exist several instancesof a Formthey ll copy or resemble t, and from hisresemblances derivedtheirresemblance o one another. Historically t is probable

that this theoryhad seemed the obvioustheory o hold whenattentionwas beingfocussedupon the concepts f mathematicsand especiallyofgeometry. The squares and circleswhichwedraw are not exactlysquare or circular. They are nearly butnot quite good copies of ideal or perfect quares and circles,though these never exist in nature. At this stage, probably,philosophers ailed to distinguish deal circlesfromcircularityand ideal squares from quareness. It was only ater seen that








they are or wouldbe instances fthoseattributes nd so are or

wouldbe particularsventhoughnot ones existingnnature.

Parmenides wiftly efutes his theory. Resemblance s asymmetricalelation. If A is similar o B in a certainrespect,B is similar o A in that respect. [We mustbe carefulnot tosay that 'being a copy of signifies symmetrical elation,since n the notionof being a copy there s, overand above thenotionof resemblance,he quite differentotionof origination.A portraits a copyof a face,but a face s nota copyofa por-trait.]

But for wo things o resemble ach other n a certain espect,bothmusthave at least one common ttribute,r bothmustbeinstancesof at least one commonuniversal. So if a Formandits instances re similar, othmust be instances f at least onehigherForm. And if theirbeing nstancesof it entails, s ac-cording o thetheoryt must entail, hat theyand it have somepointof similarity,henall mustbe instAnces f a stillhigherForm,and so on ad infinitum. o even ifthere s some sensein which drawncircle s rather ikean ideal circle, here s no

sense n which ither s similar o circularity.Socrates is now bankruptof any answerto the question,

Whatsortof a relation s being-an-instance-of But thedebateis so far nconclusive hat the fact thatSocratescannotanswerthe questiondoes not implythat there s no answer. Other'friendsof the Forms' mightassimilatethe relationto someotheras yet unexaminedfamiliar elation. I proposehere togo beyondmytext and arguethat therecan be no answertothe question, incethequestion tself s illegitimate.

To show this, it is convenient o considerCook-Wilson'sanswer o the question. His viewis that therelation f being-an-instance-ofs a relationsui generis apable of no analysisand in need of none. It is a mistake n principle o look forsome familiar elationwhichholds between one particular ndanother, nd to try to show that the relationof being-an-in-stance-ofs a case or speciesof that. None the less, there sno mystery bout the relationof being-an-instance-of;t is

one with whichany ability to thinkpresupposesfamiliarity.Indeedno ordinary elation r qualityor statecouldbe familiarto us without urbeingfamilarwith hisuniquerelation.

Let us, forbrevity, all this allegedrelation, s CookWilsondoes not, ' exemplification',nd ignoringhe questionwhetheror not it is assimilableto any otherknownrelation, onsiderwhether he assumption hat there exists such a relationcon-tainsany logicalvice. On thisview a thing-qualityroposition







138 GILBERT RYLE:

willassertthata thing s in thisrelation f exemplifyingo thequality; and a relationalpropositionwill assert that the two

or moreterms ointly xemplifyherelation.Thus every hing-qualityropositionwill be a relationalpro-

position,and everyordinaryrelational propositionwill be adoublyrelationalproposition,ince t will be asserting hat therelation of exemplificationolds betweenthe terms and thespecialrelation, aythat ofbeing-neighbour-to.

Now if one thing s in a certain elation o another, helatterwill be in some,notnecessarilyhesame,relation o the former.If

'thisis green' is more fully xpressedby 'this exemplifies

greenness',therewill be anotherrelationalproposition f theform greenness s exemplifiedn (or inheres n) this'. Formswill be thesubjectsof relational ropositions: .e., therewillbesignificantnd irreducible elationalsentenceseach with anabstractnoundenoting t leastoneof the termsn therelationalproposition.

Now what ofthe allegedrelation tself,whichwe are calling'exemplification' Is thisa Formor an instanceofa Form?

Take thetwopropositionsthis s square' and ' thatis circular.We have here two differentases of something xemplifyingsomethinglse. We have two differentnstances f therelationofbeing-an-instance-of.What is therelation etween hem ndthat of which hey are instances-? It willhave to be exempli-ficationNumber2. The exemplificationf P by S will be aninstanceof exemplification,nd its being in that relationtoexemplificationillbe an instance f a second-orderxemplifi-cation, nd thatofa third, nd so on ad infinitum.

