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PUBLICATION SERIESMONOGRAPHS AND ANALYSES

NO. 16

SERIA WYDAWNICZAMONOGRAFIE I OPRACOWANIA

NR 16

Review/Recenzja: prof. dr hab. Ivan Pankevych prof. dr hab. Konrad Zieliński

© Copyright by State School of Higher Professional Education in ZamośćOfficina Simonidis

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Table of Contents

Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5

Rostyslav Romanyuk, Nataliya RomanyukIdentities.of.International.Actors.and.the.Basis.of.Integration....................................................................9

Małgorzata Samulak-PiłatPhenomenon.of.Triple.Identity.–.British.Nations’.Cross-Cultural.Problem.in.Relation.to.European.Integration.....................................................................25

Rafał RiedelMigration,.Social.Capital.and.Identity.–.Polish.and.European.Perspective.........................43

Henryk ChałupczakEuropean.Neighbourhood.Policy.–.Nature.and.Functioning........................................................................61

Paweł TurczyńskiBetween.Libya.and.Belarus.–.European.Union.Foreign,.Security.and.Defence.Policy.after.the.Treaty.of.Lisbon.............................................................................................73

Łukasz PotockiEuropean.Integration.versus.the.European.Union-Russia.Relations.in.the.21st.Century....................................................................................................................................................................................91

Irma SłomczyńskaPersistent.Threats.to.Security.–.New.Space.Tools.for.the.Global.EU................................................103

Arkadiusz Toś, Robert TabaszewskiDenmark.in.European.Union.–.Danish.Attitudes.towards.European.Cooperation.............................................................................................................121

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Piotr TosiekState’s.Influence.on.EU’s.Policy:.the.Case.of.Polish.Presidency..................................................................133

Monika KowalskaThe.Right.to.Trial.and.to.Constitutional.Complaint..as.Examples.of.Changes.Adapting.the.Polish.System.of.Guarantees.of.Individual.Rights.to.European.Legal.Standards...........................................................................................................151

Piotr TosiekChallenges.of.Europeanization.in.New.EU.Member.States...............................................................................169

Grzegorz ChałupczakEuropean.Employment.Strategy.–.Evolution.and.Development.Perspectives....................................................................................................................................185

Justyna Misiągiewicz European.Union.and.Energy.Security.Challenges.............................................................................................................203

Introduction

The process of European integration is based on cooperation of nations and states in many spheres of human activity. Institutionally it encompasses many international organizations like the European Union, the Council of Eu-rope, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to mention only the biggest and most power-ful. The history of European integration is determined by a typically European experience where nation-states with very long historical traditions cooperate and compete at relatively new forums of specific international organizations. This model can hardly be adapted to the needs of other continents, though some other or partly similar forms have been used in South-East Asia, Africa or North America.

In this volume the term <European integration> is generally restricted to the development of the European Communities and the European Union (only some contributions tackle broader problems). The existence of this integration structure exemplifies the constant search for a compromise among various concepts represented by member states and scholars. The European Union of the 21st century is featured by two main trends. The first was enlargement in-corporating the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the second is a con-stant impossibility to carry out reforms rooted in deeper cooperation. In the last decade the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, a new general in-ternational agreement replacing majority of earlier legal acts of a constitutional nature, might have been a symbol of reformatory concepts. However, it did not enter into force as a result of objection of French and Dutch citizens expressed in the referendums. The second reformatory attempt was the successful Trea-ty of Lisbon that, however, occurred to be an insufficient reply to integration challenges. Thus is the beginning of the second decade of the century marked by the crisis of both financial and confidence nature.

Internationally, the European Union is not a single actor, which surely holds true for political relations, while meets some obstacles in the case of international economic cooperation where it operates as the Single European Market. It is the very identification of this specific integration structure that opens the discussion on the nature of the Union. The key issue is its internal decision-making process that creates a very complicated system of governance. A critical assessment of this phenomenon is connected with three questions: the first is the modelling of

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Introduction

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European Integration - Models, Challenges, Perspectives

integration connected with political thought and evaluation of the system mainly from a perspective of member states, the second are the challenges of integration constantly characterized as the „process in the making” marked by democrati-zation failures, while the third are the perspectives of integration encompassing some extrapolation activities judged in respect of the continuous process.

The authors of this volume assert that the process of European integration is a multifaceted phenomenon featured by high complexity of concepts, prob-lems and methods of further development. Still, in its complicated structural and functional construction it should be perceived as a tool of creating security, peace and welfare of the continent. A successful political, economic, legal and cultural cooperation of nations and states allowed to overcome historical bur-dens and created inspiration for many other actors of international stage.

The volume consists of thirteen contributions referring to various prob-lems of European integration. Four main analytical spheres can be identified: European identity, European external policy, position of member states in the EU and finally challenges of integration. This attitude was chosen to tackle a broad range of topics, but not to offer the holistic view of Europe in the 21st century. The main objective of authors and editors was to prepare a scientific book that would be a starting point to further research.

The book begins with an in-depth analysis of identities of international actors being the basis for European integration. The authors argue that the chronological approach that links origin, development and decline of paradi-gms, principles, grand theories with historical and philosophical streams, cru-cial historical events or conflicts is best suited methodologically for idealistic thinking about European integration. The old-style theories tied with impor-tant historical events created the background for theories specific for European integration only, but at the same time closely interconnected with general the-ories of international relations. The second article elaborates the phenomenon of triple identity of British citizens and its cross-cultural ties with European in-tegration. The goal is to explore the complexity of national identity shaped for hundreds of years by historical, economic and mental experience leading to the very distinct attitude, ability and willingness to integrate with other European nations. The other determinants of identity – migration and social capital on Polish example – are discussed in the third contribution. A poor level of major social capital components constitutes a pre-requisite for migration readiness. The author, using empirical data, analyses the motives of migration decisions, its intensiveness, dynamics and directions.

The second compound of problems is initiated by the general examination of European Neighbourhood Policy, which covers political, economic and so-cial relations of the European Union with its surroundings also with respect to reforming capacity of countries involved. Another article refers to the charac-teristics of the European Union Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon. Its regulation after the reforms introduced by the new treaty is elaborated first, aiming at focussing then on two empirical cases: the European intervention in Libya and the attempts of external democratization of Belarus. Preliminary conclusions – not very optimistic – are based on a still actual assumption of incoherence of European actions. The next chapter presents the actual state of the art as well as the perspectives of relations between the European Union and Russia. The topic is analysed with regard to the histo-ry of European integration and EU’s expansion to the former Russian sphere of influence, which is judged as a fact of great historical significance. This part of the book is concluded by a broad elaboration of the European Space Policy. The author finds that the EU tries to exploit space for civilian and military purpo-ses, but is still lacking real common defence policy.

The third part of the volume is dominated by states’ experience of EU membership. It starts with an evaluation of Danish attitudes to the coopera-tion of European countries. Denmark occupies a very special position and its rather specific approach to integration is subject to many disputes. The aim of the authors is to show the complexity of conservative policy in relation to the European Union as an integrative group of states. This contribution is followed by an analysis of single state’s influence on EU policy. The example of Poland is used to explain the necessity of coalition building and a rather symbolic character of EU Council presidency. Poland is also the topic of the next contri-bution that emphasizes the role of democratic legal instruments in European political systems and – above all – the process of adaptation of Central and East European countries to EU norms.

The last part refers to challenges of European integration from three vie-wpoints. The first is called Europeanization and encompasses a big complex of processes, instruments and institutions that in the case of EU newcomers should be seen as an element of modernization. Both successes and failures of Europeanization are debated in this respect. The second point is social poli-cy and unemployment. The European Employment Strategy with its evolution and perspectives, including scenarios of further development, is discussed in detail. In the very final chapter the author elaborates challenges to EU energy security. The interdependence in energy field is a significant dimension of re-

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Introduction

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lations between states and transnational corporations as well as international organizations. The EU as the world’s fastest growing energy market, facing a shortage of energy, is enforced to diversify its energy supplies, which fosters inter-state cooperation.

The book results from cooperation of representatives of many scientific specializations from a number of academic centres in Poland and Ukraine. It offers a multidisciplinary approach based on methodology of political science, law, economy, history and philology. Researchers and practitioners from the following institutions made their contributions (in alphabetical order): Catho-lic University of Lublin, Maria Curie Sklodowska University of Lublin, Natio-nal Ivan Franko University of Lviv, University of Opole, University of Wrocław and – in coordinating function – the State School of Higher Professional Edu-cation in Zamość.

The authors and editors are aware of limitations of such volumes rooted in a variety of views and experiences. Nevertheless they hope that their work will contribute to better understanding and explanation of problems connec-ted with European integration. An in-depth scientific analysis has always had some practical consequences and created a feedback activity. The goal is fin-ding the solutions of problems that must be identified first. This can be the real value of this book.

Rostyslav RomanyukNataliya Romanyuk

Identities of International Actors and the Basis of Integration

1. Introduction

Simultaneously to the ideological and methodological principles of theories of international relations classification, researchers suggest the chronological appro-ach that links origin, development and decline of certain paradigms, principles, grand theories with historical philosophical streams, crucial historical events or conflicts1. The experience of First World War and the creation of the League of Nations in the twentieth century, contributed to the establishment of idealism, while strengthening of fascism, global economic crisis, World War II and the be-ginning of conflict between East and West actualized its counterpart – realism. Escalation of conflict between two superpowers – USA and USSR, and dynamics of arms race opened explanation possibilities of system theories. Background for neofunctionalism and theory of integration has been the unification of Europe. Decline of relative economic power of the United States, strengthening of Japan and occasional successes of OPEC shifted scientific emphasis from political to economic issues. Neorealism, hegemonic theory, cycles theory and regime theory has been spread in the consequence. End of East–West confrontation resulted in a strengthening of neoidealism. The collapse of the bipolar world meant, however, a return to classical balance of powers theories that explain the system of great po-wers of the nineteenth century. Intensification of globalization breathed new life into neofunctionalism, theory of international community and interdependence theory called „Global Governance”2.

Thus, the relationship between different political processes and dynamics of scientific interest to their theoretical explanations is more than evident. It seems that political practice in most cases preceded thematic theoretical de-1 The short chronologic overview of international relations theory development as follows has been adopted

from: U. Menzel, K. Varga, Theorie und Geschichte der Lehre von den Internationalen Beziehungen. Einführung und systematische Bibliographie. – Schriften des deutschen übersee-Instituts, Hamburg, 1999, pp. 29-30.

2 Ibidem, pp. 29-30.

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Rostyslav Romanyuk, Nataliya Romanyuk

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velopments and scientific achievements in the field of international relations. Though used in practice (as idealist policy in the interwar period etc.), its im-plementation was not consistent: the global political development was stimula-ting new or actualizing competitive theories, offering at the same time, visible benefits of their instrumentation. To some extent, the exceptions were some substantial theories (game theory, deterrence theory etc.). Usage of such the-ories was carried out in certain global political context and, therefore, they did not offer an original vision of international relations.

This general view of international relations theory and some particular theories dispels widespread critical statements on scientific failure of integra-tion theories, as being emerged and developed in a very close relation to the particular political practice – integration process in Europe, and therefore they can’t claim to universality. Indeed, most theoretical generalizations within the theory of international relations were results of studies on specific issues and patterns of international practice.

2. The Concept of Integration

Theories of international integration within different scientific approaches of the international relations theory are enjoying development for more than half a century. The key of research interest to the study of integration are practi-cal requirements, associated with needs of explanation and forecast of political phenomena and processes. Within the general philosophical and methodo-logical orientations of international relations theory was offered a number of integration concepts and some interesting criteria and methods for studies on integration „level” etc.

Development of integration theories was not too productive. None of the theoretical approaches to the study of integration process was firmly establis-hed as hegemonic. Interpretations of reasons, objectives, factors, contents and forms of integration within the framework of different theoretical approaches proved themselves insufficiently substantiated and ambiguous. However, the theoretical justification for the integration interactions deserve significant at-tention as one of the most focused on practical application in the field, which plays a significant role in contemporary international relations.

Considering the problem of cooperation and integration in international relations we can agree with a common statement of institutionalists that states cooperate when cooperation provides better results than following of self-help

principle based on power, preferred by realists. Therefore, the quality and sco-pe of cooperation depend primarily on the nature of state interest. Instead, the process of integration is partially forced by transfer of their competences in specific areas that traditionally have been part of the state mechanism to supranational institutions. Obviously, it can’t be considered without any doubt as part of state interest. Even assuming that integration is one of the following stages of cooperation, we still have to acknowledge the change of subjects of in-terest. The answer to the question – who is the ultimate beneficiary of interstate cooperation or integration, based on a number of social theories, including modern ones, will be not unexpected – citizens of states, involved into coope-ration or integration – private individuals. Simplistically, one could argue that in terms of cooperation individuals derive benefits through the state, which takes part in it (results conditionally allocate under the scheme state → citi-zens), and in the case of integration – they receive benefits directly, effectively bypassing the state or by its minimal intervention (integration union → citi-zens). Therefore, the current discussion about the retreat of the state is not only focused on the loss of its competences in favor of supranational institutions, but also on its gradual elimination from the redistribution process on own na-tional territory and attendant transfer of loyalties of the citizens from national to supranational level.

This approach suggests that the problems of theoretical understanding of integration process, not least are related to unclear perceptions of their outco-me, particularly to question of which organization form an integrated union will have. On the one hand, integration facilitates „erosion” of the state, which was designed, primarily, to provide public goods, on the other hand – it is in-tegration, which is providing public goods in larger capacity by increasing and improving reallocation opportunities.

We are not focusing on critical views of the state as a form of social life, but generally, one should agree with the notion that it used to be nothing but state more efficient in providing public goods, created yet. Then bringing up discus-sion about „retreat of the state”, on next level we should answer the question „what after”? Could it be possible to reject of state mechanism (state structure) of social life regulation, along with the retreat of the state?

The current crisis in the European Union has shown the problem of general government in some spheres, particularly financial one. Obviously, in the long term one can talk about creating not just a supranational bodies of union, but namely the (quasi) government at the supranational level, as such, which has hi-

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storically confirmed its performance in providing all aspects of societies life. Let’s leave the question about the (state) form of integration (federal, unitary, etc.).

So while the problem of retreat of the state as a form of social life admi-nistration on a national territory can be discussed today from theoretical and practical point of view, the issue of parallel non-state mechanisms or state go-vernance structures (regardless of level) should not provide significant results.

Moreover, the discussion on integration process should focus on the prob-lems of institutionalization of the EU and, therefore, on the question of trans-ition of loyalties from government agencies of the (national) state to the (gover-nment) structures of the union.

Another important issue is the intensity of the integration process, which is accompanied by both successes and failures. At first glance, this two issues are interrelated, since the intensity of the integration process forces the loyal-ties transition. However, the explanation of this phenomenon requires deeper theoretical perspective.

Critics point out that the state should not be anthropomorphized. Howe-ver, similarities of certain features of human behavior in explanations of the states’ behavior in international relations are present in all paradigms of in-ternational relations theory. Even the game theory or the deterrence theory, seemingly devoid of subjectivity, also show anthropological assumptions: the first one is using an idea of winning (or order of preferences), which is subje-ctive, and the second one – focuses on calculated perception of appropriate intensity of threats to use force. Therefore, inevitably subjective perception of (international) reality and the fact that states are social bodies, allow us to use models of human behavior to analyze the states actions. Moreover, modern theorists of international relations pay attention to public identities. This dist-inguished their various dimensions.

3. The Concept of State Identity

A. Wendt points out, that states have certain common characteristics, which form their corporate identity and which distinguish them as states. These com-mon features are based on certain physical features (political system, sovereign-ty, state, territory etc.) and motivations (ensuring existence, autonomy, prosper-ity, collective sense of self-importance etc.), which are the same for all states and allow us to consider the state as an integral actor3. We should note, that such

3 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge 1999, pp. 193-245.

universalized understanding of corporate identity lost an own „personal” di-mension of state identity – a conglomerate of political system, nation-state com-bination, notions of welfare, etc., which are unique in each case and not useful for generalization. Therefore, the concept of state identity should also consider such individual characteristics of a state as self-positioning in the international relations, including its own ideas about the goals and objectives, which are de-rived from internal evidence. It actually refers to the individual identity of the state, which not only distinguishes it as a state actor, but also distinguishes it among other states through certain peculiarities of features. This real identity, let’s call it immanent, does not depend on environment, its ratings or options of (external) identification. Among all dimensions of identity, the immanent state identity is the most complete and controversial. Corporate identity of Wendt is rather speculative category, which although seemingly corresponds with real-ity, but does not account differences outside of corporate perception. We agree with the existence of a corporate identity solely within the meaning of so-called self-identity, which each state creates for itself in order to achieve its goals more effectively (for ex. democratic state, a state of market reforms, etc.).

The second dimension of identity pointed out by Wendt is collective or so-cial identity. As known, the key issues for constructivist research are formation and change of collective identities. Wendt argues that the processes of identity formation of an actor take place in interaction with other actors. It means, that they are, in fact, socially constructed solely in relations with other actors not only at national, but also (that is the starting point by Wendt of all his asser-tions) through interstate interaction – internationally4. During social interac-tions, actors get not just new information. Through mutual attribution of roles and functions, which takes place in this case and which is considered in re-sponse to each other depending on circumstances, actors design their essential characteristics in alternate way and relevant identities of actors are emerging5.

Therefore, we can assume an existence of a certain identity of internatio-nal actor (state) of „external” character, which is actually a collective notion of other actors. Generally, we can agree with that. Without doubt, all dimensions of state identity are in permanent development. Constructivists suggest that the main force of their transformation is the social interaction of actors. In our view, this thesis is open to discussion.4 Idem, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, „American Political Science Review” 1994, No.

88(2), pp.384-396; Idem, Identity and Structural Change in International Politics, [in:] The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. by Y. Lapid, F. Kratochwil, Boulder 1996, pp. 4�-64.

5 A. Wendt, Social Theory…, op. cit., pp. 328-331; Idem, Anarchy is What States Make of It, „International Orga-nization” 1992, No. 46(2), pp. 391-425, 404-425.

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Immanent, corporate and collective identities are not identical and do not always correlate. It is difficult to determine which of them are changing faster or make other changes, as well as establish laws and conditions of such change. For example, immanent identity of a person can change in the scheme: boy/ girl (child) – guy/girl (teenager) – man/women – father/mother – grandfather/gran-dmother, or cannot change: a person can feel as teenager and act accordingly all its life, regardless of circumstances or opinions of others. At the same time, collective identity can ascribe certain characteristics to that person, that meets the real state: boy/girl (child) – guy/girl (teenager) – man/women – father/mother - grandfather/grandmother that in this particular case will not correlate (except of a brief period) with its immanent identity - a teenager. At the other hand, a person may feel quite mature, think and act responsibly as an adult, but be-ing, for example, a teenager – perceived therefore as a teenager by the others. Thus, identities are always subjective, of estimate nature and do not always take into account peculiarities of each other. Moreover, they may not reflect certain circumstances, such as real age or status. This allows us to make the important conclusion, that the development of identities is not always affected by social in-teraction (a teenager will not be accepted as adult, despite of his behavior).

This simple example makes visible the actual relationship of corporate and collective identities in version by Wendt. For example, a part of the „corpora-te” identity of a person, which discerns a certain number of persons by their features, may be age (adolescents) or status (students), which completely „fit into” the collective identity – perception of this group of persons by the others. Although the immanent identity will include corporate one, or at least a part of it, the immanent identity will not always correlate with the collective one, as already mentioned. This interpretation of identity dimensions can be applied to the states. Simplistically the correlation of three dimensions of identity of an international actor can be represented as follows:

All identities of an international actor are undergoing permanent change, and, in some cases, corporate and collective identity may obtain identical pa-rameters. Instead, immanent identity will be coupled with corporate and collec-tive dimensions only partially in all cases. It should be stressed that the collec-tive identity is actually a generalization of perception of an international actor by other actors. In some cases, it is difficult to give a definite answer about the possibility of independent existence of a consistent collective identity as one that consists of the set of value judgments of number of actors.

From the point of view of constructivists, identities determine interests of actors. Changes of identities lead under certain conditions to changes in esti-mations of certain situations, which may result in interests redefinition, that helps to explain the structural changes in international system6.

A. Wendt distinguishes at least three structures in international system, depending on what kind of common beliefs about the roles guide actors. In for-eign policy these ideas about roles are characterized by how crucial is violence between actors and their environment, which may lead to different perception of each other – as enemy, rival or friend. Wendt, basing on the concept of the English School, calls the appropriate structures, which can be formed in inter-national system in this case, the structures of Hobbes, Locke and Kant�.

We are not going into more detailed consideration of Wend’s „cultures of anarchy” and factors, that contribute to their development, as far they are wide represented in scientific discourse. Our attention is paid to the following question. Does always the role-idea „friend” and „friendship” perception of international actors exclude violence between them? And vice versa – does in all cases antagonistic perception include an element of violence? Obviously, the answer is not as simple as in approach, represented by Wendt. Theoretically it is possible, that international actor resorts to use of different means of pressure or „violence” against other international actors (which it regards as „friends”) in order to realize own goals. More over its collective identity can also fit into the „friend” perception.

There are many cases of „attribution” by international community of „peaceful” (collective) identity to a state, which expects its willingness to coop-erate on important international issues etc8. Taking advantage of this collective

6 C. Ulbert, M. Spindler, S. Schieder, Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen. – 2 Auflage. – Verlag Barbara Budrich, „Opladen&Farmington Hills„ 2006, pp. 409-440, 421.

� M. Wight, The Three Traditions in International Theory, [in:] International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. by G. Wight, B. Porter, Leicester 1991, pp. �-24.

8 Note. Different identity representations of Russian Federation are good examples for heterogeneous state-per-ceptions in international relations.

Immanent identity

Corporate identity

Collective identity

Fig.1. An option of identities correlation of an international actor.

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identity and creating its counterpart in form of corporate identity, such a state, however, resorted to use various means of influence (military intervention, economic war, etc.)9 that corresponds to its immanent identity – to realize own interests using power in non-cooperative way. As a result of this inconsistency of identities is likely to be an escalation of a conflict, but in the case of real pow-erful international actors, the international community fails to take decisive sanctions or use of force10. Finally, we can assume a conflict development by a hypothetical convergence of different dimensions of identity - for example, when a state claims to be a powerful actor and the international community considers it to be the threat for peace and security11.

Therefore, there is no direct relationship between identities and goal per-ceptions, as between goal perceptions and identities. Otherwise, similar to the Wend’s „cultures of anarchy” – states that act in the structure of „higher” cul-ture (Kantian) can pursue goals and use tools, which are appropriate for states that are within the structure of „lower” level (Locke) and vice versa. Explana-tion of this phenomenon, in our view, is the different dynamics of immanent identity versus corporate or collective identities, if the nature of their transfor-mation generally can be considered as linear – as growing process from less to more developed form.

If constructivist view about interconditionality of actors and structures, and, therefore, identities, should be accepted, it confirms only in case of cor-porate and collective identities. Definitely, collective and corporate identity can cause each other. A state is able to shape not only its corporate identity by ta-king into account characteristics of the collective, but also collective identity can be transformed because of changes in corporate one. However, search for causal mechanisms of immanent identity transformation does not allow to spot direct dependencies. Propulsion for reinterpretation of immanent identity of the sta-te, for example, may be changes in the age structure of population, internal mi-gration, regional shifts in economic development, technological and infrastru-ctural transformation etc. Influence of external factors may be also significant, including natural and anthropogenic disasters, emigration and immigration, conflicts, integration processes etc. Without doubt, these factors could also be considered in the terms of reinterpretation of corporate and collective identities, but it should be noted, that dynamics of immanent identity shows generally less association with genesis of ideas (ideologies) and norms. Different ideas,

9 Note. Gas-crises in relations between Russia and Ukraine are recent examples of such development.10 Note. See for example not consistent reaction of international community to Russian-Georgian conflict (2008).11 Note. Very illustrative in this context is the fall of Husseyn-regime in Iraq.

norms and consistently different ideologies can be present in a state, witho-ut causing transformation of its immanent identity, while any change of ideas and norms in international environment will certainly affect the reinterpreta-tion of collective identities and, if necessary, cause a „correction” of a corpora-te identity of particular international actor. There are many examples of such (re)interpretation of identities in international relations. By trying to create the desired collective identity, international actors do often serve themselves as sta-tes of definitive kinds of futures: which are „on the path of democratization” or „market reforms”, eliminate different types of weapons, support humanitarian actions or sanctions against international law violators etc., and designing the relevant corporate identity. However, the immanent identity of such states do not goes through necessarily transformations. In the context of the integration, we can see certain analogies in declarative course of some states by joining of the EU by absence of appropriate domestic reforms. Thus, one of them can create a corporate and collective identity as „ready for membership” in the EU (Romania), and others - not (Ukraine). This, again, confirms the problems of correlation between individual identities of international actors.

We can probably agree with constructivists that there is some kind of cor-relation between identities of international actors and their goals, which, howe-ver, is not necessary direct. Moreover, there is the goal responsible for choosing a way or strategy, selected by international actor - conflict or cooperation. Pro-pensity to conflict or cooperation should be regarded as a natural component of immanent identity of all actors, as well as international ones.

Therefore, international actors act in relation to objects, or other actors, excluding basing on collective meanings, which they have for them, as argues A. Wendt, but regarding to their goals imaginations. Collective substantive meanings aid only by choosing strategies in achieving the goals.

Internalization of norms and higher levels of cooperation or common ideas, which, according to constructivists, can lead in the long term to redefinition of identities of international actors, is actually constitutive in shaping collective substantial meanings and can actually cause transformation of identities. Thus, changes of corporate and collective identities take place under certain circum-stances, preceding transformation of immanent identity. Only change of the last one causes a redefinition of goals of an international actor, which requires changes of the strategies of goals achievement. Schematically, this process is presented in Fig. 2.

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Thus, in the process of internalization of norms international actors are re-jecting the purposes of domination and focusing mostly on the goals, they reali-stically can achieve. Simplistically, goals that are in some correlation with the re-alist notion of high politics, designed to ensure existence of a state per se, but less related to citizens priorities, gradually will be replaced with welfare goals, that in realists view, belong to low politics. A state is shifting gradually to fulfillment of its primary function – to provide public goods and prosperity to the citizens.

Development of this process leads to something that could be described as state paradox. On the one hand, the government begins to provide public goods in a better way and increases their volume, which theoretically should strengthen loyalties to the state by own citizens, on the other hand, the state achieves this on the way of cooperation or integration with other international actors. This forces the state not only to reconcile own interests, but also to transfer parts of the traditional responsibilities to the international level. Such idea is associated with the threat of transnationalization of loyalties of citizens and, therefore, with „erosion” of the state and loss of its importance in providing of public goods.

This paradox is one of the key aspects in explaining of intensity changes of an integration process and of its progress in general.

Taking into account that identities are changing, a transition of loyalties is fundamentally conceivable. Ideas concerning personal interests, based on indi-vidual identity and inherently related evaluations of own place, roles, opportu-nities in the social structure (which is saturated of collective representation(s) of identity) etc. Thus, transformation of loyalties (which are considered to con-tribute realization of the goals) will take place solely in correlation with trans-formation of identities.

State by designing its own corporate identity, is defining goals it can achie-ve in a cooperative way, favors a transformation of collective identities, and, finally, falls into a kind of „trap”: it unintentionally causes a redefinition of immanent identity at some stage of integration and transition of loyalties to the transnational level begins. It should be stressed that such transfer of loyalties does not start automatically with the start of integration process. Integration can develop without transfer of loyalties. However, whenever the immanent identity of an international actor with regard to the goal – to provide public goods, determine a strategy to achieve it by self-help principle, cooperation or integration process will get into crisis.

Therefore, different dynamics of integration process have to be explained by the conditions of immanent identities reinterpretations of its parties. They

Stages presented in Fig. 2. are controversial to some extent, because of dif-ficulties of determination how successively or parallel they could happen in the practice. For example, transformation of collective identity may have dire-ct implications to the level of co-operation, without necessary redefinition of immanent identity or changes of goals or strategies. Changes of level of coope-ration may result in a transformation of collective identity, without growth of common ideas number by international actors etc.

Going through (re)interpretation of identities, international actors are gaining knowledge about their real (not imaginary) interests and choose strategies that pre-vent direct application of violence. By analogy to the games theory, it is a kind of iteration process: development of norms, identities reinterpretations and changes of relations to more cooperative ones, encourage actors to deepen cooperation.

Fig. 2. Correlation of norms, common ideas, levels of cooperation and transformation of identities of an international actor.

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are solitary responsible for (common) goals and (cooperative) strategies of their achievement. If an immanent identity of the one of participants in integration interactions not reinterprets to the conditions, that satisfy current stage of integration process, integration slows or gets into crisis. In Fig. 3 is depicted one possible example of such developments of integration interactions. It does not reflect dynamics of reinterpretations of immanent identities of integration partners. Though, we can assume that it slows too.

A remarkable example for identities discords is number of crises of inte-gration process within the EU. To determinate the promptness of new candi-dates for membership, a redefinition of their corporate and collective identities is needed. So it comes to ascription of such characteristics as „full promptness for membership”, „responsibility for common integration project,” „equality of partnership,” etc. However, the real immanent identity of (irresponsible) can-didates refers to own desire just to use benefits of EU membership by non-compulsory „fulfillment of obligations” (the logic - „we’re not ready yet for full responsibility for integration project at the same scale as powerful partners” is followed). As result, it gradually provokes a crisis development within in-tegration process. By the absence of sense of own responsibility for the entire dynamics of integration process, as well as readiness to deal with possible cri-

Fig. 3. An option of failed integration project as a result of negative immanent identity dynamics by one of the partners.

Fig. 4. An option of an integration process dynamics and reinterpretation of collective and immanent identities of an international actor correlation (alternative „Greece - Financial Crisis 2011”).

Fig. 5. An option of an integration process dynamics and reinterpretation of corporate and immanent identities of an international actor correlation (alternative „Greece - Financial Crisis 2011”).

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ses, an international actor – a part of integration interactions, tends rather to abandon its generated corporate identity and tends to focus only on goals that meet its immanent identity conditions (Fig.4-5)12.

There are a number of international actors (states) taking part in an inte-gration process, so its development is determined by a set of reinterpretations of immanent identities. However, a reinterpretation problem of immanent iden-tity by at least one of the integration-bodies can significantly affect the quality of the entire integration project (Fig. 6). In particular, due to the current crisis in the EU, Lithuania announced 2012 its intention to delay the introduction of the common European currency - the Euro. This decision, of course, can affect the dynamics of the European integration process as well.

The fact that a state continues to operate independently, or returns to the basis of self-help principle by providing public goods, means that the structure of loyalties remained without any change. Achievements and ideas of them conti-nue to be distributed in a „state → citizens” patterns and the citizens actually link their benefits to state capabilities, rather than to integration context. This pre-vents the integration process to go outside of actual „cooperation among states”.12 Note. Fig.4–8 do not represent real stages of Eropean integration or transformation of identities of actors that

participate in European integration prosess and are of illustrative nature exceptionally.

Only with such redefinition of immanent identity, when a state ceases to feel exclusive responsibility for public goods provision to the citizens, and they, in turn, begin to associate specified benefits with the integration context and not with their national state, a transfer of loyalties to transnational level begins (Fig. �). In fact, general accepted redistribution changes and citizens of states, involved in the integration process, starts to receive benefits directly in an „in-tegration union → citizens” pattern.

With the beginning of transnationalization of loyalties, an integration pro-cess becomes more irreversible. In other words, an integration process becomes irreversible only when it comes to shift of loyalties, that show positive dynamics, based on redefinition of immanent identity. We can assume that this dynamic should generally correspond the intensity of integration process (Fig. 8).

Fig. 6. An option of an integration process dynamics and reinterpretation of collective, corporate and immanent identities of an international actor correlation (alternative „Lithu-ania - problem of euro-currency introduction 2012”).

Rice. 7. Correlation of an integration process and a transfer of loyalties.

Fig. 8. An option of an integration process dynamics, reinterpretations of immanent iden-tity and transfer of loyalties correlation.

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4. Conclusion

Shift of loyalties to the supranational level, conceivable in the long term period, allows to make assumptions about their indispensable „snap” to cer-tain structures, that demonstrate potential of better provision of public go-ods within the integration process. This refers to the question of the ultimate quality of integrated union – about its institutional nature. History of political thought shows many attempts to reappraise the state as a form of social life, however, a better alternative to its organization than in a modern democratic state and was never been offered. Therefore, as it already mentioned, the part of the debate on the future of the EU should be a question of European organs of (state) government formation, supported by the loyalties shifting of citizens of those countries, which are participating in the integration relations. On the one hand, this would not only catalyze the beginning of the loyalties transfer process, but also contribute to its greater credibility. As a result, the European integration project would gain new dynamics and become irreversible. Conco-mitant to erosion of European nation-states and the formation of new Euro-pean (above)states would become the process of common policies formation, consistent in all areas, effective and comprehensive ensuring of interests of Eu-ropeans in both foreign and domestic policies.

