Wykład 4 – 23.03.2005 – Product Assurance

TECHNOLOGIE KOSMICZNE, Podstawy budowy aparatury pomiarowej

Piotr Orleański / CBK PAN / Wykład 4 / 23.03.2005 / strona 1

Wykład 4 – 23.03.2005 – Product AssuranceKlasyfikacje projektów uwzględniające problemy niezawodności,Elementy projektu wpływające na stopień niezawodności,Normy projektowania stosowane przez różne agencje kosmiczne,Wymagania dotyczące dokumentacji,Analiza niezawodnościowa (FMECA),Interaktywna próba zaprojektowania urządzenia – na przykładzie analizatora fal plazmowych,Interaktywna próba zaprojektowania urządzenia – na przykładzie spektrometru HIFI w misji Herschel.

Rodzaj projektu Odpowiedzialność Niezawodnośćaparatury

Konstrukcjaaparatury

Normyprojektowania

Elementy

projektykomercyjne i

militarne, projektyzałogowe

wymagania –zamawiający,

wykonanie – przemysł,nadzór – obie strony

najwyższa pełna redundancja,“cross coupling”

pełnezastosowanie

tzw. “deratingrules”

tylko specyfikacjekosmiczne,

nowe elementy tylko popełnych testach

ESA “cornerstonemission”,

międzynarodowelaboratoriabadawcze

wymagania – głównieESA, czasami wspólnie

z PI,wykonanie –

wyspecjalizowaneinstytuty naukowe,czasami przemysł

nadzór – obie strony

bardzowysoka

“single point failurefree” (SPFF),

awaria jednegopodzespołu nie

może zmniejszycmożliwości

metrologicznych owięcej niż 20%

w wyjątkowychwypadkach

odstępstwa odzastosowania


tylko specyfikacjekosmiczne,

nowe elementy tylko wwyjątkowych

wypadkach i po pełnychtestach

duże projekty wktórych ESA

dostarcza tylkoplatformę

badawczą (satelitę),PI odpowiada zaefekt naukowy

wymagania – główniePI, czasami wspólnie z

ESA,wykonanie –

wyspecjalizowaneinstytuty naukowe,czasami przemysł

nadzór – PI

wysoka zależy od PI -czasami

redundancjaniektórych bloków,

w wyjątkowychwypadkach



bardzo różnie: z reguływiększość elementów wwykonaniu militarnym,

ale zdarzają sięelementy ze

specyfikacją kosmiczną,zastosowanie nowychpodzespołów za zgodą

PImałe projekty PI,

projektytechnologiczne i

studenckie

wymagania – główniePI, czasami wspólnie z

ESA,wykonanie –

wyspecjalizowaneinstytuty naukowe,

nadzór – PI

średnia praktycznie bezredundancji

nagminniestosowane


tzw. “deratingrules

elementy militarne,czasami “industrial”



Elementy projektu wpływające na stopień niezawodności:

struktura konsorcjum - zespół PA (Product Assurance) bezpośrednio podlegający PI, dokładne ustalenie zakresów prac, obowiązków i odpowiedzialności (tzw. work packages), sformalizowanie współpracy (business agreement),

organizacja pracy - kontrolowany system przepływu dokumentów (documents tracebility), zapewnienie, aby w danym momencie wszyscy posługiwali się tymi samymi wersjami dokumentów , bieżące spotkania lub telekonferencje, raporty z postępu prac i wynikłych problemów, system rozliczania kolejnych faz projektu (reviews), system monitorowania zgodności wykonanych prac z założeniami (Non Conformance Report, Waiver, EIDP), wczesne i bardzo dokładne sprecyzowanie wymagań technicznych oraz pełna specyfikacja interfejsów,

metody projektowania - symulacje prowadzone we wczesnej fazie projektu, modelowanie i testowanie krytycznych bloków aparatury, odpowiedni schemat blokowy, pojęcie Single Point Failure Free, stosowanie odpowiednich marginesów projektowych (derating rules), listy elementów, materiałów i procesów technologicznych, analiza niezawodności (FMECA),

wykonawstwo - zgodnie z zaleceniami i normami agencji kosmicznych, kwalifikowane technologie i producenci, kwalifikowany personel, weryfikacja każdej operacji przed przystąpieniem do następnej (inspection points),

testy - testy elementów u producenta i w wyspecjalizowanych firmach, różne modele testowane począwszy od wczesnej fazy projektu, struktura testów uwzględniająca specyfikę kosmiczną