(This is not the same regress, houghreminiscentf it, asthat whichBradleythoughthe had found n the necessity fthere lwaysexisting furtherelation o relate anyrelation oits terms.)

This conclusion s impossible. So there s no such relationas being-an-instance-of.This is green' is not a relationalproposition,nd 'this is bigger han that' onlymentions nerelation, hatofbeing-bigger-than.

There are no genuinesimplerelationalpropositions aving

fortheirtermswhat is denotedby abstractnouns. Formsarenot terms n relationalpropositionswiththeir nstances ctingas the otherterms. And if (what is a further ointwhich snot here being argued) Forms are also incapable of havingqualities or dimensions r states or places or dates, etc., itfollows what is true) that Forms cannot be the subjects ofany simplepropositions,ffirmativer negative, ttributive rrelational.







PLATO S 'PARMENIDES. 139

Now when we say such thingsas that there is no relationbetween greenness r circularitynd its instances,we seemtobe sayingthat thereexistsan intolerable emoteness r aliena-tion betweenuniversals nd particulars. It sounds ike sayingthattwo menhave nodealingswith ach other, rthattwobodiesare debarredfrom ver coming nto contact. But this is notwhat is meant. What is meantis that abstractnouns are notpropernames, so that to ask what is the relationbetween henomineeof such a noun and something lse is an illegitimatequestion. The semantic unctionf abstractnouns s something

otherthan that of denoting ubjects of qualities, tates,dimen-sionsorrelations. To enquire fter hequalities, tates, ositions,sizes or relationsof circularityr unity or civility s to ask anonsensical question. Abstractnouns are not the names ofentities solemnword ), for hey re not names at all in thewayin which Julius Caesar is thename of some one.

So whenwe say that there s no relatiofi etween n universaland its instanceswe are onlysayingthe same sort of thingaswhen we say that yellownesshas no colour or circularity as

no shape. These assertions uggest hat yellowness s woefullyanaemic and that circularitys gravely morphous; but whatis meant s simply hat such sentences s 'yellowness s yellowor green and 'circularity s circular r square are illegitimate,since the abstractnouns are not the names of thingspossessingqualities.

It is important o see that this is all quite consistentwiththe admission hat thereare plentyof significantentences fthe noun-copula-adjectiver the noun-copula-nounattern, he

grammatical ubjects of whichare abstract nouns. 'Yellow isa colour' and 'unpunctuality s blameworthy' re significantandtrue entences. Only heydo not express ingular ttributivepropositions bout one entity of which the propername is'yellow and one of which hepropername is ' unpunctuality'.

The theory of Forms maintainedthat Forms are terms nrelationalpropositions;namely, hat about any Form therewillbe the true proposition hat something oes or might tand inthe relation o it ofexemplification. o this was a doctrine fSubstantialForms,foraccording o it each Form would be asubstance, ince t would be an 'entity' possessing t least onerelational roperty.

It is commonly aid that where the young Socrates wentastray was in treatinguniversals s if they were particulars.How does one treata qualityor a relationor a dimension s ifit were a particular Not by falsely sserting fit that it has







140 GILBERT RYLE:

the qualityofparticularity,or here s no suchquality. Treat-ingan universal s if it werea particular an onlybe*speakingas iftherecould be significantentences f the simple, ingular,attributive rrelational atterns aving bstractnouns roughly)for theirnominatives; as if, for xample,givena sentence ike' This has such and such a qualityor relationor magnitude',an abstractnoun couldreplace he this ' and leave theresultantsentencesignificant.And this is illegitimate, artly for thereasonsalreadygivenby Parmenides, artlyforreasonsyet tocome in the dialogue,and partly for reasonswhich I have

suggested.The reasonsare all of one type,namelythat contradictionsor vicious regresses rlse out of assertionswhichassume thevalidityofthe practice n question.

Parmenidesnow produces a generalargument gainst thepossibility f there existing ny relation betweenForms andctheir nstances. I am not sure that tire rguments valid; itwould certainly equirea much profoundernquiry nto thevarieties f relations han Parmenides upplies to establish he

point. The arguments as follows. If instancesand that ofwhichtheyare instances,namelyForms, both exist,theywillbe existences f differentrders. Now when a relation holdsbetweenterms, hoseterms re correlates f each other. Andthese correlatesmust be of the same orderof existence. Aslave-owner s the correlate f the slave whomhe owns. Heowns a slave and not slavery. The correlate o servitude sownership, hile the correlate o a slave is an owner. If thereare the two ordersof existence-' existence' and 'subsistence

are the titles recently oined-then what exists is correlatediwith what exists, nd what subsistswithwhat subsists. Thereis no cross-correlationf something xistingwith somethingsubsisting.

