Ik t £ W Il 11 IU 'I ^ C F SEßÄO

PCStt HC* 0BK3SHAL A. ÖHHWIiflHSk,

SHBJBCCt SHAPS Stfbevdltiate Oantuad Btruetnre.

1. Attocbod berste are ton (10) copias of a draft 3>«Kcrapdta Irok SAC1 Barop» to th* Stondlng Group. nie uanoraMÜ» Mt i forth SftO, EuropV • reeoamMVlftfcioua relotlT» to Ma' auborCInata Comaand atrnetura, thaae reocameodationa b«Lng required under the terns of D.c» 24/5,

» , Full allied psjrtielpBtion boa bam obtained l a Üb» forçaistlOtt of tb* iMaorandia* and* en th« basis of SftC1 BBrcpe1B DOO 1«JJCJO aa TO tha atnutar« i taoir , « « «R» ROVING ahead «Ith tbe preparation of Aran tanas of refcranoe for tbe a «vor e l subordinate CCCBIanders Involved.

C. T. R. SCHUÏLBH Brigadlar Oaneralt TJ.S.A»,

Aettsg Dapaty Cbtaf of Staff *t 1*

1 Ineli SEàPB SabordinctB CMaaflmJ Structure (Coploa 1 thru 10 Incl*)

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: ; o - o T O P S E O N I } b *

Y&mAKDUf KHtj THE STANDING, GODUP SffBJECTt SlkPE Subordinate Goroand Structura

The terctt of reference »stabilebed for at bf the Ctofenee Ccwittee of 'the orth Atlantic Treaty OrgadMtioa Charge Bfi with the r sponslbUit ïto to the lttlitary Cownitteey through the StaMing Qrcnpt a subordinate ccraand structare for t Ï* ftir:.*) Jorccs in Europe. I hove regarded this responsibility as one of overriding initial inportanoe to the successful e s tabli shnent of an i jisetaMr- fcrce Ior the do fens« Ois

Europe, 2« In determining th» aost- suitable subordinate command structure, I

hare bean guided by several criteria Tihichj in rajr opinion, exert a control» ling influence upon tn* Lilt m te solution, TtotSe are;

d„ ltie quires» nt for a structure which «ill provide simple J anti direst channels Vü roby 1 can exercise centralised direction acn£ co- | ordination with respect to «y responsibilities fort

¢1) The generation- organization,, equipping, training Q and inspection of aa integrated Allied force, all llJf u

en an urgent basis« Ci (2) in» preparation of plans for th« defense of Europe.

1 (3) The conduct of operations in the «rent of war« b» Acceptable resolution of coijflictiog political psychological .

a nd national considerations inherent in the problems Of the development of • an integrated Allied force«

c, Oapitaliaatlon on the progress inherent in existing plans for European defense, and utilisation of existing command agenciez in order to nake most effective use of available resources;

df Adaptability to augmentation of forces and to the addition of possible new participating aat-lons*

e* Facility of establishment and• transition necessary to meet the exigencies of actual hostilities,

f* Consonance with my conception as Suprene Allied Gamander* Europe, of the nature and scope of mçf mission» J

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O T O P S E C F L E N O 3. Hth respect to the foregoing criteria, It Is my vie*

that the'defense of Sorope requires the Integrity of a coordinated syst am along a general front frctn the northern reaches of Norway to the interior of North Africa. ^Thls front divides itself geographlc B Ily and strategically into three sectors. In the center is the "eatem Bqropean peninsula, on the northern fiante of Äiich lies the water, air and land complex of Scandinavia, the O.K., the Horth Sea and the Baltic. On the southern flank lies the water, air and land complex constituted by Northnert Africa, Italy, the Mediterranean and possibly other positions along its northern littoral.

In the central area a battle for the defense of Sorope would be characterised by Intensive land and air action. On the northern flank, operations would entail extensive naval and air action closely Integrated vith the defense of key strong points. On the southern flank, naval operations would initially play «a significant role In support of the center battle. On this flank there must also be major land and air oporetlohs In defense of an AttStro-ItaliaQ couverture. Of transcending Importance Is the necessity for recognizing that the success of the overall battle for the defease of, Europe requires the Integration of the military resources of all three areas and the exploitation of the maxima potentialities of ground, naval and air forces through coordinated action.

5. Corollary to the above Strateslc concept la the recogni-tion that the entire European front also divides itself Into northern, central, and southern sectors for logistic reasons. The north, divorced from the center due to the absence of major land lines of ecmmunlcation, must receive special consideration. The south. Isolated from the center by tbe Alpine barrier, re-quires separate logistic arrangements to Include supply by sea and sii W C through northern Italy.