ESA

PI i współpracujący z nimzespół naukowców

Techniczny kierownik projektu,Inżynierowie systemowi,Zespół kontroli jakościBiuro projektu

Podsystemy



struktura konsorcjum - niezależny zespół PA (Product Assurance) bezpośrednio podlegający PI lub kierownikowi projektu

Arne O. Solberg

- inspektor ESA

sprawdza poprawność

montażu VEB FM

Specjaliści z LABEN dyskutują

szczegóły dokumentacji VEB FM



struktura konsorcjum - niezależny zespół PA (Product Assurance) bezpośrednio podlegający PI lub kierownikowi projektu



struktura konsorcjum - dokładne ustalenie zakresów prac,

obowiązków i odpowiedzialności (tzw. work packages)

WP 0000 LO managementWP 1000 LO Unit (LOU)WP 2000 LO Control Unit (LCU)WP 3000 LO Source Unit (LSU)WP 4000 LO Interfaces (external)WP 5000 LO AIV, incl. GSE (subsystem level)WP 6000 LO PA/QA............................WP 1100 LOU Mechanical StructureWP 1200 LOU OpticsWP 1300 LO ChainsWP 1400 LOU internal harness...................................WP 1310 W-band Tripler responsible MPIfR (tbc)WP 1320 Power Amplifiers JPLWP 1330 Multipliers Bands 1-4 MPIfR with RPGWP 1340 Multipliers Band 5 JPLWP 1350 Multipliers Band 6 JPL (tbc)WP 1360 Devices (for multipliers) JPL [RPG, UMass]WP 1370 Isolators WR 10/12 JPL [Millitech]WP 1380 Isolators WR 05/06 MPIfR [Millitech]



organizacja pracy - wczesne i bardzo dokładne sprecyzowanie wymagań technicznych oraz pełna specyfikacja interfejsów, „Experiment Interface Document” jako podstawowe źródło informacji o projekcie




Piotr Orleański / CBK PAN / Wykład 4 / 23.03.2005 / strona 9„Experiment Interface Document” jako podstawowe źródło informacji o projekcie – Herschel/Planck IIDA 1.0/2000