Thus instances of knowing,namely the cases of knowingwhichwe enjoy, are correlatedwith their objects, namely n-stances of truth. But knowledge thatofwhichcases of know-ing are instances) s correlatednot withtruthsbut withtrue-ness. Hence if thereare Forms, they cannot be what ourknowingsreknowings f. We cannotknow he Forms. And f,knowledge-in he senseofthatof whichknowings re instances-belongs to God, then God cannot know us or any of ourconcerns. (This step is unwarranted. Parmenides s speakingas if that ofwhichknowings re instances s itself knowingof something nd one whichGod enjoys. I thinkhe is alsoassuming rpretendinghat God, because supramundane,must







PLATO S ' PARMENIDES'. 141

be a Form, and yet a possessorof knowledge. But if God

knows anything,he is a particular,whether upramundaneor not; and his knowingswill be instances of knowledge.)This last conclusion s rathershocking han convincing; b'utthe general point is of some logical importance, hough t istoo elliptically resented o carrymuch weight as it stands.I think hat it is true that a relation an onlybe conceived ohold between erms hat are ofthe same typeor level; and ifinstancesand what theyare instancesof are not of the sametype or level, no relation can hold between them. But the

notion of typesor levels is still a veryobscure one, and wasmuch moreso in Plato's time when even the muchmore ele-mentarydistinctions f Aristotelian ategorieshad yet to beworkedout.

There s now left big question. It is apparently llegitimateto assert that Forms have this, that or any relationto theirinstances it is illegitimateo assert thatEny quality,relation,magnitude, tate,etc., s an instance f tself r ofanyattributesof the same familywith tself. What sortsofpropositions an

then be asserted about Forms? Are there ny cases where tis legitimate o describe ne Formas an instanceofanyotherAre there ny attributive rrelational ropositionsboutFormsat all ? Or is Socrates to be disconcertedn theway in whichhe repeatedly aid that he would be disconcerted y the dis-covery that propositions bout Forms are or entail self-con-tradictions

Parmenides ays that the young Socrateshas got into diffi-culties because he has not been put through certainsort ofphilosophical iscipline; namely,he has not learnedto explorequestions bytheZenonianmethodof dialecticalreasoning. Weknow well what this method was. Zeno had shown that thepremissesof Pythagoreanmathematicswere illegitimate,inceincompatible consequencescould be rigorouslydeduced fromthem. Thosepremisses ad seemed nnocent nd plausible,buttheirhiddenviciousnesswas exposed by the derivation fanti-nomiesfrom hem.

But the method requires a certain expansion. Zeno hadshown that certainpropositions r hypotheses ntailed contra-dictory consequences; but it is also requiredto see whetherthe contradictoriesf such propositions r hypothesesentailcontradictoryonsequences.

For primafaciewe should expect that ifa given propositionis shownto be logically vicious, its contradictorymust beautomatically validated. But if both a proposition nd its







142 GILBERT RYLE:

contradictoryre logicallyvicious,both entailing ontradictory

consequences, hen the viciousnessof those propositions s ofa moreradicalorder.For instance,Jones is a childless arent' contains contra-

diction, but 'Jones is not a childlessparent' containsnone,though t contains 'triflingproposition'. But 'a line is anassemblage fa finite umber fpoints' as well as 'a line is anassemblage fan infinite umber fpoints generate ontradic-tions. There s an illegitimacyommon obothwhichs firste-vealedwhenboth areshown o entailcontradictoryropositions.

Parmenides s prevailed on to give a specimen xhibition fthis sort of two-wayZenonian operation, n whichhe is alsoto take up Socrates'challenge o showthat Formshave incom-patible predicates. Namelyhe is to take up a proposition rhypothesis bout a Form, and show that this hypothesis ndalso thecontradictoryf t entailthatcontradictoryropositionsaretrueaboutthatForm.

He gets Socrates to allow that it is an integralpart of histheory fForms, hat fthere xist nstances fsomething,hat

ofwhichtheyare instances tself xists and is something therthan they. Goodness, imilarity, ircularitynd the rest, areterms fwhich t is notonly ignificantuttrueto say thattheyexist orare entities, ifwerelish erms fart). It is alsotakento be an integral art ofthetheoryhatFormshave attributes,i.e., that abstractnouns can be the subject-wordsn significantand true sentences, fwhichthe predicates ignify he havingofqualities,relations,magnitudes,tates,etc.

