Case Study I BAC

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    CASE STUDY ICASE STUDY I

    FAIRHOLME

    Ignore the crowd.

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    CURRENT INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITYWehaveidentifiedapubliccompany:

    Tradesatlessthanonethirdbookvalue

    Corebusinessesgenerating1%returnonassetsand10%returnonequity

    Fortressbalancesheet

    LargestU.S.

    retail

    deposit

    market

    share

    and

    serves

    one

    in

    every

    two

    U.S.

    households

    Operatesinall50statesandservesclientsinover100countries

    Essentialtoglobaleconomicsecurity

    Soundinteresting?

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    Bank of America is a strong, wellled company...I am impressed

    with the profitgenerating abilities of this franchise, and that they

    are acting aggressively to put their challenges behind them.

    WarrenE.Buffett

    ChairmanandCEO,BerkshireHathaway

    August25,2011

    Wecertainly

    think

    so,

    andwearenotalone.

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    InvestmentThesis

    for

    Bank

    of

    America

    (BAC)

    ReasonableExpectations

    1% ReturnonAssets

    10% ReturnonOwnersEquity

    20% ImpliedAnnualReturnonInvestment

    Thisisareasonable

    aftertaxprofitincurrent

    marketconditions.

    Thisisareasonablereturn

    evenatheightenedcapital

    ratiosexpected

    this

    cycle.

    Thisisareasonablereturn

    whenyoubuystockatless

    thanhalf

    book

    value.

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

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    BankofAmerica:A200YearHistoryExtensive

    Reach,

    Extraordinary

    Breadth

    *BankofAmericawascreatedthroughnumerousmergersandacquisitions

    overthelasttwocenturies,someofwhicharedepictedabove.FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

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    $0

    $500,000

    $1,000,000

    $1,500,000

    $2,000,000

    $2,500,000

    1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

    Do

    llars

    (in

    millions

    )

    WORLDWIDE PRESENCE AND ASSETGROWTH

    TotalAssets

    BankofAmericasGlobalFranchise 5,702Branches,17,817ATMs,and58millionconsumerandsmallbusinessrelationships

    17,300FinancialAdvisorsserveclientsinover100countries

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

    *BankofAmericaconductsglobaloperationsintheblueshadedgeographicareasdenotedabove.

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    $0

    $10

    $20

    $30

    $40

    $50

    $60

    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

    Do

    llars

    Pe

    rShare

    BookValue MarketPrice Cash Revenue

    Experiencedwith

    financial

    companies

    Favorableearningspower

    InvestinginourCircleofCompetence

    Fixableproblems

    Availableatattractiveprices

    Initiatedpurchaseafter

    thefinancialcrisis.

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

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    U.S.HousingMarketisStabilizingNew

    Single

    Family

    Home

    Sales

    Trending

    Upward

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

    Source:National

    Association

    of

    Home

    Builders

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    U.S.JobMarketisStrengthening

    InitialJobless

    Claims

    Trending

    Lower

    300

    350

    400

    450

    500

    550

    600

    650

    700

    January February March April May June July August September October November December

    Initia

    lJobless

    Claim

    s(in

    Thousan

    ds)

    2009 2010 2011

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    FDIC3Q2011QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE:INSURED INSTITUTION PERFORMANCE

    Netincome

    rose

    to

    $35.3

    billion

    as

    provision

    expenses

    fell

    further

    Loanlossprovisionsdeclinedforaneighthconsecutivequarter

    Reportedrevenuesincludeaccountinggainsatlargebanks

    Loanlossespostedfifthquarterlydeclineinarow

    Noncurrent

    loan

    levels

    fell

    for

    asixth

    consecutive

    quarter

    Loanlossreservesdeclinedforsixthquarterinarow

    Internalcapitalgrowthimproved

    Commerciallendingactivityrose

    Flowof

    large

    denomination

    deposits

    into

    large

    banks

    increased

    FinancialSectorFundamentalsAreImproving

    Youvegot

    to

    admit

    its

    getting

    better...

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    0

    0.020.04

    0.06

    0.08

    0.1

    0.12

    0.14

    0.16

    0.18

    Tier1commonEquityRatio

    Tier1RiskBasedCapitalRatio

    TotalRisk

    Based

    Capital

    Ratio

    capital

    ratio

    $920,000

    $940,000

    $960,000

    $980,000

    $1,000,000

    $1,020,000

    $1,040,000

    $1,060,000

    Deposits

    $0

    $2,000

    $4,000

    $6,000

    $8,000

    $10,000

    $12,000

    Charge

    Offs

    $0

    $100,000

    $200,000

    $300,000

    $400,000

    $500,000

    $600,000

    LongTermDebt

    BACFundamentalsAreImproving

    alittle

    better

    all

    the

    time.