6. In the light of the foregoing, the subordinate command structure In Europe should entail delineation of Northern, Central and Southern Allied Commands, Within these Commands, I consider

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• 0 ftP SECRET5 o / that-th« most lntenslve operations would be staged In the «enter t T op the axes of the traditional invasion routes into Europe from the east. In view of the criticslity of these operations, and with due regard for political and psychological considerations, t have further concluded that It devolves upon me as the Supreme Commander initially to assume personal responsibility for the dir-ection and control of the forces and operations in the central area.

7. In the exercise of this responsibility I consider that I must command through an Army ConmsnJei-? art Air Cosmander and a jWaya3 Flog Ofricer.

8. Additionally, for the Northern and Southern areas I will require under me Commanders-in-Chief to «hom I aUall give strategic direction and allocate Army, Naval and Air Forces from those avail-able tb me*

9i Finally, in order that I may be assured of the closest possible integration of the Strategic Air-Forces with the European defensive, effbrt, and that I may be assured of the fullest possible coordination and utilisation of other air forces allocated to I regard aa essential the establishment of an Allied A Ir Command reporting directly to Me on a level coordinate with the Ccnoandera-In-Chlef of the Northern and Southern Areas,

10. In line with the magnitude of the responsibilities inherent in the command structure I have outlined, I consider that I shall require a deputy *ho, by virtue of his experience and posi-tion in, the command structure, will be able to assist me In the exercise of toy duties.

11. A recapitulation In diagrasiatlc form of the subordinate commend structure I have described, is contained at Enclosure "A".

IS. It Is my.recowaendatlon, therefore, that tbe Standing Qvoup and KIlltary Coamitfee In turn approve the structure defined at Biclosure "A", and direct the Iinplasentatlon therèof. I. further recommend that tbe structure at Enclosure nAn be regarded as on . ultimate solution» and that in arriving thereat, I be permitted to retain freedom of choice In'establishing such interim arrangeaents-es may be either required or desirable in the interests of econtany of personnel, utilisation of existing agencies, or military or political expediency. THP SFRRFT

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O O O T O P S E G R E T

O

• JICLCtmiE

ÛKAP-a SDSCIiaKAT11 Ca.. CTRfCTORB

SUPROtK CCKUAMD1B

I C-IH-C I I SORTE

1 CrIS-C t Land ' Osntrsl

r C-IV-C ' Air Contral .

DBPOTÏ Sopran caxjünnR

J .

_L 1; Seval ' ' C-IK-C ! Alllad Plag , SOVIH ' ' Air Cffloar ,, ConnBDd

(Ctrat)

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^ \ Q I M

r i o atatfc

dUAltUate of WfariUfclöfl of

It cflrtUMit wa k m this DATA witnuod UM Dntiw tlon by burning, ot C L a M U M IfatorUl UaUd MIowt

(Shirt atnoDT tltïi if

«0. cams

OOPf 806»

j — _ _ _ _ _ a, a/»» 0/ * to î. ni» o w

(Haara # 4) U

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^-L ,.-Zrr tt&M 1 Of vjtUnb I »• ~ TBp SECRET

;>kT.£ Sl Petrrusry 19P1 if,/ , • tZfH

I1AGE 1 of Itf _ I

~ , •r,J: 9

!'IliOlUiDTI1 FOB; THJV LTMIDlKa GROUP

STJBJnCTt SrLftFi ubordlnats Camnsnd i-troeture

1. Sie term* of refer ones established for ne toy the

- Defense Cosnlttee of t!in iiorth Ablaatle Treaty CrganiEstlon

charge me ai Ki me responalbi 11 ty for recommending to the

Military Comnltteet through tîie standing "roup, a subordinate

. OtKLiatuJ a trustor« for the Allied PorceE la Mir ope. I have

regarded this natter es one of overriding Initial importance

to the suoceasiTul establishment of an Integrated force for

the defense of Jiurope.

2* In determining tiie wont suitable subordinate cOanand

structure, I have been guided by several criteria, which, la

ry opinion, esert a controlling Influence upon Uie ultimate

solution. Ihoae are: -P

a» Uie requi recent for a structure «h. ch »ill

provlöo Blaiple and direct charnels thereby I con exercise

neutralised direction and coorctinatl en tdth respect to ray

rsapoi.,-;,ïiiv,tler for:

roß.

r.a y n

WMIhet •t-.'vj

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° 0TOP WRFT0 0 (1) Cii gttSraMlaMM&roaafela«, - «quipping.

trelding and Inspection of an Integrated

Allied Voroej all on «a urgtat basis.

(2) 'itae preparation of plena for the defense of .

Europe.