Parmenides s goingto perform dialecticaloperationupona selectedForm; namely,he is going to discover whethercertainhypothesisbout thatForm as well as its contradictorygenerate ontradictions.WhichFormwillhe choose? The listof alternatives ut of which he selects s 'plurality (or mani-foldness), imilarity, issimilarity,hange, changelessness, e-coming,annihilation, xistence,non-existence nd unity (orsingleness). And he picks on the last on the pretextthat itwas his philosophicalperquisite. The propositionwhich-and

the contradictoryf whichhe is goingto subject to Zenoniandissection othhave fortheir ubjectsthe Form or conceptofUnityor Singleness, hat namelyof which all thesebuildingsare one college' embodies n instance.

Andhere mustdifferrom rof.Taylor,Mr. Hardie andmanyotherson a point of translation. For theyrenderto E'vas'The One'. Nowthisphrase s objectionable n othergrounds,for nyman of sense willbe provoked o say 'the onewhat 2








As it stands,the phrase s incomplete nd meaningless. How-ever, the suggestion s that we are to take it as analogous

to 'the Almighty',t.e., as a terse description f a being ofw-hichinglenesslike omnipotencen the analogouscase) is aleading property. But Plato makes it perfectly lear thatT' 'v isthename f Formideby idewithor's or rwpO'-S.

The English abstract noun 'Unity' is its propertranslation.If the Greek anguage had possessed the word-as it did lateron-cvomTs.would have beenemployednstead.

The collocation f the particleTo with a neuteradjective isa perfectly amiliarway of expressingwhat we expressby anabstractnoun, nd theonlyexcuse forrenderingt by the onein thisdialogue s thepresuppositionhatofcourseParmenidesmustbe discussinghis Monistictheory, orwhichthere s nointernal videncewhatsoever.

While on this matter ftranslation, emayalso complainofProf.Taylor'sconstantuse ofsuchphrages s 'the just equal'and the just similar as translationsorTo' 'ov ' and -4Lo oovor'ath ro Tov'

and'cavTOtOOLotov'. Actuallyhese hrasesre

onlytheequivalentofourabstractnouns equality' and ' simi-larity ; butProf.Taylor'sphrases renearly enseless nd quitemisleading. When we use the word ' just' adverbiallyweusually mean ' nearlynot', as when reachthe station ust intime. Or sometimeswe use it in thesense of merely as whenI call someone just an ignoramus. If either ensewereap-propriate,phrases ike 'the just equal' would be descriptionsof particulars haracterised s 'nearly not equal' or ' merelyequal '-silly descriptions f nothing t all. But in fact, the

Greekphrases re used to denoteForms; theymean equalityand ' similarity', nd the sentencesn whichthey occurmakeno senseunlessthey re so taken.

What then are the propositions r hypotheses bout Unitywhich are to be shown to entail contradictoryonclusionsAndhere,unfortunately,here s a real ambiguityn theGreek.

There are three lternatives.(1) Each hypothesis is the existence-propositionUnity

exists oritscontradictoryUnitydoes notexist'.

(2) Each hypothesis s the attributiveproposition Unityis unitary orsingle)' or its contradictoryUnity s notunitary(orsingle) .

(3) Someofthehypothesesreoftype 1) andsomeoftype 2).If we are primarilynterested n the logic of existence-pro-

positionsor in the theoryof the substantiality f the Forms,we shall be tempted o render ll the hypotheses s ofthefirst







144 GILBERT RYLE:

pattern. If we are primarilynterested n the logical questionwhether ny universal an be an instanceof itself,we shall be

drawntowards hesecond.Bothwould be naturaltopics forPlato to explore, fterwhat

has already transpiredn the firstpart of the dialogue. TheTheaetetusnd the Sophist show that Plato was at this timedeeplyconcernedwiththe logic of existence-propositions,ndtheycontainno suggestion hat he was much exercised boutthe problemwhether termcan be one of its owin nstances.The prefatoryemarks f Parmenides 135-136) trongly uggestthat thehypotheseswill be of the form that so and so existsand ' thatso and so does notexist . But the internalevidenceof the earlier dialecticalmovements, hough equivocal whentaken by itself, ointsas strongly o the second alternative rto the third s to thefirst.