    Dollars(in

    millions)

    Capital SufficientTier1Capital

    *Seelastpageforsupplementaryinformation.

    FAIRXHolding

    Period

    *

    FAIRHOLME

    LongTermDebtDecline

    27%declinesinceQ12010

    ChargeOffs

    62%declinesinceQ12010

    QoQdecreasesince2010

    Deposits

    6%increasesinceQ12010

    Reflectsstrongcustomerbase

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    $27,000

    $29,000

    $31,000

    $33,000

    $35,000

    $37,000

    $39,000

    $41,000

    Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

    2009 2010 2011

    BACConsume

    rSpending($MM)*

    *

    Source:

    Bank

    of

    America

    BACConsumerSpending

    ShowingSigns

    of

    Improvement

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    TIER 1COMMON EQUITY ($B)

    4.80%

    9.86%

    $63.3

    $126.7

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    12%

    14%

    16%

    $0

    $50

    $100

    $150

    $200

    4Q08 4Q11

    Tier 1 Common Equity Tier 1 Common Equity Ratio

    2.93%

    6.64%

    $50.7

    $136.4

    0%

    2%

    4%

    6%

    8%

    10%

    12%

    14%

    16%

    $0

    $50

    $100

    $150

    $200

    4Q08 4Q11

    Tangible Common Equity Tangible Common Equity Ratio

    TANGIBLE COMMON EQUITY ($B)*

    * Representsanon

    GAAP

    financial

    measure.

    Ourcapitallevelsareamongthehighest

    theyveeverbeeninthisinstitutionshistory.

    BrianMoynihan,PresidentandChiefExecutiveOfficer,BAC,August10,2011

    BACisPrudentlyAccumulatingCapital

    WellAboveRegulatoryMinimums

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    4Q2008 1Q2009 4Q2011

    CounttheCashBACShortTermLiquidityhasdramaticallyimprovedsincethefinancialcrisis.

    FAIRHOLME

    $250,000

    $200,000

    $150,000

    $100,000

    $50,000

    $0

    $50,000

    $100,000

    $150,000

    $200,000

    $250,000

    BACShort

    Term

    Liquidity(inmillions)

    Cash&TimeDeposits NetTradingAssets NetDerivativeAssets

    NetFederal

    Funds

    &

    Repos Commercial

    Paper

    &

    STBorrowings Excess

    Cash

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    TrustButVerifyOurResearchhasbeenEnhancedbyUnprecedentedRegulatoryDisclosure

    Youalsohavetorememberthatinourindustrywerenotalone,

    sowehaveregulatorsandothersthatlookoverourshoulders.

    BrianMoynihan,PresidentandChiefExecutiveOfficer,BAC,August10,2011

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    0.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.6

    0.8

    1.0

    1.2

    1.4

    1.6

    1.8

    2.0

    WellsFargo J.P.Morgan Citigroup BankofAmerica

    5YearAveragePrice/Book CurrentPrice/Book

    Historical15yearPrice/BookAverageforKBWBankIndex=1.83

    BACPrice

    /Book

    =.29

    ComparedtoitsPeers,

    BACis

    Exceptionally

    Cheap

    (MarketCap:$150+Billion) (Market Cap:$140+Billion) (Market Cap:$80+Billion) (Market Cap:$70+Billion)

    MarketCapitalizationsasofJanuary30,2012.

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    MarketCap:$70bn

    FutureCash

    Flows

    MarginofSafety:$7BuysYou$20+Investingisallaboutwhatyougiveversuswhatyouget.*

    *BruceR.Berkowitz,MorningstarConference,June9,2011

    MarketPricesasofJanuary30,2012.

    In return for purchasing stock (above) at

    historic lows, an investor in BAC receives

    value (right) that far outweighs the cost.

    This provides downside protection as wellas upside opportunity when the market

    returns to a weighing machine, BACs

    market cap will increase.

    OwnersCapital:$200bn

    Reserves:$50bn

    GIVE =$7

    GET =$20+

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    Currentheadlinesremainscary[and]companystockpricesattimes

    becomeschizophrenic,butintheend,theyconsistently

    revertto

    reasonable

    assessments

    of

    value.