Małgorzata Samulak-Piłat

Phenomenon of Triple Identity – British Nations’ Cross-Cultural Problem

in Relation to European Integration

„We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not combined. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed.”

Sir Winston Churchill

1. Introduction

Sir Winston Churchill’s words used as a motto of this article show cle-arly the attitude of the British people to European Union and it is clear from the above motto that it is not a simple matter. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and its national identity issues pose a problem to European integration process. Although Britain has been a member of the European Union since 19�3, applying as early as in 1961, it still has not gi-ven up Pound for Euro, still has its own maeasurement system and in the face of European Crisis refused to support Angela Merkel’s and Nicolas Sarcozy’s efforts to preserve European Union’s stability. When in 1961 Britain applied to be a member of the EU French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed British membership saying that British government lacks commitment to European integration, was he right? Or maybe the answer to this question is not as simple and requires more analysis. The aim of this paper is to show how the complex issue of British national identity, which has been shaped for hundreds of years by history, economy, island mentality and stereotypes to name just a few, has influenced the United Kingdom’s ability and willingness to fully integrate with countries of the EU.

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2. British National Identity – a Complex Matter

2.1. Identity and National Identity – Multidisciplinary Approach

The notion of identity and national identity has been approached by many sciences. Originally it stems from social sciences i.e. sociology and political science but philosophy, psychology and geography have also been intere-sted in this phenomenon. To begin with, sociology defines social identity as „a person’s self definition in relation to others”1; in philosophy the only refe-rence to person’s identity is offered in epistemology and is „the (numerical) identity over time of persons”2. which means that personal attributes and cha-racteristics are not the most crucial thing but „what it is […] for a person exist-ing at one time and a person existing at another time to be one and the same person”3. Finally, personal identity in psychology is a thing „reflecting those parts of one’s self-definition which have to do with personality traits, physical attributes, interpersonal styles and the like.”4 Treanor claims that „at least nine academic disciplines develop theories of nationalism and nation states: politi-cal geography, international relations, political science, cultural anthropology, social psychology, political philosophy (normative theory), international law and Staatsrecht, sociology and history”5, therefore, it is obvious that a further narrowing of the term is required for the purpose of this article.

2.2. National Identity – Term Disambiguation

When one is talking about the notion of identity one usually means the way in which a person perceives himself/herself in relation to other individu-als, groups, societies etc. The term national identity requires us to take into consideration two terms. To begin with, national identity has to be treated as a certain form of identity. Secondly, when analysing the concept of national identity one has to understand the very notion of ‘nation’ and what it means to be a member of a nation.

1 R. Brown, Social Identity, [in:] The Social Science Encyclopedia, ed. by A. Kuper and J. Kuper, second edition, New York 1996, p. �89.

2 S. Shoemaker, Personal Identity,[in:] The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by R. Audi, Cambridge 1995, p. 5�4.

3 Ibidem, p. 5�4.4 R. Brown, p. �89.5 P. Treanor, Structures of Nationalism, „Sociological Research Online” 199�, Vol. 2, No. 1, http://www.socreson-

line.org.uk/2/1/8.html, (20.06.2012).

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines identity as „those attributes that make you unique as an individual and different from others” or „the way you see or define yourself”6, therefore identity can be viewed as a perception of oneself in relation to others. However, when one goes beyond individual identity to collective one and consequently approaches the concept of national identity, the definition appears to be more complicated, as now it is not abo-ut identifying a single individual, but about enumerating characteristics of an entire population. Therefore, if we return to the previous definition of identity, collective identity can be perceived as the „self” of a community – individuality in relation to certain group affiliations – here a nation of a particular country, as opposed to the „others”.

Who can, therefore, be treated as this ‘self ’ of a community? The Oxford English Dictionary presents such a definition of a nation: „An extensive ag-gregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent, language, or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory”�. Smith moves even further, presenting the concept of a nation as „a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”8. If such circumstances are met then the group can develop a feeling of national character which, according to Bloom, is „that particular set of cul-tural mores and political norms which, through socialisation, are passed down from generation to generation within a particular ethnos”9. And the develop-ment of national character would consequently lead to the growth of national feelings leading to the development of national identity which can be defined as a construct consisting of certain features, such as:

1. a historic territory, or homeland2. common myths and historical memories3. a common, mass public culture4. common legal rights and duties for all members5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members”10.

6 E. T. Olson, Personal Identity, [in:] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by E. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/identity-personal/, (06.0�.2012).

� Nation, [in:] The Oxford English Dictionary, The Philological Society, Vol. VII. Oxford 1993, p. 30.8 A. D. Smith, National Identity, London 1991, p. 14.9 W. Bloom, Personal identity, national identity and international relations, New York 1990, p. 18.10 A. D. Smith, p. 14.

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To sum up, one can assume that national identity will be a person’s identity and sense of belonging to one state, country or nation; this would be a feeling one shares with a group of people regardless of one’s citizenship. National iden-tity is shaped by common history, national symbols, language and culture to name just a few. The word ‘common’ is crucial here.

The above mentioned definition will also be adequate in explaining why in case of Great Britain it is such a complicated issue which makes it impossible for its citizens to define themselves simply with one state, which, consequently, leads to even greater problems when it comes to identifying themselves with European Union.

2.3. British Problem of Double Identity

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is the full name of the country in question which already in the beginning poses problems for a foreigner. Whom does one refer to when they say British/English? – there are often cases when one uses British or English as synonyms and unintentionally offends Britons. Can we refer to a person from Northern Ireland as English or British? Why do some people from the UK who introduce themselves to a per-son from abroad say for instance ‘I’m British, from Wales’. Those are the signs of British Double Identity and problems connected with it.

The problem of double identity stems from England’s long history marked with conflicts with its neighbours. There is not enough space here to discuss all conflicts in detail, what should be stated, however, is the fact that the effects of those conflicts are clearly visible nowadays: the United Kingdom as the name it-self suggests is a union of England which managed to conquer its neighbours and ‘convince’ them to unite with it, therefore, obviously it was not a mutual agre-ement, with only one country being able to partly oppose it – Ireland. Thus, Wales joined the union as the first country as early as in 1536. Scotland followed suit in 1�0� by signing The Act of Union for England and Scotland. Ireland – the last member was finally incorporated in 1801, but endless conflicts and fight for inde-pendence led to independence of southern Ireland in 1922 leaving only Northern Ireland in the union11. And thus the beginnings of national identity problems began to appear in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland feeling oppressed and conquered and English feeling superior and victorious. Those animosities are still present in Britons and make it impossible for them to feel attached emotionally

11 M. Storry, P. Childs, British Cultural Identities, second edition, London and New York 2002, p. 36.

to one state or country, because they have to divide their national identity and patriotic feelings between at least two countries. The best example of this split identity is offered by football/soccer – one of the most popular games on the Is-les. Whenever a Scottish team for instance is playing against English team Scot-tish people support naturally the Scots and English support their own team. The situation changes when for instance English team is playing against France for instance, then all countries of the Union support English team. Another example may be quoted by James O’Driscoll from his book Britain: „A wonderful example of double identity was heard on the BBC during the Eurovision Song Contest in 1992. The commentator for the BBC was Terry Wogan [...] an Irishman who had become Britain’s most popular television talk-show host during the 1980s. To-wards the end of the programme, with the voting for the songs nearly complete, it became clear that the contest [...] was going to be won by either Ireland or the United Kingdom. Within a five-minute period, Mr. Wogan could be heard using the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘us’ several times; sometimes he meant the UK and some-times he meant Ireland!”12.

Of course, it can be argued that these distinctions are very much a modern phenomenon. A hundred years ago, the town or district of birth was the overar-ching factor in a person’s identity. Before modern communication, except for the relatively few higher class people who could travel widely, the question of natio-nality would not arise, unless a government was trying to raise funds for a war (in Britain’s case usually against the French or Spanish). Then everybody would be British and proud of it (as the propagandists would state) and the enemy he-athens and evil people. However, nowadays, with easy access to information and globalization being a modern phenomenon, national identity problem became visible. Identity in the UK became a particularly complex issue. On the whole the Scottish, Welsh and Irish peoples tend to have their own strong national iden-tities that has generally more influence than their ‘Britishness’. Many of these identity issues depend heavily on context. The answer to a question of a person’s origins depends at least as much on the location and (perceived) nationality of the inquirer, than on the actual origins of the questioned. One of my British friends has observed Welsh and Scottish people in India being asked from where they came and the answer was invariably, „ I am British, from Wales....Scotland...”. The English tend to state British, leaving it at that unless pressed further. If the Irish, Scot or Welsh think that the questioner would know of their country, in general they would not answer British, but Welsh, Scottish or Irish. The English

12 J. O’Driscoll, Britain, Oxford 1995, p. 13.

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also tend not to have the same nationalist feelings (pride) than their fellow Brits. This could be for many reasons, but it can be felt that the primary reason for this state of affairs is that historically, Britain has generally been ruled by the English. Englishmen had most of the power, wealth, influence and land, even in Scotland, Wales and to a slightly lesser extent, Ireland. The Scots, Welsh and Irish regarded themselves, quite accurately, as a repressed minority within the United King-dom, and many still do feel that way. Perversely, the ordinary English person would feel much the same, repressed and powerless, as indeed they were, but still English domination can be seen in various ways British public life is being des-cribed. To begin with, „the supply of money in Britain is controlled by the Bank of England (there is no such thing as a ‘Bank of Britain’)”13; furthermore, the term ‘Anglo’ – for instance ‘Anglo-American relations’ is also commonly used in reference to relations between British and American governments, although The Angles were a Germanic tribe who settled in England in the 5th century, and from the name England was derived14; last but not least, the present monarch is known as ‘Elizabeth the Second’ although Scotland and Northern Ireland have never had ‘Elizabeth the First’ as she reigned England and Wales only from 1553 to 160315. Another example can be found in the use of language: „To welsh is to cheat or renege; to scotch is to thwart, to squash, to prevent; an Irish lanyard is an untidy rope. In other words the names of the three ‘subsidiary’ nations in the British Isles have negative connotations in the language of the dominant one. Thus national prejudice is encoded in the English language”16.

Therefore, judging by the above mentioned examples one could propose such a diagram illustrating British people’s identity:

13 Ibidem, p. 12.14 Ibidem, p. 12.15 Ibidem, p. 12.16 M. Storry, P. Childs, p. 16.

With English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish national identity and feelings being more important than British. However when asked about their identity – un-prompted by news and mass media – many British people often place their regio-nal identity over even national identity, „It is important to remember that culture varies for Irish, Welsh, Scottish, or English people depending on which region of their country they come from. In Wales, three-quarters of the population live in the valleys and coal regions of the south, which instill a different sense of Welsh identity from the mountains and seaside towns of the more militantly anti-En-glish north; while in England it is the heavily populated metropolitan areas that have created several of its strongest regional identities. People from these diffe-rent areas are associated with specific names and local characteristics, though it is their dialect that most obviously distinguishes them”1�. Here is the answer I got from one of the Britons asked about their national identity: „My own personal view of my identity is one of being Lancastrian. I am from the county of Lancashi-re in NW England. I do have a more local identity from my hometown, but Lan-castrian is my most prevalent identity, then comes English, then British. People of my generation and older tend to think in this way, particularly in the northern and extreme western counties. The two major northern counties in England are Lancashire and Yorkshire (see War of the Roses). Yorkshire people were/are also identify themselves strongly with their county rather than their nation. I am tal-king here of free, unprompted personal identity.” Thus one could judge by such an answer, that the notion of double identity has also another layer – regional one. Geographical place of birth very often, because of history and divisions within the country, defines people’s national identity narrowing it even further. However, a question should be asked here if regional identity can be as important as natio-nal identity, as „[a] sense of identity based on place of birth is, like family identity, not very common or strong in most parts of Britain – and perhaps for the same reason. People are just too mobile”18. Therefore an affirmative statement would be very hazardous as „[t]here is quite a lot of local pride, and people find many op-portunities to express it. This pride, however, arises because people are happy to live in what they consider to be a nice place and often they are fighting to preserve it. It does not usually mean that people of a locality feel strongly that they belong to that place”19. Nevertheless, it is without a doubt that local identity should be noted as the one influencing British national identity because „[a] sense of identity with a larger geographical area is a bit stronger […] In some cases there is quite a strong

1� M. Storry, P. Childs, p. 48.18 J. O’Driscoll, p. 4�.19 Ibidem, p. 4�.

Diagram 1. British national identity, Source: own analysis.

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sense of identification. Liverpudlians (from Liverpool), Mancunians (from Man-chester), Geordies (from the Newcastle area) and Cockneys (from London) are often proud to be known by these names. In other cases, identity is associated with a county. These are the most ancient divisions of England. […] Even today, some Cornish people still talk about ‘going to England’ when they cross the co-unty border – a testament to its ethnic Celtic history”20. Therefore, the diagram 1 should be redrawn and presented in such a form:

with regional identity being placed above national one (English, Welsh etc.) but not separated from it entirely. So far the problem of British double identity has been explained, what will follow will be an analysis of British attitude to European Union and the influence it has on their European Identity and atti-tudes towards Euro-integration.

3. The British and the European Union – Reasons for Reluctance

3.1. Geography

In a geographical and linguistic sense, it is easy for a Briton to let their mind wander and ponder the physical extent of their ‘identity’ because one can’t wander too far before reaching the sea. „The British mainland, separated from the European continent by the English Channel, is the eighth largest is-land in the world. Its inhabitants are islanders, and their attitude towards the rest of the world has sometimes been said to reflect this”21.

Britain is an island, with an island mentality, and (apart from small excep-

20 Ibidem, p. 4�.21 M. Storry, P. Childs, p. 43.

tions) the British all speak a common language – English. For British people Europe is a large mass of differing nations with many differing languages, so appears to the British as somewhat alien. Their island nature has meant that for over a thousand years they have not had someone else’s army tramping across their country, though again, the Scots and Irish may have a rather different vie-wpoint if one looks from the perspective of their national feelings and identity.

What is more, Britain used to be a great empire with dominions all over the world, the best proof of it today being remnants of Commonwelath. In 1919 The British Empire comprised such possessions as Canada, Australia, India, Egypt and Nigeria to name just a few22, therefore, such a country should have the mentality of a leader rather than the will to take part in Euro-integration process as an equal partner. „While the Commonwealth offers many indica-tions of the cultural and ethnic influences on modern Britain, and is at the same time a sign of the UK’s international links and imperial past, it is Europe’s economic policies, legal dictates, and bureaucracy that is increasingly forcing the British to reconsider their identity. For some people, ‘Brussels’ has become a major opponent, in the face of whose recommendations and legislation they are trying to assert a national culture that they feel is coming under attack”23.

3.2. Individualism

The British love their individualism and are very proud of it. This leads to the fact that they are very reluctant if not hostile to all kinds of changes. „The British can be particularly and stubbornly conservative about anything which is perceived as a token of Britishness. In these matters, their conservatism can combine with their individualism; they are rather proud of being different. It is, for example, very difficult to imagine that they will ever agree to change form driving on the left-hand side of the road to driving on the right. It doesn’t matter that nobody can think of any intrinsic advantage in driving on the left. Why should they change just to be like everyone else? Indeed, as far as they are concerned, not being like everyone else is a good reason not to change”24.

„European union has developed into one of the most important political issues of the present day. Since the Union’s conception, Britain has been some-what slow and reluctant to participate fully, despite the majority perception that European integration is inevitable. It was not until 1 January 19�3, follo-

22 See: J. O’Driscoll, p. 113.23 M. Storry, P. Childs, p. 43.24 J. O’Driscoll, p. 59.

Diagram 2. British national identity. Source: own analysis.

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wing two years of negotiations, that Britain joined the EC”25. And since then The British have been very reluctant in conforming to EU standards treating them as an invasion on their individualism and attack on Britishness. That is the reason why they still drive on the left-hand side of the road when the rest of EU drives on the right, they still have Pound when the general tendency for all the countries that can fulfil certain criteria (Britain meets them all) is to introduce Euro currency. What is more, although British manufacturers are obligated to give the weight of their products in kilograms and grams, British people still buy things in pounds and ounces, the same rules apply to measu-ring temperature – Britons do it in Fehrenheits, the rest of Europe in Celsius, or liquids – measured in pints for instance.

„Developments at European Union (EU) level which might cause a change in some everyday aspects of British life are usually greeted with suspicion and hostility. Alongside genuine fears, such as that of a loss of local languages, there has also arisen a mythology of European Union policies: rumours maintaining that traditional British foods, such as dairy milk chocolate, crisps, fish and chips, and Cornish ice cream, are under serious threat because of EU standardisation. Through appeals to such recognisable staples of national heritage, a powerful resistance to the EU has been built up, but other voices maintain that Britain’s political, economic, and legislative future has to lie within a united Europe”26. Therefore, a conclusion might be drawn that whenever EU is aiming at standar-disation of its countries and in helping them survive through crisis Britain feels that they have no need of conforming to these pleas and wishes, however, when it comes to economic and political perks membership in the EU gives them, they feel very happy about the fact that they are a member country.

Another example is a case of double-decker buses: „Whenever EU commit-tee makes a recommendation about standardizing the size and shape of these, it provokes warnings from British bus builders about ‘the end of the double-decker bus as we know it’. The British public is always ready to listen to such predictions of doom”2�.

What British people cherish so much: dissent, scepticism, lack of confor-mity, the ability to set rather than follow fashion trends, and individuality over the herd instinct tends to pose problems for EU. „Eccentricity is one stage furt-her on from this and is admired even more. Undoubtedly for a country of ec-centrics to thrive, fundamental tolerance of dissent or difference is necessary,

25 M. Storry, P. Childs, p. 2�6.26 Ibidem, p. 43. 2� J. O’Driscoll, p. 60.

and clearly this exists in Britain”28. However, many people begin to ask them-selves a question: how long can Britain remain eccentric, individualistic and nonconformist in the face of homogenising forces of EU and globalisation?

3.3. Ignorance

Sadly the attitude of the British people towards European Union is often governed by ignorance and national prejudice. „In 2001, a report from the Eu-ropean Commission warned that public ignorance in Britain of the euro was such that a credible referendum about it could not be held. Only 20 per cent of people felt they were well informed, while 80 per cent of the thousand questio-ned confessed to a serious lack of knowledge. Almost two-thirds of those que-stioned said they believed giving up the pound would mean an end to national independence while 60 per cent said they thought the EU could not be trusted with British interests. The academic asked to review the figures in Brussels con-cluded that views about the euro were based upon ‘prejudice and the innate conservatism of British public opinion’”29.

Recent opinion polls show that not much has changed in the British people’s knowledge about EU. A survey „Attitudes Towards the EU in the Uni-ted Kingdom” conducted by The Gallup Organisation in 2010 and released in 2011 shows that only 18% of Britons felt informed about EU and 82% stated that they know very little or nothing30.

28 M. Storry, P. Childs, p. 20.29 Ibidem, p. 2�8.30 Attitudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom, The Gallup Organisation 2010, p. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/pub-

lic_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf, (18.06.2012).

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Diagram 3 illustrates how British people’s knowledge about European Union has been changing since 2002. One conclusion that can be drawn for certain is that the level of awareness about EU has almost not changed since 2009. The group of those who knew ‘a lot’ has always been small, verging on 1-2% of all respondents. What is disturbing is that after quite a big raise in 2009 (‘quite a lot’ – 1�, ‘a little’ – 69) one actually sees a small decline in the ‘quite a lot’ and ‘a little’ group in 2010. What may be comforting, however, is the fact that the group of respondents who knew nothing about the EU has dropped significantly since 2006, but, on the other hand, in 2010 was remaining at the same level as in 2009, presenting lack of changes in this group of respondents.

What is more, not many British citizens were actually interested in recei-ving information about EU, as illustrated by Diagram 4 below.

In ‘very interested’, ‘quite interested’ groups one can see even further decli-ne in the willingness to receive information about the EU (-1% and -5% respec-tively). A slight decline is also visible in ‘quite uninterested group’. However, the biggest raise, which unfortunately is not a positive thing, is visible in ‘not at all interested’ group. Since 2009 additional �% of respondents decided that they are not interested in receiving additional information about the EU.

Taking into consideration the low level of knowledge about the EU it may be stated that the majority of opinions that British citizens have about the EU stems from their own opinions shaped by different external or internal forces which may often be unreliable. Such a situation may lead to the development of negative emotions and attitudes towards EU based on, for example, prejudice, gossip or emotions. It can be illustrated by the diagram 5 below.

Respondents in the Diagram 5 were asked: ‘What percentage of the UK’s gross national income do you think goes towards the EU budget? (2010)’ and ‘How much percent of the UK’s gross national income do you think goes towards the EU budget? (2009)’ and it is obvious from the answers that a great majority of British people are absolutely not aware of the actual facts as „The UK pays an annual con-tribution to the EU on the basis of the rules laid out in the 200�-2013 multi-annual budget framework. In 200�, the UK’s contribution to the EU budget was approxi-mately 0.5% of the UK’s Gross National Income (GNI). The UK has a negative net position in the EU, meaning that it pays more than it directly receives from the EU budget. In 2009, this difference amounted to about 0.12% of GNI”31. They were probably basing their knowledge on the fact that they heard probably on the news that Britain was paying too much and, consequently, the answers they presented 31 Both GNI figures are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin_reports/fin_report_09_

data.xls the last two rows show the net contribution by Member State

Diagram 3. How much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions? Would you say you know...? Source: Attitudes Towards the EU in the United King-dom, The Gallup Organisation 2010, p. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf, (18.06.2012).

Diagram 4. How interested are you in receiving more information about EU? Source: At-titudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom, The Gallup Organisation 2010, p. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf, (18.06.2012).

38


39


in the chart were not even close to reality. Only 6% and 9% of respondents in 2009 and 2010 respectively were aware of the percentage of GNI that the UK pays to the EU. However, a higher percentage – 10% in 2009 and 8% in 2010 claimed that it was 41-100% of GNI (sic!). „The average estimated proportion of the UK’s national income transferred to the EU was 19%; this shows that most citizens do not seem to understand these figures. Even the most educated segment estimated the UK’s contribution to the EU budget to be about 12% of GNI”32. The figure that should actually draw attention here, however, is the DK/NA one as it proves that the level of ignorance even in the matters crucial to Great Britain is very high.

And finally, summarising Diagram 6 illustrating general attitude of the British people towards the EU. British public was split here in their attitudes towards the UE. Positive feelings were expressed by 42% of respondents (very or quite positive), whereas negative attitudes were expressed by 39% (quite or very negative). What may be worrying is the fact that almost one fifth of re-spondents (19%) had no feelings towards the EU or simply did not care. And it should not be a surprise that „[a] positive perception of the EU was well above average among the youngest respondents (aged 15- 24: 63%), full-time students (6�%) and those with the highest level of education (59%), as well as among re-spondents from metropolitan areas (52%). On the other hand, manual workers 32 Attitudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom, op. cit.

(53%), British citizens older than 54 (48%), rural residents (45%), those with the lowest level of education (48%) and men (45%) were particularly likely to have a negative image of the EU”33.

3.4. Triple Identity

It has been discussed that a matter of identity in the UK is a complex issue which is often referred to as double identity which was illustrated by Diagrams 1 and 2. However, if one wishes to speak of Great Britain as a loyal member of the European Union, one should also bear in mind that such an allegiance requires the development of a common feeling of all people inhabiting European Union – a common feeling referred to previously as national identity. If The European Union is aiming at unification of the union and wishes to create a borderless state of countries which cooperate together under the same economy, rules, laws and currency a certain patriotic feeling of belonging to this state must occur in all member states, not only in Great Britain. A willingness to give, not only to recei-ve perks as a member state, must mature in all nations of the EU. However, while in the majority of countries in question the development of such a European Identity would require creation of the above mentioned double identity, of course not forced by military invasion but based on mutual agreement, in the case of the UK the situation would be again more complicated.33 Ibidem.

Diagram 5. Source: Attitudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom, The Gallup Organi-sation 2010, p. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf, (18.06.2012).

Diagram 6. Source: Attitudes Towards the EU in the United Kingdom, The Gallup Organi-sation 2010, p. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf, (18.06.2012).

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Great Britain, as it has been discussed earlier, already has a phenomenon of double identity ingrained in its national identity. The creation of European Iden-tity would necessitate great mental and patriotic efforts on the part of all citizens of the UK as it would require them to pass from Double Identity to Triple Identity – a new patriotic feeling this time expanded into all countries of the EU. If one wanted to show it on the diagram it would probably look like this:

and unfortunately and justifiably European Identity is at the bottom of this pyramid, as it would come last and the least important to people of the United Kingdom. But before this identity is fully developed and matured the attitude of the British people must change. However, it will not be possible without gre-ater awareness and knowledge about the European Union.

What is more, one must remember that although scholars often talk about the notion of Double Identity it is not always clear as „[a]n article in the Sunday Times on 5 February 1995 was entitled ‘Disunited We Stand’. It maintained that, while each of Britain’s four different countries has a strong identity and inspires patriotic loyalties, there is no ‘British’ identity as such. The article not-ed that a 1994 survey revealed that �5 per cent of people ‘north of the border’ would call themselves Scottish and not British. […]Such a view has made Brit-ish studies courses often turn to a ‘four nations’ approach”34. Therefore, unless these animosities are settled it will not be possible for the British nation to develop a patriotic feeling towards Europe if they have problems with whom to turn their patriotism to in their own country in the first place.

34 M. Storry, P. Childs, pp. 43-44.

4. Conclusions

One must remember, how complex and individualistic in their feelings the UK is. It is difficult to make generalisations about it because „Britain is an amalgam of paradoxes. It is generally conformist and conservative but is also in a constant state of change. It is governed by Parliament, but the people’s voice is strong. It has a monarch but many people are republicans. It generates a lot of popular and much ‘high’ culture, but also philistinism and hooliganism. Constituency of its population also is in flux. The majority of the population is Caucasian, but 6.8 per cent of people are now from ethnic minorities – predo-minantly from the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. It is hard to embrace such contradictions and tensions. It is much easier to talk about ‘Britains’, or for that matter the ‘Identities”35. Thus, it is obvious that British Identity problem is a very multifaceted issue. Therefore, such problems must be resolved before Britain can move on to European Identity.

To sum up, „[o]ver the last three decades, British people have become dec-reasingly hostile to and increasingly appreciative of European culture, old ri-valries and prejudices themselves passing away with older generations. Among the young, Europe is generally perceived positively and associated with many of the good things in life”36, therefore, from the above mentioned arguments one can draw conclusion that before developing European Identity, and conseque-ntly moving on to the phenomenon of Triple Identity in their nation, Britain must combat inner identity issues within the country, raise public awareness concerning the EU and sacrifice a minute part of its national pride and indivi-dualism to make it possible for them to fully embrace unification the European Union is offering to its members.

35 Ibidem, pp. 14-15.36 Ibidem, p. 280.

43

Diagram 7. Triple identity. Source: own analysis.

and unfortunately and justifiably European Identity is at the bottom of this pyramid, as it

would come last and the least important to people of the United Kingdom. But before this

identity is fully developed and matured the attitude of the British people must change.

However, it will not be possible without greater awareness and knowledge about the European

Union.

What is more, one must remember that although scholars often talk about the notion of

Double Identity it is not always clear as ―[a]n article in the Sunday Times on 5 February 1995

was entitled ‗Disunited We Stand‘. It maintained that, while each of Britain‘s four different

countries has a strong identity and inspires patriotic loyalties, there is no ‗British‘ identity as

such. The article noted that a 1994 survey revealed that 75 per cent of people ‗north of the

border‘ would call themselves Scottish and not British. […]Such a view has made British

studies courses often turn to a ‗four nations‘ approach‖46. Therefore, unless these animosities

are settled it will not be possible for the British nation to develop a patriotic feeling towards

Europe if they have problems with whom to turn their patriotism to in their own country in the

first place.

4. Conclusions

One must remember, how complex and individualistic in their feelings the UK is. It is

difficult to make generalisations about it because ―Britain is an amalgam of paradoxes. It is 46 M. Storry, P. Childs, pp. 43-44.

British Identity

English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish

Regional identity

European Identity

Diagram 7. Triple identity. Source: own analysis.

43

Rafał Riedel

Migration, Social Capital and Identity – Polish and European Perspective

1. Introduction

This paper analyses the present condition of social capital in Poland and its correlations with migration in the identity building context. The thesis can be formulated in a statement that a poor level of major social capital compo-nents constitute a solid pre-requisite for migration readiness. There is a number of determinants of migration (social, economic, political, cultural and others) – this analysis focuses on social capital and its selected elements in the perspec-tive of motives that lay behind migration decisions.

Being the biggest workforce exporter in EU, Poland is a very good case study, when discussing migration traffic, its intensiveness, dynamics, motivations, di-rections and characteristics. Specific components of social capital may be parame-terized and act as variable correlated with migration processes. Therefore the aut-hor of this paper emphasizes those indicators that represent values and attempts oriented on community and social networks. Those are in case of Poland so low that some academics debate on the adequacy of using civil society concept in ana-lyzing the reality of post-communist societies. The critical mass of the discussion was reached when Janusz Czapiński published his paper in „Nauka” (Science) en-titled: „Poland – a state without society” (2006). This provocative thesis was for-mulated on the basis of rich and recognized research proving poor condition of trust and consequently inter-personal relations within Polish society.

Civic society building as well as identity building (and rebuilding) - especially in European integration process - seem to be happening parallel and at the same time they are significantly affected by the driving factor: the social capital.

Author of this paper will also refer to empirical data and major argumen-tation will be rooted in social survey reports.

One of the major non-economical determinants of migration processes is the specifics of relations between an individual and his / her wider social con-text – family, local community, society. These correlations (especially in the case of Poland) potentially are very interesting and promising area for research

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penetration. Two important characteristics of today’s Polish society is massive migration exodus and poor level of social capital.

The correlations between those two phenomena cannot be satisfactory ana-lysed just by economics, or theories dominated by economic logic, therefore it is recommendable to engage neighbouring and related disciplines – sociology, social psychology, political sciences or social geography to fully explore the scientific potential.

Social capital in post-soviet societies has its specifics. In social conditions of real-socialism, individuals tightened the bonds based on trust and mutuality wit-hin family or friends circles. Rarely did the individuals decide to broaden their social horizon beyond the circle of primary groups. As it is argued by Granovetter (based on empirical data) strong ties created and kept on long-lasting, emotional interactions are less effective than weak ties, in the creation of bridges between wider social networks enabling easier flow of information, resources, etc.

The discussion about poor condition of civic society in Poland reached its culmination point last year, when prof. Janusz Czapiński, published his paper: Poland – a state without society. So even stronger – not only civic society but society in general

The only societal institutions that work in Poland is family and nation. There is nothing in between, the body, the content – what makes a group a pe-ople a society.

2. Social Capital and Migration

Many analysts refer to the works of Max Weber, that might inspire the next generations of social researchers dealing both social capital1. C. Trigilia finds in Weber’s writing key elements of social capital: non-economic relations network, enabling circulation of information and other resources generating in trust.

The first author who used the term was Lynda J. Hanifan, writing an the beginning of XX c. about passive attitudes of the citizens as dangers for de-mocracy. Those problems (and many others – economic, political, social) could be fought only by strengthening local communities and building positive rela-tions among the citizens)

In numerous conceptualisations of social capital (Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Robert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama or George Soros) the common denominator of the key elements of most social capital definitions are: trust, social networks and norms and obligations associated with collective living.

In consequence, it can be understood as resources that are in the reach of an individual or a group available (beyond family structure) thanks to social ne-twork.

Through the permanent process of building social capital, an individual or a group, structures its social identity.

At the same time it is important to remember that migration belongs to this type of social processes that is connected with re-construction of social identity.

Migration, connected with changing place of living, means – for many – transfer to culturally strange world and is connected with radical decision meaning participation in the process of de-socialization and new socialization leading to absorption of new norms, values, social relations, habits, etc.

Research on migration for a long time has been carried mainly based on these theoretical inspirations that limited the problem to reasons of migration and then migrants’ assimilation, integration and acculturation. Nowadays, more and more often we observe intensified scientific interest in investigating the correlations between migration and identity building as well as post-natio-nal polity.