The difficultys this. 'or-Tr' can be used as a copula or tomean exists'; 'v ' can be used as an'abbreviationor TOv',i.e., substantivally,r t can be used adjectivally,o that t canmean Unity or t can mean unitary or single. And Greek

permits he predicate-adjectiveo precedethe copula. So thelittle sentence 'v or-rtcan mean ' Unity exists or ' it (i.e.,Unity,whichhas been previouslymentioned) s unitary'.

And this is complicatedby the fact that Plato is ready toinfer rom proposition f theform is P to ' S exists , sinceif S has a certain ort of beingit must have being, .e., exist(see Theaet. 188-189,Parm. 161-162,Soph. 252). That is, an' &rd' in the sense of ' exists followsfrom n ''or "', in thesense of ' is . . .'. And conversely,f it is true to say that

Unity exists, t is plausible to infer hat it is unitary. (Thisbegs a big question-but we cannotsay yet thatPlato realisedthat it begs t.)

I am convinced hat the correctnterpretations the existen-tial one; that is, thatin thefirst wo ofthefour operationsthe hypothesis nder examination s 'that Unity exists' andinthe secondtwo t is ' that Unitydoes not exist .' When, ssometimesccurs, speciallyn the first peration, eis deducingconsequences rom heproposition Unity sunitary or single) ,

this tself s takento be an obviousconsequence f the originalone ' Unity exists'. It has to be admitted hat, especially nthe first peration, he Greek does not square any betterwiththis nterpretationhan withthe other. But the followingon-siderationsmake it necessary,f t is possible.

IV. Brochard onstrues he hypothesesn this way in his essay LaTheoriePlatonicienne e la participation'n hisbook IRtudesde Philo-sophieAncienne t de PhilosophieModeme'.








Thegeneralpattern f the arguments simple. There re twomain operations pon the affirmativeypothesis,nd two mainoperations pon thenegativeofit. Let us label them Al andA-2,Ni and N2 (' A ' for affirmative, ' N ' for negative ).Next,Al answers o NI, and A2 to N2, in thisway: In Al andNI Parmenides s seeing what propositions bout Unity areentailedby the hypothesis; in A2 and N2 he is seeing whatpropositionsbout erms ther hanUnityfollowfrom he hypo-thesis. (There re subordinate ivisionswithin heseoperations,whichdo not matterforourpresent urpose.)

Now thoughthe actual formulation f the hypothesis ndthe development f the argumentn operationAl leaves it indoubt whether he hypothesis s ' Unity exists' or 'Unity issingle', theformulationf thehypothesis nd the argument fNI make it perfectly lear that herethe hypothesiss ' Unitydoes notexist .

It is fairly lear too, though ess so, that the hypothesis fN2 is 'Unitydoes not exist'. But from his t follows hatthehypotheses f operationsAl and A2 mustbe 'Unity exists',

else the promised wo-way pplicationofthe Zenonian methodwould be broken. Moreover,this alone is consistentwithParmenides'sketch of the task of the dialecticalmethod inthepassagesfrom 35a to 136c. And as I have said, it is cor-roborated y thefacts 1) thatintheTheaetetusnd theSophistPlato is acutelyconcernedwithexistence-propositions,nd (2)that,as we shall see,Aristotle ecogniseshattherewas orhadbeen a major philosophical rux about the two concepts ofUnityand Existence. And (anyhow ater) l51rSOEMs5' normally

meant the assumption ftheexistencef so and so.Prof.Taylor'stranslationhindersratherthan assists us in

this matter. For he rings,hechanges upon such formulationsas, ' if it (i.e., the one) is one5' if there s one 'if the one is'if theone is not and 'if there s no one . None of theseareconsonantwithEnglish diom, nd hardlywithEnglish yntax;but anyhowthe very varietyof them is inconsistentwithParmenides'self-announced ask. His task is to explore onepropositionwith its contradictory,nd not several. And thisproposition nd its contradictorymust have Unity fortheirsubjects.

EvidencethatthesinglewordE'vs used as a simple ubstitutefor hephrase rO'' is as follows:KaAo'v,CKaLov andaya0o'varesoused in 130b and 135c, avo'-tocov in 136b. E'v is indubitablyused substantivally t 143b2, 143c5-7, 144a4, 149c7, 160b5-7et seq., 161b9, 163c1, 164b3, 164d and e, 165b6, 166bl. Cf.