    BruceR.Berkowitz,LettertoClients,July2008

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

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    GlobalBanking&MarketsLEGACY CONSUMER REAL ESTATE SERVICES

    MovingForwardAs

    part

    of

    its

    effort

    to

    generate

    long

    term

    shareholder

    growth,

    BAC

    is

    continuingtoaggressivelyaddresslegacyCountrywidemortgageissues.

    48,500DEDICATED EMPLOYEES $2BILLION IN EXPENSES PER QUARTER

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    FROM TO

    MortgageBusinessTransformationBAC

    is

    fundamentally

    transforming

    its

    mortgage

    business

    to

    reduce

    risk,

    improveperformance,andeliminateinefficiencies.

    INTEGRATED INTO CONSUMER FRANCHISE 38KHomeLoanreferralstoConsumerBankingin3Q11

    162KConsumerBankingreferralstoHomeLoansin3Q11

    DIRECT TO CONSUMER ExitedWholesaleandCorrespondentchannels

    REDUCING MSRS Asof3Q11,completedsaleofservicingon150Kloans

    Additionalsalesexecutedin4Q11

    ExitofCorrespondentchannelwillresultinaddinglessMSRsin

    thefuture

    LEGACY ASSETSERVICING ESTABLISHED

    MORTGAGE MARKET SHARE DRIVEN

    MULTICHANNEL PRODUCTION

    ADDING MORTGAGE SERVICING

    RIGHTS (MSRS)

    REGULAR AND DEFAULT SERVICINGTOGETHER

    ANCILLARY BUSINESSES EXITING NONCORE ACTIVITIES (E.G.,BALBOA,

    REVERSE MORTGAGE,ETC.)

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    1.0 X

    2.1 X

    0.0

    0.4

    0.8

    1.2

    1.6

    2.0

    2.4

    $0

    $10

    $20

    $30

    $40

    $50

    4Q 2008 4Q 2011

    Allowance Allowance to Annualized Net Charge-offs

    $0

    $5

    $10

    $15

    $20

    $25

    $30

    4Q 2008 4Q 2011

    ALLOWANCE FOR LOANS AND LEASES ($B)AND COVERAGE OF ANNUALIZED NET CHARGEOFFS

    REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES RESERVES ($B)*

    *Representations

    and

    warranties

    reserves

    do

    not

    include

    litigation

    accruals

    established.

    BuildingaStrongCushionBAC

    is

    conservatively

    managing

    its

    legacy

    mortgage

    exposures

    by

    increasing

    chargeoffallowancesaswellasputbackandliabilityreserves.

    $23.1

    $33.8

    $2.3

    $15.9

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    ConsumerRealEstateServices

    LegacyAssetServicing

    DEPOSITS CARD SERVICES GLOBALCOMMERCIAL

    BANKING

    GLOBAL BANKING &MARKETS

    GLOBAL WEALTH &

    INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

    CONSUMER REAL ESTATE SERVICES

    PowerfulFranchisesWithongoingreductionsinriskandexpenses,NewBACwillbepropelledbythe

    strongperformanceofitsprofitablefranchises.

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    InSum

    Its earnings power has been disguised by the

    intense provisioning for loan losses. But when theprovisioning gets back to a normal level, youll start

    to see that incredible earnings power come down to

    the bottom line. And its as simple as that.

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    Djvu?

    Its earnings power has been disguised by the

    intense provisioning for loan losses. But when theprovisioning gets back to a normal level, youll start

    to see that incredible earnings power come down to

    the bottom line. And its as simple as that.

    BruceR.

    Berkowitz

    OutstandingInvestorDigest

    November25,1992

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

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    %

    200%

    400%

    600%

    800%

    1,000%

    1,200%

    1,400%

    1,600%

    1,800%

    Cu

    mu

    lative

    Return

    WellsFargo S&P500

    StartedtoBuy

    WellsFargo

    %

    200%

    400%

    600%

    800%

    1,000%

    1,200%

    1,400%

    1,600%

    1,800%

    Cu

    mu

    lative

    Return

    WellsFargo S&P500

    BanksHaveBeenHereBeforeWiseinvestorsdonotpermitMr.Marketsdailyfluctuations

    toaffect

    their

    understanding

    of

    fundamental

    value.

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    StayingtheCourseCourage

    of

    Conviction

    Our inclination remains to run from the popular

    and embrace the hated where prices tend to reflect

    such mistrustwe eventually get it right by seeing

    beyond temporary conditions and by avoidingdiversification that leads to mediocrity.

    BruceR.

    Berkowitz

    SemiAnnualReport

    May31,2011

    FAIRHOLME Ignore the crowd.

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