Migration, both in the scale of a region as well as global one bring about far going changes of social, political, economic and cultural character within and outside of the nation states. The XXI century is most probably going to be a century of intensive migrations, with dynamics not know ever before. There-

1 Some go centuries before – to Scottish Enlightment: Adam Smith, David Hume.Diagram 1. Level of Trust in European Societies. Source: European Social Survey (2002).

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fore the consequences that migration causes – problems with ethnic and natio-nal identity, multicultural societies – may be dominant also in social sciences of XXI century.

One may also expect a fear of uncontrollable nature of this phenomena, especially on the political elites side. Most modern analysis of migration pro-cesses are based on neo-classical theory of migration, especially on proposed by Gordon De Jong and James Fawcett model: „value expectancy model” ac-cording to which the decisions consist of calculations of expected costs and benefits as well as likelihood of realisation of different scenarios, life strategies as well as alternative analysis. For the new member states this brings about huge migration potential – number of persons, who would like to take up mi-gration strategy and - at the same time – have real possibilities (for example: legal, economic), which this is not the same as migration readiness – however both of them have a common denominator in factors responsible for creating both of them: most frequently pointed – economic situation, political insta-bility, wars, ecological / natural disasters, on the other side – high salaries in importing countries. To this one should add – poor level of social capital in the exporting community: distrust (interpersonal, inter-group), quality of social networks, norms and obligations. If they do not correspond to the expectation of the individual – they may act as prerequisites of migration readiness.

The last waves of EU enlargement (in 2004 and 200�) brought about mas-sive migration flows from the new member states to those old ones that had decided to open their labour markets without implementing 2+3+2 years tran-sition periods2.

It is also important to notice that European Union enlargement (of new Central and Eastern European countries) had also its implications from the point of view of European identity evolution. The new member states have specific perspective on identity issues, different from the one of the old Eu-rope (EU15). Many of CEE states undergo parallel process of reconstruction of national identity and European identity, with a strong correlation of both of them. Migration outflow from those countries (its scale and intensity) has made this phenomenon an important point in the political agenda, not only from demographic perspective, but also from he point of view of supranational concept of statehood.

Contemporary characteristics of migration has take into account globa-lization that impacts on the migration process to a large extent. It is assumed

2 First the United Kingdom, Ireland and Swedan, later on, also: Finland, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Holland

that the fast and growing pace of migration processes is induced by develop-ments in global political, economic, technical, information and social spheres. Another characteristic is also the existence of so called global labor market (constituted by the rich countries). There is a constant inflow to the centers from peripheries and semi-peripheries (reservoirs of needed resources)3. Ad-ditionally world-wide, one observes a growing category of pro-active migrants, who have a choice of decision and decide to migrate. Therefore the distinction between stable and temporary migrations seems to be less and less accurate as well as distinguishing between sending and welcoming countries. However when debating about migration, the most influential are those arguments that are promoted by welcoming states, which take care of their own citizens. In-strumental treatment of migrants is dominant over ethics of symmetry. Migra-tion policy of welcoming states is aimed at solving their population and labor problems. In the era of societies’ aging, low or negative demographic growth in developed countries, migration is a method of compensating demographic shortages.

Contemporary world is individualistic orientation friendly. New cosmopoli-tan identity for which polyvalence of cultures is acceptable, makes the „one-way” national identification less attractive and supports adaptation of migrants.4

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt paid special attention to time, as one of major deter-minants of social integration of the migrants as well as participating in more and more fields of social life. Eisenstadt analyzed certain levels of identification of the migrants with the welcoming society He pointed a number of phases in the process of migrants’ integration;

- phase „adaptive integration”, characterized with demonstrating the competence to perform the basic social roles, connected with partici-pation in the social life.

- Phase „instrumental integration”, is related with participation of the new migrants into the economic life, which makes it possible for them to answer their existential needs themselves.

- Phase ”identification and solidarity” – the migrant becomes aware of being a member of the welcoming society. Accepting the system of values of the welcoming society is typical for this phase

3 Legal and illegal migrations have been treated as a component of world economical system4 On the other side – what we observe in some post-soviet area states - transition from industrial societies to

post-modern as well as nation states to multicultural states, which may result in the renaissance of ethnic na-tionalisms (for example in Russia).

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- Phase „cultural integration” accepting symbolic culture, internaliza-tion of norms, patterns of behavior.

Eisenstadt belongs to those theoreticians who claim that the migration pro-cess is not always a success story. This is dependant both on a number of factors on the side of the migrant as well as the welcoming society. Specially important risk of migration – from the point of view of identity building – is marginalisa-tion. In general marginalisation and the feeling of alienation are more natural in poor social capital community. It may be understood as lack of participation5 (individuals or groups) in the spheres of life, in which – according to established criteria and rules – the participation is expected. Maginalisation in one of the sub-systems does not automatically involve marginalisation in other spheres. However there is a tendency to accumulate spheres in which an individual does not participate (for example: being jobless limis one’s access to culture, some areas of consumption, security, etc.) Marginalised groups should not be treated as categories places outside of social structure – they are an element of it. Mi-gration strategy is (most frequently) chosen by people, who has little to lose – to a large extend they are marginalized when the migration decision is taken.

According to E. Lee’s theory (push – pull theory) there are four determi-nants defining the migration readiness and potential:

1. Determinants connected with place of origin (push factors) 2. Determinants connected with place of destination (pull factors)3. Intervening obstacles 4. Personnal determinants

Social capital may be important as a push and pull factor. But also as a in-tervening obstacles – here more adequate may be social migration capital and its eventual poor level that might become critical for the success of the migra-tion project. However it is the negative social capital that is important as a de-terminant of a push – pull theory.

Portes (1998) indicates four types of negative social capital:

(1) exclusion – access to different type of goods / commodities is provi-ded only for certain social network. „WE”

(2) „too strong” social capital may lead to over-exploitation of some group members

5 Participation – fulfilling social roles in certain systems and sub-systems (family, political system, production)

(3) Strong ties funding the social capital may generate rights infringe-ment – individual freedom may be sacrificed for group solidarity or loyalty

(4) „Race to the bottom” – periphery groups function sometimes in op-position to dominant group, this often reveals tendencies to block pro-motion of group members outside of the periphery group (dependen-cies, particular norms).

Apart from this, we should also identify negative (low) social capital which is constituted of:

• Strong materialism generating relations mainly of transactional nature• Weak institutions of social life (beside family and nation) • Weak local communities• Poor quality of relation networks not helping (in extreme conditions

– unabling) effectiev flow of information • Not effective social control of activities of groups and individuals (espe-

cially those negative and pathological) • Lack of trust atmosphere – potentially leading to the general culture of

distrust • Lack of positive norms for collective actions• Not paying attention to ethical norms (lack of collective ethos) • Negative experience of co-operation in the past• No disposition to social activities • Lack of competencies in team-work • Ineffective or poor quality socialisation (civic, political, economic).

Most modern analysis of migration processes are based on neo-classical theory of migration, especially on proposed by Gordon De Jong and James Fawcett model: „value expectancy model” according to which the decisions consist of calculations of expected costs and benefits as well as likelihood of realisation of different scenarios, life strategies as well as alternative analysis.

According to this logic the most predestined social group (from migration point of view) is the youth. Young people are in a specific phase of their life cyc-le breaking ties with parents’ household and taking responsibility (eventually securing material existential foundations for newly established family unit) on

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their own. The relation between tendency to labour migration and age shows clearly that the most eager to leave were persons aged 18 – 24.

In this age group, over 40% of the population is ready to take up job abroad. Pe-ople in this age group has less to lose – according to „value expectancy model”. Ho-wever in the transition societies this phenomenon may also be explained in another way. As it was observed by the social psychologists, persons born in the system change period, more often than born before or after, over-use alcohol and cigaret-tes, use drugs, have a strong feeling of being discriminated. This could be explained in two ways: (1) Siegmunt Freud’s rationale claims that the early age experiences are decisive for psychological development of an individual And when the fall of com-munism brought about a revolution in Polish families, confronting the parents with huge challenges and dangers, this generation was in the critical age. (2) Education system reform. The representatives of this generation belonged to the first ones who attended a completely new in entity in Polish educational system – gymnasium.

In this context it is perfectly suitable to apply the Social Choice Theory, known in migration studies as New Economics of Migration. According to it, the decisions on migration are undertaken in social groups, such as family, household or local community. They are taken collectively – depending on the social structure, traditions and other social determinants.

In Poland, the most important social context of migration decisions is fa-mily, which plays multiple functions in these circumstances:

• Family – decision making unit• Family functions connected with migration:• subsistence unit. Family treated as a basic economic unit, where decis-

sions about production and consumption are undertaken• socialisation unit.• Family is a sphere where norms, rules and patterns of behaviour are

created and modified.

This element might strengthen or weaken migration readiness.

• - family as a social group and component of a network. This function in-cludes mediating between an individual and wider social surrounding.

3. Social migration Capital and Migration Readiness

Migration readiness is an attitude determined by multiple factors (econo-mic, social, psychological, and others), which identifies the migration strategy as the most optimal.

It is different from migration potential, which is a number of persons, who would like to take up migration strategy and - at the same time – have real po-ssibilities (for example: legal, economic)

Migration readiness is not the same as migration potential, however both of them have a common denominator in factors responsible for creating both of them: most frequently pointed – economic situation, political instability, wars, ecological / natural disasters, on the other side – high salaries in importing countries

To this one should add – the poor level of social capital in the exporting community: distrust (interpersonal, inter-group), quality of social networks, norms and obligations.

If they do not correspond to the expectation of the individual – they may act as prerequisites of migration readiness.

Creating migration readiness may be (and most frequently is) accompa-nied by marginalization. Marginalisation – lack of participation (individuals or groups) in the spheres of life, in which – according to established criteria and rules – the participation is expected�.

In general marginalisation and the feeling of alienation are more natural in poor social capital community. Maginalisation in one of the sub-systems does not auto-matically involve marginalisation in other spheres. However there is a tendency to accumulate spheres in which an individual does not participate (for example: being jobless limits one’s access to culture, some areas of consumption, security, etc.)

Marginalised groups should not be treated as categories places outside of social structure – they are an element of it. Migration strategy is (most freque-ntly) chosen by people, who has little to lose – to a large extend they are margi-nalised when the migration decision is taken.

Here the most applicable theory would be the theory of Social Balance, One of its splendid representatives, Harold Sounders, claims that a person who finds himself / herself in a situation of clash of intensions (scale of living) and real conditions (standard of living) becomes a potential migrant. This clash ge-nerates tensions relieved by migration.

6 Participation – fulfilling social roles in certain systems and sub-systems (family, political system, production)

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Another scholar of the Social Balance theory - Hoffman-Novotny ans-wers the question: How are the tensions relieved / discharged? An individual may be „balanced” (configuration of status) within one system, however he / she may suffer tensions created by low position (undervalued / unprivileged) of the whole system or sub-system. If the individual assumes there is no real possibility to change the status of the system, he / she may find the migration strategy the most optimal. An individual may suffer tensions for the structu-re within sub-system. If the perception of chances for changing the unprivile-ged position is believed to be low, then – hanging the status quo will become the priority.

When / if the person decides on migration strategy, the most important type of social capital, becomes the social migration capital which is a is a mi-gration capital that is at the disposal of migrants and potential migrants. It is a migration network – a system of interpersonal ties that bind migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in sending countries as well as welco-ming states.

It performs many important functions:

• Securing migrants from costs and risks of migration• Isolating migrants from importing societies and creating pressure on

sustaining contacts with exporting society • Influence on decisions - which households and which of their members

migrate• Influence on the selection of target states / regions • Influence on the migrants’ activity in the targeted places • The channel for exchanging information, goods, and normative struc-

tures.• Influence on scale and dynamic of migration

Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) described four processes of „producing” social capital in the context of migration:

1.value introjections – an individual is interjected with norms and values oriented on helping other group members – not motivated exclusively by the desire of profit.

2.reciprocity exchange – expecting future benefits for the shown help. The subject of such an exchange are usually non-material goods.

3. bounded solidarity – ties of group solidarity and loyalty, based on the similar situation, common experience, and convenience about com-mon interests as well as feeling of obligation

4.enforceable trust – in this type of trust, the motivation behind helping is not internalised norm or altruism or solidarity but pragmatic group conformism – being afraid of group reaction to not-showing help.

4. Migration Phenomena and Identity Building

As it was already noticed earlier, migration is also an important determi-nant of identity building process.

It is possible to understand identity as a collection of qualities (charac-teristics) ensuring the individual or group to remain the same in a changing environment.

Some of those qualities (characteristics) are given by birth, some are deve-loped with the process of growing up and socialization.

The sense of identity allow the individual to function in various collective configurations – also when migrating, at the same time holding subjective con-viction on its own uniqueness and unrepeated-ness. Collective identity provi-des the sense of belonging to a group by its symbols, history, heritage.

At the same time we need t remember that we live in the era of questioning the old identities for the new ones, pluralism of both individual and collective identities, their diffusion. Post-industrial society is also characterised by de-standardization of social life. Up-keeping social ties (also – most importantly - within family) is a matter of choice rather than necessity. As a result of such a tendency, an individual becomes more independent and emancipated. The emancipation processes in economic, social and even intellectual sphere bring about stronger sense of autonomy, generating at the same time accelerating need for freedom and degeneration of authorities�.

This means traditionally understood identities are in crisis, especially when young people are concerned. This results in interesting consequences, especially when observing migration processes, especially those migrants, who (usually) chose as a destination economically developed countries, me-aning those offering better life quality possibilities. Observations show that counter-intuitively, economic emancipation is accompanied with conflict of values which prolongs and intensifies identity crisis. Surprisingly this expe-� J. Miluska, Społeczno - kulturowe podstawy procesu kształtowania tożsamości we współczesnym świecie,

„Przegląd Zachodni” 2006, No. 4.

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rience is also shared by second generation of migrants, mostly young people, namely those who should have already gone through the process of assimila-tion or integration8.

Other types of identities in post-modern societies may be called: „life wit-hout choice” or „negative choice identities”. Both of them mean accord for mar-ginalisation and lack of participation in performing social roles (characteristic for this phase of age). Quite often such an attitude may be strengthened by contacts with individuals having the same characteristic.

However if we refer to the supranational - European identity - context it is important to recall a statement given by Hooghe and Marks in 2004: „It is wrong to conceptualise European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreases one’s loyalty to national or other communities. Europe and the nation are both ‘imagined communities’ and people can feel a part of both communities without having to choose some pri-mary identification. Survey data suggest and social psychological experiments confirm that many people, who strongly identify with their nation-state, also feel a sense of belonging to Europe. Analyses from „Eurobarometer” data and other sources show that ‘country first, but Europe, too’ is the dominant outlook in most EU countries and people do not perceive this as contradictory. The real cleavage in mass opinion consists between those who only identify with their nation and those perceiving themselves as attached to both their nation and Europe. Nationalists are far less likely to support European integration than those who at least partially also identify with Europe. Moreover, as Marks and Hooghe show, identity is a stronger predictor for support for European integra-tion than economic rationality.

There is a second way of conceptualizing the relationship between Europe-an and national identities which people might hold. We could call it a ‘marble cake’ model of multiple identities. Accordingly, the various components of an individual’s identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels as the con-cept of nastiness implies. What if identity components influence each other, mesh and blend into each other? What if my self-understanding as German inherently contains aspects of Europeanness? Can we really separate a Catalan from a European identity? Most empirical work on European identity does not explicitly deal with such a ‘marble cake’ concept. Yet, most of the evidence is actually consistent with it, starting with the ‘nation first, Europe second’ iden-tification found in the Eurobarometer data.

8 Ibidem.

5. New Dimensions of Identity in Migration Intensive Realities. Multi - and Trans – culturalism as a Side Effect of Migration

Due to the conceptualisation of this paper it is also interesting to distin-guish between cultural and civic identity. However in many countries, such a distinction is both difficult as well as little interesting from political point of view, where the idea of state overlaps the idea of nation. Even in the case of states where we observe strong regional and separatist tendencies, difference between culture and civic identity is noticeable only for ethnic minorities. For example in Great Britain, many Scottish treat themselves as having dual identity: British and Scottish. However in he case of their southern neighbours – the English: „Englishness” and „Brutishness” will be treated almost as substitutes9.

Research carried on in the member states of the Community – for exam-ple: the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands show that seeing Euro-pe and own identity (self-evaluation) as a European is expressed - in majority – through the civic perspective, in minority through cultural perspective.

Images of Europe, build on cultural foundations consist of such elements: peace, harmony, co-operation of similar cultures and societies. The same ima-ges, built on civic foundations comprise of: lack of borders, migration, com-mon territory, creating new polity and common prosperity. Undoubtedly, the mixture of both cultural and civic elements are building and are going to build the sense of belonging to European demos.

At the same time, we observe a situation in which, nation state is, somehow, in defence. Modern state (often perceived through the prism of its bureaucracy) does not create community, which would be able to generate (higher) motiva-tion, civic qualities based on moral ties and sense of belonging10.

In such a case, it is important to ask – if the nation state can be still a point of reference and to what a degree can it expect citizens’ loyalty? Additionally one should ask: do we still live in a modern world of nation states and equally nation societies? Or do we yet exist (unexpectedly?) in a post-national world, in which different rules of the game are valid?11.

One of the reasons of such questions being valid is a complete change of cha-racter of internal and external borders in Europe. European integration utterly 9 M. Bruter, On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceprion of News, Symbols and Borderless-ness,

„Journall of Ethnic and Migration Sudies” 2004, Vol. 30, No.1. 10 R. Piekarski, Lokalna wspólnota polityczna a zagadnienie tożsamości zbiorowej, Kraków 2002, p. 3�.11 M. Kwiek, Tożsamość narodowa – państwo narodowe – demokracja. Filozoficzne i polityczne wyzwania epoki glo-

balizacji, [in:] Przezwyciężanie barier w integrującecj się Europie, ed. by Z. Drozdowicz, Z. W. Puślecki, Poznań 2000.

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changed the nature of the borders between the member states as well as European Union’s neighbours and affects our perception of migration within the EU polity.

This change does not limit itself only to trade or legal aspects. This change acts also as one of the more important elements affecting citizens’ identity and relations to other nations and ethnic groups. Internal borders within the Europe-an Union can be characterized as fence type or street type borders. Fence divides symbolically. The sides see each other very well, observe differences and simila-rities. They got used to each others’ existence, got accommodated (old and new member states). Street type borders are blurred borders that can be crossed at any time. It unites rather then divides, the sides are aware that on the other side of the street there are different values, patterns of behavior, however they respect it and very often like it. (for example between regions, also from different states).

The post-national world is characterised by multi-culturalism, which – in the field of identities and identifications – allows the individual to define his / her own identity based on birth, religion or simply psychological dispositions12. For some time, multi-culturalism was perceived in Europe as exotic phenome-non, typical for migration countries like: Australia or USA. Multiculturalism should also be understood as political – normative concept referring to co-exi-stence of two or more cultures in one state entity. Multiculturalism is treated as a problem only when culturally homogenous communities are seen as a stan-dard. Therefore, it seems accurate to observe migration as one of the major factors bringing as a side effect an erosion of exclusiveness of national identity.

Multiculturalism is a social fact, more and more often the state is forced to take it into consideration as a fact, with all consequences of this fact, for example weakening its ambition to integrate or assimilate the new-comers so that the whole populations is harmonized in terms of national identity. But is homogeneity – no matter if it suggests common political views (demos) or eth-nical relationship (ethnos) – a condition of creating and existence of national identity? If the thesis on evolution of identity basis towards post-national con-cept is true, then the new point of reference is not Europe as a structure, a sy-stem, administration. Empirical research proves that European citizen’s identi-fication with the European Unions is rather weak. As a political, economic and administrative construction, Europe is clearly not treated as a community – in its sense of „belonging to” – and therefore is not similar to nation state (and nation state’s identity). Europeans sense of belonging to European community is funded on believe in common cultural identity.

12 Ibidem, p. 140.

The above discussed components of (national) identity could be a foun-dation for individual or collective identity, depending on ones psychological dispositions. Such relativism is highly comfortable, especially from the point of view of defining individual and collective identities. At the same time it is also applicable from the point of view of trans-culturalism concept.

The concept of trans-culturalism suggests that todays’ cultures should be seen as culture networks, tied, interrelated and complex nets, as consequences of migration, communication systems, economic and political global processes. One of the consequences is hybridization of cultures and lack of clear borders between cultures13. What are the mechanisms of trans-culturalism that affect identity?

Today’s transferring identity from generation to generation is heavily af-fected by mass culture. Especially effective tool in this regard is media that is uncontrolled, chaotic, fast, blurred, disordered. The today’s world tendencies are Among others): trans-cultural processes refer to all dimensions of social life. They are present within and across nations, ethnic groups, culture lines, etc. Apart from „closed societies” the world is one big border land (including states with so called strong culture: Islamic culture). Secondly, trans-cultural processes refer also to individuals, therefore personalities of individuals also can be characterized as so called border land identities, where different influ-ences are crossed and mixed (Almost each of us is a cultural hybrid). Last but not least - the above mentioned increase assimilative-ness of new values, but also makes an individual more transferable. An individual more and more easily and more and more fast takes over new values, abandons them, captu-res new ones, and new identity.

The new competence of adaptation has also its side effect, and to some ex-tent it is its own reason, which is the superficiality of the internalized values. We do not suffer from the fast pace of trans-culturalism mechanisms as the captu-red cultures (as well as the smuggled values) are more and more indifferent. We are cultural smugglers. Siegmunt Baumann claims that today we observe the necessity of constant building, re-building and up-dating our identities. This is one of the major uniting factors not only in the scale of Europe, but also in the scale of the whole world. Present social hierarchy does not constitute a stable structure with stable positions. Instability of all, or majority of identities. One of the indicators of individuals’ position within the hierarchy, an element of promotion, as a measure of success is the level of freedom in choosing identity and ability to keep it according to one’s wishes. 13 The character of borderland depends on the type of border, certainly this correlation is also actual the other

way, it is the type of borderland that defines the type of border.

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The process of identity building in supra-national sphere is not a steer-able one. It cannot be controlled, stimulated or limited. Social reality undergoes con-stant changes and some of them are not event noticeable. It is also impossible to see the humans’ undertaking at the beginning of the process of European identity building. No-one would even dare to point the starting point of this phe-nomenon. This does not mean that this process is not affected by social actors. In-deterministic character of social change makes it hardly predictable. Planning such processes is both useless and impossible14. Social change, especially when has relative deep character is a form of society building – work in progress.

6. Conclusions

Identity, especially in its collective dimension is also an important element of social capital. Identity and social capital building processes are to a large ex-tent a parallel ones. They interact and influence one another. They are also both an important factor of migration, its driving forces, trends and intensiveness.

Social capital is an important determinant of migration processes. Its po-tential can act positively or negatively depending on the society to which we re-fer to. When the social capital is poor at the sending community side, it can act as a push factor, when its strong it undermines the migration decision. When its strong on the welcoming community side, it acts as a pull factor, when its week (or of a bonding type) it does not allow to fully integrate the migrants and can affect the weakening of migration.

The migration readiness is in this regard, the most affected phenomenon by the social capital and its potential. As an attitude determined by multiple factors (economic, social, psychological, and others), which identifies the mi-gration strategy as the most optimal, it is specially sensitive and responsive to the level of trust (the constituting element of social capital) as well as other components of migration decision making (like: economic prosperity).

It is interesting to notice that the level of trust and the life satisfaction cor-relate positively – according to the below chart.

14 Rapidly undergoing social change may however bring about results similar to so called trauma. Cultural trauma appears when basic and constituting values, norms are questioned. The new facts and environment seems in-compatible with the so far cultural stakes. Cultural trauma appears also as a result being implemented into a new culture (for example as an emigrant or a refugee) or transition from, for example, communist system to capitalist one – radical change of social and economic life pre-conditions. Trauma appears also when old ways of life get confronted with the new ones. Therefore social change, and the necessity of re-construction of identity resembles migration.

The correlation between trust and life satisfaction (with some exceptions, like: Portugal) seem to be proportional. The most important conclusion drawn from this chart / map is serious differences in trust potential among member EU states. Similar map shows tendencies on other social capital components, like social norms, civic society activeness, NGOs membership, political parti-cipation and many others. Differences between member states in this regard reveal also differences in identity building process.

According to Anders Follesdal, it is trust that is a key category determining the development of European identity, especially in its „EU context”. Trust is needed as the European Union is to a large extent a regulatory authority, the-refore for creating new regulations, everybody needs to trust that every other partner will keep to the new principles. Trust is also needful for establishing and functioning of the institutions, which are entitled to take binding deci-sions15. Sometimes it is justified to have an impression that the European inte-gration project started to be built from an above (as an elitist project) and today the citizens’ trust is searched for a posteriori.

Civic society building as well as identity building (and rebuilding) - especially in European integration process - seem to be happening parallel and at the same time they are significantly affected by the driving factor: the social capital. The so-

15 A. Follesdal, Democracy and Federalism in the EU: A Liberal Contractu-alist Perspective, [in:] Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, ed. by A. Follesdal, P. Koslowski, Berlin, 199�.

Diagram 2. Trust vs. life satisfaction. Source: European Social Survey 2002.

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cial backbone of post-communist societies is however very week and this situation is an important sensitive for migration processes. So far it acted as a push factor, bringing about a result of massive exodus to the United Kindgom, Ireland and other Western countries, however it is possible to speculate that the low level of social ca-pital may be a substantive determinant of return migration traffic in the future. Mi-grants representing – as individuals and group – poor level of social capital are less probable to integrate and at the same time the primary group ties (usually a family – type ones) will make them more connected to their root, ethnical ground16.

16 In this article the following references have been used: P. Bourdieu, The forms of Capital [in:] Handbook of Theory and Research for Sociology of Education, ed. by J.G. Richardson, 198� New York, Greenwood; P. Bourdieu, J. D. L. Wacquant, Zaproszenie do socjologii refleksywnej (transl. A. Sawisz), Warszawa 1992; M. Bruter, On What Citizens Mean by Feeling European: Perceprion of News, Symbols and Borderless-ness, „Journall of Ethnic and Migration Sudies” 2004, Vol. 30, No.1; T. Buksiński, Nowe szaty modernych tożsamości, [in:] Kryzys tożsamości politycznej a proces integracji europejskiej, ed. by B. Markiewicz, R. Wonicki, Warszawa 2006; S. Castles, The Australian Model of Migration and Multiculturalism: Is it Applicable to Europe?, „International migration Review” 1992, Vol. 26, No. 2; J. Czapiński, T. Panek, Diagnoza społeczna 2005. Warunki i jakość życia Polaków, Warszawa 2006; G. De Jong, J. Fewcett, Motivations for migration: an assessment and a value-expectancy research model, [in:] Migration Decission Making. Multidisciplinry Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries, ed. by G. De Jong, R. Gardner, New York 1981; L. Driedger, Changing, Visions in Ethnic Relations, „Canadian Journal of Sociology” 2001, No. 26 (3); A. G. Duettmann, Between Cultures. Tensions in the Struggle for Recognition, Lon-don, New York 2000; A. Follesdal, Democracy and Federalism in the EU: A Liberal Contractu-alist Perspective, [in:] Democracy and the European Union: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, ed. by A. Follesdal, P. Koslowski, Berlin 199�; M. Gołka, Tożsamość granic – granice tożsamości, [in:] Europa w nowych granicach czy Europa bez granic?, ed. by Z. Drozdwicz, Poznań 2004; M. Granovetter, The Strength of the Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revised, „Sociological Theory” 1983, No. 1; S. F. Harbison, Family Structure and Family Strategy in Migration De-cission Making, [in:] Migration Decission Making. Multidisciplinry Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries, ed. by G. De Jong, R. Gardner, New York 1981; P. Kaczmarczyk, Migracje zarobkowe Polaków w dobie przemian, Warszawa 2005; J. Kilias, Wspólnota abstrakcyjna. Zarys socjologii narodu, Warszawa 2004; K. Koseła, Europejska tożsamość Polaków w teorii i badaniach, [in:] Tożsamość Polaków a Unia Europejska. Instytut Badań nad Podstawami Demokracji, ed. by K. Koseła, T. Szawiel, M. Grabowska, M. Sikorska, Warszawa 2002; M. Kwiek, Tożsamość narodowa – państwo narodowe – demokracja. Filozoficzne i polityczne wyzwania epoki globalizacji, [In:] Przezwyciężanie barier w integrującecj się Europie. Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, ed. by Z. Drozdowicz, Z. W. Puślecki, Poznań 2000; E. Lee, Theory of Migration, „Demography” 1966, nr 3; F. I. Lendvai, Obywatelstwo a tożsamość narodowa, [in:] Kryzys tożsamości politycznej a proces integracji europejskiej, ed. by B. Markiewicz, R. Wonicki, Warszawa 2006; G. Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?, „Social Philosophy and Policy” 198�, No. 5; N. MacCormick, Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘Europe-an Commonwealth’,” Law and Philosophy” 199�, No. 16(4); J. Miluska, Społeczno - kulturowe podstawy procesu kształtowania tożsamości we współczesnym świecie, „Przegląd Zachodni” 2006, No. 4; J. Mucha, Stosunki etniczne we współczesnej myśli socjologicznej, Warszawa 2006; A. Mueller, Wieloetniczność a przynależność do wspólnoty politycznej, [in:] Lokalna wspólnota polityczna a zagadnienie tożsamości zbiorowej, ed. by R. Piekarski, Kraków 2002; D. Osipowicz, Marginalizacja społeczna migrantów, [in:], Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu, ed. by E. Jaźwińska, M. Okólski, Warszawa 2001; R. Piekarski, Lokalna wspólnota polityczna a zagadnienie tożsamości zbiorowej, Kraków 2002; A. Portes, J. Sensenbrenner, Embaddedness and immigration: Notes on the social determinants on economic action, „American Journal of Sociology” 1993 Vol. 98; R. Putnam, Bowling Alone; America’s Declining of Social Capital, „Journal of Democracy” 2000, Vol. 6, No. 1; J. Reiter, Po co wspólna Europa? Jak dzisiaj burzyć mury i umacniać więzi? [in:] Pytania o duszę Europy,Warszawa 2002; D. Simo-nides, Tożsamość pogranicza, [in:] Dialogi śląskie, Rozmowy z przełomu wieków prowadzi Józef Górdziałek, Opole 2002; A. L. Stinchcombe, Reason and Rationality, „Sociological Theory” 1986, No. 4; S. Strange, The retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in World Economy, Cambridge 1996; A. Triandafyllidou, Immigrants and National Identity in Europe, London 2001; C. Trigilia, Social Capital and Local Develoment, „European Journal of Social Theory” 2001, No. 4(4); C. Trutkowski, S. Mandes, Kapitał społeczny w małych miastach, Warszawa 2005.

Henryk Chałupczak

European Neighbourhood Policy – Nature and Functioning

1. Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 significantly influenced its current internal policy, especially towards the nearest neighborhood. This geo-political change, which moved the center of gravity to the East, forced actions ai-ming to regulate the relations with the new, direct neighbors and at the same time to continue cooperation with the Mediterranean countries. The accession of ten Central-Eastern European countries exhausted the formula of the enlargement as the main tool of European Union’s influence on its nearest neighborhood, thereby forcing the development of a new, effective tool which would provide a real possi-bility to influence the situation in its immediate international environment.

The answer to challenges, resulting from this substantial enlargement, was the European Neighborhood Policy, established in 2004 as the new tool of the external policy of the European Union. Originally, it was supposed not only to regulate the current relations with direct neighbors in the South and the East but provide possibilities of influence on the processes in the nearest neighbor-hood of the European Union as well. The ENP‘s main aim was to ensure stabili-ty, prosperity, and security both inside the Union itself and outside its borders. The policy was directed to the Mediterranean countries, the Eastern European countries, and those in the Southern Caucasus.

The functioning of the European Neighborhood Policy was based on the mechanism of „conditionality” (known from the process of enlargement), which gave the European Union the ability to actively influence the neighbo-ring states and the chance to promote and accomplish its own interests on the international arena. Within this mechanism, the neighboring states are offered, in exchange for the implementation of specific obligations, benefits resulting from cooperation other than membership. The cooperation is realized in three dimensions: political, socio-economic, and security, with the obligations and conditions determined within those components contributing to the gradual „Europeanization” of the territory of the nearest neighborhood.