1 INTRODUCTION

2 APPLICABLE/REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

2.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

2.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

2.3 LIST OF ACRONYMS

3 KEY PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1 ESA PERSONNEL

3.2 CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL

4 SATELLITE DESCRIPTION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

4.3 FIRST PAYLOAD MODULE (FPLM)

4.3.1 FIRST Telescope

4.3.2 Helium Cryostat

4.4 Planck PAYLOAD MODULE (PPLM)

4.4.1 Planck Telescope and FPU

4.4.2 PSVM Units

4.5 SERVICE MODULES (SVM)

4.5.1 FIRST Service Module

4.5.2 Planck Service Module

4.5.3 SVMs Subsystems

4.6 OPERATING MODES

4.6.1 Launch

4.6.2 FIRST

4.6.3 Planck

5 INTERFACE WITH INSTRUMENTS

5.1 IDENTIFICATION AND LABELLING

5.1.1 Project code

5.1.2 Unit identification code

5.1.3 Connector identification

5.2 COORDINATE SYSTEM

5.2.1 Spacecrafts Coordinate system

5.2.2 Instrument unit coordinate system

5.3 LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT

5.3.1 Instrument location

5.3.2 Instrument alignment

5.4 EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION DRAWINGS

5.5 SIZES AND MASS PROPERTIES

5.5.1 Mass tolerances

5.5.2 Centre of Gravity Location and Tolerances

5.5.3 Moments of Inertia and Tolerances

5.5.4 Overall Instrument Mass Allocation

5.6 MECHANICAL INTERFACES

5.6.1 FIRST Payload Module

5.6.2 Planck Payload Module

5.6.3 Service Modules

5.7 THERMAL INTERFACES

5.7.1 FIRST Payload Module

5.7.2 Planck Payload Module

5.7.3 Service Modules

5.8 OPTICAL INTERFACES

5.8.1 FIRST Instruments

5.8.2 Planck Instruments

5.9 POWER

5.9.1 Thermal dissipation on FIRST Payload Module

5.9.2 Thermal dissipation on Planck Payload Module

5.9.3 Thermal dissipation on FIRST Service Module



5.9.4 Thermal dissipation on Planck Service Module

5.9.5 Power Supply - Load on main-bus

5.10 CONNECTORS, HARNESS, GROUNDING, BONDING

5.10.1 Connectors

5.10.2 Harness

5.10.3 Grounding and Isolation

5.10.4 Bonding

5.11 DATA HANDLING

5.11.1 Telemetry

5.11.2 SSR Mass Memory

5.11.3 Timing

5.11.4 Telecommands

5.11.5 Special signals

5.11.6 Interface circuits

5.11.7 Application Process Identifiers

5.12 ATTITUDE AND ORBIT CONTROL/POINTING

5.12.1 Terminology

5.12.2 FIRST Pointing Requirements

5.12.3 Planck Pointing Requirements

5.15.3 Physical handling

5.15.4 Purging

5.15.5 Mechanism positions

6 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

6.1 Mechanical Ground Support Equipment

6.2 Electrical Ground Support Equipment

6.3 Commonality

6.3.1 EGSE

6.3.2 Instrument Control and Data Handling

6.3.3 Other Areas

7 INTEGRATION, TESTING AND OPERATIONS

7.1 AIV Sequence Overview

7.1.1 FIRST AIV Sequence Overview

7.1.2 Planck AIV Sequence Overview

7.2 Integration

7.2.1 FPLM Integration

7.2.2 PPLM Integration

7.2.3 FSVM Integration

7.2.4 PSVM Integration

7.2.5 FIRST S/C PFM Integration

5.12.4 FIRST Scientific Pointing modes

5.12.5 FIRST Calibration - Star Tracker

5.12.6 On-Target Flag

5.12.7 Planck Reference Star Pulse

5.12.8 FIRST Slews

5.12.9 Planck Slews

5.13 ON-BOARD HARDWARE/SOFTWARE AND AUTONOMY FUNCTIONS

5.13.1 On-board hardware

5.13.2 On-board software

5.14 EMC

5.14.1 Electrical Interfaces

5.14.2 Harness, Connectors and Shielding

5.14.3 EMC Performance Requirements

5.14.4 Conducted Emission/Susceptibility

5.14.5 Radiated Emission/Susceptibility

5.14.6 Frequency Plan

5.15 INSTRUMENT HANDLING

5.15.1 Transport container

5.15.2 Cleanliness

„Experiment Interface Document” jako podstawowe źródło informacji o projekcie – Herschel/Planck IIDA 1.0/2000



7.2.6 Planck S/C Integration

7.3 FIRST/Planck Testing

7.3.1 FIRST PLM CQM Testing

7.3.2 FIRST S/C CQM Testing

7.3.3 FIRST PLM PFM Testing

7.3.4 FIRST S/C PFM Testing

7.3.5 Planck PLM CQM Testing

7.3.6 Planck S/C CQM Testing

7.3.7 Planck PLM PFM Testing

7.3.8 Planck S/C PFM Testing

7.4 Operations

7.5 Commonality

8 PRODUCT ASSURANCE

9 DEVELOPMENT and QUALIFICATION

9.1 General

9.1.1 Definitions

9.1.2 Documentation

9.2 Model Philosophy

9.2.1 Spacecraft Models

9.2.2 Deliverable Instrument Models

9.3 Deliverable Instrument Test Plan

10.2 Management

10.2.1 ESA Responsibilities

10.2.2 ESA Organisation

10.2.3 Principal Investigator Responsibilities

10.2.4 Instrument Team Organisation

10.2.5 Formal Communication

10.2.6 Financing

10.3 Project Control

10.3.1 Project Control Objectives

10.3.2 Project Breakdown Structures

10.4 Schedule Control

10.4.1 Baseline Master Schedule

10.4.2 Schedule Monitoring

10.4.3 Schedule Reporting

10.5 Configuration Management

10.5.1 Objectives

10.5.2 Responsibilities

10.5.3 Configuration Identification

............

10.8 Reviews and reporting

9.3.1 Instrument Verification

9.3.2 Instrument Scientific Performance Validation

9.4 Design and Analysis Requirements

9.4.1 Mechanical Design and Analysis

9.4.2 Thermal Verification Requirements

9.4.3 Mechanism Verification Requirements

9.4.4 Electrical and Software Verification Requirements

9.4.5 Radiation Environment Verification

9.5 Verification and Testing

9.5.1 General Test Requirements

9.5.2 Test Level Tolerances

9.5.3 Mechanical Verification and Testing

9.5.4 Thermal Verification and Testing

9.5.5 Mechanism Verification and Testing

9.5.6 EMC Verification and Testing

9.5.7 Qualification to the Radiation Environment

10 MANAGEMENT, PROGRAMME, SCHEDULE

10.1 General

„Experiment Interface Document” jako podstawowe źródło informacji o projekcie – Herschel/Planck IIDA 1.0/2000

organizacja pracy - kontrolowany system przepływu dokumentów (documents tracebility), zapewnienie, aby w danym momencie wszyscy posługiwali się tymi samymi wersjami dokumentów,



organizacja pracy - system rozliczania kolejnych faz projektu (reviews)

