Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH Security SVGA Image Sensor VISION...

Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH

AIM

AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbHAIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH

Security SVGA Image Sensor

VISION 2005, Dr. P. Stifter

SPIE 2005, 26,09.05Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH

AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Transition Real World Virtual World

Some of our real world aspects are mapped into a digital representation and stored in large databases. The digital identity has to be protected !

FR

Software


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Application Scenario of optical Sensors

Ethernet

Video Surveillance

SecVGA-1

Face Recognition

SecVGA-3

Video Surveillance

SecVGA-2

Biometric Server Video Server

Ethernet based physical layer with TCP/IP as a transport and routing layer.

Sensors capture images, generate sensitive data and transfer data packets over an open and insecure channel to dedicated servers


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Secure Sensor Design

Requirements:

• Data Authentication

Authentication ProtocolCryptographic Checksum (MAC)Cryptographic hardware modules

• Usage of publicly known and proven algorithms

• Secret Unique Identifier

Key storage

Key programming


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

System Design

large and busy digital core

Active Pixel Array

Column Decoder

Ro

w D

eco

de

r

Column Sample & Hold

Amplifier / ADC

SystemBus

TimingGenerator

CryptoUnit MainControl

RAM I2C

EEPROM

da

ta[9

:0]

SCL

SDA

dataOut[9:0]

PCLK

LSync

FSync

dataB

addrB


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Floorplan

Problem: CMOS imager is susceptible to various noise sources.

Noise level is increased by the activity of the digital core.


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Mixed Signal Design

• Most prominent noise: FPN

• Modules on the same substrate

Use CDS

Separation with multiple guard rings

Differential signal lines

Large blocking capacitors

• Signal integrity

• Stable reference voltages


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Key Storage

Selection between Polysilicon fuses or EEPROM cells

D-Matrix Pro

Poly

silicon

EEPROM

cells

Con

Simple interface External programming voltage

Not buried under metal layers

Burn-through process may damage pixel

Buried under shielded metal layer

No external access, on-chip charge pump

Encapsulation

Hardware overhead: controller


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

ChecksumAuthentication

Operational Flow

Start

Send Challenge

))(()~

( fEE KK

Read Response

))~

(()'( 1 fEE KK

Read Image x

)(xCCK

Recalculate Checksum

)(' xCCK

'Set Alarm

y

n

Stop

)()( ' xCCxCC KK

y

n

Accept Image

IndicateManipulation


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Data Protection

Data transfer with TCP/IP can be easily manipulated in the context of raw sockets. Application of cryptographic methods (MAC) protects against bit manipulations and faked identities

nEkK

nx

nc

Block cipher E of length n encrypt the message x to the cipher text c with key K of length k.


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Data Protection

Data transfer with TCP/IP can be easily manipulated in the context of raw sockets. Application of cryptographic methods (MAC) protects against bit manipulations and faked identities

MacDES

(1) Padding

(2) Splitting

E

E

1K

)( 2K (3) Initial Transformation

E E

1x tx

1K 1K

1H 2H 1tH

(4) Iteration

E2K

),(21 , xMAC KK

(5) Output Transformation


AIM

INTRODUCTION

SYSTEM DESIGN

MIXED SIGNAL

AUTHENTICATION

Conclusion

• One can obtain real end-point security on open and insecure data channels.

• On-chip cryptographic module provide real-time encryption and secure key storage.

• Challenge/Response method give any host in possession of the secret key the assurance of the data origin.

• Even a single bit manipulation is detectable.

• On-chip integration provides a high protection level against key recovery attacks.

Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH Security SVGA Image Sensor VISION...

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