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2. The origins of the European Neighborhood Policy

The formation of a new concept of the European Union’s policy towards its new, direct neighbors was closely connected with the stage of enlarge-ments which was slowly coming to an end. Before the accession of the ten Central-Eastern European countries, the European Union did not create within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) a separate policy directed to the neighboring states. Relationships with them were included in the then ongoing accession negotiations. In practice, in the 1990s the European Union based its neighboring contacts mainly on the prospects of membership and did not have any other political tools which would enab-le it to influence the nearest neighborhood1. The enlargement planned for 2004 prompted the European Union to start actions aiming at developing a new tool to give the Union the possibility of at least partial influence on the countries which were in its direct neighborhood and the promotion of its own interests. Within this framework, the European Union started the process of moving from „the policy of enlargement” to the policy of the so called „new neighborhood”2.

The need to develop a new formula of cooperation of the European Union with its direct neighbors was expressed in the letter of the Commissioner for External Relations - Chris Patten and the High Representative for CFSP – Ja-vier Solana to the Council of the European Union3. The authors emphasized that geopolitical changes connected with the anticipated enlargement in 2004 opted for undertaking actions which should prevent the formation of new di-vision lines on the external borders of the European Union and give chances for the development of relations with the nearest neighbors4. They also pointed out the necessity of departure from the previous uniform policy towards the neighbors for diversified and elastic approach which would take into account the heterogeneity of those states5.

1 T. Kapuśniak, Polityka Unii Europejskiej w regionie Morza Czarnego, [in:] Unia Europejska i Federacja Rosyjs-ka wobec regionu Morza Czarnego, ed. by T. Kapuśniak, Lublin 2010, p. 16. See also: P. Jakowluk, Kaukaz Południowy w Europejskiej Polityce Sąsiedztwa, Lublin 2012, p. 15.

2 A. Harasimowicz, Koncepcja wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej w kontekście „sz-erszej Europy i nowego sąsiedztwa”, [in:] „Nowe sąsiedztwo” na wschodzie poszerzonej Unii, ed. by T. Kołodziej, Warszawa 2005, pp. 34-35.

3 C. Patten, J. Solana,Wider Europe, Letter to the Council, August 2002, http://ec.europa.eu/ world/enp/ pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf.

4 J. Cieślińska, The Eastern Dimension as an Element of the European Neighborhood Policy. From „Wider Eu-rope” to „European Neighbourhood Policy Plus”, [in:] Polityka Sąsiedztwa Unii Europejskiej. Pomostowość czy buforowość?, ed. by J. Jartyś, A. Staszczyk, Szczecin 2008, pp. 36-38.

5 P. Marcinkowska, Europejska Polityka Sąsiedztwa, Warszawa 2011, pp. 28-29.

The authors of the letter divided the future neighbors of the European Union into three regional groups, stressing that this division gave all the states included in the neighborhood policy the same chances and opportunities to establish close relationships with the European Union. The first group consisted of the countries of the Mediterranean region which were excluded from the membership; the se-cond group included the Western Balkans, whose target was future membership, and the third one included Russia and other neighbors in the East which were undergoing the process of transformation and were a new challenge for the Euro-pean Union6. The authors maintained that the starting point for the new relations of the European Union with the neighboring countries should the common poli-tical and economic values, which constituted the foundation of stability and coo-peration, of the development of trade contacts and harmonization of legislation. These actions were, in a longer perspective, supposed to build a stable space which surrounded the European Union while the existing relations and instruments and geographical proximity would create the possibilities for the neighboring coun-tries to participate in the Union’s internal market�. According to the authors, the main aims of the new neighborhood policy included stability, prosperity, and pro-motion of common values and the rules of law. The achievement of the objectives within the new strategy was to guarantee the European Union’s security; at the same time the authors underlined the importance of the new members of the European Union, which, using their experience, should actively participate in the formation of the proper framework of cooperation with the Eastern neighbors8.

In response to the letter, in November 2002 the European Council presented its own point of view in the so called „New Neighbors Initiative”9. The Coun-cil expressed its will to create a new neighboring policy which would support the stability and prosperity not only within the borders of the European Union but within its nearest vicinity as well. In its conclusions, the European Council committed itself to preparing a detailed study of the abovementioned initiative10. In March 2003, the European Commission presented a Communication titled „Wider Europe-Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors”11. in which it presented a comprehensive vision of re-

6 Ibidem� Ibidem. See also: A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, M. Słowikowski, Unia Europejska a państwa Europy Wschodniej,

Warszawa 2008, pp. 24-2�.8 J. Cieślińska, p. 3�. P. Jakowluk, p. 16.9 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ docs/press Data/en/gena/�3248.pdf.10 Ibidem.11 Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, Wider Europe-Neighborhood:

A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors, Brussels 11.03.2003, COM(2003) 104 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.

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lations between the European Union and the countries which were in its direct neighborhood. The vision was directed to the countries which had common, di-rect border (sea or land border) with the European Union. The initial recipients were the countries of the southern neighborhood: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunis, and the countries from the eastern neighborhood: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova12. The Commission decided that the European Union was obliged to undertake actions for social cohesion and for the economic development both in the member states and the states in the current and future neighborhood. The Commission recom-mended treating new relations with the nearest environment as the foundation of security of the Union and as a growth stimulator in the neighboring states, which allowed them to achieve political stability, prosperity, and economic deve-lopment. The Commission underlined that the enlargement created new oppor-tunities for strengthening the existing bilateral and regional relationships and the geographical proximity enabled them to make use of the single market and gave opportunities for a common struggle with threats13.

Later, the assumptions presented in the Communication of the Commis-sion were regarded by the Council of the European Union as a good foundation for working out the rules of cooperation within the new neighborhood policy. Thus, it committed the European Commission to present, at the beginning of 2004, detailed documents which regulated the bilateral relations with parti-cular states, the so-called Action Plans. On this basis the Commission started talks with the states of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region concer-ning the form of these documents. In May 2004 on the basis of the Strategy included in the Communication of the European Commission titled „Euro-pean Neighborhood Policy-Strategy Paper” the European Neighborhood Policy was established as a new tool of external relations of the European Union14. This document contained the main objectives and assumptions of the new nei-ghborhood policy, i.e. the formation around the European Union of the „ring of friendly states”, which constituted the region of stability, prosperity and se-curity; it also outlined the policy’s subjective and objective scope and the way of realization of the objectives15.12 A. Legucka, Polityka Wschodnia Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2008, p.61.13 Based on: P. Jakowluk, p. 18; P. Marcinkowska, p. 34; J. Cieślińska, pp. 38-40; B. Jagiełło, Wymiar wschod-

ni w polityce Unii Europejskiej po jej rozszerzeniu, [in:] Wschód jako partner Unii Europejskiej, ed. by M. Dobroczyński, M. Lipiec-Zajchowska, Warszawa 2005, p. 93.

14 Communication from the Commission, European Neighborhood Policy-Strategy Paper, Brussels 12.05.2004, COM(2004) 3�3 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf>.

15 Communication from the Commission, European Neighborhood Policy-Strategy Paper, Brussels 12.05.2004, COM(2004) 3�3 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf>.

The final recipients of the European Neighborhood Policy were the Eastern European countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; the countries of the Me-diterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunis and Palestinian Authority and also the countries of the Southern Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia16 .

3. The nature of the European Neighborhood Policy

The specify of the European Neighborhood Policy is most often under-stood in three ways. First, as a practical mechanism which aims at mitigating the negative results of the enlargement in the regions neighboring the Euro-pean Union. Secondly, as a public gesture directed to the neighboring states, which was to alleviate the fact of their exclusion from the accession process. Thirdly, as an attempt of „Europeanization” as part of the undergoing process of political, economic, and social processes in the neighboring states which will not lead to their future membership1�.

The enlargement in 2004 largely exhausted the European Union’s tools of influence on its closest vicinity. As a result of a significant shift of the Union’s external borders to the East the European Union turned out to be in the direct neighborhood of an unstable area which comprised the states of the former Eastern bloc, which were undergoing turbulent system transformations18. The European Union faced the necessity of creating new formulas of relationships with its closest neighborhood which would provide possibilities of influencing the processes in its direct vicinity19.

Therefore, the European Neighborhood Policy is a political tool which gives the European Union the possibility of active influence on the neighboring sta-tes20. The influence is possible due to the application of,, the mechanism of „ con-ditionality” (known from the process of enlargement). Its beginnings are closely connected with the activity of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The mechanism enables international organizations to promote and pro-tect their own interests on the international arena. The main aim of the policy

16 J. Cieślińska, p. 56; P. Jakowluk, p. 18. 1� The Center for European Policy Studies, Two cheers for the European Neighborhood Policy, June 2004, http://

www.ceps.be/wp.php?article_id=338; P. Jakowluk, p. 18.18 A. Harasimowicz, Koncepcja wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej w kontekście „sz-

erszej Europy i nowego sąsiedztwa”, [in:] T. Kołodziej, „Nowe sąsiedztwo” na wschodzie poszerzonej Unii, Warszawa 2005, pp. 3�-41.

19 A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, M. Słowikowski, p. 32.20 F. Boedeltje, H. Houtum, Brussels is Speaking: The Adverse Speech Geo-politics of the European Union Towards

its Neighbors, „Geopolitics” 2011, No. 16, pp. 136-138.

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of „conditionality” of these organizations is economic and political development of the target states, accomplished by the actions which stimulate their economic development, provide a stable government and active struggle with poverty. In practice, „the conditionality” is a set of factors which must be fulfilled to make the World Bank pay the financial resources for the policy of development. These conditions serve to keep the stable economic policy of target states, introduce the programmes realized by the Bank in a way that will satisfy the Bank, and to im-plement political and institutional changes in target states which are necessary to achieve the results expected by the Bank21. These conditions are included in each credit agreement concluded by the Bank with a state.

In the EU, „conditionality” was at first used to determine the process of the adaptation of the Member States to the norms and structures of the Eu-ropean Union and reflected the dynamics of the interactions between these subjects. At the beginning of the 21st century this term was used to analyze the interaction between the European Union and the third states, including the reference to the European Neighborhood Policy. In this respect, the structure of „conditionality” was built around the potential ability of participation in the four Union’s freedoms: the free flow of goods, services, people and capital. The achievement of benefits such as the access to the Union’s internal market depends on the level of common values and the degree of implementation of institutional, economic reforms in particular neighboring states 22.

The cooperation within the European Neighborhood Policy is to contribu-te to the alignment of the neighboring states with the European Union and to offer those states definite profits from cooperation in the from of participation in the European Union’s policies and programmes23. According to the Euro-pean Commission, the new neighborhood policy is supposed to be the factor which stimulates the political reforms and economic-social development in the neighboring states and also the integration of these states with the internal market of the European Union.

The level of a state’s engagement in the cooperation within the Europe-an Neighborhood Policy and the progress in implementation of the reforms is evaluated and properly rewarded by the European Union. It means that depen-ding on the level of progress in accomplishing the conditions of cooperation, this state receives various rewards in the form of different degrees of access to

21 J. Ruszkowski, Europeizacja „ad extra” w zarządzaniu zewnętrznym (external governance) Unii Europejskiej, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej” 2010, No. 4, pp. �-15.

22 Ibidem.23 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.

the internal market24. It should be stated that all conditions concerning the cooperation within the European Neighborhood Policy are jointly set by the European Union and the neighboring states.

Thus, the European Neighborhood Policy is seen as the policy of „conditio-nality”. The use of this mechanism in the Union’s internal policy gives it possibi-lities to cover the partner states with a dense network of political, economic, and social interrelationships which allow the European Union to influence the chan-ges 25. This activity serves the realization of the Union’s interests and its main aim is to create a good neighborhood around the European Union which is supposed to contribute to the growth of stability, prosperity, and security of both sides26.

4. Functioning of the European Neighborhood Policy

The European Neighborhood Policy based on „conditionality”, functions due to the application of a great variety of instruments. They can be divided into: legal instruments, operational instruments, political instruments and fi-nancial and technical instruments2�.

The main legal instruments of the European Neighborhood Policy are the Action Plans and bilateral agreements concluded between the European Union and the partner state28. The plans determine the objectives and priorities of cooperation and they are based on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (in the case of Eastern neighbors) and Association Agreements ( in the case of Southern neighbors)29. They comprise two main areas. The first one relates to the commitments made to respect and strengthen common values and to achieve defined objectives in the sphere of foreign and security policy. The se-cond area comprises commitments concerning actions that contribute to the gradual approach to the European Union by the partner states on such vital issues as economic development, trade, justice system or internal affairs30.

In practice, the Action Plans contain a catalogue of conditions which the partner states have to fulfill to achieve benefits resulting from enhanced coopera-tion with the European Union. These conditions are determined in the priorities

24 P. Borkowski, p. �2.25 A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, M. Słowikowski, p. 31.26 Ibidem, p. 30.2� Based on: P. Jakowluk, p. 26; J. Ruszkowski, pp. 18-23;.28 Based on: Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy-Strategy Paper, COM(2004)

3�3 final, Brussels 12.05.2004, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_ paper_en.Pdf>, 16.05.2012; P. Marcinkowska, pp. 40-41; J. Ruszkowski, p. 19; J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, pp. 69-�1; B. Jagiełło, p. 94.

29 Ibidem.30 B. Jagiełło, p. 94; J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, pp. 69-�0.

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of cooperation which comprise six main areas: political dialogue and reforms; economy, social reforms and development; trade, market and regulation reforms, cooperation in the sphere of justice and internal affairs; sector questions such as energy, transport, environmental protection, research and development; and interpersonal contacts. All actions undertaken within the abovementioned prio-rities are assigned specific indicators of their accomplishment. They suggest the direction of changes and type of actions which are expected as far as the partner states are concerned and they enable the EU to asses their progress in implemen-tation of commitments resulting from the Action Plan31.

The next instruments, which are important from the point of view of „con-ditionality” of the European Neighborhood Policy, are the operational instru-ments. They include: National Reports, Periodic Reports, National Strategy Documents and National Indicative Programmes32.

National Reports are the documents prepared by the European Com-mission which present the analysis of political and economic situation in a given state; they also analyze its institutional capabilities. A detailed ana-lysis of the situation of the state enables identification of the problems and discrepancies with the European Union’s values, norms and standards that should be solved. The analysis of the development of the future cooperation between the partner state and the European Union is accomplished on the basis of National Reports33 and the Council of the European Union makes decisions about the cooperation with a given state. A report is also the foun-dation for, targets and priorities of cooperation formulated in Action Plans, and it enables adjustment of the undertaken actions to the situation in each neighboring state34.

Moreover, the European Commission prepares Periodic Reports which assess the progress of works connected with the implementation of the re-forms and it determines the spheres in which further changes are expected. If the progress in the cooperation accomplishment of targets and priorities is significant, the states may expect specified benefits in the form of broader political and economic cooperation and an increase in financial resources for aid programmes35.

31 J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, p. �0.32 P. Jakowluk, p. 25; J. Ruszkowski, pp. 18-19.33 Communication from the Commission, European Neighborhood Policy-Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 3�3 final,

Brussels; http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ trategy/strategy_ paper_en.Pdf>; J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, p. 69; P. Marcinkowska, p. 40.

34 Ibidem.35 P. Marcinkowska, pp. 42-42; J. Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, p. �1; See also: B. Jagiełło p. 94.

National Strategy Documents are the next operational instruments. They identify concrete actions and resources designed for their accomplishment. Apart from detailed analysis of the situation in the state, this document de-termines the areas of cooperation which are considered as the key ones and it presents planned financing of actions conducted in particular spheres within the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument36 .

National Indicative Programme is also an operational instrument. It di-rectly refers to the spheres of cooperation which are regarded as the key ones in the National Strategy Document. This programme describes in detail the situation concerning a concrete sphere. Moreover, it contains concrete targets together with indicators of their accomplishment and a particular description of actions conducted in the state at national, regional and local levels3�.

„Conditionality” of the European Neighborhood Policy is also expressed in appropriate financial and technical instruments whose aim is a direct su-pport of actions to achieve the targets and priorities included in the Action Plans. These instruments are a strong incentive that stimulates political and economic reforms in the neighboring states.

The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument has been the main financial instrument of the European Neighborhood Policy since 200�38. Its aim is to promote the cooperation and gradual integration between nei-ghboring states and the European Union. It also provides assistance in the de-velopment of prosperity and neighborly cooperation. In practice its main task is to support all actions which lead to the realization of targets and commit-ments included in the Action Plans39.

Financial support for the neighboring states within the European Nei-ghborhood and Partnership Instrument is provided through national pro-grammes, multilateral (regional and international) programmes, trans-border cooperation (both land and see) and Neighborhood Investment Facility40.

In 200� the European Commission issued a Communication titled „A Strong European Neighborhood Policy” which was the base to increase the effi-ciency and attractiveness of the European Neighborhood Policy. The Commis-

36 P. Marcinkowska, pp. 58-60, Regulation (WE) no. 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and Council from 24th October 2006 determining general rulet concerning establishment of European Neighborhood and Part-nership Instrument, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/ pdf/oj_l310_en.pdf>.

3� Ibidem38 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/ pdf/oj_l310_en.pdf.39 The amount of resources available within European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument in 200�-2013

is 11.2 billion Euros. See: J. Muś, J. Kamińska, Implikacje wymiaru finansowego polityki UE wobec sąsiadów, „Biuletyn Analiz UKIE”, grudzień 2008, No. 21.

40 Ibidem.

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sion underlined in this document that the greater the engagement of the nei-ghboring states in the cooperation with the European Union was, the greater the engagement and financial support would be. Within this framework, the European Union enabled the neighboring states to take part in the works of the agencies of the European Union and in the community programmes, thereby enlarging the current catalogue of benefits resulting from the cooperation41 .

In 2011, in connection with the outbreak of the so-called „Arab Spring” the European Commission issued a special Communication titled „A New Respon-se to a Changing Neighborhood” which was the answer to the events in Egypt, Tunis, Libya and Syria. The Commission expressed its readiness to provide a greater support to the neighboring states on issues concerning the building of democracy, the rule of the law, protection of human rights and basic freedoms and it also promised greater political engagement in the matters concerning security and peaceful solution of conflicts in the area of direct neighborhood. In this way, the European Union underlined and strengthened the importan-ce of political conditions for the cooperation conducted within the European Neighborhood Policy42.

The Communication of the European Commission from May 2012 titled „Delivering on a New European Neighborhood Policy” is a culmination of works whose aim was the adaptation of the European Neighborhood Policy to the ra-pidly changing situation in the neighboring states. According to the Commis-sion, the last events connected with the „Arab Spring” and the situation in the area of Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus clearly confirmed the need for greater engagement of the European Union in the building of democracy and the rule of law, the protection of the human rights and basic freedoms in the neighboring states. This Communication significantly strengthened the politi-cal dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy, emphasizing the Euro-pean Union’s willingness for greater engagement in building democracy in the states of the Southern neighborhood and it declared the need to strengthen the political dimension in current cooperation with the Eastern neighbors43.

41 Communication from the Commission, A Strong European Neighborhood Policy, Brussels 05.12.200�, COM(200�) ��4 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com0�_��4_en.pdf>. The list of progrmmes and agencies available for neighbor states see: http://ec.europa.eu /world/enp/documents_en.htm#10.

42 Communication from the Commission, A new response to a changing Neighborhood, Brussels 25.05.2011, COM (2011) 303, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf. See P. Jakowluk, p. 24.

43 Communication from the Commission, Delivering on a new European Neighborhood Policy, Brussels, JOIN (2012) 14 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/delivering_ new_ enp_en.pdf.

5. Conclusions

The European Neighborhood Policy is a relatively new tool of influence of the European Union on the closest environment. The „conditionality” used within its framework concentrates on actions undertaken in the social-eco-nomic dimension which, from the point of view of the European Union, is the least problematic sphere, and it forms solid basis for further cooperation. The „positive conditionality” used within the European Neighborhood Policy - which concentrates mainly on offering incentives - significantly influences the neighboring policy of the European Union.

Within the frames of the European Neighborhood Policy various con-ditions are used; their accomplishment is to make the neighboring states gra-dually approach the European Union’s values, norms and standards. The inclu-sion of the states into the network of connections allows the European Union to influence the situation in its closest neighborhood and to promote its own interests on the international arena. On the other hand, the level of implemen-tation of particular commitments by the partner states testifies to the effecti-veness of the European Union’s policy and to its position on the international arena. It should be stressed that the implementation of these conditions by par-ticular neighboring states is characterized by selectivity and inconsistency, the effectiveness of the Union’s policy depending on the sphere of cooperation in which it is implemented.

It is the most effective in the social-economic field where a high level of implementation of obligations can be noticed. It is due mainly to the scope of benefits which the implementation brings and relatively low costs of their adaptation. The neighboring states, as a rule, strive to achieve social-economic development and a close cooperation with the European Union, which is why they implement the majority of social-economic conditions due to which this development will be possible. The high degree of implementation of these con-ditions shows that the integration is perceived by the neighboring states as an attractive model of economic development.

A significant weakness of the European Neighborhood Policy is seen in its political and security dimension where a relatively low level of implementation of commitments can be observed. The European Union is not able to offer the neighboring states attractive benefits from their point of view, resulting from strengthened cooperation in these spheres. The cooperation of the European Union and the neighboring states is characterized by the weak clarity of ac-

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cepted commitments which mainly refer to the sphere of the so-called „soft” security and are complementary to actions undertaken by NATO and OSCE. This testifies to a limited attractiveness of the European model of security and the weakness of the European Union as a security guarantor.

The support of actions, within the frames of the EU, in the sphere of eco-nomy and trade is regarded as the main task; the long-term goal is to form the Neighborhood Economic Community.

One of the most important challenges is the need to strengthen coope-ration on issues concerning the removal of barriers in the flow of people and in the actions against illegal immigration and negative phenomena connected with it. In this context it is necessary to strengthen the civil society in the nei-ghboring states and support various types of education and youth exchange between the cooperating states. There is a clear need for greater engagement of the European Union in solving the conflicts in its vicinity and in the fight with risks that arise as a result thereof.

The European Neighborhood Policy, creating solid frameworks for coope-ration of the European Union with the international environment, was greeted with interest by the neighboring states. The fact that it constitutes the basis for further integration with the European Union’s values and standards, faci-litating the political dialogue between the states, is its major achievement. Its effectiveness significantly determines the position of the European Union as an important actor in modern international relations.

Paweł Turczyński

Between Libya and Belarus – European Union Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the

Treaty of Lisbon

1. Introduction

In this paper, I would like to analyse principles and objectives of EU’s cur-rent foreign policy pursued under the Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty fundamen-tally transformed the.principles.of.creating.EU’s.Foreign.and.Security.Policy,.changed.the.scope.of.competences.of.individual.bodies.of.the.EU.and.increased.the.EU’s.ability.to.act.on.the.international.arena..In.particular,.I.wish.to.ana-lyse.two.examples:.

•. Civil.war.in.Libya.which.was.fought.from.February.to.October.2011.and.constitutes.the.most.spectacular.example.of.„the.Arab.spring”.

• The situation in Belarus, which is the most difficult test of the so-cal-led Eastern Partnership led by the EU

The.first.of.these.two.events.was.surprising.for.the.EU.for.a.few.reasons..What.was.unexpected.was.a.series of social protests in countries in North Afri-ca and Middle East (the so-called „Arab spring”), overthrow of the long-stand-ing regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, and Libyans’ rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled the country for 42 years. Moreover, just as the outbreak of this conflict was hard to foresee at the beginning of the year, nothing indicated in the spring, after the involvement of the international military forces, that it would last so long.

The other of these two events was not a surprise. Alexander Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus has been functioning in the present form for almost 20 years and is becoming more and more oppressive. It seems that the EU has exhausted all possible instruments to democratize Belarus, or at least to make it a more pro-western country – nonetheless it has not achieved any lasting effects in this way. Similarly, the Eastern Partnership programme, inaugurated in 2009, has not changed much in this policy.

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Between Libya and Belarus – European Union Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

2. Regulations of the Treaty of Lisbon in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Treaty of Lisbon was formulated and accepted in a very complicated pro-cedure. The necessity of reforming the EU at the turn of the 20th and 21st centu-ries was substantiated first by the planned significant enlargement, and second – by numerous challenges of the present day faced by the EU. From the European Council’s summit in Laeken (14-15 December 2001), a new treaty was being prepa-red to modify the EU, and in particular to determine permanently which compe-tences are delegated to the European Union and which ones remains with Member States. There was a project to „finally define” the EU’s relations with its Member States and permanently divide their competences. Also, proposals were put for-ward to redesign the EU into the nucleus of a federal state, with its own currency, the core of military forces and significance on the international arena1.

Work on the new treaty in the years 2002-2003 was conducted by the Eu-ropean Convention - a newly appointed body to democratically represent both the EU Members and the EU candidates (overall 25 countries). Its president, V.G. d’Estaing (former president of France), promoted „Euro-Constitution” or „Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” (TCE) as the name of this new document – the name was officially accepted. TCE was to supersede earlier documents regulating the functioning of the EU, as well as deepening the inte-gration in the area of European Security and Defence Policy. The project pro-posed was bold, it envisaged clear strengthening of the EU structures, however his opponents accused him of pushing through French-German interests.

In the autumn of 2003, the works on TCE were taken over by the Inter-governmental Conference (IGC), made up of the representatives of 25 coun-tries (the then Member States and the states that were to join the EU on May 1, 2004). After a few months of debates, a bloc of states emerged demanding a quick adoption of this document (France and Germany) and a bloc of states striving to block it (Great Britain, Spain, Poland). Apart from that, we also saw an emergence of a „triumvirate” of the strongest states (France, Germany and Great Britain), which negotiated the future of the EU mainly among each others, often presenting smaller Member States with a fait accompli2. 1 J. Fischer, Od związku państw do federacji – rozważania na temat finalizacji integracji europejskiej, presented on

12 May 2000 at Humboldt University of Berlin; Quo vadis, Europo? „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2000, 25 May, p. 1�. 2 On 20-21 September 2003 a French-German-British summit was held in Berlin (formally non-EU); R. Choroszy,

Porządkowanie europejskiego stołu, „Polska Zbrojna” 2003, No. 40 (5 October), p. 22; „Polska Zbrojna” 2003, No. 42 (19 October), p. 8, after: „The Times” 2003, 13 October; O. Osica, Polityka paragrafów, „Polska Zbrojna” 2003 No. 44 (2 November), pp. 26-2�; „Polska Zbrojna” 2003, No. 48 (30 November), p. 8.

The debates on TCE proceeded dramatically: the European Council’s sum-mit in Brussels on 12-13 December 2003 was broken off. Then, on 11 March 2004 Madrid was hit by a terrorist attack resulting in a huge change in the Spanish foreign policy: prime minister J. M. Aznar, who was reluctant to TCE, was repla-ced by an enthusiast of this document - J. L. Zapatero. Finally, at the European Council’s summit in Dublin on 18-19 June 2004 a compromise was reached, and after an official signing of the document on 2 October 2004 in Rome, the ratifi-cation process began. It collapsed in the spring of 2005, when first the French (29 May) and then the Dutch (2 June) rejected TCE in their respective referenda. It was obvious that TCE could meet with opposition also in other countries. As it was not clear what was the status of TCE at that time (it should have been accep-ted unanimously by all the states), on 16-18 June 2005 European Council in Brus-sels adjourned taking the decision for a year.3 It was classical „playing for time”, because there was no political will to take any binding decision. This meant lack of any decision and an extended „state of a limbo”.

It wasn’t until the early 200�, that the discussion about the future of the EU was resumed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who proposed an interest-ing solution. On her initiative the „problem was bypassed”: the most controver-sial provisions of TCE were identified and it was decided that the debate would be limited only these provisions and the rest (vast majority) of the text of TCE would remain as it was. In this way, from the spring of 200� works were conducted on a formally new document (although a vast majority of its text repeated the pro-visions of TCE), which was called Reform Treaty. This document was developed at Intergovernmental Conference taking place from 23 July 200�, and called the Treaty of Lisbon after the place it was signed in (on 13 December 200� during the European Council in Lisbon). First, the proposed date of entry into force of the Reform Treaty (1 January 2009) was adjourned because on the 12th of June 2008 the Irish rejected this document (they accepted it in a repeated referendum on 2 October 2009). The Reform Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, and with that moment all the earlier treaties regulating the functioning of the Com-munities and the European Union were replaced by two new ones4:

• Treaty on European Union (TEU)• Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

At the time TCU and then the Reform Treaty was prepared, it was known that the EU would be joined by 10-12 countries from East-Central Europe. Thus 3 „Rocznik Strategiczny” 2005/2006, p. 1514 M. Rewizorski, Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2011, p. 18.

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it was clear that the EU was getting closer to the geographical borders of Eu-rope and soon it would border on countries which it wouldn’t be able to accept quickly (if ever). In 2003, it was decided that a new mechanism of cooperation would be created for Maghreb, Mashrek or post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldavia - European Neighbourhood Policy. Together with European Security Strategy, also adopted in 2003, it started to create the framework of the Common Fo-reign and Security Policy of the UE5.

The Reform Treaty introduces serious changes into the structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy:

• It creates an international legal personality for the EU (art. 1 and 4� of TCE). Whereas EC had it since its establishment (1952-195�), the EU was not granted international legal personality and its actions un-der the Common Foreign and Security Policy did not have a status of a full international law, but only a status of political activity, someti-mes also referred to as „soft law”. Although some later modifications of TCE suggested that a „partial” legal personality of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is introduced (for instance, right to con-clude international agreements), it is the Reform Treaty that clarified its status and covers by a uniform legal system (art. 25 of TCE, 216 and next of TFEU).

• It includes CFSP into „external relations” of the EU and binds it with trade and aid policies, and means of exerting economic pressure on third countries. It is important because even before the establishment of the EU Communities learned to use their economic power (con-tracts of association, trade advantages, credits) for achieving political aims. Only the establishment of the UE in 1993 allowed undertaking foreign police and military as well as stabilization missions. Before the Reform Treaty was adopted, these two spheres of activity were separa-ted and didn’t always cooperate with each other.

• The Reform Treaty establishes European External Action Service (art. 2� of TCE), designed to cooperate with diplomatic services of the Mem-ber States. This service is to comprise of officials running the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and European Com-mission and staff delegated by national diplomatic services. Offices of the European External Action Service were to be established in around 130 countries and protect the interests of both the EU and its citizens.

5 R. Zięba, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 200�, pp. 15�-159, 1�9-184.

• It introduces serious changes in the status of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (art. 18, 2� of TEU)

6. This post was created back in 1999, but the person holding it wasn’t granted any specific powers, staff or sources of financing. It is only thanks to the effort taken by High Representative Javier Solana from Spain (1999-2009) that the importance of this institution gew and it was unofficially regarded as the most important representation of the UE on the international arena. Under the Reform Treaty, High Representative is both Vice-President of the European Commission and President of Council of the European Union for foreign affairs. He consolidates in his hands all the external relations of the EU (us-ing political, economic as well as police and military means). He also heads the European External Action Service. This post is filled by a unanimous decision by the Council of Europe.

• The Reform Treaty introduces the following „Solidarity clause” (art 222 of TFEU): „The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist at-tack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military re-sources made available by the Member States, to:

• (a) — prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

• — protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

• — assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its po-litical authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

• (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its poli-tical authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster�.

• „The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security

6 TKUE envisaged appointment of „EU Minister of Foreign Affairs”, but in the Reform Treaty the name intro-duced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 199� was restored.

� Whereas art. 42(�) of TEU states that in the case of military aggression on one of the member states, the re-maining states undertake to give the invaded state assistance and support, using all measures provided for in art. 51 of the UN Charter. Although this provision did not mean that a system of common defence was created, ale the Treaty provided for the possibility of creating it, if the European Council unanimously decided so. Analysis – S. Koziej, Bezpieczna swoboda, „Polska Zbrojna” 2005, No. 2.

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(…). The common security and defence policy shall include the pro-gressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”. (art. 42(1-2) TEU)8.

• It announces building European defence and establishment of Euro-pean Defence Agency, officially called the Agency in the field of de-fence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments – art. 42(3) and art. 45 of TCU. It has been designed to define opera-tional requirements, measures to meet them, assist in defining and implementing any useful measures to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, assist in defining European capabilities and armaments and advise the Council on defence.

• Under the Reform Treaty, those Member States whose military capa-bilities fulfill higher criteria and which will make commitments to lead the most demanding missions will be able to establish perma-nent structured cooperation within the Union framework (art. 42(6), art. 46 of TCE). The missions referred to above include: disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peace-keeping missions, military crisis management, including peace restoration missions and post conflict stabilisation operations (as well as fight against terrorists).

Summing up, the Reform Treaty defines entities responsible for the Union foreign policy in a new way. Compared to earlier solutions, it significantly wea-kened the role of the rotating presidency, institutionally strengthening the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who gai-ned real capability of harmonizing economic, political and military means at the disposal of the EU. At the same time, the decision to appoint British woman Cat-herine Ashton to this post (she is to fulfill this function in 2009-2014) indicated that the EU states didn’t want the person holding this post to be too independent, and wished to keep in their hands a significant part of diplomatic activity.