10







146 GILBERT RYLE:

also Theaetetus 85dl, 186a8, Sophist 238el, 239a10, Phaedo

76 and 77. Onmyview there re otsofplaces ntheParmenideswhere his diom s employed; but I cannot use most of themas evidence, ince t s justthe conclusionhat t isbeing mployedthereforwhich adduce theseotherpassagesas evidence.

There are, of course,plentyofpassageswhereE'vis certainlybeingused adjectivally r predicatively.

Beforeembarking pon the exegesisof the main drift ftheZenonianexercise, here s a matter of some general nterest onotice. Why does Plato make Parmenideschoose to operate

upon such rarefied oncepts as Unity and Existence? Or,when makinghis selection of his victim, why does he onlymentionas candidatesforthe post such rarefied onceptsasManifoldness,imilarity, issimilarity, hange,Changelessness,Existenceand Non-existence Would not the operationshaveworked fappliedto beautyor justice,circularityr squareness,humanity ranimality

No hint of a reason is given in the dialogue. The answermay simplybe thathe assumedthat what is trueof the more

genericFormswill cover the more specific nes; the generallogical propertiesof universals will come out most swiftlyfrom n inspection f thosewhichare nearestthe peak of thepyramid. That is, Plato may have thought hat as Figure ishigher hanPlane Figure, nd thatthanTriangle, o Similarity,Plurality,Existenceand the rest are higher han Figure, .e.,that they are Summa Genera. If he did thinkthis, he wasmistaken. This seemsto be Prof. Cornford's xplanationforthe selection; he does not recognise hat Existence is not asort-concept.

In fact,these conceptsor most ofthem,and severalothers,differrommostordinary onceptsnot ust in levelofgeneralitybut in type. They are formalconcepts,not peculiarto anyspecial subject matter,but integralto all subject matters.Theybelong, o to speak,not to thisor thatspecialvocabularyofknowledge, ut to itsgeneral yntax. Now in the Theaetetusand theSophistwe findPlato recognisingust sucha feature f

certain concepts. The mode of arrangementf letterswhichconstituteshema syllable s not itself letter; and Plato usesthisanalogyto explainhow certainconcepts ike existence ndnon-existence ave a differentort of logical behaviour frommost ordinary oncepts, ust (as I construehim)because theyare not terms n thepropositions hichwe thinkbut theformsofthecombinationsfthoseelementsntopropositions. He doesnot and cannotfullydevelopthis view. But as it is trueand








importantnd was in Plato's mindat thisperiod, t is agreeable

to conjecture hat it entered nto his motiveforselecting heconceptswhich he does select forsubjectionto his Zenonianoperation.

As what I wish to showis that the Parmenides s an earlyessay in thetheory ftypes, hissuggestion as somerelevanceto what will be my generalthesis. I shall take it up againlateron.

Anotherpossiblemotiveshould be considered. What werethe salientproperties f Forms according o the stricttheory

of them? Plainly two; first, hat a Form is singlewhereasits instances re ormightbe plural. The wholeproblemwas:How can a plurality f objects differentromone anotherbegivenone name or be spokenof as if there was one identicalsomethingn them? It is the primebusinessofa Formto besingle. And,second, Formhad to be realorexistent,n orderto infect ts instanceswith such meagrecontagions f realityas they enjoy. It is byreferringo a Formthatwe answer hequestionWhatreally s thisparticular

Now,ifForms, o resolve ny of ourdifficulties,ave to existand to be single,what sort of Forms will these be, namelyExistence and Singularity Will they too be existent andsingle Or not ? Clearly hemenaceof an infinite egress relse a flatcontradictiontaresus in theface. (Cf.Philebus15.)

For thisto have been Plato's motive nselecting or nspectiointhe hypothesis hatUnity xistsorthatUnity s single ortheircontradictories),e wouldnot have had to supposethat,Unityand Existenceare SummaGenera,nor yetwouldhe have had.to see or half-see hat Unity and Existence are not Summa.Generabut form-concepts.His concentrationponthemwould.have had thehistorical easonthat ust theseconceptswerethesheet-anchorsfthewholetheory f Forms. He operatesuponthem, ecausethewhole arguments an argumentumd homines.I thinkthat in fact, f not in Plato's consciousness,hissug-gestedline of approachis only a special case of the one pre-viouslymentioned. For what it is tempting o construe s the

essentialproperties f universals,will in fact turn out (sinceuniversals cannot have properties) o be formal features ofpropositions,n which of course universalswill be factors.