Instrument Science Verification Review,Instrument Preliminary Design Review,Instrument Baseline Design Review,Instrument Hardware Design Review,Instrument Critical Design Review,Instrument Qualification Review,End Item Data Package,Instrument Flight Acceptance Review

Review Board

Review Item Discrepancy

IBIS INTEGRAL REVIEW ITEM DISCREPANCY VETO CDR-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RID-No: IAS-012/VEB/2000 CLASS.: MAJOR

TITLE OF RID: POWER PROTECTION DIODES

ORGINATOR: J.M. Poulsen

DOCUMENT REFERENCE: VEB Hardware Description, issue 6.0, pg. 8-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------DISCREPANCY:The power outputs from the DC-DC modules have only one diode for protection (see fig 3).

What happens if one of the diodes gets short-circuited and VECU-1 plus VECU-2 both arepowered ?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INITIATOR RECOMMENDED SOLUTION:

Clarify fault tolerance concept, and introduce additional diode in series on each 28 V output(towards VDM/CDM) - if not already implemented in the design.

In any case the drawing fig. 3 should be updated accordingly.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS:

P.Orleanski answer:The drawing shows only the general concept of DCDC. In fact, in actual design the outputs frommain and reserve DCDC are separated and commutated by bistable relay – short circuit in oneDCDC will no affect to the another one. The drawing can be updated in next issue if necessary.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CDR BOARD:Provide the updated version of documentation



organizacja pracy - system monitorowania zgodności

wykonanych prac z założeniami (Non

Conformance Report, Waiver)


Piotr Orleański / CBK PAN / Wykład 4 / 23.03.2005 / strona

15

organizacja pracy - system monitorowania zgodności wykonanych prac z założeniami (Non Conformance Report, Waiver)

NON CONFORMANCES / WAIVERS

Actual statusPos. NCR number DescriptionFor EM For QM For FM

1 NCR 001/98 Wrong position of bonding strap closed closed closed

2 NCR 002/98 Minimum delay and width closed closed closed

3 NCR 003/98 Software problems closed closed closed

4 NCR 004/98 Wrong conversion factor of A/D closed closed closed

5 NCR 005/00 VEB mass increased NA closed closed

6



organizacja pracy - system rozliczania kolejnych faz projektu: End Item Data PackageThe EIDP shall provide the set of documents and records for further integration, testing and operation in higher-level assemblies:1. Title page 2. Table of Contents 3. Shipping Documents 4. Packaging, Storing, Transport, Handling and Installation (incl. Alignment)Procedures 5. Full copies of the major drawings including: Drawing family tree, ICD, Top Assembly Drawing(s), Electric circuit diagrams 6. Operation and Maintenance Manuals, User Manual 7. Certificate of Conformance (CoC) containing a binding statement that the items offered for acceptance (name, ID-number, serial-number/model) have been manufactured, assembled and tested in accordance with the CIDL and comply in all respects with EID requirements. If there are exceptions, they shall be listed.8. List and copies of all NCR and RFW's9. Copy of the full "As-designed/As-built Configuration Item Data List" (CIDL) The CIDL shall identify all documents with the name, number, issue number/date which define the configuration status of an item.10. Serialized Items List (replaceable subassemblies) with reference to lower level EIDP's11. Qualification Status List with reference to applicable Qualification Reports and with identification of differences/modifications between the item used for qualification and the item being offered for acceptance.12. Test Reports overall Test Flow Chart and copies of all Inspection- and Test-Reports 13. Calibration Data Record, Instrument Data Base 14. Pyrotechnic, radioactive and laser data sheets as applicable with relevant safety procedures15. Residual Hazard Sheets with applicable safety procedures16. Historical Record Sheets ("logbook") which shall list in chronological order all major events and activities carried out on the item starting at the latest from the end of the manufacturing phase and with the beginning of all formal inspections and tests. The list shall contain: Start/end date of the activity or event, Activity or Event (e.g. vibration test, transport from A to B, repair per NCR...), Reference Document identifying the procedure, Name and signature of the person responsible for the activity 17. Operating Time or Operating Cycle Records for limited life or age sensitive items (if applicable) 18. Connector mating records (if applicable) 19. Pressure Vessel History Log (if applicable) 20. List and copies of all NCR's 21. Record of temporary removals and installations (e.g. Red Tag/Green Tag Items)22. Record of open and deferred work or installations23. Proof Load Certificate for Handling/Lifting Equipment, Safety Certificates for GSE 24. Minutes of the DRB/Acceptance Review Meeting



metody projektowania - stosowanie odpowiednich marginesów projektowych (derating rules)