3. Intervention in Libya

Early 2011 saw the beginning of mass riots in Arab countries: in Tunisia and Egypt totalitarian regimes were overthrown, in Syria fierce fights have lasted to this day, and from February to October a civil war was fought in Libya, whe-

8 In TEU, in is repeatedly stressed that the planned EU defence system will not compete with NATO.

re citizens rose against over 40-year rule of Muammar Gaddafi9. The events in Northern Africa (called „the Arab spring”) were a huge surprise for EU states, and were initially received with mixed feelings. Until then, politicians ruling in Egypt or Tunisia were regarded as predictable, having the situation in their co-untries under good control, and „convenient” to the West.10 Still fresh in the me-mory was the example of Algeria, where Islamist fundamentalists gained huge support in free elections in 1991. For the next 10 years this country was a stage of a very fierce civil war, in which the army backed by the West finally defeated the Islamists. In this conflict, economic interests and international stability were regarded as more important than human rights or democracy.11 Especially af-ter 9/11/2001, undemocratic Northern African leaders used the pretext of „fight against terrorism” to oppress any opposition in their countries. In 2003-2010, also Gaddafi was tolerated by the UE – after he declared fight against terrorism himself, he was forgiven for the long years of sponsoring terrorism12.

The first antigovernment actions in Libya took place already in mid-January 2011 in the cities of Darna and Benghazi13. The protests were violently resumed on 15 February 2011 in Benghazi, and on 1� February, on the so-called „Rage Day”, mass riots followed in many cities and in most regions of the country. They were ruthlessly suppressed by Gaddafi’s regime – on 20 February Human Rights Watch (HRW) informed that there were at least 233 casualties and the number of those injured was several times higher14. Most of the casualties were killed in Benghazi, the second largest city of Libya, which after the fights was taken by the demonstrators and started to be seen as the symbolic capital city of the opposi-tion forces. It is there that the National Transitional Council established by the insurgents had its seat. From that moment there could be no retreat – the oppo-sionists started to organize themselves, creating the National Liberation Army and many smaller insurgent groups. In late February the insurgents launched an attack on Tripoli, and other cities started to go over to their side.

However, Gaddafi had supporters: most of the army and significant part of policemen and special services remained loyal to him. Various sources also informed that the dictator recruited mercenaries from many countries, such as Algeria, Syria, Chad, Zimbabwe, and even Belarus and Ukraine. The co-

9 W. Jagielski, Karawana nie jedzie dalej. Libia po Kaddafim, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 29 August.10 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 4 FEBRUARY 2011 CONCLUSIONS; ANNEX II DECLARATION ON EGYPT AND THE

REGION; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/1191�5.pdf (0�. 10. 2012).11 R. Young, The EU and the Promotion of democracy, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 94-114.12 J. Zając, Role Unii Europejskiej w regionie Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, Warszawa 2010, pp. 90-92.13 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 4 FEBRUARY 2011 CONCLUSIONS, op. cit.14 Libia jak Egipt? ‘Dzień gniewu’ wobec Muammara Kaddafiego, http://gazeta.pl, 2011, 1� February (0�. 1�. 2011).

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unteroffensive by the government forces took place at the beginning of March – Gaddafi supporters recaptured a number of cities and in mid-March pushed the insurgents back to Benghazi.

In the light of international law, these fights were Libya’s internal affairs. Any international intervention would be acceptable only with the authorisa-tion of UN Security Council. The international public opinion felt firmly who in this war is fighting on the good and who on the bad side – politicians from the EU countries unequivocally accused Gaddafi of disproportionate use of force. On 22 February, Head of Union Foreign Policy and Security C. Ashton announced suspension of trade talks between EU and Libya. Only Italy, which intensely traded with Gaddafi’s regime and was afraid of a mass influx of ref-uges if the conflict lasted longer, presented a restrained position.

Meanwhile, many diplomatic representatives started to leave Libya, and Libya’s ambassadors abroad and its representatives in international organiza-tions started to turn against Gaddafi15. Many states called on their citizens to resign from travelling to Libya. On 22 February 2011, also the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs „strongly recommended” that Polish citizens should refrain from going to this country, and on 3 March the staff of the Polish embassy in Tripoli was pulled out16.

On 26 February, UN Security Council adopted resolution 19�0 condemn-ing the use of force against the demonstrators and introducing a range of in-ternational sanctions, such as arms embargo, freezing of funds and economic resources of people connected with Gaddafi or restrictions on admission of the regime officials. On 11 March 2011, during the extraordinary European Council meeting devoted to the situation in Libya the following statement was made: „The situation in Libya remains a cause for grave concern. We express our strong solidarity with the Libyan people and the victims. We firmly con-demn the violent repression the Libyan regime applies against its citizens and the gross and systematic violation of human rights. We welcome UN Security Council Resolution 19�0 and the referral of the situation in Libya to the Interna-tional Criminal Court. The use of force, especially with military means, against civilians is unacceptable and must stop immediately. The safety of the people must be ensured by all necessary means. The European Council expresses its deep concern about attacks against civilians, including from the air. In order to protect the civilian population, Member States will examine all necessary

15 TVN 24: Minister Kaddafiego uciekł? Władze zaprzeczają. 17.05.2011. (06. 1�. 2011).16 http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ostrzezenie,MSZ,w,zwiazku,z,sytuacja,w,Libii,-,aktualizacja,41392.html;

http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ewakuacja,personelu,Ambasady,RP,w,Trypolisie,41�09.html. (06. 1�. 2011).

options, provided that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and sup-port from the region. Those responsible will be held accountable and face grave consequences. We will work with the United Nations, the Arab League, the African Union and our international partners to respond to the crisis. We call for the rapid holding of a summit between the Arab League, the African Union and the European Union. Colonel Kadhafi must relinquish power immediately. His regime has lost all legitimacy and is no longer an interlocutor for the EU. The European Union has adopted restrictive measures against the country’s leadership and against entities holding sizeable assets controlled by the regime, and stands ready to adopt further sanctions”1�.

Then, on 1� March, when Gaddafi’s army stood at the gates of Benghazi, UN Security Council adopted resolution 19�3, introducing a ban on flights in the airspace of Libya. In addition to that, the resolution allowed to protect civilian people by undertaking international military intervention18. The military inter-vention by western countries was prepared for a long time. The first flights over Libya (and attacks on Gaddafi’s forces) were conducted almost immediately after the resolution was adopted – on 19 March – in a mission code-named „Odyssey Dawn”. Until 31 March, this mission was formally carried out by a group of ad hoc organized countries, from that date it was officially taken over by NATO. The code-name of the operation was changed into „Unified Protector”. Most active in these operations were the French and British air forces, whereas the American air force was slightly less active. Thus, it has been proven once more that there are „superpowers” within the EU, which are able to carry out com-plicated military operations by themselves (apart from them, the following EU Members joined the initiative: Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy).

At the next, „ordinary” summit of the European Council, on 24-25 March 2011, the earlier declarations were repeated, stressing a bigger role of the in-ternational community: „In line with UNSCR 19�3, the European Union, to-gether with the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the African Union, will intensify its efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people. The European Council reiterated its call on Colonel Kadhafi to relinquish power immediately in order to allow Libya to rapidly embark on an orderly and Libyan-led transition to democra-cy through a broadbased dialogue, also taking into consideration the need to ensure Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”19.

1� EXTRAORDINARY EUROPEAN COUNCIL 11 March 2011 DECLARATION, point 6-�.18 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of 17 march 2011, http://www.bbn.gov.pl, (1�.06.2011).19 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 24/25 MARCH 2011 CONCLUSIONS, point 19.

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With the intervention of the international forces, another offensive by the insurgents was launched. Towards the end of March, they took all the ports in ea-stern Libya. While in the spring the insurgents succeeded in surviving thanks to the help from the West, in the summer they started to gain advantage. Provided with more arms and having gained funds for building the foundation of their own administration, they began to achieve successes in fights in the summer. More and more countries recognized them as the representatives of the Libyan people - on 22 May the EU established diplomatic relations with them, and at the G-8 summit in Douville, held on 26 May, also Russia ceased to stand up for Gaddafi. An important argument highlighting international recognition of the insurgents’ case was the decision of the International Criminal Court in Haque from 2� June 2011, which issued an order of arrest for Muammar Gaddafi and his closest associates on the charge of crimes against humanity.

At that time, another European Council summit, held on 23-24 June 2011, already treated the intervention in Libya as one of many elements of transfor-mations in the Arab world: in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Yemen – and statement: „The European Council confirms its full support for UN Security Council Resolutions 19�0 and 19�3 on Libya and for the efforts Member States of the EU are taking for their implementation. It fully endorses the Council conclusions on Libya adopted on 20 June 2011, and reiterates its call to Kadhafi to relinquish power immediately. Libya’s democratic transformation remains a primary interest of the European Union. The European Council stresses the essential role played by the Transitional National Council (TNC) in this pro-cess as a representative of the aspirations of the Libyan people”20.

After another several months, in the second half of 2011, it was clear that Gaddafi’s regime was collapsing. Its relatively fast and sudden collapse was cau-sed by the fact that losses reached „the critical mass” and couldn’t be replenis-hed any longer by Gaddafi’s henchmen21. After a series of attacks supported by Western countries’ air forces, on 20-28 August the insurgents took control of Tripoli. Gaddafi himself was killed in fights on 20 October (probably immedia-tely after capturing him, the insurgents punished him without due process of law). 23 October was announced as the day of official end of fights, and then the insurgent authorities moved from Benghazi to Tripoli and started to create the foundation of state administration.

20 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 23/24 JUNE 2011 CONCLUSIONS; ANNEX DECLARATION ON THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD, Point 4.

21 W. Jagielski, op. cit.

Also on 23 October 2011, another European Council meeting took place, at which not even one point in the conclusions was devoted to the Libyan is-sue. Point 16 summarized the events in Egypt and Tunisia, and the following paragraph addressed Libya:”The death of Muammar Gaddafi marks the end of an era of despotism and repression, from which the Libyan people have su-ffered for too long. Today Libya can turn a page in its history, pursue national reconciliation, and embrace a new democratic future. The European Council pays tribute to the courage and determination of the people of Libya. It looks forward to the formation of an inclusive and broad-based government, to the launch of a democratic, peaceful and transparent transition that reaches out to all Libyans and to the preparation of free and fair elections in accordance with the Constitutional Declaration by the National Transitional Council. It reaffirms the commitment of the European Union to support the emergence of a democratic Libya”22.

There are concerns whether in the long run the new authorities in Libya will remain pro-Western, or rather the people’s support will be won by e.g. fundamentalists who made a name for themselves in the fights against Gad-dafi. This is connected with another problem: Libya is not a coherent state, within the present borders it was created as an Italian colony at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, and animosities between various tribes and regions remain strong23. In this context, the 2011 war can be perceived not only as rebellion of people against the tyrant – but as a clash between two capitals: Tripoli and Benghazi. The elections held on � July 2012 indicate the following result: the success of Islamists and separatists. The later variant would force the West to develop a new policy towards this region.

4. Attempts of External Democratization of Belarus

President Alexander Lukashenko, ruling in Belarus from 1994, already in the 90s was regarded by the EU as „persona non grata”. The reason for that was his persistently breaking human rights, violating principles of democracy, and ruthless strengthening of power24. The pressure from countries of the West was weakened by the protection he was receiving from Russia, and over the last several years – also from China. Lukashenko proved to be a skilled politician who occasionally showed friendly gestures towards countries of the West, e.g.

22 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 23 OCTOBER 2011 CONCLUSIONS, point 16.23 J. Zając, pp. �2-�424 B. Piskorska, Wymiar wschodni polityki Unii Europejskiej, Toruń 2008, p. 346

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for some time the Polish minority in Belarus didn’t experience repressions. In exchange for Belarus tolerating the Polish speaking media and young people of the Polish descent going on scholarship – the Polish state tried to soften the EU policy towards Belarus. This policy was unilaterally broken off by Lukashenko in the summer of 2005, when he imposed leaders appointed by himself on the Polish community in Belarus.

Under the impetus of „colourful revolutions” in post-Soviet countries (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004), power was taken by pro-Western governments, which declared willingness to conduct reforms to make these countries closer to the EU (and also United Nations). The EU did not intend to propose mem-bership to these countries, but tried to modify the European Neighbourhood Policy to grant them more privileges than earlier. At the initiative of Poland and Sweden, the EU started to develop the framework of its new programme - Eastern Partnership, addressed to post-Soviet countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine. At the same time it turned out that Russia used various means to regain influences in the countries which wanted to become independent from it25.

In these circumstances, the project of the Eastern Partnership was adopted by the European Commission on 3 December 2008, and on 20 March 2009 it was accepted by the European Council summit in Brussels, while the next summit of the European Council in Prague on �-8 May 2009 officially inaugurated this pro-gramme26. The Partnership envisaged: establishing a free trade area with post-Soviet countries, signing association agreements with them, visa facilitation, and increasing funds by € 600 million. To highlight social control over the Eastern Partnership and its „human dimension”, Euronest - Parliamentary Assembly - was established in May 2011, comprising Members of the European Parliament and members of parliament from the Partnership countries2�.

However the Eastern Partnership countries were expected to carry out eco-nomic reforms, adopt EU standards in many areas, respect human rights and public freedoms, facilitate the activity of non-governmental organizations, and control the actions of the authorities. These countries (except for Belarus) were treated by the EU as generally free market democracies, struggling with only minor problems. Belarus was regarded as a dictatorship, which should first of all stop rigging elections and persecuting the opposition28.25 S. Parzymies, Dyplomacja czy siła ? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2009, pp. 230-23126 At the European Council summit in Prague, during the inauguration of the Partnership, many heads of the EU

states were absent – this reflected, among other things, little recognition of the Czech presidency. 2� M. Wojciechowski, T. Bielecki, Sukces wizjonerów z paryskiej ‘Kultury’ „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 10 January. 28 C. Ochmann, Szczyt nie był sukcesem, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 10 February.

Meanwhile, the beneficiaries themselves treated the EU offer ambiguously. Naturally, they were interested in economic aid or visa facilitation, but they weren’t so willing to push through European political and social standards or to deepen democracy. It also turned out that the Eastern Partnership – laun-ched at the outbreak of the financial crisis – is not properly funded29.

The early period of the functioning of the Eastern Partnership was also cha-racterized by certain hopes for improvement of relations with Belarus30. In 2009-2010, Lukashenko tried to warm up his relations with the West, by distancing himself from Russia after the 2008 war, slightly decreasing repressions against the opposition (as well as the Polish minority) and expressing willingness to coope-rate with the EU more closely. This policy ended at the close of 2010, when on 19 December Lukashenko once again won presidential elections, and then brutally suppressed the opposition protests. The EU compromised itself, because it no lon-ger demanded fully democratic elections and limited itself to calling for „allowing the opposition to speak”. Thus, Lukashenko reached the position of being able to „select” his opponents – choosing those who can compete and repressing others.

The first two years of the functioning of the Eastern Partnership were marked by struggle for its existence. The countries that did not support this project – ma-inly from the „old EU”, except for Germany – would write it off on the pretext of the worsening of democratic standards in the East. Another impulse that revived this programme was the Polish presidency of the EU in the second half of 2011. One month before the start of the Polish presidency, on 2�-28 May Warsaw became the organizer of the meeting of the leaders of 20 East-Central Europe countries. The visit of these leaders was combined with a European trip of the U.S. President Barrack Obama, who came to Poland on these days. At that time, successive trials of Belorussian opposionists sparked off protests of the Polish authorities and on the threshold of the Polish Presidency of the EU31, on 30 June, R. Sikorski and Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle met in Warsaw with the representatives of the Belorussian opposition32.

29 M. Wojciechowski, Ukraina bliżej UE „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 30 September.30 B. Piskorska, pp. 352-353.31 http://www.msz.gov.pl/Oswiadczenie,Ministerstwa,Spraw,Zagranicznych,w,zwiazku,z,postepowaniem,sado

wym,w,stosunku,do,dzialaczy,opozycji,na,Bialorusi,41262.html; http://www.msz.gov.pl/Oswiadczenie,w,sprawie,kolejnych,represji,na,Bialorusi,42581.html; http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ministerstwo,Spraw,Zagranicznych,potepia,wyrok,skazujacy,Andrieja,Sannikowa,43196.html; http://www.msz.gov.pl/Oswiadczenie,Ministerstwa,Spraw,Zagranicznych,w,zwiazku,z,wyrokiem,na,Uladzimira,Nieklajeua,43334.html; http://www.msz.gov.pl/Oswiadczenie,MSZ,w,zwiazku,z,represyjnymi,dzialaniami,wladz,Bialorusi,wobec,opozycji,43396.html; http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ministerstwo,Spraw,Zagranicznych,krytykuje,,niesprawiedliwy,proces,Andrzeja,Poczobuta,436�8.html; http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ministerstwo,Spraw,Zagranicznych,o,wyroku,na,Andrzeja,Poczobuta,440��.html

32 http://www.msz.gov.pl/Spotkanie,z,przedstawicielami,opozycji,bialoruskiej,43926.html

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Another important event (one can even say – the most important during the Polish presidency) was to be the Eastern Partnership summit in Warsaw held on 29-30 September 2011. A bad prognosis before the summit was the first session of Euronest, organized in Strasbourg on 14-15 September, which did not succeed in adopting a declaration condemning the practices used by the Belorussian authorities33. To avoid partiality, the authors of the project pro-posed postponing the vote until they get to know the position of the Belous-sian authorities. The declaration was based mainly on the information from the Belorussian opposition and the majority of the members stated that Euronest should not condemn a state without hearing its official authorities.

On the threshold of the Eastern Partnership summit, there was a wide-spread belief that the EU did not have much to offer to its eastern neighbours to encourage them to carry out reforms, democratization and approach the UE. Indirectly, this was confirmed by the announced absence of leading EU politicians from the summit: France was to be represented not by the president but by the prime minister, Great Britain – by the deputy prime minister, and Italy – by only the foreign minister. This was explicitly commented by French expert on EU, Dominique Moisi: „In France, nobody cares about it, neither the public opinion, nor the political class. There is no information on this subject (…) From foreign news – only Libya and the Middle East. It is only diplomats that heard about the Eastern Partnership (..) It’s not surprising that neither Sarkozy nor Cameron will come to Warsaw. They neither have time nor want to deal with it now”34.

The summit was chaired by the head of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, and the most important of the EU guests was German Chancellor A. Merkel: „In a TV interview, Chancellor Merkel spoke recently about ‘so-called Eastern Partnership’. If something is ‘so-called’, then it’s as if it didn’t exist. This is a regress compared to the statements a year or two years ago. There is no information that the EU spends on the East twice as little as on Northern Africa. Maybe that is why the effects of transformations in the USSR countries of the former are so poor”35.

The diplomatic dispute concerned the delegation of Belarus. The UE re-garded A. Lukashenko for persona non grata on its territory, so Poland sent a personal invitation to the chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Siarhiej Martynau, but he turned it down. Thus, the Minsk delegation was to be he-

33 M. Szczepanik, Partnerstwo Wschodnie: porażka Euronestu „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 1� September.34 D. Moisi, Ten szczyt to dla nas sprawa peryferyjna, „Rzeczpospolita” 2011, 28 September.35 C. Ochmann, op. cit.

aded by ambassador to Poland Wiktar Gajsionak, however according to the international diplomatic protocol, an ambassador can not participate in mee-tings with heads of state, prime ministers and foreign ministers on equal terms. Meanwhile Belarus demanded a full participation in the summit under threat of absence of its representation: „Belarus gives itself the right to refuse to par-ticipate in the summit, if the status and form of participation of the head of its delegation, ambassador to Poland Wiktar Gajsionak, is in any way limited (…) Each country participating in the Eastern Partnership has the sovereign right to define by itself the level and members of its representation during the par-ticipation in the Eastern Partnership projects (…) From a legal point of view, the documents adopted at the summit without the consent of the head of the Belorussian delegation will not be legally binding”36.

In the end, Belarus refused to participate in the summit and did not show any interest in the offer presented to it. The EU offered a generous financial aid in exchange for releasing and rehabilitating political prisoners, carrying out parliamentary elections in accordance with the OSCE standards and starting talks with the opposition3�. Still, the absent Belorussian authorities achieved a success. The participants of the Eastern Partnership summit could not reach agreement on condemning Lukashenko for breaking human rights and the rel-evant declaration was signed only by the EU members. Thus, the situation in EU relations with Belarus remained at a deadlock38.

In the margins of the summit, the Eastern Partnership Citizens’ Forum took place, in which non-governmental organizations from the Eastern Partnership countries participated (including the delegation of the Belorussian opposition). The conclusions were pretty bad – from 2009 democratic standards in most of the Eastern Partnership countries deteriorated, and Belarus should even be re-garded as a dictatorship. In addition to that, nobody saw any remedies, although the EU sent a signal that it did not forget about the Belorussian opposition.

Although the achievements weren’t significant, the fact the Eastern Part-nership still existed could be regarded as a success. This was confirmed by the European Council summit on 23 October 2011: „The European Council welco-mes the second Eastern Partnership Summit, held in Warsaw on 29-30 Septem-ber, and welcomes the intention of the High Representative and the European Commission to propose a roadmap that would list the objectives, instruments 36 A. Słojewska, Co zrobić ze Wschodem Europy, „Rzeczpospolita” 2011, 29 September.3� E. Kaca, Szczyt Partnerstwa. Sukces w walce o przeżycie, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 10 March; http://www.msz.

gov.pl/Minister,Spraw,Zagranicznych,Radoslaw,Sikorski,na,spotkaniu,z,Komisarzem,Praw,Czlowieka,Rady,Europy,i,opozycja,bialoruska,45669.html

38 B. Tarasiuk (interview), Od Partnerstwa Wschodniego chciałoby się więcej, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2011, 10 January.

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and actions with a view to the next Eastern Partnership Summit in the second half of 2013. The pace and depth of these countries’ political association and economic integration with the EU will depend on their upholding of the de-mocratic principles and rule of law which are the basis of the Partnership”39.

The winter of 2012 saw another power struggle between Belarus and the EU. On 28 February, ministers of the EU states approved sanctions in the form of a visa ban for, and freezing of assets of 21 other representatives of the Belorussian authorities responsible for breaking human rights and repressions against the opposition. By way of revenge, on the same day the Belorussian authorities called Polish and EU ambassadors to leave Belarus (as a gesture of solidarity, all am-bassadors of the EU states left Minsk with them.) At the next European Council summit, on 1-2 March 2012, a tough declaration – first such for a long time – was adopted on the issue of Belarus: „The European Council welcomes the progress the Eastern Partnership has achieved in furthering political association and eco-nomic integration with the EU. The partnership is based on a commitment to common values, where those most committed to reforms will benefit more from their relationship with the EU (…) The European Council expresses its serious and deepening concern at the further deterioration of the situation in Belarus. It welcomes the decision reached at the Council to extend the list of those re-sponsible for serious human rights violations or the repression of civil society and the democratic opposition or supporting or benefiting from the Lukashenko regime to be targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze. The European Council invites the Council to proceed with its work on further measures. It reiterates the Union’s commitment to strengthening its engagement with Belarusian civil society and to supporting the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people”40. Then, on 23 March, the foreign ministers of 2� EU states once again extended sanctions against Belarus, by deciding, among other things, to freeze the assets of 29 companies belonging to three oligarchs supporting Lukashenko’s regime. In the adopted declaration, the ministers announced they would introduce further sanctions „until all political prisoners were released”.

39 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 23 OCTOBER 2011 CONCLUSIONS, point 19.40 EUROPEAN COUNCIL 1/2 March 2012 CONCLUSIONS, point 3�-38.

5. Conclusions

The Treaty of Lisbon has been in effect for 2.5 years and it is already clear that the EU uses its rules very carefully41. On the one hand, actions are taken when a spectacular disaster or tragedy occurs. Libyan people who fight by force of arms against their dictator have attracted attention of the media and public opinion, Belorussians who use peaceful means are ignored. Further, the EU does not have sufficient funds to pursue efficient foreign policy in all significant areas. In 2011, it was evident that the funds earmarked for aiding „Arab spring” depleted the aid for democracy supporters in post-Soviet countries. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon did not eliminate „national egoisms” – the EU acts efficiently where its actions gain support of the most powerful Member Sates. France and Great Britain committed themselves to overthrowing Gaddafi much more than Germany did to democratizing Lukashenko.

41 M. Rewizorski, pp. 28-29

91

Łukasz Potocki

European Integration versus the European Union-Russia Relations in the 21st Century

1. Introduction

In 199�, the European Union took a historical decision of beginning the accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus of the so-called Luxembourg group of countries. Moreover, in the oth-er group of the candidate countries were Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania (the Moscow-Helsinki group). Accession negotiations resulted in the European union enlargement in 2004 and 200� respectively, when 12 new countries were encompassed. From that moment on the organization extended to cover the central Europe countries. Both the former communist countries and the ones which came into being after the breakdown of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, gained membership in the EU. In the history of the Euro-pean Union integration it was, by all means, a breakthrough, for the first time the Union „trespassed” the area formerly recognized as a Russian sphere of influence. It was a fact of great importance in the European Union-the Russian Federation relations.

The European Union and the Russian Federation are two basic entities in international relations on the European continent. The history of their mutual relations shows that the policy of one entity towards the other is shaped by a great number of internal and external conditions. In the case of the European Union, primarily a territory scope and a material scope of the co-operation are extended. The evolution in the relations indicates a lack of uniform approach among the EU member countries towards Russia. The countries do not have a uniform attitude to the country in question. Some treat Russia as a partner, the other mention it among the countries which pose a potential threat. A pe-culiar character of the entity which is the European Union leads to organiza-tional dispersion in its external policy, a lack of strong possibilities in making decisions and a dependence on the separate policies of member countries. It all influences the relations with the Russian Federation.

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2. Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

Taking into account both historical, political and cultural conditions, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are enormously significant in creating the external policy of such entities as the European Union. The area „between” Germany and Russia, directly after the changes of 1989-1990, was to create the balance area between the West and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was, as a matter of fact, a „negative” interpretation of the region location and de-fining it as an area beyond the Euro-Atlantic unity1. However, for Eastern-Central and Eastern Europe politicians, the location „between” Germany and Russia laid the foundations for breaking with the dependence on the USSR and contributed to the beginning of a new kind of integration and unity with Western Europe2. As a result of the 1990s changes, a total integration of the countries of the region with the western structures, first NATO, next the European Union, became pos-sible. Simultaneously, its role in creating the policy of the organization in external areas, which was a major concern of the countries of the region, was increasing. After 1989, while the identity of the Central and Eastern European countries was being formed, numerous concepts on identification of the region were in clash. Among others, J. Rupnik claimed that: „the time is coming for a political concept of Central Europe as an answer to the process of communism collapse which is in progress today and the de-sovietization of the western realms of the Soviet em-pire”. G. Konrad considered the concept of Central Europe: „a scope of mediation between NATO and the USSR” and „an in-between state: neither East nor West; this and that at the same time”, which neither complies with a potential come back to Europe nor meets the ambitions and expectations of the region leaders3.

Eastern-Central and Eastern countries were gradually taking over expe-rience of market economy, political pluralism and civil society. The block divi-sion of Europe seemed transitional, since both in civilization and culture the region was a part of the continent. Joining different organizations like Coun-cil of Europe, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development or NATO was an element of the integration.

The thought of association in the spirit of the European integration of Cen-tral European countries with the European Communities was put forward by

1 H. Szlajfer, Europa Środkowo – Wschodnia (jako akronim) i Rosja. Kilka refleksji, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2008, No. 2, p. 6.

2 Ibidem.3 See: Ł. Potocki, Polityka państw członkowskich z „nowej Europy” wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej, [in:] Europa

Środkowo – Wschodnia w procesie transformacji i integracji. Wymiar polityczny, ed. by H. Chałupczak, M. Pietraś, P. Tosiek, Zamość 2010, pp. 52-53.

Margaret Thatcher in 1989. Later, on the grounds of Thatcher’s proposal, co-untries, former COMECON members, were offered treaties of accession4. As the first, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary began access talks trying to regulate economic, legal and political rules of mutual co-operation. There were attempts to adjust accession agreements to the conditions of the respective can-didate countries. The attention should be paid to the fact that they were a me-ans enabling getting both economic and expert help. In order to facilitate the accession process, pre-accession funds were created5. However, the so-called „Copenhagen criteria”, accepted at the EU summit in Copenhagen of 1993, proved to be of the utmost importance to the „Eastern enlargement”.

Copenhagen criteria constituted the conditions for candidate countries to be fulfilled to accede the European Union. Among the most significant requi-rements are:

- stable democratic institutions, rule of law, human rights and national minorities protection;

- functioning of the market economy;- capability of taking on membership obligations along with the adhe-

rence to the development of the political, economic and monetary union;

- administrative capacity of applying union legal regulations to national laws6.

„Copenhagen criteria” did not bring closer the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union yet, although they established formal accession conditions. They started a process of bringing the countries of the region closer to the western structures. The greatest importance was gained by the European Council meeting in Copenhagen of December 199�, when the decision on accession of six countries of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e.: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary. Nearly simultaneously, the decision on accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary was taken, which evidently contributed to the change in geopolitical 4 K. Łastawski, Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej (1993-2011), [in:] Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego,

ed. by A. Bryc, A. Legucka, A. Włodkowska – Bagan, Warszawa 2011, pp. 251-252.5 In 1990 Poland and Hungary Assitance In Restructuring their Economics (PHARE) was created. The fund initial-

ly set up for Poland and Hungary was extended in time to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 2000 Instrument for Structural Policy (ISPA) aimed at financial support for the investment projects in the associated countries in the area of transport and ecology. The European Union established Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) with the aim of adapting the agriculture of the candidate countries to the Union requirements.

6 K. Łastawski, p. 253.

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structure in that part of Europe. In 2004 and 200� respectively, twelve countries joined the European Union. It was the biggest enlargement in the history of the European integration, and, at the same time, bringing together both parts of Europe�. The new EU countries accession forced the organization to create a new Eastern policy as well as partnership with the Russian Federation.

Becoming the members of the European Union in 2004 and 200�, the co-untries simultaneously became participants of Common Security and Defence Policy with the opportunity to create the security on the European continent8. Moreover, all the countries of the region in question belong to the North At-lantic Treaty Organization, which cannot be underestimated in the relations with the Russian Federation. As S. Parzymies explains, integration of the Cen-tral-European and Eastern countries with the West after 2004 has changed the geopolitics in that part of the continent, and the immediate neighborhood with the Russian Federation enforces a harmonious cooperation with it9.

The situation of 2004, connected with integrating new countries to the Union, did not contribute to making the EU policy towards Russia more ho-mogeneous. Indeed, the countries of the „new Europe” brought about new va-lues, but there was a constant strong division into „two Europes” which had a certain influence on the Russian Federation. L. Unger wrote that: „the old Europe shows magnanimity and turns a blind eye on the situation in the name of the misconstrued political realities in reference to V. Putin (...), whereas the new Europe looks critically on relations with Russia since it knows and bears in mind the dictatorship, the Soviet Union and fundamental human rights abu-ses”10. It seems that the Russian Federation itself showed interest in intensify-ing divisions among European countries and considered it a means to accom-plishing its own business goals.

Eastern enlargement of the European Union required modifications of the foundlings of the EU policy towards the Russian Federation, enforced appease-ment and gradual process of reaching model relations11. However, the principles of selecting methods and means used by the EU in the relations with Russia re-mained unchanged. After 2004 they were still: general institutions established by Partnership Cooperation Agreement, Cooperation Council, Cooperation Com-mittee and Parliamentary Cooperation Committee meetings. The only change was, as established at the Rome summit of November 2003, transforming Coope-� Ibidem. p. 254.8 Ł. Potocki, pp. 52-53.9 Ibidem, pp. 52-53.10 Ibidem, pp. 52-53.11 Ibidem, p. 55.

ration Council into Permanent Partnership Council. Since 2004, countries of the „new Europe” had their part in the dialogue as well as making decisions.

The process of the European Union Eastern enlargement required crea-ting a new project of cooperation with the Russian Federation. The EU aimed at settling relations in the name of an idea of the „strategic partnership” and wished to avoid limiting mutual relations which might be the outcome of the enlargement process. The EU and Russia authorities entered a number of talks and worked on treaties to settle their relations.