The onemotivewhich feelfairlyure didnot much nfluencePlato is the one usuallymentioned, amelythat he wishedtodiscussParmenideanMonism. This insipidunitarianism as nospecialbearings n the truthor falsity f the theory f Forms,and no specialbearings n moregeneralquestionsof logic, and







148 GILBERT RYLE:

I see no reasonwhyPlato shouldhave interested imselfmuch

in it,ormuchevidence hathedid so,whereas here s plentyf

evidence nternal o this dialogueand adjacent dialoguesthathe was verymuchinterestedn the theory fFormsand verymuch nterestedlso in moregeneral uestions f ogic.

Parmenideshas opted to practicehis Zenonian operationsupon one selectedconcept; that of Unity. But he does notsuggest hat the resultant ntinomies re peculiarto this con-cept. The implied uggestions, rather, hat antinomies fthesame typecouldbe shown o resultfrom perations ither pon

any otherconceptsor upon some otherconcepts. Parmenidesnowhere ayswhich. Eitherdiscoverywouldprovide heyoungSocrateswiththe disturbancewhichhe had said wouldtroublehim. Whether t is shown in the case of one concept,or ofseveral,or of all, that contradictionsrise in theirdescription,it will be enough to show that the promiseof the perfectknowability f the supposed supramundane ntitieshas beendelusive.

The most temptingreadingof the position is that Plato

realised or nearly realised that antinomiesnecessarilyarisefrom he attemptto make any conceptwhatsoeverfrom hemostspecific o themostcategorial) subjectofattributes. Toassert or to denythat a conceptdoes or does not exemplifyitself r another oncept s to assertsomethingllegitimate, omatterwhat that conceptmay be. A quality or a relationneitherhas nor lacks any qualityor relation. The name of aqualityor relation annot significantlyccuras the subject ofan attributive r relationalsentence. Abstractnouns cannot

assumetherolesofpropernames or demonstratives.In particular,here s a deep-seated rregularityn sentences

of whichthe verbis the verb to exist , and the subjectis anabstractnoun or the name of an E3OS'. Contradictionsriseas wellfrom hedenialas from heassertion hat Unityor anyotherEt3os exists. So the halloweddoctrine hat it is onlyof such subjects that we can withknowledge r truthassertthat theyreally xist s baseless.

This, say, is themosttempting onstructionf themessageof the Parmenides. For, for one thing, t is true. And foranother hing, t is completely eneral. And,thirdly,t roundsoffvery neatlyParmenides'criticism f the youngSocrates'simpletheoryof SubstantialForms. It had been shownal-readythat Socratescould say nothing f the relations etweenhis Formsand their nstances, r betweenhis Forms and ourknowings nd thinkings.And now it is shownthat he can







PLATO S ' PARMENIDES'. 149

say nothingof the relations betweenone Form and another

Form.None the less, I am not satisfied hat this is themessageofthe dialogue. I thinkthat Plato thought hat the antinomieswhich he exhibitsresult from he applicationof the Zenonianoperationto certain concepts, nd no such antinomieswouldhave arisen from ts applicationto certainothers. There issomething ogicallyeccentric bout certainconcepts, uch asUnity and Existence,whichdoesnot infect ll concepts, houghitmay infect fewothers.

I shall try to formulate his interpretation oreaccuratelylater on. For the moment wishto mention hegroundswhichmakemedubious f hetruth f hemore emptingnterpretation.First, the dialoguethe Sophist,which s certainly loselycon-nected with the Parmenides n date and style, nd in certainstretcheslso in method nd topic,nowhere andles ny generaltheoretical ifficultiesn thetheory fForms but it does dealvery intensivelywiththe logical properties f a fewconceptswhich are of a veryformal ort,namely,those of existence,non-existence,imilarity, ifference,hangeand changelessness.And it picksup two threadswhichare already to be found nthe Theaetetus, amely (1) that there is something ogicallypeculiarabout the conceptsof existence,and non-existence,and (2) that the modes of combination f elements,ikethat ofletters n syllablesor words in sentences, re not themselveselements. And it is suggested hat someconcepts but not all)are somehow nalogousnot to letters rwordsbut to themodes

of combination fletters nd words, o that the contradictionswhichperplexedus over these formal onceptsarose from hefact thatwe weretrying o treat as 'letters or 'words whatare in truthmodes of combination f 'letters or 'words .Or to use the language of Kant and Wittgenstein, e weretryingto treat formalconceptsas if they were 'proper' ormaterialconcepts.