WORST CASE ANALYSIS (WCA), PART STRESS ANALYSIS (PSA)

PURPOSE To demonstrate the capability of the electronic design to operate satisfactorily during the whole mission, taking into account worst case conditions of parameter drift and degradation due to temperature, ionizing radiation and ageing.

CONTENT This analysis has to be performed on mission critical electronic equipment with special emphasis on analogue circuitry including power supplies, RF-circuitry, critical interfaces (e.g. ECL devices), optocouplers and CMOS, as well as power- MOS devices which are susceptible to ionizing radiation for each individual unit. The parameter degradation given in PSS-01-301 shall be applied. Any adaptation of these data to the actual mission duration or the use of other data sources is subject for approval by ESA. Radiation dose values shall be taken from a separate radiation analysis which takes into account the internal radiation shielding of the analysed equipment. In case of use of non radiation resistant components, data on parameter degradation caused by radiation shall be provided by representative sample tests. At least twice the maximum degradation resulting from these tests shall be considered for worst case analysis.



metody projektowania - listy elementów, materiałów i procesów technologicznych

Title : DECLARED MATERIAL LIST (DML)Materials are classified into 20 groups depending on their type or their main use.1. Aluminium and aluminium alloys2. Copper and copper alloys3. Nickel and nickel alloys4. Titanium and titanium alloys5. Steels6. Stainless steel7. Filler metals: welding, brazing, soldering8. Miscellaneous metallic materials9. Optical materials10. Adhesives, coatings, varnishes11. Adhesive tapes12. Paints and inks13. Lubricants14. Potting compounds, sealants, foams15. Reinforced plastics16. Rubbers and elastomers17. Thermo plastics (non-adhesive taoes, foils (MLI)...)18. Thermoset plastics19. Wires and cables (for materials aspects only)20. Miscellaneous non metallic materials (ceramics...)

Title : DECLARED MECHANICAL PART LIST (DMPL)Mechanical parts shall be classified in 11 groups:1. Spacing parts (washers, spacers, ...)2. Connecting parts (bolts, nuts, rivets, inserts, clips ...)3. Bearing parts (ball-bearings, needle bearings, ...)4. Separating parts (pyrotechnics, springs, cutters ...)5. Control parts (gears, ...)6. Fluid handling parts (diffusers, ...)7. Heating parts8. Measuring instruments (gauges, thermocouples, ...)9. Optical passive equipment10. Magnetic parts11. Other parts



metody projektowania - listy elementów, materiałów i procesów technologicznych

Title : DECLARED PROCESS LIST (DPL)Processes shall be classified into 17 groups:1. Adhesive bonding2. Composite manufacture3. Encapsulation/molding4. Painting/coating5. Cleaning6. Welding7. Crimping/Stripping/wire wrapping8. Soldering/Brazing9. Surface conversion treatments10. Plating11. Machining12. Forming13. Heat treatment14. Special fabrication: processes developed specifically for the programme15. Marking16. Miscellaneous processes17. Inspection procedures

Title : DECLARED COMPONENT LIST (DCL)Overall data:- DCL Number, Issue, Revision and Date;- Project.The DCL shall contain the following entries for each part, organised by FAMILYand GROUP:- Sequential line item number;- Component part number;- Equivalent/similar commercial or military type;- Generic and detail specification-number with revision index and with amendments if applicable;- Manufacturer (and back-up if applicable);- Applied screening level;- Applied LAT level;- PAD number or other approval reference.



metody projektowania - redundancja i pojęcie Single Point Failure Free3.4.2 Single Point Failure