2. Geographical and Political Conditions of the EU Policy towards Russia after 2004

Geopolitical location of the new member countries resulted in closing the neighborhood of the EU and the Russian Federation. Before 2004 the land bor-der ran along only Finland - Russia frontier. The additional factor complicating the situation was the status quo of the Kaliningrad Oblast, which, as an auto-nomous part of the Russian Federation, became a region surrounded by the EU countries from all sides. The issue of the Kaliningrad Oblast status was a crucial point in the dispute even before the EU enlargement, with the main part play-ed by the new member countries. In 2001 the European Commission launched a report The European Union and the Kaliningrad Oblast12, in which the main problems connected with the EU enlargement were mentioned. Chiefly, power supplies, transit of goods and military transit issues were concerned. The Russian Federation had high hopes with the Kaliningrad Oblast and the EU enlargement to increase union institutions in the region and to acknowledge a special status quo to the citizens. Meanwhile, the European Union counted on easing possible decisions on investments (it was essential in the context of bilateral relations Po-land - RF and Lithuania - RF). In retrospect, it seems that the advantage of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s status quo was not fully taken and many possible enterpri-ses were neglected in the field. On the one hand, it resulted from the lack of the strong policy of such countries as Poland and Lithuania on the European Union forum. On the other, from diminishing the significance of the Stalingrad Oblast by central authorities of the Russian Federation and underlining greater impor-tance of Saint Petersburg, which could as well have been considered a strategic game on the part of the Russian countries with the European Union.

12 Ł. Gemziak, Obwód Kaliningradzki – rosyjska enklawa wewnątrz Unii Europejskiej, „Dialogi polityczne” 2008, No. 10.

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Geographical vicinity since 2004 forced the European Union to take diffe-rent actions towards the Russian Federation which were initiated by newly ac-ceded countries. Basing on Finland’s experience, solving the issues of soft secu-rity threat13 became a fundamental objective. Due to shrinking of the borders, the EU became afraid of negative phenomena such as immigration, cross-bor-der organized crime and growing problems with ecological dangers. Providing proper resources together with taking efficient actions became a natural objec-tive in order to deal with the effects of the changes in the post-soviet area14.

A political factor played an important role in defining the Eastern policy by the countries which acceded the EU in 2004 and 200� both during the ac-cession negotiations and, subsequently, as a part of the the actions undertaken on the EU forum. It seems that the political conditions became the commo-nality of the enterprises of the new EU countries towards the Russian Federa-tion. Dependence on the Russian Federation concurred to the creation of the specifics of the relations with Russia in the subsequent period. For instance for countries like Germany or France, which had different political traditions con-cerning Russia, the policy consisted in „building relations” with the Federation authorities, whereas the „new” Europe aimed at „building alliances” against the Federation authorities15. S. Dębski gives an example of Poland, claiming that „The Poles have tried almost all possible ideas to disrupt imperial Russia, form the idea of the of forming an international alliance of the nations under the Polish command against tzars’ authority, through the ideas of cooperation with the revolutionary movement, or even a Bolshevik party, aimed against Russian ancien régime, to the concept of driving a wedge between the Russian nation and the soviet authority”16.

It is worth emphasizing that the dependence of the majority of newly acce-ded countries on the Soviet Union contributed to constitution of the so-called two-track strategy. In Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic or Hungary it is difficult to talk about creating a homogeneous „eastern policy” or articulating an „eastern doctrine” towards neighbouring countries. There is a tendency to isolate individual countries, mainly the Russian Federation, and shaping a se-parate policy line.

The new EU member countries of 2004 submitted the policy towards the Russian Federation under dispute. The very fact of their accession neither chan-13 K. Reczkin, Finlandia – granica zewnętrzna Unii Europejskiej z Rosją. Wnioski dla Polski, „Publikacje CSM”

2004, No. 3, p. 6.14 Ibidem, p. 6.15 S. Dębski, „Polityka wschodnia” – mit i doktryna, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny” 2006, No. 3(31).16 Ibidem.

ged nor thoroughly rebuilt the „eastern policy”. The countries of the „new” Eu-rope were additionally endowed with new instruments. During the access nego-tiations the future-EU members did their best and aspired to play an important role in the Eastern policy of the EU, including the policy towards the Russian Federation. In 2001 a document Eastern policy of the European Union prospect enlargement was created. It stated that after new countries’ accession to the EU it will be obligatory to create a new, comprehensive policy towards the Russian Federation. Poland additionally pointed out an essential role to be played by the new members1�. A prospect Russian membership of the European Union was not assumed in the project, yet the project involved moving the European Union and Russia closer as well as breaking away all the barriers in Russia’s socio-eco-nomic development. It was assumed that special and friendly relations with the Russian Federation should be established, however without integration18.

Doubtlessly, after 2004, the policy of the European Union towards Eastern neighbours, including the Russian Federation, was activated. Bilateral relations became intensified and the institutions of cooperation were established. The conflict issue after 2004 was, basically, so-called „close vicinity” and post-soviet area. A radical policy of the EU in this field could have met a strong reaction on the part of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, turning a blind eye on Russia’s actions questions the plausibility of the whole EU19. Thus, on the one hand, the European Union expressed its discontent, on the other, tried to diminish its presence in potentially conflicting areas20.

At present, mutual relations of the European Union and the Russian Fe-deration focus on establishing a new, basic agreement to regulate bilateral re-lations. It seems that the process of European integration did not bring closer the goal. A perspective of a new agreement depends basically on recognizing a reciprocal status of both sides as well as accepting by the Union Russia’s impe-rial ambitions. However, not all of the EU countries consent to it21. The Russian Federation also fears Europeanization as well as adapting to union standards and values.

1� Ibidem.18 Ibidem.19 K. Pełczyńska – Nałęcz, Integracja czy imitacja? UE wobec wschodnich sąsiadów, „Prace OSW”, 2011, pp. 9 – 11.20 Ibidem.21 M. Słowikowski, Rola Rosji we współczesnym systemie stosunków międzynarodowych, [in:] Unia Europejska

i Rosja. W kierunku nowego otwarcia, ed. by B. Piskorska, Lublin 2012, p. 54.

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3. Economic Conditions of the EU Policy towards Russia after 2004

The European Union is considerably dependent on energy raw materials imports. Present energy demand is in 50% fulfilled by raw materials imports. The dependence on the Russian Federation has grown along with the enlarge-ment of the European Union. Firstly, the territorial range of the EU has been enlarged, secondly, Central and Eastern European countries maintained a na-tural dependence on Russia due to existing transportation systems of gas and oil pipelines, in many cases, the remains of the Soviet Union. E. Wyciszkiewicz points out, taking as a criteria a geographical direction of the supplies, three groups of countries:

• countries such as France, Austria, Belgium, partially Germany, with diversified directions of the supplies, including raw materials supplies from the Russian Federation;

• Italy, Spain, Greece, supplied by OPEC and Russia;• new EU countries, with practically dominant, monopolistic Russian

supplier22.

There a different situation in natural gas industry. The European Union id dependent on the Russian Federation to a much larger extent in this field. The alternative for gas imports from Russia can be merely a rise in the share of the LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) or sea transport of liquefied gas from countries like Qatar, Nigeria or Trinidad and Tobago. The other option may be using the deposits in Iran and Turkmenistan, although the transport passing by Russia would have to be across Turkey and the Caucasus region. All options seem at present, in a short period of time, hard to be put into effect. Taking into acco-unt the analyses indicating growing gas consumption in Europe, cooperation with Russia is more than desired23.

Central and Eastern Europe countries, as mentioned before, are to a lar-ge extent dependent on energy raw materials imports from the Russian Fede-ration. The region does not have such possibilities of supplies diversification as for instance western Europe or the „old” EU countries. The main task is then a so-called energy security and a necessity to guarantee supplies from the

22 E. Wyciszkiewicz, Perspektywy wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Unii Europejskiej, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny” 2006, No.1(29), p. 55; P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Rosji a interesy Polski 1991 – 2004, Kraków – Warszawa 2008, p. 452; See also: Ł. Potocki, pp. 52-53.

23 P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, pp. 443-458.

„only” source which is the Russian Federation. In the face of such events as „gas crisis” between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of 2009, the situation does not seem completely obvious. A security of energy raw materials supplies, considering the transport network depends, to a certain extent, on th situation in Ukraine. „Gas crisis” at the beginning of 2009 contributed to limiting gas supplies to the European Union countries. A majority of countries which suffe-red in the „gas conflict” were those which acceded the EU in 200424. Thus, the task of the European Union and „new” member countries is seeking solutions which will prevent such a situation in the future.

One of the postulates put forward by the European Union is signing an agreement with Ukraine and taking under control the raw materials supply routes on Ukraine’s territory. It could lead to a situation where transit routes would be owned by the European Union. „New” EU countries have an unque-stionable asset, for the further part of the route crosses their territory and this way they are able to control transit routes to Western Europe.

Western Europe tries to articulate its own projects which guarantee the security of raw materials supplies. Such a solution is offered by Nord Stream pipeline and planned in the south of the continent Nabucco pipeline. Nord Stream was being promoted on the part of the EU mainly by Germany. Com-mon actions of Russia and Germany resulted from three factors. Firstly, from the fear of stealing the gas in transit countries (Ukraine), transit fares, quality and stabilization of the pipeline network in third countries. Secondly, from the decrease in economic value of the third countries concerned as transit routes (Belarus, Ukraine). Thirdly, they were the expression of interest of the western-European countries (mainly Germany) to increase gas supplies to their own markets and to improve the security of the supplies25. It should be mentioned that there is a project competitive to Nord Stream, thus the one of the modified Yamal pipeline route, which could be led from Russia across Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad Oblast, Poland and Germany. The project known as Amber is sup-ported by both Poland and Baltic countries. Accomplishment of the enterprise is, according to its promoters, cheaper by far than Nord Stream and it would increase energy security of Central-European countries. The Russian Federa-

24 Gazprom oskarża Ukrainę o kradzież gazu, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/6�299,243083_ Gazprom_oskarza_ Ukraine_o_kradziez_gazu_.html (03. 01, 2009). Gas supplies from Russia through Ukraine were reduced by 100% in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece, Austria and Hungary, by 90% in Italy and Slovenia, by �5% in the Czech Re-public and Romania, by �0% in France and Poland; the Minister for Economic Affairs of Slovakia declared a state of emergency.

25 A. Riley, Analiza ekonomiczna i rynkowa projektu gazociągu północnoeuropejskiego, „Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny” 2008, No. 2(22), p. 52.

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tion aims at limiting to a minimum a so-called „transit dependence” and con-siders the area of Latvia and Lithuania as an unstable part. In consequence, an absolute priority of the Russian part is Nord Stream, irrespective of the finan-cial costs. It means that the main decisive factor may be that of political natu-re26. The need of building Nord Stream pipeline was emphasized primarily by Central and Eastern-European countries, including Poland. The issue of Nord Stream with all its circumstances exhibited conflicting aims of the individual EU countries and led to the internal fracture inside the European Union.

A similar situation was in the context of southern Europe region and a pro-ject on supplies routes being in progress. The EU’s project of Nabucco pipeline is competitive to South Stream project put forth by the Russian Federation. As in the case of Nord Stream, bilateral relations, Russia’s direct negotiations with individual EU countries and the field of business were of the pivotal impor-tance. For example Bulgaria as the European Union member country signed cooperation agreements for the sake of building South Stream pipeline which, actually, is in contradiction to the official EU policy.

The above mentioned factors reveal the discrepancies in the policy of the EU and the Federal Republic. In many cases the Union, as a whole, lacks a cohe-sive policy. Numerous crucial issues are solved in bilateral relations. It cannot be explicitly proved that the European Union is divided into „new” and „old” co-untries which pursue a common policy towards Russia in two respective groups. The „new” Europe countries do not have a common vision of building relations with the eastern country. They tend to pursue relations in a bilateral way. The-refore, among the countries of the”new” Europe one can find the entities which maintain amicable relations with Russia and, at the same time, show opposite countries where mutual relations are of a rather cool kind. The first group of countries consists, among others, of Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria. An excel-lent example of a „good” cooperation is, above mentioned, Bulgaria and Russia agreement upon South Stream pipeline construction. The second group of co-untries consists of the countries geographically located in the north of Europe, mainly Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. The countries are definitely in less amicable relations with the Russian Federation. It can be stated that these are problems and discrepancies of political and economic nature that prevail in mutual relations. Poland and Lithuania are actively involved in the actions in the Commonwealth of Independent Countries, which Russia obviously does not like. The operations of Poland and Lithuania’s Presidents in the face of the con-

26 A. Riley, pp. 54-55.

flict in Georgia of August 2008 may serve as an example here. Both countries try to shield themselves from Russian investments on their markets in various ways, persistently strive for ensuring security of raw materials supplies as well as reducing dependence from natural gas and crude oil imports from the Russian Federation. They often raise historical issues in the relations with Russia. The „new Europe” pursues a policy based on the „national interest”, which weakens the region and the whole Union’s position against the Russian Federation. In in-dividual countries one can find the actions based on resistance efforts (for exam-ple Poland and Lithuania) or deepening dependence (Hungary, Bulgaria)2�.

4. Conclusions

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe which became members of the EU on the grounds of 2004 and 200� enlargements, play a crucial role in the relation between the European Union and the Russian Federation. It is determined by political conditions, historical events, economic dependence and geopolitical location. Nevertheless, the „new Europe” does not have a one specific role towards Russia. It is divided into nine distinctive entities, each pursuing a separate policy which is often at odds with the policy of a different country and the European Union as a whole. So far, a common attitude of the Central and Eastern Europe region towards the Russian Federation has not been adopted yet. It also seems that economic conditions, including energy dependence, make some of the countries look through the prism of their own business. There is no disputing that the countries of the „new Europe” have a great impact on the shape of the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Playing the „main part” is enabled by the mechanism of the decision making in the EU. Among others Poland, followed by Lithua-nia, have availed of the possibilities of blocking decisions, delaying the start of negotiations on the new Partnership Cooperation Agreement. A lack of shared interests within the group of countries in question and the fact that the coun-tries do not constitute a coherent identity within the European Union makes it difficult to shape the relations between the European Union and Russia. It is also unlikely to define a new paradigm of the relations, outline the goals, mea-sures and actions on which the relations are based.

2� H. Szlajfer, p. 13.

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Persistent Threats to Security – New Space Tools for the Global EU1

1. Introduction

The EU becomes increasingly a global actor which requires acquisition of new instruments, including space assets to fully and autonomously realize all EU aims and values. Therefore the EU tries to exploit space for civilian and military purposes, but one still has to bear in mind that the EU as an international actor lacks common defence policy. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP2) is just a mechanism for crisis prevention and management, although some military solutions cannot be excluded. That is why European space policy focuses on pea-ceful exploitation of space, avoiding its weaponization which is widely perceived as a main threat for the EU, its member states as well as every EU citizen.

Most scholars agree that the EU establishing space policy focuses its atten-tion on the space security and not on space defence. This approach arises from the overall strategic culture of the EU. R. E. Johnson points out that the EU nee-ds space policy in order to benefit from an effective coordination of technologies and assets in order to enhance European and international security as well as prevent testing, deployment or use of anti-satellite weapons or weapons in and from space.3 The EU and its member states would like to acquire new space assets yet it is very clear that these capabilities will be civilian ones although having security implications. All European space assets should therefore be per-ceived as dual-use which constitutes both new advantages and new challenges.

R. E. Johnson warns that „there is a danger that in the rush to ensure that Europe’s space assets are better geared to serve ESDP goals, not enough consi-deration is being given to the countervailing implications of an overly narrow and militarised concept both of ESDP and of space potential and uses. Europe’s space policy needs to balance the requirements of ESDP with the overarching

1 The article is written within the research project entitled European Space Policy (N N116 321638) granted by the Polish National Science Centre.

2 The CSDP acronym is used in the paper interchangeably with the previous one – ESDP, yet they both refer to the security and defence policy of the European Union.

3 R. E. Johnson, Europe’s Space Policies and their Relevance to ESDP, Brussels 2006, p. 6.

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need to support European security objectives and CFSP. Much of the current debate appears to have lost sight of this fundamental obligation.”4

T. Hitchens and T. Valasek underline that the EU has adopted a multidimen-sional approach towards security, quoting European Commission’s document in which it is clearly stated that the Council of the EU has underlined that space sy-stems and assets could enhance the EU ability in the field of crisis management as well as its capability to fight different security threats. Moreover, the Council has approved the idea that all requirements and goals of CSDP should also be expres-sed in the global EU space policy and European space programme.5

In the article I will concentrate on basic premises of the European Space Po-licy, its current posture as well as prospect of evolution of the EU’s global role within security and defence. The main assumption of the article is as following: the EU as an emerging space power tries to exploit space to realize efficiently its global power role. Dual-use, non-aggressive and common/joint space assets are indispensable for the realization of EU pragmatic external policies and are only partially linked with the need for prestige. Cooperation between the EU, particular member states and other space-faring actors concerning space seems to be the only option to develop real capabilities since the pooling of resources is a precondition for the success. Moreover, the EU entering space will acquire new capabilities but in the same time it will be exposed to new challenges and threats. To succeed as a space power the EU will have to use cross-pillar approach and find a clear, straightforward way of coordination of all space activities at every stage.

2. European Space Policy – a Theoretical Framework

As discussed so far, the EU has adopted the multidimensional approach towards security. According to „the Copenhagen school” there are five dimen-sions of security: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal one. In order to analyze the European space policy another dimension should be added – space security, which encompasses all above dimensions. It could be defined as a security in space (safety of all systems and objects in space), as well as security from space (to avoid the weaponization of space and using of space weapons and to determine legally binding principles of using space for military purposes) and security via space (using space systems for civilian purposes).

According to J. C. Moltz, space security involves both preserving from man-made and natural threats. He defines it as „the ability to place and opera-4 Ibidem, p. �.5 T. Hitchens, T. Valasek, The security dimension of European collective efforts in space, „SIPRI Yearbook” 2006, p. 56�.

te assets outside the Earth’s atmosphere without external interference, damage, or destruction.”6 There are four main schools of thought concerning space se-curity: 1. space nationalism; 2. technological determinism; 3. social interactio-nism; 4. global institutionalism.�

Space nationalism started after World War II, and was marked by the lar-ge, government-run military space programmes realized by both the U.S. and the USSR. Realistic approach, great power rivalry and hostility between them gave a spur towards space exploration and exploitation. J. C. Moltz describes that era quoting McDougall: ”the international system absorbed space just as it absorbed the atom.” The two Superpowers did not want to limit themselves as far as space exploration and exploitation are concerned, that is why they percei-ved international treaties and agreements as useless. Therefore cooperation was limited and possible only in areas, which needed huge costs or very complica-ted technical assets and both sides were not interested in their deployment. So space-faring powers adopted a „militaristic drive” concerning space in order to achieve strategic advantage over their rivals, similar to the rivalry during the era of sea power, Moltz adds.8

Global institutionalism is an a diametrically opposite approach to space na-tionalism. Space is perceived as a „sanctuary from world political conflicts”. The main assumption of that approach is that it is possible to achieve international cooperation concerning the exploration of „another unknown environment”. Moreover, shared scientific thinking and international norms and treaties wou-ld bring security in space rather than a new arms race: „humans might be able to live peaceably in space through new methods of transnational governance.”9

Technological determinism is focused on technological determinants not related to political factors. In the U.S. in the 1950s many scientists believed that space exploitation, like nuclear energy, could raise standards of living. Pessi-mists from the other hand underlined the fact that the military space technolo-gies could lead to conflict and even space destruction (in space and from space). Therefore costs and complexity would make different states cooperate within the realm of space exploration/exploitation. Technological challenges were al-

6 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security. Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, Stanford 2008, p. 11.

� Ibidem, p. 23.8 Ibidem, pp. 24-2�.9 Ibidem, pp. 2�-31. Thinking in the spirit of the global institutionalism, German scholar D. Wolter has proposed

signing of the new treaty concerning Cooperative Security in Outer Space and then establishment of the new international organization to implement that agreement. Main provisions of the new treaty provide for: the prohibition on destructive space weapons, including ASAT, space-strike weapons, as well as antiballistic mis-sile technologies; the international system of monitoring and verifications of provisions.

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most the same for states having „space ambitions”. Technological determinism stresses the special role of military-industrial complex as well as „scientific-technological” elite in the process of space exploration/exploitation.10

In the 19�0s and 1980s European political economy produced a variation of technological school thinking – theory of „collective (public) goods”. States interested in space activities were perceived as „self-interested rational actors making decisions according to shifting economic and strategic calculations.” Commercial and military benefits from space exploration/exploitation could even lead to the „privatization of space”. It could be possible because apart from the U.S. and the USSR different states and organizations interested in space activities have appeared in this time. Nowadays technological determinism is sometimes used by the military scholars who refer to space as to another im-portant Revolution in Military Affaires (RMA). Some of them share the view that space militarization is inevitable, but it should not have the form of an aggressive arms race. Negotiations with other space powers are still important to reduce the probability of space conflicts.11

The newest approach towards space security is social interactionsim. It is based on the assumption that new cooperative initiatives are possible, and less military-oriented approach towards space exploration/exploitation is viable. Social interactionsits rejected the assumption that one has to accept the inevi-tability of space weapons, pointed out that there were a plenty of political tools available for space-faring states which could be used instead of the deployment of harmful weapons, which could only „damage other priorities they had in space.” Sometimes social interactionism is linked with concepts of cognitive change (learning) at the individual, organizational, and state levels.12 Regar-ding the EU space ambitions, social interactionism seems to suit better than other approaches, because it puts pressure on „the loose coupling of national and international goals for safe access to space, with new commercial and other non-state actors gradually becoming major actors and joining international ef-forts to make and establish space ‘rules’.„13

D. Lupton gives another theoretical approach towards space power. Firs-tly, space can be treated as „sanctuary”, because of the principle of „peaceful purposes”. Yet it does not preclude the use of space in a non-aggressive way to support some military activities and goals like for example navigation, weather

10 Ibidem, pp. 31-3�.11 Ibidem, p. 34.12 Ibidem, pp. 3�-40.13 Ibidem, p. 313.

observation, communications, warning etc. Yet space should not be weaponi-zed. Secondly, „survivability” doctrine perceives space not as a strategic asset, but as an operational and tactical one. Space support a warfighter therefore giving an opportunity to gain additional advantage over an opponent. „Space begins to be considered a military center of gravity that needs protection to survive.” Thirdly, „Control” doctrine focuses on assuring access to space, pro-tecting space infrastructure, and possessing the capability to deny space adver-saries. Space in that particular approach is perceived as a strategic asset as well as vulnerability. Fourthly, „High-ground” approach envisages that war can be waged using space as the ultimate high-ground in order to control the terre-strial theatre of operation. It means weaponization of space in other words.14

The EU perceives space as „sanctuary” using Lupton’s wording, yet ana-lyzing the prospects of the European space policy, we could observe a „silent shift” towards „survivability” doctrine by stressing the importance of space assets for the effective realization of the CSDP15. According to the report of the Assembly of the WEU concerning GMES and Galileo, truly common Euro-pean defence needs better geared means and assets to implement CSDP goals. Therefore, the autonomous space-based earth observation and satellite naviga-tion capabilities seem indispensable. It could be said that the EU is nowadays in a transition phase establishing its space policy. The ultimate goal is the achieve-ment of a space power status.16

Space activities, previously marked by the competition and need for prestige, is currently based on the requirement for information in a globalized world. Eco-nomic development, national and international security will be key directions of the future space exploration/exploitation. Therefore some scholars suggest the need to define a theory of space power, which „will provide an opportunity to maximize the benefits of space for global society.”1� J. E. Oberg observes in his book entitled Space Power Theory that space power which is not combined with classical power determinants cannot ensure the prompt results of terrestrial con-flict or achievement of political objectives. Therefore the control of space or space wars are and will be important in the coming years especially as they pertain to terrestrial issues. He stresses that „space power must be combined with its emer-

14 M. P. Gleason, European Union Space Initiatives: The Political Will for Increasing European Space Power, „Ast-ropolitics” 2006, No. 4, pp. 13-14.

15 See: A. Kolovos, The European Space Policy – Its Impact and Challenges for the European Security and Defence Policy, „ESPI Perspectives” 2009, No. 2�.

16 Space systems for Europe’s security: GMES and Galileo – reply to the annual report of the Council, European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union, 4 June 2008, p. 20.

1� P. L. Hays, Ch. D. Lutes, Towards a theory of spacepower, „Space Policy” 200�, No. 23, p. 206.

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ging sibling, information power, and the older, purely terrestrial, expressions of national power.”18 The EU can therefore be perceived as a „real space power”, because it possesses important instruments which allow it to influence its envi-ronment and space assets are perceived as the means not ends. Yet Oberg also points out that „the weaponization of space is inevitable, though the manner and timing are not at all predictable”. It means that the EU as a space power should be somehow prepared for that and as a first step it should establish situational awa-reness in space as a key to successful application of space power.19 According to G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, the EU should particularly focus on the weaponization of space which will be the most dangerous threat to its space systems. Therefore the EU should be concerned with such eventuality, planning its future use of space in both civilian and defence aspects. That is why the protection of space systems should be a key concern for the future EU space policy, inspite of the expected increases in cost that this policy will?20

3. European Space Policy – Premises Laid behind and Challenges Ahead

The EU „entering space” had to take into account some challenges concer-ning contemporary space activities like electromagnetic pulse radiation, orbital space debris, increasing population of operational satellites and space statecraft and the fact that political decisions sometimes prevail over the cost-effective-ness and technological obstacles.21 J. C. Moltz underlines that space powers should focus their policy on the following issues: space „traffic control” to avo-id domino-effects crashes between different objects, especially within really crowded geostationary orbital realm; possible future use of nuclear reactors in space, especially for propulsion; development of space surveillance systems in order to collect and distribute information concerning orbital spacecraft and debris; and decreasing availability of useful radio frequencies for space com-munications and limited availability of slots in GEO for communications satel-lites.22 He is right to notice that as far as future of space exploitation is concer-ned a wide set of factors should be taken into account: military developments;

18 J. E. Oberg, Space Power Theory, Colorado Springs 1999, p. 12�.19 Ibidem, pp. 129-130.20 G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, Space for defence : A European Vision, „Space Policy” 2006, No. 22, p. 9�. They even call

for a „space dissuasion” capability. „If the weaponization of space is taking place, it will be necessary to study the means to neutralize satellite systems in order to build a ‘space dissuasion’ capability.”

21 J. C. Moltz, p. 55.22 Ibidem, pp. 309-312.

threat perceptions; commercial pressures; environmental issues; globalization trends; national and international political pressures.23

There were some external and internal factors which made the EU estab-lish space policy. First, the crisis in the commercial space launch sector, which threatened Arianespace in 2003, made Europeans aware of the fact that their sole asset for independent access to space is threatened in the same time. That is why in May 2003 European Guaranteed Access to Space (EGAS) programme was adopted. Second, another crisis in the European commercial space sector occurred between 2001 and 2003. The lack of demand made this sector hard to sustain, which threatened according to ESA wording „basic” activities. The decline of leading space companies linked with decline of space power capa-bilities were enlisted as the main threats in the White Paper on Space issued by the European Commission in 200324. Thirdly, Europeans would like to get an independent access to information through space applications. There is no possibility to perform the global role by the EU so long as it is depended on the American strategic information.25 N. Peter thinks in this regard that, „space is now seen as an essential asset for European integration and for non-dependen-ce in the current geo-strategic context, since space-based systems and derived information can bring necessary capabilities for autonomous decision making. The development of an integrated European space capability for security is at an early stage, but it is an ongoing process that presents some opportunities to enhance European independence and security.”26

J. Nyamuya Maogoto and S. Freeland claim that American, Russian and Chinese initiatives aimed at weaponization of space have spurred the EU to rethink its role as a space actor seeking new assets to be used for civilian and security purposes.2� T. Hitchens and T. Valasek point out that several reasons laid behind the establishment of the EU space policy: multilateralism as a prin-ciple of common action as well as requirements of modern warfare, plus an

23 Ibidem, p. 312.24 F. Slijper urges the EU to „cut the influence that corporate business has on policy making and instead invest

much more energy in addressing new policies to the general public. Not only is this a democratic duty, it is also a necessity for a clear public understanding of the way Europe is developing, especially in the politically sensi-tive area of foreign and defence policies.” The author is afraid that EU officials claiming that European space policy is a civilian undertaking are slowly realizing military ambitions thus blurring the line between civilian and military realms. According to him such steps could expose the EU to accusations of being a militarized space power. See: F. Slijper, The EU should freeze its military ambitions in space, „Space Policy” 2009, No. 25, �0-�4.

25 M. P. Gleason, p. 16.26 N. Peter, Space and Security: The Emerging Role of Europe, „Astropolitics” 2005, No. 3, p. 265.2� J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars – The Next Strategic Frontier: Paradigms to

Anchor Space Security, „Air & Space Law” 2008, vol. 33, No. 1, p. 11.

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urgent need to build autonomous capabilities to reduce European dependence on American assets in that area.28 Yet EU space policy and assets should be perceived as a common/joint undertaking which is „the accumulation of a con-fused mixture of national and multinational entities and efforts.”29 European space activity arises from its political goals like in the U.S., but there are many different actors engaged: the EU at the European level, European Space Agency and Eumetsat at the intergovernmental level and national space agencies at the national level. ESA is responsible for developing and implementing space and ground segments while the EU identifies its needs as far as the realization of political goals is concerned. It is worth adding in that context, that only few European countries own civilian or military space systems – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK. Moreover, almost all space based military systems cover earth observation and telecommunications.30 All actors involved in the space activity might be basically divided into three functional areas: space science and exploration (including human spaceflight); space utilities (including space commerce); and military applications.31

K. Madders and W. Thiebaut aptly point out, that „the EU is more than a stakeholder, or ‘federator of user needs’ vis-a-vis ESA, because its obligations extend throughout vast areas of European society and to each citizen; it hence needs to assume a more basic responsibility and take ‘ownership’ at the highest political level in order to ensure its obligations are exercised to full effect.”32 Moreover, the European space policy should consist of the following elements: a vision referring to the values, goals and policies of the EU that will be addres-sed by the space policy; a clear exposition of the political context; a statement of direction which indicates how the vision can become a reality; the estab-lishment of the priorities within European Space Programme and EU flags-hip projects – Galileo and GMES; a clear mechanism of overseeing the policy; a financial orientation; an affirmation of competence on the basis of already existing ones within the EU/ESA.33

28 T. Hitchens, T. Valasek, p. 565.29 Ibidem.30 N. Peter, pp. 2�1-2�6. 31 J. C. Moltz, p. 5�.32 K. Madders, W. Thiebaut, Carpe Diem: Europea must make a genuine space policy now, „Space Policy” 200�, No.

23, p. 10.33 Ibidem, p. 11.

4. European Space Policy – Institutionalization

The process of institutionalization of the European space policy was star-ted in the late nineteen nineties, yet there is still much to be done. „European Strategy for Space” published in November 2000 focused on the recognition of space as a strategic asset enabling Europe’s political and economic power as well as contributing to achieve common goals. Mainly, the strategy highlights the importance of space capabilities for economic and political growth in Europe, the European strategic independence, the global competitiveness of European industry and efficient use of the European space infrastructure.34 Another im-portant step was taken in September 2002: „ESDP and Space” – a study of mili-tary needs of space capabilities has been presented to the EU Military Commit-tee. In 2003 several important documents were published: joint EC/ESA Green Paper on European Space Policy; ESA International Report on Space and Secu-rity Policy in Europe; Framework Agreement on cooperation between the EC and the ESA.35 In November 2003 the European Commission released its Whi-te Paper ‘Space: a New European Frontier for an Expanding Union – An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy.” As a result, the Panel of Experts on Space and Security (SPASEC) was established in March 2004. One of the main tasks of this panel was „to identify where security requirements can or cannot be met by existing civilian space assets. Four SPASEC working groups were set up: Operational Requirements, Capability Gaps, Programme Options, and Financial Planning.”36

In 2004 the first meeting of the Space Council comprising the EU and ESA Councils of Ministers and the establishment of the European Space Policy In-stitute took place. In 2005 Report of the Panel of Experts on Space and Security was published. Moreover, the Space Policy Unit under the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry has been set up. It was important because it over-came obstacles emanating from the EU’s three-pillar nature. The Unit was in-dispensable for „the EC coordination of space policy within the EC first pillar, between the first and second pillars, between the EC and ESA, and between the EC and industry. Working-level consultation and coordination among the vario-us actors within the EC occur regularly via the Space Coordinating Group and progress toward harmonization is being made. In addition to bringing together the space activities from the various Directorate-Generals, this group brings to-

34 M. P. Gleason, p. 19.35 Ibidem, p. 18.36 N. Peter, pp. 286-288.

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gether such disparate EC actors as External Relations, Judge Advocate, Legal Division, Environmental Affairs, Fisheries, Agriculture, and others, along with ESA. Observers from the second pillar actively participate in these meetings.”3�

European Space Policy – Communication from the Commission to the Co-uncil and the European Parliament issued in 200� and European Space Policy Progress Report – Commission Working Document published in 2008 are other steps towards the crystallization of the EU space policy. The Framework Agre-ement between the European Community and ESA has been extended in 2008 for a further four years until 2012 and the European Space Programme will be further developed, through the High Level Space Policy Group, based on recom-mendations from a dedicated ad hoc working group composed of Member State representatives.38

Lisbon Treaty institutionalizes the role of the EU regarding the space policy and places that policy at the very top of the political level, therefore underlined its importance. That should be perceived as an important shift, because for the first time space issues have been on the top of the EU political agenda and not only within ESA. Thus the EU defined itself as a major space actor within Euro-pe. Moreover, Lisbon Treaty envisages explicitly the establishment of the Euro-pean Space Policy and European Space Programme signalling „that for the first time the European space sector firmly resides within the auspices of the EU, positioned to support both EU civil policies, and the EU CFSP and ESDP.”39

5. European Space Policy – Security Challenges

According to international law, outer space should be used in a peaceful way in the name of whole humankind. In the same time what this means is that we-

3� M. P. Gleason, p. 25.38 European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, pp. 10-11.39 Ibidem, p. 18. Article 189 of the Lisbon Treaty envisages: „1. To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies, the

Union shall draw up a European space policy. To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, support research and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation of space.