Finally, it seems to me unquestionablethat Aristotle inMetaphysics 001a, 1003b, etc., Physics 185-187,Topics 121a

and b, 127a, and De Sophisticis Elenchis 182b) is referringto notoriouscruces about the special conceptsof Unity andExistence-whetherhe actuallyhas his eye on the Parmenidesdoes not matter. There were clearly difficultiesbout themwhichwere notthought o attachto mostother oncepts;theywereclearly losely ffiliatedo each other; and somethingm-portant s thought yAristotle o be revealed bout themwhenit is said ofthemnotmerely hatthey renotsubstances which







150 GILBERT RYLE:

is trueof all Formsalike),but also that they re notgenera nddo not fall underanyone of the categories s opposed to anyother, but in some way pervade them all-in which respecttheyareunlikemostconcepts.

These considerations uggestto me the followingway ofrendering lato's line of thought n the Parmenides nd theSophist and in lesserdegree heTheaetetus).

He was beginning o see that there are differentypes ofconcepts. (As always happens, a philosophicalproblem is,at the start,dominated ya status-question.Later, thisstatus-

questionsurrendersts primacy nd even its interest o a net-work of constitution-questions).a) One difference etweentypesof concepts, pecimens fwhichPlato exploreswith lmosttedious pertinacityn the Sophist nd the Politicus, s that be-tweengeneric nd specific oncepts, rbetween he moregenericand themore pecific oncepts. Thus, iving reature-animal-man,orfigure-planefigure-planerectiIinearigure-triangle-isosceles riangle, re scales ofkinds or sorts,which scales ex-hibitdifferencesn degreeof generic-nessr specific-ness.But

this sort ofdifferences not directly mportant orour purpose,save in so far s thenegative oint, o whichPlato was, think,alive in the Sophist, s relevant,namely that Existence andNon-Existence re not co-ordinate pecies ofa genus,northem-selves generahavingeach other r other oncepts s subordinatespecies. The same wouldbe trueof Unity and Plurality. (b)Anotherdistinction,whichPlato himselfdraws elsewhere, sthat between qualities and relations. Relational predicates,with the possibleexception fidentity, equire he existence f

at least two terms,whereasqualitativepredicatesonly requireone. (c) A thirddistinction, hich thinkPlato never ttendsto, is that betweensimpleand complex concepts,or betweensimplernd more omplex oncepts. Thus, danger' is ess simplethan ' harm , for t combines he notion of harmwith that oflikelihood. Completely imple concepts would be indefinable,and definableoncepts re complex. It is odd thatthe Socratichunt for definitions id not lead to the realisation hat someconceptsmustbe simple nd so indefinable. Perhapsthecryptictheory, xpounded and criticisedn the Theaetetus,hat theultimate lements f what exists resimpleswhich an be namedbut not asserted, s an indicationthat somebodyhad noticedthe point. But it is probablethat by 'simple elements Platounderstoodatomic particulars, ike sense-data, rather thanelementary oncepts ike 'yellow . (d) Quite otherthan thesedifferencesf type betweenconcepts s the differenceetween








formal onceptsand ' proper concepts. A formal onceptisone whichmay have a place in a proposition bout anysubject-

matteryou please, and some formal onceptsor otherwill bepresent n any proposition. But non-formalonceptswill onlyoccur n propositions iththisas opposedto that specialtopic.'Triangle' occurs n propositions f geometriciansr surveyors,and ' catapult' in propositions escribinghooting. But ' not'' exists 'some 'other' 'single ' several ' is-an-instance-of''is a species of ' and' 'implies' and many othersare notpeculiarto any special topics.

Such formal onceptsare not subject or predicateterms ofpropositions-they re not 'letters , but ratherthe modes ofcombiningerms. Whatthe spelling fa word s to its letters,or what the syntax of a sentence s to the words n it, that aformal oncept s to the non-formalonceptsn a proposition.

So it may be that the laborious operationsof this dialogueare intended,perhaps onlyhalf consciously, o bringout thedifferenceetween ormalnd ordinary oncepts y showinghatthe ogicalbehaviour f someof the formers anomalous.

(To be concluded.)

RYLE, Gilbert (1939) - Parmenides (Mind, 48 190)

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