1. The instrument design must preclude single point failures resulting in complete loss ofinstrument.2. The instruments, except the OMC, shall provide redundancy and modularity such that anysingle point failure after appropriate reconfiguration only causes a throughput reduction ofnot more than 20 % for SPI and IBIS andnot more than 50 % for JEM-X.3.4.3 Redundancy1. Redundant functions shall be physically separated to prevent propagation of failures.2. Redundant functions housed in a common box shall be separated by continuous metallic wallacting as heat sink and EMC shield.3. Redundant functions shall be routed through separate connectors.4. Fasteners shall be arranged and dimensioned such that the function is still provided with onecomponent failed.5. On-board data processing, storage and transmission shall be structured in such way that singlebit error per word does not disturb normal operation or activate redundancy.6. If cross-coupling is implemented to improve the instrument failure recovery capability then itshall be designed in such a way that failure propagation from primary to redundant branch canbe excluded.



metody projektowania - odpowiedni schemat blokowyproblemy redundancji przyrządów i bloków



metody projektowania - odpowiedni schemat blokowy problemy redundancji przyrządów i bloków.„Triple Module Redundancy” jako najskuteczniejsza metoda zabezpieczenia się przed SEU



metody projektowania - analiza niezawodności Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA)

The purpose of the FMECA shall be to identify all failure modes of the system and rank them in accordance with the severity of the effects of their occurrence. The logical sequence of the FMECA shall include the following steps:- to identify the item under consideration and its function;- to identify the assumed failure modes for that item or function;- to analyse and describe the effect of the assumed failure mode on the function of the assembly under consideration and the effects on related and higher level assemblies and functions;- to identify observable symptoms for the assumed failure mode or its effects (e.g. Automatic function monitoring or house-keeping data and telemetry; in orbit or during test).- to establish what provisions are inherent in the design:. to compensate the effect of the malfunction (e.g. switching to redundant unit, automatically or by telecommand),. to isolate the fault, or. to switch to contingency operational modes;- to identify the criticality category of the failure effect according to the definition given below and, specifically, whether the item is a Single Point Failure (SPF).- provide remarks and recommendations if applicable or necessary or desirable modifications for the design or operations (e.g. elimination of SPFs).The FMECA shall be performed on the basis of the lowest level of design definition which is available at the successive steps in the design and development process, e.g. initially starting with assumed failure modes of basic functions, later at assembly level and finally at instrument level as necessary to cover potentially critical effects. Later, for mechanisms from part level upwards; else from functional blocks without redundancy upwards.The following Failure Effect Severity Categories shall be used in the FMECA:Category 1 : The failure effect is not confined to the instrument. When this failure results also in loss or degradation of the instrument's function, this shall be stated.Category 2 : The failure results in loss or degradation of the instrument's function beyond the limits, and the effect is confined to the instrument.Category 3 : Minor internal instrument failures.



metody projektowania - analiza niezawodności (FMECA)




Main Block #1

Main Block #n

Red. Block #1

Red. Block #n

Interfacesto mainexternal

units

Interfacesto red.

externalunits

Piecescommon

forBands1A, 2a,

3A

Band 2A Interface

Band 3A Interface

Band 1A Interface

LOWINT A

Piecescommon

forBands5B, 7B Band 7B Interface

Band 5B Interface

HIGHINT D

MAIN LCU SET

RED. LCU SET

FMECA oriented FHLCU block scheme



metody projektowania - analiza niezawodności (FMECA)Unit: FHLCU Module: LOWINTA

Component

Failure Effects / LCU Effects / LO Action Criticality Comments

sheet2

REL19 alwaysmain

only main LCU active only main LO active use only main LO No

alwaysres.

only res. LCU active only res. LO active use only res. LO No

REL20 always on 1A always on 1A always on use REL19 to 1A off No

always off 1A always off 1A not in use use other bands No 1A Band lost

R21 shorted no effects no effects No

open 1A/D1 off not shorted 1A/D1 possible lost use other bands No 1A Band possible lost

C17 shorted 1A/D1 overcurrent 1A/D1 possible lost use other bands No 1A Band possible lost

open no effects Band 1A more noisy No part of data in 1A lost

C21 shorted 1A/D1 overcurrent 1A/D1 possible lost use other bands No 1A Band possible lost

open no effects Band 1A more noisy No part of data in 1A lost

F10 open 1A/D1 not supplied 1A not in use use other bands No 1A Band lost

D25 shorted not enough power foremmergency off procedure

potential danger for threebands

effect not to be recovered Yes 1A, 2A, 3A possible lost

open no power for switching three bands eliminated effect not to be recovered Yes 1A, 2A, 3A lost