2. To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.

3. The Union shall establish any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency.4. This Article shall be without prejudice to the other provisions of this Title.” Source: Consolidated Version of the Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union, Part Three Union Policies and

Internal Actions, Title XIX: Research And Technological Development And Space, „Official Journal of the European Union” 9.5.2008, pp. C 115/131-132.

aponization is prohibited40. Yet space-faring powers claim that some military-su-pporting technologies and activities in space such as observation, surveillance, communications are passive thereby not undermining the principle of peaceful exploitation of space.41 EU decision-makers seem to share that approach. Nevert-heless J. Nyamuya Maogoto and S. Freeland predict that there will be a serious legal deficit as far as space legal regime is concerned. Because of ambitions of spa-ce-faring powers and possibilities which new technologies give them, the outer space could become a direct battlefield in a near future42. It poses a real challenge for the EU and other actors, because space can become weaponized without any rules and limitations. Therefore the EU should develop non-aggressive rather than non-military space assets, because some military applications of space capabili-ties are indispensable during peace-keeping or peace-making operations.43 Some scholars even call for space-enable warfare approach to be taken with regard to security and space. It embraces capabilities needed to increase the precision and overall effectiveness of different systems of weapons, which at the same time can reduce casualties and collateral damage.44 G. Brachet and B. Deloffre stress „the importance of intelligence gathering before a crisis, thanks in particular to the discretion of space systems and their capacity to investigate any region of the globe with impunity.” Moreover, they note that space assets „make it possible to set up well-adapted communication networks for very mobile ground forces operating in enemy territory, and provide navigation and guidance aides, in particular for ever more efficient weapon systems.” Therefore, space systems seem to be indispensable during war-time and in stable security environment.45 Furthermore these authors stress that „it is no doubt premature for Europe to plan for neutralization weapons being placed in orbit, but it is now urgent that it reinforce its capacity to monitor

40 According to R. Ramey following military activities in outer space are not comprehensively prohibited by the international law: the use of military personnel and space based remote sensors supporting combat or other military activities; using of space based communication, navigation or meteorological systems for military pur-poses; the deployment and non-aggressive use of conventional space weapons; the transiting of WMD in non-orbital trajectories. Therefore there is a probability that space-faring states inventing new space technologies will interpret the basic principle of „peaceful purpose” to fit their real ambitions in that regard. J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, p. 29.

41 J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, p. 25.42 New advanced technologies should be perceived both as assets and challenges as far as space exploitation and

exploration are concerned. Therefore states should avoid creating new space weapons, because it can only lead towards greater chaos and insecurity in the same time changing the basic patterns of international order and beginning the ne arms race. It is worth adding that states seem to be irresponsible as non-state actors in that particular issue. Moreover, new space technologies offer just new ways of killing assuring power states that they still need to back up they hegemonic status by new military technologies unavailable to their rivals. J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, pp. 18-19.

43 N. Peter, p. 291.44 J. C. Moltz, p. 30�.45 G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, p. 93.

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space, which means having at its disposal precise knowledge of all objects in space including debris, and the ability to identify them.”46 That means at the same time that they do not make the weaponization of space impossible what in turn should influence European long-term vision regarding space exploitation.4�

6. European Space Policy – Flagship Projects

GalileoThe Galileo navigation system and the Global Monitoring for Environment

and Security renamed Kopernikus initiative are landmark projects aimed at es-tablishing European space capabilities.

The Galileo satellite navigation system is perceived as a key program for many reasons. Firstly, Galileo is the first EU space program. Secondly, when it reaches full operational capability, it will have worldwide coverage and availa-bility. Thirdly, Galileo is a European undertaking financed through a public-private partnership which means that as a dual-use system it will have both civilian and military applications48. Fourthly, there are many states and or-ganizations interested in the Galileo project. For example, China has started cooperation with the EU in the Galileo system since 200349.

Galileo’s complete architecture will consist of 30 satellites including three that are spare. The ground segment will include three control centers that will manage 30-40 sensor stations and nine uplink stations around the world. Galileo will send ten different signals. Six of them will be open and safety-of-life signals provided for free. Another two signals will be reserved for commercial users who must pay for the service in order to get more precise signal. There will be also two Public Regulated Service (PRS) signals which will be encrypted and intended for selected government receivers, for example, law enforcement and security servi-ces, intelligence services, border control agencies, the European anti-fraud office and the European police EUROPOL. Greater accuracy and reliability than the

46 Space debris pose an additional challenge for actors involved in space activities. Some researches stress that „a war in space could create a battlefield that would last forever, with the capacity to encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris, thus making space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes.„ The worst case scenario is „cascade effect” – space debris will become self-generating and com-pletely uncontrolled. J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, p. 34.

4� G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, p. 94.48 In 200� Council of the EU „decided that the future development of the European navigation programmes, in-

cluding governance and procurement aspects, are based on a full public, EU funding of the deployment phase. The public governance of the programmes will be based on the division of labor between the EC, the European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) and ESA.” European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, p. 3.

49 C. Bildt, M. Dillon, Europe’s final frontier, in: Europe in Space, ed. By C. Bildt et al, London 2004, p. 10.

current GPS signals should be the basic advantage of the Galileo’s signals50. It is worth mentioning, that in June 2004 an agreement between the EU and U.S. was signed. Its aim was to harmonize Galileo and GPS with lower signal robustness than originally planned for Galileo (in order not to jam American M-signal)51.

Following the adoption of the Space Council Resolution issued in May 200�, „important technical progress has been achieved in the development and in-orbit validation phase of the GALILEO programme”52. According to the Commission’s Report „GIOVE-B, the second GALILEO experimental satellite, has been suc-cessfully launched on 2� April 2008. It will work in conjunction with the first GALILEO experimental satellite, GIOVE-A, carrying critical new technologies to be tested in space and needed for the performances of the GALILEO systems, notably the most accurate atomic clock ever put into orbit”53. It is also stated in the document that „the first four operational GALILEO satellites will be launched in 2010, by which time the related ground control infrastructure will also be establis-hed”54. The full operational capability of Galileo targeted for 2013 (although at the beginning of the project it has been planned for 2008) has been once again post-poned for 2019-2020, whereas its intitial capability is planned for 2014-2015. At the same time, the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) infrastructure is progressively being phased into operation. EGNOS is monitoring and correcting signals emitted from existing global satellite navigation systems to make them suitable for safety critical navigation applications55.

Researchers and strategists agree that Galileo’s navigation system can be particularly useful for security and defence goals, for example, to guide mu-nitions, to improve logistics within the theatre of operation, to track enemy assets and positions, to enhance the capability to synchronize the movement of different units, to enhance awareness within the battlefield, to improve stri-ke effectiveness or to reduce the possibility of „friendly fire”56. Yet its crucial applications are: border control, transport management and logistics, and the surveillance of critical energy and communications infrastructures.5�

50 There are many advantages of the Galileo navigation system, yet some question the need to establish new Euro-pean system since both American GPS and Russian GLONASS will be improved in a near future and they will be available to European states. G. Lindström, G. Gasparini, The Galileo satellite system and its security implica-tions, Paris 2003, p. 16.

51 Ibidem, p. 19. See also: B. Giegerich, Satellite States – Transatlantic Conflict and the Galileo System, paper pre-sented during ISA Annual Convention, 1-5 March 2005, Honolulu.

52 Commission Working Document. European Space Policy Progress Report, Brussels 11.9.2008, p. 3.53 Ibidem, p. 3-4.54 Ibidem.55 Ibidem.56 G. Lindström, G. Gasparini, p. �.5� European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, p. 3.

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GMES/KopernikusAlthough initially Global Monitoring for Environment and Space was tar-

geted at monitoring environmental changes, the concept was expanded to inclu-de security issues in order to realize the goals within the CFSP and particularly the CSDP58. R. E. Johnson underlines that „it is intended to bring together all the relevant European Earth observation activities, making the use of Europe-an assets more effective by forming a „system of systems”, which would enable a better flow of information. In addition to its original purpose of monitoring climate change and providing early warning of environmental dangers, GMES has been rethought as a tool to be used to monitor borders and population cen-tres and movements, support conflict prevention and crisis management, and help verify international arms control and environmental treaties”59.

The space component of GMES relies on five concepts of space missions or ‘Sentinels” feeding into the US-initiated ‘Global Earth Observation System of Systems’ (GEOSS) and contribute to data sharing for land monitoring, climate research, marine research and disaster (emergency) planning. Some elements have been operational since 2008, some are scheduled to follow in 2009-13. In order to avoid duplication and enhance cost-effectiveness, „GMES will start by incorporating planned national and EU satellite and in-situ systems”60.

According to the Commission Working Document „GMES requires the inte-gration of data from space-based and in-situ (ground) Earth observation capacities into operational European application services. Three user-based GMES services in the areas of Emergency Response, Land and Marine Monitoring will be pre-ope-rational by the end of 2008. Work was also launched on identifying user require-ments for security services, on the development of an additional Atmosphere Pilot Service, as well as on the potential contribution of GMES to addressing climate change”61. It is worth adding that GMES „is based on several interlinked compo-nents (service, space and ground components), which produce data and informa-tion for users and for the further processing by the downstream service sector”62.

In particular, GMES services could provide support in areas such as con-flict early warning, counter-proliferation monitoring of sensitive or denied lo-cations, and CSDP operations. With respect to CSDP operations, imagery of key infrastructures in the theatre of operations is particularly useful: marking

58 See: N. Rohnera, K.-U. Schrogl, S. Chelic, Making GMES better known: Challenges and opportunities, „Space Policy” 200�, No. 23, pp. 195-198.

59 R. E. Johnson, p. 50.60 Ibidem p. 50-5161 Commission Working Document. European Space Policy Progress Report, Brussels 11.9.2008, p. 5.62 Ibidem; See also: The Graz Declaration, „Space Policy” 200�, No. 23, pp. 5�-59.

of road networks, embassy locations, identification of potential landing sites for aircraft and helicopters, and other facilities which could either facilitate or complicate the operation63.

7. Conclusions

Firstly, it should be emphasized that the ultimate aim of the European Spa-ce Policy is to enhance European and regional security in almost every aspect, although it is not about establishing of military superiority. Because European strategic culture is not offensive, all European space assets and capabilities will primarily focus on anticipation and protection, not on defence as such. As it was written in the EC’s European Space Policy communication, „the development of a truly European Space Policy is a strategic choice for Europe, if it does not want to become irrelevant. (...) Europe needs an effective space policy to enable it to exert global leadership in selected policy areas in accordance with European interests and values. To fulfil such roles the EU increasingly relies on autonomous decision-making, based on space-based information and communication systems. Inde-pendent access to space capabilities is therefore a strategic asset for Europe.”64

Secondly, although both GMES and Galileo projects are expensive, their political and strategic importance should be emphasized. Strengthening Europe’s commercial and strategic space independence is viewed more as a public service than as a solely commercial enterprise and is seen as a tool to deepen the CFSP/CSDP. Moreover, without appropriate space capabilities and clear common space policy, the EU will not challenge the political, mili-tary and commercial American monopoly of space activities. „European space capacities have become critical information tools in addressing a diversity of environmental, economic and security challenges of a global or regional scale. Autonomous access to information derived from space is thus a strategic EU asset. The EU will need to strengthen further its ability to respond to these challenges, including in the security and defence domains, both through im-

63 G. Lindström, GMES: the Security Dimension, 16 March 200�, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris. „In terms of its dual-use applications, GMES will have to meet the increasingly stringent requirements of the defence min-istries of the EU member states. Sensors for strictly military use are currently the property of nations or governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements among states. The main challenge for GMES will be to develop a model for interconnections and interoperability among the different national components. Among such complementary national elements are COSMOSKYMED, PLEIADE, TERRASAT, SAR-LUPE and the future HELIOS-3.” Space systems for Europe’s security: GMES and Galileo – reply to the annual report of the Council, European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union, 4 June 2008, p. 19.

64 European Space Policy, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 26.4.200�, p. 4.

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proved coordination and through the development of own capacities.”65

Thirdly, analyzing the European space assets one should be fully aware that there is a crucial distinction between „militarization” and „weaponisa-tion” of space. Space has been „militarized” since the earliest communications satellites were launched into orbit. In contemporary strategic environment, most technically advanced armed forces rely heavily on satellites for command and control, communications, reconnaissance and monitoring, early warning, treaty verification, and navigation with the GPS. It means that space is mili-tarized, but it is not yet weaponised. Space „weaponisation” is understood as the placement in orbit of space-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Space weapon is defined as „any system whose use destroys or damages objects in or from space.”66 Therefore, while satellites may be used for military purpo-ses, such as GPS navigation of fighter jets or precision guided missile delivery, satellites themselves have no destructive capacity and their military supporting role is not considered weaponisation per se.

Fourthly, it should be borne in mind that the EU entering space will en-hance its capability as a global player, but in the same time it will be exposed to new threats. Any disruption in the availability and functioning of space-based systems could have significant consequences on security, safety and economic activities. That is why, it is crucial to develop the Space Situational Awareness (SSA). Up to now Europe does not have its own independent capacity and is par-tly dependent on US data to monitor the population of space objects. The EDA has created a project team tasked to define CSDP-related SSA requirements.

Fifthly, the European Space Agency, the European Organisation for the Ex-ploitation of Meteorological Satellites, the Space Council, based on the EU-ESA Framework Agreement or High-Level Space Policy Group as well as member and non-member EU states are engaged in the European space projects. It means that it is a cooperative undertaking aimed at enhancement of security in distant places within different dimensions. Cooperation concerning space activities is beneficial because it gives involving partners additional capabilities which can-not be reached individually. This is not only a matter of financial input, but also scientific, technological and political ones. Therefore, partners can improve their

65 European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, p. 6. 66 J. C. Moltz, p. 43. That definition of space weapon excludes: non-devoted, dual-use systems, which can disable

or capture satellites; missiles passing through space without harming space assets; systems which interrupt the operation of satellites (like electronic jamming) – reversible effects; unintentional weapons – debris fragments, old spacecraft. It includes: ground-, sea-, space-based anti-ballistic missile; ASAT systems – laser, kinetic-kill vehicles, explosive systems used to destroy objects in space; any military systems used in space that have dam-aged spacecraft in the past – for example nuclear weapons tests in space.

capability, share their costs and build common interests as far as space exploita-tion and exploration are concerned.6� N. Peter points out that „recent geopolitical developments, combined with the funding constraints of the various space-fa-ring countries, have made it clear that greater international cooperation will be important for future major space activities, as cooperation can occur at different stages of a space project.” Formerly dominated by the intra-bloc cooperation, space activities attract nowadays many different public and private entities. It is possible due to the development of small satellite technology and use of commer-cial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. Therefore, states who traditionally have not been engaged in space activities now have an opportunity to enter that realm.68

Sixthly, European projects have wide public support within the EU states. According to General public survey on the European Galileo Programme, 63% of the EU citizens said they were willing to allocate public funds, with a higher level of support for this course of action coming from the newer Member Sta-tes, although respondents were informed that it could necessitate public fun-ding of 2.4 billion EURO to complete the Galileo project. Moreover, 80% of respondents are in favor of independent European navigation system69.

According to J. C. Moltz, there are four basic alternatives/scenarios for space exploration/exploitation: 1. international hostility; 2. selective military restra-int; 3. commercial cooperation; 4. international management.�0 The preliminary analysis of the European space policy suggests that the EU realizes the third al-ternative of commercial cooperation, although a slightly shift towards selective military restraint is visible through the influence of military-industrial bases on space policy directions.�1 Yet the EU’s decision-makers underline that all space activities undertaken by the EU are for peaceful purposes and they are fully in line with international law provisions regarding space exploitation. M. P. Gleason even thinks that the EU can acquire space assets comparable to the U.S. if it ac-cepts certain rules: highly capable, inexpensive small satellites should be a basis; dual-use space operational and organizational architectures of space activities; „imaginative” additional sources of funding; avoiding human spaceflight and prestige programs; and partnering with other space-faring nations.�2

6� N. Peter, The changing geopolitics of space activities, „Space Policy” 2006, No. 22, p. 100.68 Ibidem, p. 101.69 General public survey on the European Galileo Programme. Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer 211, June

200�.�0 J. C. Moltz, p. 32�.�1 The biggest and most influential actors are EADS Space and Alcatel-Alenia. �2 M. P. Gleason, p. 35.

121

Arkadiusz TośRobert Tabaszewski

Denmark in European Union – Danish Attitudes towards European Cooperation

1. Introduction

Among the countries which are members of the European Union, Den-mark occupies a special position. The status of the constitutional monarchy as an expression of a rather specific approach to integration is the subject of many disputes and discussions. Since the time when this small country, its popula-tion having an insignificant influence, expressed its readiness to join the Euro-pean structures in the early 60’s, its route towards integration has been charac-terised by a dynamic and changeable course. This study deals with the issue of the „Danish-specific” understanding of integration, as well as with the scope of transformations within Danish policy concerning the European Communities. The aim of the authors of this study has been to show the complexity of the is-sue of a conservative policy in relation to the European Union as an integrative group, which, especially in the context of the recent events, can prove useful for Poland. Therefore, the issue/chronological method has been applied.

The study includes a description of the actual state of the last half-century, starting from the application by the Danish for the membership of the EEC in 1961, to changes in Danish foreign policy, being a simple consequence of voting decisions of its society. The present analysis consists of several parts incorpo-rated in the main course of considerations. Thus, the study presents the factors which influence the specificity and the essence of the Danish approach to Eu-ropean issues, after which the difficulties are briefly characterised, followed by the main Danish stages of towards the united Europe. After that, attempts to overcome the difficulties are described, together with the main elements of this integration model, which was especially influenced by the Danish Presidency in 2002. The analysis closes with considerations of the possibility of acquiring new settlements by Denmark in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The present study is de facto of a pioneer nature, and the issue has not been duly recognised in the area of Polish knowledge. Therefore the preparation of

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the study was based on the available literature, especially the monumental work entitled „Community Law and European Integration” by professor Ziemowit Jacek Pietraś, as well as „The European Parliament” by Piotr Tosiek, addressing the important issue of the dynamic growth of this body in relation to other institutions of the European Union. The study was also based on a few mono-graphic studies by Joanna Berlińska and Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak concer-ning the integration of Denmark with European structures. The publications by Marian Grzybowski devoted to the legal systems of the Scandinavian co-untries, and handbooks by Rafał Matera, as well as the lexicon of European integration edited by Janusz Ruszkowski were also helpful, inter alia, for the purpose of clarifying terminological ambiguities.

2. First Steps towards the EEC

The love of their country goes back to the ancient times. When deciding to join Europe, neither the Danes themselves nor Europe itself probably realised how tough and challenging Denmark’s way to the European Community would be, and how difficult it would come to maintain this ‘marriage’. Denmark filed its application for membership of the EEC in 1961, together with Great Britain, Ire-land and Norway1. A specific understanding of the relationship of Denmark with the politics of Great Britain was possible to notice back then. These connections were reflected in nearly every issue concerning affiliation to European economic structures – for example Denmark made its accession dependent on the member-ship of Great Britain in Europe2. The hardening Denmark’s position even at that stage seemed surprising to observers – its parliament passed a resolution decla-ring that Denmark would not join EEC without Great Britain3. The negotiations concerning the potential membership of Denmark in European structures were led simultaneously with the negotiations of Great Britain and Ireland.

The rejection of Great Britain’s candidacy in 1963 blocked the Danish applica-tion as well. Another attempt by Denmark to join the Community in 196� ended in fiasco, and only the negotiations for Denmark’s accession to the EEC started during the rule of the liberal Hilmar Baunsgaard (1968-�1) were successful. This was possible due to the change in the position of France, as well as the forming of

1 E. Maziarz, Kontynent potęgi. Powstanie i rozwój Unii Europejskiej na tle globalnej równowagi sił, Warszawa 1999, p. 23; J. D. Medrano, Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton 2003.

2 J. Sevaldsen, British images on Denmark., „Angle” 1993, No. 3, pp. 25-46.; J. Sevaldsen, The anglicizing of the North: the case of Denmark, „History of European” 1995, No. 1-3, pp. 431-43�.

3 A. Czubiński, Historia powszechna XX wieku, Poznań 2003, p. 628.

a coalition of radicals with liberals in Denmark itself – unusual for those times4. Previous social democratic governments were not willing to cooperate with the countries of the six, as they saw in them a threat to the idea of a „country of pro-sperity”. Paradoxically, it was the social democrats sceptical about the integration process who persuaded its society to join the EEC. In the referendum of 19�2, 63.0% of citizens voted for accession to the European Community5.

3. Scepticism and Conservatism towards Integration Process

Danish scepticism and conservatism towards integration processes could be explained by the use of the theory of small countries in international rela-tions. According to this theory, small countries are those which do not have the necessary potential, and are dependent on the said international structures, and have a limited possibility to influence their structure6. At present, in the European Union, the following countries can be can be classified according to this model of integration: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Lu-xembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. In the literature on this subject several concepts governing the policy of a country are mentioned, e.g. the policy of isolation, the policy of reluctant integration, of balanced and optimal integration, of dominating integration and alternative integration. Depending on the approach taken by decision-makers, the appro-ach of a country to integration issues may vary. Taking into consideration pa-triotism, which is strongly established in Denmark, in radical cases taking the form of nationalism, respect for its history and language�, as well as the com-mon sense of superiority over other nations, it can be assumed that the basis of the Danish policy in relation to integration processes is reluctant integration, comprising conditional accession into an integrated group, with simultaneous avoidance of unfavourable settlements, as well as the policy of balanced and optimal integration, i.e. of minimising unfavourable settlements and simulta-4 S. Stefański, Polityka zagraniczna Danii w latach 1945-1978, Warszawa 19�9, pp. �4-81. 5 A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, Relacje duńskiego parlamentu z rządem w sprawach europejskich, „Przegląd Sejmowy”

2006, No. 3 (�4), p. 60. 6 M. Kelstrup, Small States and European Political Integration [in:] The Nordic Countries and the European Com-

munity, ed. by T. Tiilikainen, I.D. Petersen, Copenhagen 1993, p. 153; M. Paul, Negotiating in the European Union: Comparing perceptions of EU Negotiators in small member states, „Group Decision and Negotiation” 199�, No. 5, p. 468.

� K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, Państwa nordyckie a Unia Europejska, Warszawa 200�, pp. 10-11; M. Horspool, Over the rainbow: Languages and law in the future of the European Union, „Futures” 2006, No. 38, p. 160; J. Blom-Hansen, Organized interests and the state: A disintegrating relationship? Evidence from Denmark, „European Journal of Political Research” 2001, No. 39, p. 392.

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neously attempting to influence the formation of the Community’s policies8. In radical cases the Danish decision-makers also presented the policy of alternati-ve integration, i.e. heading towards membership in an alternative group or sy-stem. In Danish political thought and in the decision-maker’s practice the hard approach dominates, which, depending on one’s point of view, can be assessed as realistic or nationalistic.

4. Foreign Policy and Sovereignty Issues

The principal reason for countries such as Denmark being reluctant to bro-ad cooperation in the area of foreign policy is the fear of losing sovereignty, which here is defined rather as the sole concept of the country’s sovereignty. In the case of such a small country the issue of the loss of sovereignty is a matter of utmost importance as it is almost a hereditary trait of its society. Denmark was always a country with decentralised power, and some of its regions, such as Greenland or the Faroe Islands, enjoyed a great deal of autonomy9. However, sovereignty in the internal sense means that only the state authorities have the power to make laws, as the supreme body, superior to other bodies functioning in society. In the case of any integrating structure such as the European Union, one can hardly speak of this kind of sovereignty10. Member states do not enjoy unrestricted discretionary legislative powers, as is significantly reflected in how the internal affairs are regulated. This arises from the decisions of the Europe-an Court of Justice, which stipulate the precedence of Community law over the national law, also at the constitutional level. The decision-making process in the Community raises serious objections within Danish society. In the opinion of Danes, the EU-specific decision-making pattern is not transparent enough. They also disapprove of talks conducted behind closed doors, though they con-cern all Europeans11. Therefore, looking at sovereignty from the perspective of complete independence and autonomous development of law and policies has become obsolete, and contemporary sovereignty stands for the right vested in a given country to decide about its own future.

A similar viewpoint is taken by Danes as regards the most recent integra-tion processes, especially their attitude towards evolution of the role played by the European Parliament, in which Denmark has fourteen representatives12. 8 J. Berlińska, Ile Danii w Europie, Toruń 2004, pp. 11-13. 9 See also: R. Matera, Stopień integracji Danii z Unią Europejską, Warszawa 2002, pp. 3-5. 10 See also: T. Stawecki, P. Winczorek, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, Warszawa 1993, p. 29. 11 J. Berlińska, pp. 13-14. 12 A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy, Warszawa 2006, p. 325.

Two standpoints have emerged in the western debates concerning accelerated integration. These represent two distinct approaches to this issue, namely the constructivist approach, which highlights the active role of units and groups participating in social dialogue, and the essentialist approach endorsed by the Danes13. If we assume that the Danish democratic system functions well, questio-ning the whole idea of putting it in jeopardy in the hope of achieving something which contradicts the country’s tradition seems justified. It seems clear to those who adhere to the essentialist theory that the existence of two parliaments does not mean two times more democracy but may only impair and undermine the current system, forcing the necessity to strictly comply with the internal EU regulations14. A certain anxiety was observed among Danes, especially after the European Court of Justice had passed the ruling on International Handelsge-sellschaft, finding that the Community law prevailed also over such legal norms as the primary laws or structural principles stipulated in the constitution.

Contrary to other Scandinavian countries, Denmark was never deeply committed to the idea of the political union of Europe15. Despite its member-ship of such organisations as EFTA and OEEC, it was basically oriented to-wards cooperating with Great Britain and Nordic countries. To manifest its support for the idea of such cooperation, Denmark broke off intensive talks with Sweden and Norway, focusing on the prospects of establishing the Nor-dic Economic Council. For this country, European integration revolves mainly around the issue of the economy, which is to promote international trade. The Danish politicians used to consistently steer clear of institutional integration, especially in the field of common foreign and security policies. Support for the-se concepts could not be found among the residents of the kingdom-dependent territories, i.e. the Faroe Islands and Greenland, whose policy after achieving autonomy was becoming more independent of Denmark16. The result of the Greenland referendum in 1982 concerning the membership of these territories of the European Communities turned out to be a peculiar precedent which ob-liged Denmark to apply for the exclusion of Greenland from this organisation1�.

13 Ibidem, pp. 28-30; J. Blom-Hansen, Avoiding the ‘ joint-decision trap: Lessons from intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia, „European Journal of Political Research” 1999, No. 35, pp. 3�, 45-46.

14 See also: K. Klaus, „Pojęcie i źródła deficytu demokracji w Unii Europejskiej, „Studia Europejskie” 2004, No. 2, pp. 53-55; M. Ahlt, Prawo europejskie, Warszawa 1998, p. 31.

15 See also: U. Burda, J. Gajewski, K. Szczepanie, Vademecum organizacji europejskich, Warszawa 1998, pp. 241-261; Z. M. Klepacki, Zachodnioeuropejskie organizacje międzyrządowe, Warszawa 1969, p. 320.

16 See also: Z. J. Pietraś, Prawo wspólnotowe i integracja europejska, Lublin 2005, p. 84. 1� See also: M. Grzybowski, Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich, Warszawa 1998, pp. 12, 34-35; S.

Rudolf, The European Constitution after the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty, „Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht” 2008, No. 2 (63), p. 180.

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Greenland was assigned the status of an overseas country, previously assigned also to the Falkland Islands and to New Caledonia, and retained the right of duty-free sales of its goods on the ECC markets, as well as the right to apply for financial aid from Brussels. The exclusion of Greenland from the structures of the EU has not brought any significant detriment to the Community, despite the considerable territorial loss.

5. Security Issues

Denmark based its security policy on its membership of NATO and on its close relationship with the United States18. As a result of the political expansion of the USSR, influenced especially by the events taking place in Czechoslova-kia in 1948, Denmark had already joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-sation by 1949. The subsequent ruling party consistently granted precedence to NATO. According to many politicians, the time when Europe shaped its own history had passed forever, hence we should seek relations with the United States. This viewpoint was also supported by politicians after the crash of the eastern alliance. This thesis has remained to this day, especially in the light of efforts undertaken with a view to establishing the European Security and De-fence Identity, to which Denmark is opposed19. Although the security of Den-mark has always depended on its allies, it has conducted a firm policy against the alliance, in which it even managed to win a special status20. Denmark obje-cted to the installation of nuclear weapons and Euro rockets, and also refused to make contributions to the rocket infrastructure programme. Furthermore, it has never even sent a NATO contingent of its armed forces in the time of pea-ce. Therefore, one can hardly expect that it will consent, similar to several other member states, including Poland, to far-reaching cooperation within the com-mon security policy as exemplified by the arrangements made in Edinburgh in December 1992, under which the EU Council agreed upon extraordinary privileges of retaining autonomy, inter alia, in the field of defence policy, as well in as judicial and police cooperation. Additionally, Danish euro-sceptics voice certain doubts as to whether the united Europe will have sufficient powers to eliminate the risk of new conflicts arising, which was the initial intent of the founders of the ECSC. As emphasised by Danish analysts, in 1999 the King-dom was engaged in war for the first time since 1964, taking an active part in

18 See also: S. Stefański, pp. 29, 34-4�; K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 10. 19 See also: R. Zięba, Europejska Tożsamość Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony, Warszawa 2000, p. 38. 20 See also: L. Orchowicz, Dania we współpracy nordyckiej, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1986, No. 3, p. 86.

armed operations against Serbia, but it was not preceded by a comprehensive political debate in the country. Actually, Dunes are not inclined to believe that Europe has any common tradition of peace21. They advocate that only certain countries can be considered peaceful, rather than Europe as a whole, since only in the 20th Century did it „serve” its citizens with two world wars, as well as with Marxism, Nazism, and concentration camps. The sceptical Danish society just does not believe that things can be different now.

6. Economic Issues

A similar standpoint was expressed by Denmark as regards the Single Euro-pean Act, agreed upon on 16 December 1983, preceded by long negotiations. At that time, power in Denmark was exercised by Liberals and Conservatives, led by the Prime Minster, Paul Schluter (1982-93) from the Conservative People’s Party. The coalition lasted ten years, mainly due to the participation of the De-mocrats. Public acceptance for the Single European Act was one of the main challenges to be faced by the new coalition government, as on 1� February 1983 Denmark refused to sign this document22. Brussels’ uncertainty was intensi-fied by the gradually dropping support of Danes for earlier ECC policy, while the socio-democrats postulated the rejection of the document, thereby blocking its acceptance by parliament. The decision by the Folketing (the Danish Par-liament) would have serious consequences for both the common market and Denmark. For the ECC it would have a paralysing effect, destroying all pre-vious achievements, whereas for Denmark, in the nightmare scenario, it could even mean the necessity to resign from the Group23. Given the decision passed by parliament, the conservative government reacted immediately, undertaking a diplomatic action aimed at obtaining a special status for Denmark, granted by the ECC member states. The government simultaneously decided to hold a refe-rendum on this matter24. Eventually, support among the Danish society for the Single European Act exceeded 56.2%, and on 1 July 198� it came into effect.