(S) 'Übe conduct of operations In tbe event of aar.

b. Acceptable resolution of conflicting political,

•isyoliologloal and national considerations lnbermt in the

n rob lams of the development of an integrated Allied force •

This Implies recognition of the fact that many of the forces

«h ch Eiay be required for the defense of Jwrope noraall? have

other tusks to be perforaed under their national service

OOrD1Onderi except «hen requirements for the defense of Kurope

ore of sa overriding nature.

e. Copltsllzatlon on existing plans for m r op en«

defense, and ut 111 eu tlon of existing planning and CO uuond

agencies In order to ako nost effective use of available

resources.

d. Adaptability to augmentation of forces and to

the addition of possible new participating nations.

c. Facility of tStaSllsltneat and transition necessary

to r»eet t'-p exigencies of actual hostilities.

Pige S of lo pages

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Q o TOP ShCHt ; o , f, My conception, aa Suprene Allied Casanander Europe,

of the nature and scope of my «laslon.

3. TWth respect to the foregoing criteria. It lo EJy view

that the defease of Hbrope requires the Integrity of a coordi-

nated system extending fron the northern roaches of Xormy to

the Interior of Horth Africa. Kils "couverture" divides Itself

geographically end strategically Into three principal sectors.

In the center Is the land peninsula of Western Suropet bordered

on both Ita northern and southern flanks by extensive water,

air and land complexes. The northern flank is constituted by

Soandlnavla, the Oilted Kingdom, the North Sea and the Baltic,

On Qic southern flank are Italy, Northwest Africa, the Mediter-

ranean the Mediterranean islands, and other positions along the

northern and southern littorals of the Dedltorronsen,

4. A battle for the defence of Western lsuropo would be

characterized by intensive Iond and air action baséd on the

central area, powerfully supported by naval and air operations

of forces concentrated In the northern and the Hedltorrenean

areas. Ihe oporationa by forces in His north would entail

nnval nri'J air action closely integrated with the defense of

key strong points. Highly jooblle airborne and amphibious

forces wou j be used to reinforce tbeso positions and to (-.ow.tar

caemjr odvo-icca. On the southern flank, naval air, aurfoco, and Pago 3 pflO pages TOP SECRET

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v OIU^ StUHtluO no phi Moos operations In support of the central bettle mould

bi coordinated with an?Jor lrtnd trad air operations in defense

of an Austro-Italien couverturo, end other key positional I

view Kit operations of the forces In the cdlttrroriooIl rnd

those in tbe Ucvthcrn rtgiea as being of critical Importance

In their relationship to the defense of \'estcrn mropc. Ihrrc

is thus obvious necessity for centralised strategic direction

of operations In the „'edit err en can region and thosf In the

I Horthorn region with those In "estera jUropc. For the

effective defense of Testern Uiropc, It le essential to

aj-ur; full IntégrâtIna of the Military resources ef all three rrcce and the exploitation of the anxlmum potentialities

»

of all (pound, siavnl and rlr forces through coordinated action*

I 5. Ihs entire ^uropcen front niso divides itsolf Into : northern, oentrol, and southern scctora for logistic?I reasons. i

' Ihe north is dlvoro'd from the center by the ahssnc of major

l.md lines of COTGUFIIcc tioa, Xhe south, isolated from the

center by the Alpine barrlor, reculres eeparote logistic

arrangements, to include supply by sea pad lines of ceoMmloa-

tlms throujh northern Italy. Xn both the north and In the

J'cdltorrcTieon the protection of sra lines of co™unletstloi is

of vital "nportonec.

Paae 4 of 10 Pages

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• Q 0TH0 FPRFl0 0

13. Cn the two f l M t s r V l r W W ^ M presently lnelwfled

j^n iiAT-0 but viiliSi ore obviously of great Iapoirtatiof to the

diif&nse of "astern '-uropc. I consider that the command

structure for the defense of Europe must bi such aa »111-

facilitate, at the appropriate time, utilisation of the forces

of Owodant YugoeIivia, ^poln, Sroeco end Turkey cither Inte-

grated Into or In olosc coordination, with thnsc of the atlantic

Powers. Similarly, In accordance with the concept of a

'forwerd strategy*^ we oust bc prepared now for the operation,

If required, of our oav^l end air foroea In the Bcltlo and

Astern . cûi terra nc. an.

j 7. In the liglit of tho firegelng, the subordinate eom-I

j mond structure la fcurope should entail delineation of üerthem, f

' Oeatral end ùouthem Auropo s n-tted 11 err an can allied Commande.