R19 shorted D25 possible broken three bands eliminated effect not to be recovered Yes 1A, 2A, 3A lost

open slower load of C25/26 slower switching sequence modify the ICU commands No


open slower load of C25/26 slower switching sequence modify the ICU commands No


open no effects no effects No

C25 shorted no power for switching three bands eliminated effect not to be recovered Yes 1A, 2A, 3A lost

open not enough power foremmergency off procedure



C26 shorted no power for switching three bands eliminated effect not to be recovered Yes 1A, 2A, 3A lost

open not enough power foremmergency off procedure



RELAYS_1A line

broken no power for switching three bands eliminated effect not to be recovered Yes 1A, 2A, 3A lost




SCANER FIELD OF VIEW

25░

88

148

+Z

+X

COLD SPACE

Pt100Pt100

43░

25░12.5░12.5░

Skaner dla spektrometru PFS - spojrzenie na niezawodność:

1. Obudowa,

2. Obracajacy się bęben ze zwierciadłem,

3. Silniki (redundancja),

4. Koło zębate napędzające bęben,

5. Ślimacznica,

6. Czujniki położenia (kodowanie nadmiarowe),

7. Źródło kalibracyjne dla kanału SW,

8. Czujnik położenia początkowego,

9. BlackBody (źródło kalibracyjne dla kanału LW),

10. Płytka elektroniki (częściowa redundancja).




TECHNOLOGIE KOSMICZNE, Podstawy budowy aparatury

pomiarowej Piotr Orleański / CBK PAN / Wykład

4 / 23.03.2005 / strona 32

wykonawstwo - weryfikacja każdej operacji przed przystąpieniem do następnej (inspection points)

HLCUSModules

ManufacturingProcess

01

01

01

01

Manufacturing Phase

Manufacturing Control Phase

Testing Phase

Quality Control Phase

13 MFGPHASE:

PCB,El.Parts &ConnectorsPreparation

Specification:

Remarks:

14 MFGPHASE:

ComponentsPretining,Bending &Positionning

Specification:

PSS 01-708Remarks:

MFGCONTROLPHASE:

Position &PolarisationInspection

Specification:

Remarks:according toelectricaldocumentation

06QUALITYCONTROLPHASE:

VisualInspection

Specification:

PSS 01-708PSS 01-738Remarks:

01

19 MFGPHASE:

PCB to PCBand PCB toConnectorsAssembling

Specification:

PSS 01-708Remarks:according toelectricaldocumentation

MFGCONTROLPHASE:

WiringContinuityChecking

Specification:

Remarks:according toelectricaldocumentation

09 02TESTINGPHASE:

FunctionalTests atModuleLevel

Specification:

Remarks:

20 MFGPHASE:

Adjustment

Specification:

Remarks:

03TESTINGPHASE:

ElectricalandPerformanceTests

Specification:

Remarks:

22 MFGPHASE:

Gluing,Masking &Labeling

Specification:

Remarks:

23 MFGPHASE:

Take aphoto (bothsides)

Specification:

Remarks:

16 MFGPHASE:

Cleaning

Specification:

Remarks:

15 MFGPHASE:

ComponentsHandSoldering

Specification:


17 MFGPHASE:

Pins /SocketsCrimping

Specification:

PSS 01-726Remarks:

MFGCONTROLPHASE:

VisualInspection

Specification:

PSS 01-726Remarks:

07 MFGCONTROLPHASE:

VisualInspection

Specification:

PSS 01-726Remarks:

08

21 MFGPHASE:

Cleaning

Specification:

Remarks:

QUALITYCONTROLPHASE:

FinalVisualInspection

Specification:


02 24 MFGPHASE:

Packing &Storing

Specification:

Remarks:

BONDED

STORE

BONDED

STORE

18 MFGPHASE:

ConnectorsAssembling

Specification:

PSS 01-726Remarks:

Key and Mandatory Inspection Points (KIP/MIP)

Among the inspections and test as part of the production sequence, some selected inspections shall be performed with participation of representatives from ESA.The PI shall identify Key and Mandatory Inspection Points (KIP/MIP) in accordance with the following criteria:- when critical processes are performed;- formal qualification and acceptance tests.

The PI shall propose a list of KIPs and MIPs to ESA together with the manufacturing and inspection flow chart at the IBDR and IHDR. The MIPs where is participation is required will be agreed with the PI.