I "Within thesf. Commrïids, 1 consider that the most Intensive

-oficrctlitts would bc staged ia ttu. contçr on tho axes of the

trad'tional invasion routes Into Europe fr-ou the erat. In

vit« of tho cri ties Hty of these Operations, and mth due

regard for political nnd psychological ocnsiderations prevailing

et tM3 tlat, 1 heve further concluded thDt it, devolves upon

•ac rä the Supreme Contmnnder i ait icily to cseuno porsoTial

"cspoaBi5'Ilty fcr the direction ond control of the forces

and opcrr.tima la the central area. Id the exercise of this

M M C R rcsponsJblllty I con si <5 or ' YVfrlu3A jtpwiçjrid througii an Amy

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&«Maandbr»ln-CMef» an" Air ComSan a er, and a Hcval Commander. '

• 8, iAddltionoilyV for each of Wie Horthorn and Southern ' .

Buropoen-Kodltcçraneon areas I «ill require under me a Conimendsir- ''Jj.

In-Chlof to whom I shall give Strategie direction and to when I

«111 allocate Army, Naval and Air Forces from those avollabia

to me. Beceuseof the Naval problems involved and the magnitude

of the naval tasks In those areas, I con3Idor that the Corcmonder-

In-Chlefs In both the Southern Kuropean-Mcdl terraneon area and

the Northern area should, at loast Initially, be Senior Naval

Officers. Among the tasks of these offlcoro, In their respective

areas, would be coordination of Army, Navy dnd Air PorceSj

provision of maxima* eir and naval support of the Sof enge of

Western Europe; protection of essential air and see communications;

and assurance of support, liaison and operational coordination

with adjacent commands and areas. I recognize t iot some of these

tasks might otherwise be susceptible to fulfillment by comit cinders

beyond my Jurisdiction. However In viae of the transcending

importance of the defense of Sorope I consider that the command

organization must bo based primarily- on the accomplishment of

that objoetlve with acceptance of responsibility by ma for

collateral tasks and the support by «ic to other coimanders In

the accomplishment of their missions.

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* ° TOP SECBEI ° t - »

A V^gapltiOaJtlon In dlagraoatlc form of the sub-

ofrdlirft« cteMnd atru^ur« I have described, Is contalneö at

EnclMOPe "A*.

"10. Qmeatlon« way be ralaaâ as to the extant of authority

to bs exercised by me or by ny subordinate oorenandera over

forces Mhleh are allocatad to the defease of Europe. I conO

alder that I and Ay subordinate eomandera mat be authorised

to axerolae operational ecnmand «a required for the aocompllah-

Kent of ny mission. Hotrevart It la iay intention that the

missions, normal employment, administration and normal train-

ing of those foroes would continue to be responsibilities of

regularly designated national service cenraaaders except when

the requirements for the defense of Europe are considered by

Me to bo of an overriding nature. In turn, I would naturally

axpeet to bs subject to the decisions of higher MATO authority

in those instances where forces normally under my operational

ooramand nay be retired to perform some task which such

higher authority considers to be of greater importance.

*

Fage T of 10 Pages

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'•• Q O TOP SECBET ° ° • *

111 I sKall expoOt to accord Oatallad study to tha

SttbJact of boundaries both of ray own area of responsibility

in Mlstlon to Otheii HATO, Allied and national countsnds

and of the areas of responsibility of my subordinate eom-

•an&ers In relation to each other. Rooomnnmaatlona «111 be

aubaltted in At« coucse to the Standing Qroup aftor I have

had opportunity to consult « Ith Uw cognisant contenders.

12. Xn vis« of the magnitude of the responsibilities

Inhärent In the coanand structure that I have outlined, I

Mmalder that I shall require a principal deputy, a soldier,

«ho, by virtue of his experience and position in the

' .atmature, «111 be able to assist no in the exercise of my

! duties. In view of the vital lmportanoo for maximum ex-i 11 ploitatlon Of iSir potentialities, I «111 a ls« require

I lnmedistoly an a ir deputy. I envisage that I may later

MqitlAi a naval deputy. These officers «111 bave no

separate staf fs or command responsibilities but «111 advise

' and represent me on «uttters «ithin their particular cont-

^ petenoa.

Page 8 of 10 Pages

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0 O T O P SEQRZT *14. ' i t la qr reeanaendatlon, therofero, that tho Standing

Oroup and Kllltaiy Coimittee In turn note the strategic concept

and intention« »et forth above, approve tho structure defined

at Rielosttre *A", and direct th« implementation thereof. I

further rccoMend that the structure at Baoloaure "A" be

regarded as an objective solution and that in arriving theraat,

I be permitted to retain f r o adora of choice in establishing such

interim arrangements ns may tfe either required or desirable

in the Interests of oconosqr of personnel, utilisation of

existing agencies, or military or politico! expediency.

Page 9 of 10 Pages

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