TECHNOLOGIE KOSMICZNE, Podstawy budowy aparatury

pomiarowej Piotr Orleański / CBK PAN / Wykład

4 / 23.03.2005 / strona 33

testy - testy elementów u producenta i w wyspecjalizowanych firmach

Założenie: proces produkcyjny począwszy od linii produkcyjnej i technologii u producenta i skończywszy na dostarczeniu elementu do finalnego użytkownika jest na tyle wiarygodny, powtarzalny i sprawdzony wcześniej oraz ma potwierdzenie w testach wybranych próbek z serii aktualnej, że z wystarczającym prawdopodobieństwem można założyć pełną sprawność elementu w czasie jego pracy w kosmosie. Po prawidłowym zmontowaniu urządzenia nie trzeba go poddawać stresom większym, niż poziom “acceptance”

•kwalifikacja producenta i linii produkcyjnej (np. lista producentów zakwalifikowanych przez ESA),•kwalifikacja technologii i rodzaju elementu (odporny na radiację, problemy przy pracy w próżni...),•kwalifikacja danego typu elementu (listy elementów zalecanych i preferowanych do zastosowania w projektach kosmicznych, specyfikacja SCC)•kwalifikacja i testy danej serii elementów u producenta (charakterystyki, szoki cieplne, testy mikroskopowe, testy niszczące, dodatkowe starzenie,...)•weryfikacja testów fabrycznych lub dodatkowe testy prowadzone w wyspecjalizowanych firmach (IGG, TopRel, Tecnologica, Asternetix....), testy wizualne, testy lutowalności, wyrywkowe testy sprawdzające charakterystyki elementu, nadawanie dodatkowych oznaczeń i numeracji, specjalne pakowanie.

PROM 8kByte nazwa handlowa firmy Harris HS1-6664




Piotr Orleański / CBK PAN / Wykład 4 / 23.03.2005 / strona 35 MIL-STD-883F : norma militarna, w chwili obecnej zstępowana przez MIL-PRF-38535

ENVIRONMENTAL TESTS: Barometric pressure, Immersion, Insulation resistance, Moisture resistance, Steady state life, Intermittent life, Agree life, Stabilization bake, Salt atmosphere, Temperature cycling, Thermal shock, Thermal characteristics, Dew point, Seal, Burn-in test, Life/reliability characterization tests, Neutron irradiation, Internal water-vapor content, Ionizing radiation (total dose) test, Dose rate induced latchup test procedure, Dose rate upset testing of digital microcircuits, Mosfet threshold voltage, Dose rate response of linear microcircuits, Preseal burn-in, Thin film corrosion test, Package induced soft error test procedure (due to alpha particles), Endurance life test .

MECHANICAL TESTS: Constant acceleration, Mechanical shock, Solderability, Lead integrity, Vibration fatigue, Vibration noise, Vibration, variable frequency, Visual and mechanical, External visual, Internal visual (monolithic), Bond strength (destructive bond pull test), Radiography, Internal visual inspection for DPA, Internal visual and mechanical, Resistance to solvents, Physical dimensions, Internal visual (hybrid), Scanning electron microscope (SEM) inspection of metallization, Die shear strength, Glassivation layer integrity, Wetting balance solderability, Nondestructive bond pull, Lid torque for glass-frit-sealed packages, Adhesion of lead finish, Random vibration, Substrate attach strength, Pin grid package destructive lead pull test, Ceramic chip carrier bond strength, Ultrasonic inspection of die attach, Flip chip pull-off test, Visual inspection of passive elements, Ultrasonic inspection of TAB bonds.

ELECTRICAL TESTS (DIGITAL): Drive source (dynamic), Load conditions, Delay measurements, Transition time measurements, Power supply current, High level output voltage, Low level output voltage, Breakdown voltage (input or output), Input current, low level, Input current (high level), Output short circuit current, Terminal capacitance, Noise margin measurements for digital microelectronic devices, Functional testing, Electrostatic discharge sensitivity classification, Activation time verification, Microelectronics package digital signal transmission, Crosstalk measurements for digital microelectronic device packages, Ground and power supply impedance measurements for digital microelectronics device packages, High impedance (off-state) low-level output leakage current, High impedance (off-state) high-level output leakage current, Input clamp voltage, Static latch-up measurements for digital CMOS microelectronic devices, Simultaneous switching noise measurements for digital microelectronic devices.

ELECTRICAL TESTS (LINEAR): Input offset voltage and current and bias current, Phase margin and slew rate measurements, Common mode input voltage range, Common mode rejection ratio, Supply voltage rejection ratio, Open loop performance, Output performance, Power gain and noise figure, Automatic gain control range.

testy - testy elementów u producenta i w wyspecjalizowanych firmach

SMD 5962-00501



Wykład 4 – 23.03.2005 – Product Assurance

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