The success of the new government achieved in relation to EU issues per-suaded Schluter to undertake more firm actions - for example, to oppose Eu-ropean tendencies. The Kingdom was suffering from recession, and Danes ex-pected it to be quickly brought under control25. Cuts in social expenditures 21 See also: L. Bill, Denmark, „European Journal of Political Research” 2000, no. 38, p. 3�1; J. Berlińska, pp. 15-16. 22 See also: Z. J. Pietraś, p. 63. 23 See also: J. Berlińska, pp. 43-44. 24 See also: A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, p. 65. 25 See also: R. Matera, pp. 5-�; L. Bill, Denmark, „European Journal of Political Research” 2002, No. 40, p. 286.

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was put through in the Folketing, which promoted the concept of the so called, „cheap state”. Conservatives did not want to agree to the proposal by the Pro-gress Party (Fremskridtspartiet – F), which strove for tax reduction, and at the same time they lost the necessary social support. Under those circumstances, new problems appeared, also relating to EU issues. Although in May 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was approved by the Danish Parliament, in June the Danes rejected its adoption by a majority of 50.�%.

7. The Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam

The referendum results evoked confusion both in Brussels and Copenha-gen. Social Democrats were held responsible for the rejection of the Treaty, though as a matter of fact they supported the document in the Folketing, but were sceptical towards the idea of integration26. In December 1992, Schluter’s government negotiated special clauses in the Treaty, which were finally adopted on 11-12 December 1992 during a special session of the European Council in Edinburgh. As a part of so-called derogations, Denmark was exempted from the obligation to replace the krone by the euro2�. It was also partially excluded from the defence, safety and judiciary policy, and from the introduction of Eu-ropean citizenship within Denmark. It is worth mentioning that the Edinburgh compromise did not introduce any new provisions into the Treaty and all its regulations were based mainly on interpretation of the Treaty resolutions28.

The amended version of the Maastricht Treaty was presented to the Danish public. Fortunately for developing European Union Danes approved the pro-posal on 18 May 1993. A second registered veto would have threatened plans for the fast accession of the remaining Nordic countries. It can be regarded as a crucial factor in the change in Danish attitudes before the second referendum on the matter29. 43% of society voted against the Treaty – this significant sector part responded to the referendum results with obvious discontent, which was proved by stormy demonstrations on the night after the results were announ-ced. It was the first time in the history of Denmark that live ammunition was

26 Ibidem; J. Zielonka, Europa jako imperium. Nowe spojrzenie na Unię Europejską. Warszawa 200�, p. 1�0; Z. J. Pietraś, p. 65; D. C. Mueller, Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective, „Public Choice” 199�, No. 90, p. 2�2.

2� See also: K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 1�; art. 2-5 of The Protocol on the position of Denmark (Official Journal of the European Union from 16.12.2004, C 310/356); N. Petersen, The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam Europas?, Bonn 1998, p. 35; H. J. Nielsen, EF pa valg, Copenhagen, 1993, p. 44.

28 See also: E. Synowiec, Duńska Biała Księga w sprawie Traktatu z Maastricht, „Wspólnoty Europejskie. Biuletyn Informacyjny” 1992, No. 10, p. 14.

29 J. Berlińska, pp. 80-82.

used against protesters. As a result over 50 people were injured. On behalf of Queen Margrethe the Treaty was formally signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Minister of Economy and future Prime Minister, Aders Fogh Rasmussen30.

In January 1993, for the first time in eleven years, Social Democrats formed a majority government under the leadership of the „specialist” in economic affairs, that is, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (1993-2001)31. Social Democrats faced a challenge of preparation and ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Ho-wever difficulties in approval for the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and sharp statements concerning the Treaty made by Steen Gadea from the So-cial-Democratic party itself persuaded the Prime Minister to announce early elections, which he justified for economic reasons. This announcement turned out to be a surprise for the opposition and for electors. In March 1998 the party already in power won the elections32. In April 1998 proceedings against Prime Minister P. N. Rasmussen accusing him of violation of constitution were clo-sed. The ruling favourable to the Prime Minister muted the campaign against the referendum, as a result of which in May 1998 Danes gave their consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam33.

8. The Danish Presidency

In the elections which took place in November 2001 the Danish social de-mocrats were defeated, losing the so-far leading position in the parliament, which they had held continuously since 192034. A coalition government was created by Liberals and Conservatists, securing their majority in the Folketing. The new Prime Minister, the Liberal Anders Fogh Rasmussen, focused on lo-wering taxes, which, despite the recommendations of the European Commis-sion, remain one of the highest in the world. It was because of him, known as he was for his fervent support for expanding the European Union, that Denmark, was the first to ratify the Treaty of Nice.

In the 2nd half of 2002 Denmark, in spite of its known Euro-scepticism, held the presidency of the European Union, which was assessed as very success-

30 See also: K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 18. 31 See also: Ibidem, pp. 8-10; J. Volz, Denmark: An Exemplary Economic Policy?, „Economic Bulletin” 2004, No. 4,

pp. 59-64. 32 L. Bill, Denmark, „European Journal of Political Research” 1999, No. 36, p. 3�5. 33 See also: A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, p. 64; K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, pp. 18-19. 34 See also: W. Czapliński, K. Górski, Historia Danii, Warszawa 1965, p. 348.

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ful35. On 13 December 2002, at the summit in Copenhagen, accession negotia-tions with ten countries were concluded. The governing Liberals attributed this success to Prime Minister Rasmussen’s personal skills. However, not all Danes believed in the diplomatic sense of the Prime Minister. Anders Fogh Rasmus-sen encouraged people to remember that „solutions in the constitution must be balanced between what Europe wants and what the citizens of the Kingdom can accept. Eventually, they make decisions in the referendum36”. The words of the Prime Minister, together with his other warnings, were ignored by many.

During the Danish presidency, many countries outside the European Union asked the Danish the question why Denmark had decided to join EEC and the EU at all. There is no simple answer why this country could not be able to accept the rules of unconditional membership since the issue of Denmark is a of many factors and it constitutes an important problem. Denmark’s accession to the EEC was purely an economic decision and hardly anyone thought of its political im-plications. The Danish began to perceive a united Europe in their own way, from the perspective of a small country, and at some point they wanted to generali-se this idea into a more universal model, consisting of some kind of alternative membership in the European Union. Such a postulate was put forward by the Danish nationalists on the occasion of the invitation to the European Council in Edinburgh, and this same concept was supposed to pertain to the new members, especially the Nordic countries3�. This concept, due to its strong nationalistic character, and since the Treaty of Maastricht, has not appeared again.

9. „Constitution for Europe” and the Treaty of Lisbon

When it comes to support for the project entitled „Constitution for Euro-pe”, which finally fell, and which for the Danish was an explicit sign of the fe-deralisation of Europe, or the European federation of countries, public opinion was traditionally sceptical38. Since the very beginning of their cooperation wit-hin the European Union, the Danish have taken the Gaullist position, claiming that „you can’t make an omelette without breaking a few eggs”. This point of view was also expressed in surveys by the European Commission concerning the necessity to introduce the Treaty of Lisbon. Although the majority of mem-ber states generally agreed that the treaty regulations are necessary, the per-35 See also: K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 69-�2; H. Larsen, Denmark. A committed Member with Opt-Outs! [in:] Na-

tional and European Foreign Policy, ed. by R. Wong, C. Hill, New York 2011. 36 J. Berlińska, pp. 163-166; D. Ćosić, Szczęściarz z Kopenhagi, „Wprost” 2009, No. 16 (13�1). 3� See also: R. Matera, pp. 5-�. 38 See also: S. Rudolf, p. 184.

centage of proponents of such a solution has been the lowest – ever, and of op-ponents nearly the highest39. Also due to this fact the government decided not to carry out a referendum, referring to the legal opinion that it is acceptable to leave the question of ratification to Parliament, which Folketing in fact did on 25 April 2008. However, under the pressure of public opinion, the government will be obliged to carry out such a referendum in the future. Although Anders Fogh Rasmussen mentioned the possibility of Denmark’s resigning from opt-out clauses by way of a referendum40, his successor, Lars Lřkke Rasmussen, has already announced the date of the referendum concerning the potential inclu-sion of Denmark into the euro zone, which will take place in 2011. It should be noted that in the light of the survey carried out in May 2009, Danish society is to large extent (45.2%) against this proposition. However, it should be empha-sised that despite the presence of strong anti-European opposition and despite the constant calling for greater democratisation of the Union, Denmark is one of the leading countries in terms of the level of democracy in the EU41. The December of 2010 marked the end of a transition the Lisbon Treaty. Danish government fully supported the new institutional balance and was working towards mobilizing all member states enhancing European economic policy cooperation and projecting EU’s influence more effectively across the globe42.

In the first half of 2012, Denmark held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. It was the seventh time Denmark holds the EU Presidency since joining the European Community in 19�3.

10. Conclusions

The decision of Denmark concerning membership of the EEC and, subse-quently, in the European Union, was not univocal. A consensus on this mat-ter has never been achieved. The creation of the European Economic Com-munity in 195� negatively affected Danish exports by discriminating against the country’s products, which in a way forced Denmark to join the group. The problems connected with the Treaty of Maastricht, in turn, resulted from the

39 See also: J. Berlińska, pp. 163-166. 40 See also: A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, p. 66; U. Federspiel, The international situation and Danish foreign policy in

2008 [in:] Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009, ed. by N. Havidt, H. Mouritzen, Copenhagen 2010 p. 29. 41 R. Grzeszczak, Problem deficytu demokratycznego w strukturach wspólnotowych, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”

2002, No. 3, pp. 5-9; R. Biering, The application of EU law in Denmark: 198� to 2000, „Common Market Law Review”, Haga 2000, No. 3�, p. 959; R. Adler-Nissen, T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Straitjacket or sovereignty shield? The Danish opt-out on justice and home affairs and prospects after the Treaty of Lisbon [in:] Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, ed. by N. Havidt, H. Mouritzen, Copenhagen 2011, pp. 13�-160.

42 N. Havidt, H. Mouritzen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2011, Copenhagen 2012, pp. 24-25.

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fear of losing identity and national values so important to the Danish. Despite the final agreement on joining the EEC and the ratification of the

Treaty on the European Union, Denmark’s road towards Europe has never been easy. Starting from the issue of the common market within the EEC, in Denmark there has always been an opposition between two positions concer-ning integration, two visions of Denmark in Europe, and separate concepts represented by the country’s two biggest parties. Therefore, as has already been rightly pointed out, the answer to the question whether there is a Danish ap-proach towards integration or whether there are specific conditions in which this process takes place should be positive.

Piotr Tosiek

State’s Influence on EU’s Policy: the Case of Polish Presidency1

1. Introduction

The influence of a member state of the European Union on decisions made by the latter should be analyzed from the state-centric point of view. The best suited and a developed theory in this respect seems to be the liberal intergo-vernmentalism (LI), one of the most important approaches to international politics in the EU. It is based on two assumptions: member states and their governments play the leading role in negotiations (an external element) while positions of member states result from aggregation of interests of actors active in national political systems (an internal element).

This paper elaborates Poland’s position in EU politics with special atten-tion paid to the activities of 2011 Council presidency. The axis of the analysis is the view that LI does not give the correct explanation of Poland’s role at this stage of European integration. The paper is divided in four essential sections. In the first one the main elements of LI vision are elaborated: both in respect of the position of a member state in EU decision-making system as well as of the creation of state’s position in negotiations. The second section discusses Poland’s position in EU institutions: this creates formal supplies of influence and gives opportunity to cooperate with other members. In the third section a brief analysis of Polish preparations to the presidency in the Council can be found: this is an attempt of the case-study of LI possible correctness. In the fourth section the address of Polish foreign minister including the vision of EU future is presented. The last section consists of the conclusions.

1 The article was written within the research project entitled Committee Decision-Makers in the European Union. Experience of Polish Governmental Administration (N N116 191139) granted by the Polish National Science Centre.

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State’s Influence on EU’s Policy: the Case of Polish Presidency

2. The Essence of EU Decision-Making System: Main Ele-ments of LI Approach

The system of decision-making in the European Union can be perceived with respect to the primary role of member states. This element is strictly connected with the very reason of the European integration after the Second World War. This reason is the convergence of interests of states that creates the tendency of ever closer cooperation and defines stages of integration. The eco-nomic interest seems to be the most important element while current situations in internal policies of states influence solutions chosen. Evolutionary integra-tion process leading to a political union as well as an active role of internatio-nal secretariats and the EU courts should be seen as fulfillment of decisions made earlier by member states. The conditions of international cooperation, its institutionalization and rules result from a relative bargaining power of sta-tes’ governments that do not give up the sovereignty but rather delegate its elements to the higher level in order to improve the efficiency of their actions. The delegation of monitoring and exercising of international agreements to in-ternational secretariats and courts is aimed at controlling of implementation of these agreements by other states. A primary role in the process of deepening and widening of integration is played by governments of the most important states and their cabinet members. The Union institutions and their officials are second-order participants of the game2.

This approach does not necessarily mean the acceptance of the realist theory of international relations. The LI vision seems to offer a better explana-tion of the situation in the EU. This way of thinking is rooted in a liberal para-digm that incorporates internal connections between the state and the indivi-dual (or the society). State’s behavior in international politics is a direct result of interactions with internal and transnational social context. Ideas, interests and social institutions affect state’s actions by shaping its preferences and main social objectives, which in turn creates the basis for strategic calculations of the governments3. The head LI thesis is the perception of integration as an outcome of international bargaining, where the main actors are governments that have access to information and ideas. These governments initiate, mediate and mo-

2 D. J. Puchala, Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, and European Integration: a Review Article, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 1999, Vol. 3�, No. 2, p. 319.

3 A. Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: a Liberal Theory of International Politics, „International Organiza-tion” 199�, Vol. 51, No. 4, p. 513. Cf. R. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games, „International Organization” 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 42�-460.

bilize negotiations that are naturally effective and deprived of big transactional costs4.

This explanation is based on three elements: (a) issue-specific interdepen-dence clarifying national preferences; (b) the bargaining process rooted in the asymmetric interdependence; (c) the institutional choice depending on the need of a credible commitment 5. The governments want to negotiate agreements that accomplish national preferences in a given area. This process results from pressures of internal constituents reacting on impulses of international politics. National preferences should not be instable and appear during negotiations (garbage can concept) or be rooted in ideological and geopolitical interests. They should rather reflect issue-specific patterns of substantive interdependence, i.e. depend on the problem actually negotiated6.

Another decisive factor is the relative bargaining power of member sta-tes. The most important is trade interest: integration is an outcome of rational choices made by national leaders on the basis of economic factors. Interests of the biggest companies, macroeconomic preferences of governmental coalitions and the impact of world market play a huge role�. In the process of the building of a new regime the asymmetry of national economies must therefore be taken into account8.

The essential role of national interests can be noticed also in shaping the institutional structure of the EU. In every phase of decision-making (initiative, mediation, mobilization) independent institutions play rather minor role: their competences result from the will of member states that delegate powers to the Union level only if they are not able to control observance of international ob-ligations unilaterally. Member states delegate powers also in other situations: when future decisions are not sure, when benefits from the implementation of agreements by other partners are high and when the costs of delegation are acceptable. Institutional solutions create a kind of a hybrid system9.

4 A. Moravcsik, A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation, ”International Organization” 1999, Vol. 53, No. 2, p. 2�3. Cf. idem, F. Schimmelfennig, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, [in:] European Integration Theory, ed. by A. Wiener, T. Diez, Oxford 2009, pp. 6�-69, 84.

5 A. Moravcsik, K. Nicolaidis, Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions, ”Journal of Common Market Studies” 1999, Vol. 3�, No. 1, p. 60.

6 Ibidem, pp. 61-62.� A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London 1998,

pp. 3-4, quoted in: D. J. Puchala, pp. 326-32�.8 D. J. Puchala, pp. 32�-328.9 A. Moravcsik, K. Nicolaidis, pp. 69-�3, �6-��.

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3. Formal Supplies: Poland’s Position in EU Decision-Making System

The formal position of member states in the institutional system creates a basis for building of coalitions giving their participants the possibility to arti-culate own interests and achieve goals. The Council with its predominant qua-lified majority rule is the most important institution from the point of view of state’s influence. The number of weighted votes and the threshold of majority were modified twice after 2004 enlargement. The first modification related to the entry into force of some institutional arrangements of the Treaty of Nice10, the second to 200� enlargement. Table 1 presents the impact of Poland’s vote. In the first six months of membership Poland offered 6,5% of the total votes cast and 9,1% of those votes representing qualified majority. In the Nice system (from 1 November 2004) the figures grew up to 8,4% and 11,6%, respectively. They went down to �,8% and 10,6% after 200� enlargement.

Table 1. Poland’s vote in the Council before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon

Time Total number of votes

Qualified majority Poland’s vote

1.05.2004-31.10.2004 124 88 8

1.11.2004-31.12.2006 321 232 27

1.01.2007-30.11.2009 345 255 27

Source: own analysis.

The reforms relating to the Council introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon are entering into force in a few phases (table 2). In the first phase, till 31 October 2014, the Nice system will apply as the only one. On member state’s demand this model will be continued till 31 March 201�. However, the new double ma-jority system will be introduced on 1 November 2014, replacing the old one totally on 1 April 201�11.

10 The analysis presented below takes into account the number of weighted votes only (as the most important ele-ment) and neglects two other majorities: majority of states and majority of population.

11 The double majority system is based on majority of population and majority of member states (Art. 16 TEU, Art. 238 TFEU). The analysis presented below neglects the latter as the second-order element.

Table 2. Poland’s vote in the Council after entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon

Time Total number of votes

Qualified majority Poland’s vote

1.12.2009-31.10.2014 345 255 27

1.11.2014-31.03.2017 499,7(345)

324,8(255)

38,1(27)

1.04.2017- 499,7 324,8 38,1

Source: own analysis. The population size according to the official data addressed to the period 1.12.2009-31.12.2010. Cf. Council Decision of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (2009/937/EU), O. J. L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35.

The absolute power of Poland’s vote in the double majority system is equaled to �,6% of the total votes cast and 11,�% of the qualified majority threshold. The relative power reflects, however, a significant reduction (table 3) in comparison to five biggest EU members. In the Nice system Poland and Spain have the same vote, equaled to 93,1% of the vote of four bigger member states. In the new sy-stem Poland’s vote represents only 46,5% of German and 83,2% of Spanish vote.

Table 3. Comparison of formal decision-making potentials of six biggest EU member states

State Vote power in the Nice system

Vote power in the Lisbon system

Germany 29 82,0

France 29 64,4

United Kingdom 29 61,6

Italy 29 60,0

Spain 27 45,8

Poland 27 38,1


The position of member states in the other EU institutions is worth ana-lyzing as well. Table 4 presents the situation in the European Parliament. The following time-frames are distinguished: 2004 enlargement, 200� enlarge-

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ment, 2009 EP elections (held under the Nice system), supplementing of the EP by new MEPs (after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and reform of electoral laws in 2011) and the final number of MEPs introduced by the pro-visions of the new treaty12. It has to be underlined, however, that the European Parliament is composed of representatives of the people instead of states.

Table 4. Number of MEPs from six biggest member states

Time Germany France UK Italy Spain Poland EP

2004-2006 99 78 78 78 54 54 732

2007-2009 99 78 78 78 54 54 785

2009 Nice 99 72 72 72 50 50 736

2011 Lisbon 99 74 73 73 54 51 754

Lisbon 96 74 73 73 54 51 751


The data relating to the biggest member states and other institutions (before Lisbon) are presented in table 5. Five member states did not participate in the rota-tion system applied to advocates-general in the Court of Justice. With this excep-tion, the members of these three institutions were recruited on an equality basis.

Table 5. Position of six biggest member states (Treaty of Nice)

Institution Germany France UK Italy Spain Poland Institution

Commission 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

Court of Justice 1+1 1+1 1+1 1+1 1+1 1 27+8

Court of Auditors 1 1 1 1 1 1 27


Table 6 consists of the presentation of the final modifications of the Treaty of Lisbon to be introduced in some phases. The principle of equality is applied in the European Council13, the Commission14 and the Court of Auditors. In 12 Cf. Ł. Sosnowski, Podział mandatów do Parlamentu Europejskiego, „Biuletyn Analiz UKIE” 2008, No. 20, pp.

152-162.13 The President of the European Council does not represent any member state formally and does not have voting

rights (Art. 15 TUE, Art. 235 TFUE). The same applies to the President of the Commission while sitting in the European Council.

14 After the decision of the European Council (Art. 1� TEU).

case of the Court of Justice of the European Union only data relating to its highest instance (sensu stricto Court of Justice) are presented: six biggest states will be excluded from the rotation system, while the total number of advocates-general will increase to eleven. As for the European Central Bank, only the Go-verning Council is analyzed (composed of six members of the Executive Board and the presidents of central banks of those member states whose currency is the euro). The United Kingdom and Poland, as not belonging to the Eurozone, do not have their representatives in this body.

Table 6. Position of six biggest member states (Treaty of Lisbon)

Institution Germany France UK Italy Spain Poland Institution

European Council 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 (29)

Commission 1 1 1 1 1 1 27

Court of Justice 1+1 1+1 1+1 1+1 1+1 1+1 27+11

European Central Bank

1 1 0 1 1 0 17+6

Court of Auditors 1 1 1 1 1 1 27


The analysis of formal position of Poland in the main EU bodies is a star-ting point to further research. Being the precondition of states’ behavior, the voting power can serve as an important tool of negotiations with other partners (inside and outside the system). Anyway, Poland is the sixth biggest member state, which has consequences for its formal position as a possibly strong play-er. On the other hand, Poland is still a newcomer, which, in turn, is a reason for weakness in comparison with member states having their settled positions resulting from many years of experience.

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4. Council Presidency: a Legal, Political, Administrative and Social Challenge

The rotating presidency in the Council should be described as a sub-system consisting of both intergovernmental and supranational cooperation. This cre-ates the mechanism of formal and informal relations of power and influence of the member state on the integration system. This is an administrative and coor-dinative phenomenon as well as a composition of special abilities, competences, measures, procedures, communicative channels and decision-making bodies. At the same time the presidency is perceived as a form of accomplishment of the EU political dimension, seeking for the common European interest, civil service, po-litical leadership or – at last – the mode of expression of state’s own interests15.

The following elements of public discourse in context of Polish presidency are most important: financial and economic position of a state; condition of state’s public administration; political stability; political and party consensus; visions of the EU in political and party programs; negotiation abilities of the government; ability to express national interest; implementation of EU law; absorption of EU structural funds; the quality of information on EU issues; surveys on social sup-port for European integration; knowledge on the EU and the presidency16.

The above-mentioned phenomena need to be set in order. All the determi-nants create an integrated system of legal, political, administrative and social factors. Legal factors create the formal structure of state’s behavior in the EU. Political elements reflect the pattern of state’s decision-making and consist of cooperation and competition of various domestic bodies (cabinet, parliament, political parties). Administrative dimension is extremely important in conte-xt of primarily administrative character of the presidency. The social element refers to the participation of civil society in preparatory and implementation stage of the presidency, encompassing the activities of NGOs, information, promotion and other elements connected with public relations.

National legal acts constitute the general system of sources of law which can-not be separated from tradition and legal culture of a state. In case of Poland the-re are four main regulations relating to the membership in the EU and – parti-cularly – the presidency: the European Affairs Committee Act; the Cooperation

15 Z. Czachór, Prezydencja państwa członkowskiego a system polityczny Unii Europejskiej. Podstawowe uwarunkow-ania, [in:] Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Instytucje, prawo i organizacja, ed. by A. Nowak-Far, Warszawa 2010, pp. 214-219.

16 Z. Czachór, Proces kreowania i upowszechniania priorytetów prezydencji na przykładzie Polski, [in:] Prezydenc-ja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, ed. by K. A. Wojtaszczyk, Warszawa 2010, pp. 106-10�.

in EU Matters Act; the Disposition on the Plenipotentiary for the Presidency; the Disposition on the Plenipotentiary for Security during the Presidency.

The European Affairs Committee Act of 2� August 20091� refers to the coordination of Polish European policy: it defines the rules of cooperation of cabinet members and other parts of public administration in EU matters and creates the European Affairs Committee. The latter is the EU-specialized body consisting of the minister of foreign affairs (as a chairman), other ministers and – without decisional powers – invited experts. The committee is respon-sible for Polish official positions in EU negotiation process.

The Cooperation in EU Matters Act of 8 October 201018 applies to the coo-peration of the cabinet and both chambers of the Parliament in questions con-cerning the membership in the EU. This is a new legal regulation – replacing the old one from 2004 – incorporating the reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon with respect to the role of national parliaments in EU decision-making. Main obligations refer to the ratification of new treaties, modifications of the treaties in force, positions on issues tackling the vital state’s interests in the European Council and in the Council as well as information. The most important role is played by the specialized parliamentary committees in the lower chamber.

The Disposition on Plenipotentiary for the Presidency of 15 July 200819 and the Disposition on the Plenipotentiary for Security during the Presidency of 28 May 201020 are governmental acts relating to the coordination of day-to-day activities during the preparation to and implementation of the presidency. The Plenipotentiary for the Presidency is the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the Plenipotentiary for Security is the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration.

Legal tools concerning Polish membership in the EU are – despite of the lack of the strict constitutional regulation of those issues – potentially effective. The division of competences and responsibilities is relatively clear, while no exclusively new bodies have been created.

The second factor of a good presidency refers to the strictly political dimen-sion. With respect to the internal context there are four models of influence on EU agenda. Firstly, the program of the Council meetings can be shaped with the aim of exclusion of isolated but strong objections of internal opposition. Secondly, the presidency can be marked by individual style of the ministers

1� Publication address: Dz. U. 2009, nr 161, poz. 12��.18 Publication address: Dz. U. 2010, nr 213, poz. 1395.19 Publication address: Dz. U. 2008, nr 133, poz. 843; Dz. U. 2009, nr 112, poz. 920; Dz. U. 2010, nr �, poz. 4�. 20 Publication address: Dz. U. 2010, nr 98, poz. 628.

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and their personal goals. Thirdly, ideological questions and the perspective of national elections influence the agenda quite often. Fourthly, some EU regu-lations are welcome from the point of view of national interests (for instance inclusion of common standards enabling some states to use comparative costs theory in practice). These are bigger member states that tend consequently to accomplish their expressly defined interests21.

A decisive factor – in terms of democratic legitimacy – can be the inclusion of national political parties and other organizations in the debate on presiden-cy priorities and implementation. Some analyses show that despite of the broad spectrum of actors involved the shaping of national positions on EU policies tend to be government-centric. Political parties, interest groups and even or-ganizations representing private interests operate according to clientelist and corporationist rules where the state dominates22.

Polish official governmental program of preparation to the presidency con-sisted of the guidelines of creating the priorities: sectoral proposals were pre-sented by the ministries and central offices while political goals were discussed and accepted by the prime-minister, deputy prime-ministers, minister of fo-reign affairs and other bodies. The final decision on priorities was made by the whole cabinet. The parliament should have been fully informed according to the Cooperation Act. The other actors of the debate should have been: admini-stration, NGOs, sectoral organizations, scientific circles and political parties. The latter played a marginal role23.

The political debate in Poland has some postpolitical features. The escala-tion of conflict between two main parties can lead to the inclusion of European issues to the general debate. The hard style of politics, personalities of leaders and a negative impact of media coverage of those elements are also important. With this in mind, the relatively narrow scope of actors included in the debate on the presidency can be perceived as a conscious and rational choice based on exclusion of European issues from possibly very competitive and destabilizing – also in terms of foreign policy – debate24. On the other hand, the final list of priorities presented just before the beginning of the presidency does incorporate the huge part of proposals presented by the opposition. This can, however, result 21 A. Warntjen, Steering the Union. The Impact of the EU Presidency on Legislative Activity in the Council, „Journal

of Common Market Studies” 200�, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 113�-1140.22 G. Schneider, D. Finke, K. Baltz, With a Little Help from the State: Interest Intermediation in the Domestic Pre-

Negotiations of EU Legislation, „Journal of European Public Policy” 200�, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 444, 455-456.23 Program przygotowań Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do objęcia i sprawowania przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europe-

jskiej. Dokument przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów w dniu 13 stycznia 2009 r. Tekst ostateczny, pp. 1�-21. 24 T. G. Grosse, Przygotowania do polskiej prezydencji w UE: między rywalizacją wyborczą a szansą modernizacji

polskiej administracji?, [in:] Prezydencja w Radzie…, pp. 54-62.

from national consensus on EU general policy at that time: Polish mainstre-am parties had very similar European programs where the differences referred rather to the ways of their accomplishment. The situation changed during the presidency as a result of the speech of foreign minister in November 2011.

A possibly destabilizing factor of Polish presidency could be constituted by parliamentary elections on 9 October 2011 and the creation of the new cabinet resulting from them. Administrative activities on lower levels are generally unaf-fected in such situations but in case of governmental change the highest admi-nistrative positions are also renewed. The time frame between the elections and appointment of new ministers is not effective in terms of decision-making. This could negatively influence the presidency that is based on informal contacts of mi-nisters and officials25. Nevertheless, the outcome of elections was the renewal of mandate for the former coalition, which allowed to continue the presidency wit-hout any tensions.

The third set of factors concerns the administrative dimension. One of the most important elements is the relation between national administration and national political leaders. The head guideline is the accomplishment of politi-cal goals by officials. There are two perspectives in this respect. The first – the imperative one – is based on formal authorization to act on behalf of another actor: this means that clear and formal instructions must be issued before. The second – the liberal – perspective is based on symbolic sphere and relates to the application of some appropriate forms of behavior: autonomy of bureaucrats are almost indefinite which results from their expertise. In reality some inter-mediate forms of relations should be found and accomplished: the loyalty of administration cannot be totally transferred to the EU level26.

Polish official governmental program of preparation to the presidency re-sulted in creation of the Presidency Corps composed of 1.200 officials from the ministries and other central offices who are responsible for the preparation and implementation of the presidency, including chairing the sittings of committe-es and working groups. Members of the Corps had to participate in a number of preparatory trainings (on EU functioning, techniques of negotiations, lin-guistic skills)2�.

25 A. Jaskulski, Co tworzy dobrą prezydencję?, [in:] Przewodnictwo państwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej – doświadczenia partnerów, propozycje dla Polski, ed. by Z. Czachór, M. J. Tomaszyk, Poznań 2009, pp. 85-8�.

26 J. Beyers, J. Trondal, How Nation-States ‘Hit’ Europe – Ambiguity and Representation in the European Union, „European Integration online Papers” 2003, Vol. �, No. 5, pp. 4-6.

2� Program przygotowań…, pp. 40-4�. Cf. M. Żywioł, Szkolenie kadr dla prezydencji – program polski a doświadczenia innych państw, [in:] Przewodnictwo państwa…, pp. 69-�2; J. Skoczek, Administracja polska w procesie przygotowań do przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Przewodnictwo państwa…, pp. 39-40.

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The presidency should be perceived as a chance for a systemic change in Polish administration. It cannot be oriented on a short-term mobilization but rather create new guidelines and objectives of strategic European planning, build institutions and procedures as well as generally strengthen administrati-ve and expertise supplies28.

The fourth determinant of the presidency is connected with social factors. Two elements are crucial in this respect: the role of public opinion in shaping the priorities and information concerning the presidency connected with pro-motion and improvement of state’s image.

The vital feature of Polish public opinion is a huge support for EU mem-bership, which strongly influences also the perception of the presidency. The results of surveys concerning the expectations of Poles in respect of the EU future should be also taken into account during the process of creation of pre-sidency priorities. The most important EU problems as perceived by Polish public opinion are: economic questions, energy policy, health and social po-licy, regional policy, criminal matters, internal market, EU foreign policy and environmental policy29.

Another problem is the participation of civil society in presidency activi-ties. There are three main areas of cooperation of public administration and private sector: information policy, consultation of documents and distribution of some funds30. The social feedback must be seen in this respect: inclusion of private social partners contributes to better information and at the same time improves the awareness of the public in EU matters.

However, the role of social context cannot be overestimated. Presidency is first of all the administrative and political phenomenon, while in the process of cooperation between governmental institutions and private sector the plurality of views and transparency should be taken into account.

The exploration of the internal element of LI vision in four respects should be followed by the analysis of state’s external behavior, in this case the selection of priorities and – when the time of presidency is over – their implementation. Polish government presented the final document concerning presidency prio-

28 T. G. Grosse, Doświadczenia prezydencji jako wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki, [in:] Prezydencja w Unii Europe-jskiej. Analizy i doświadczenia, ed. by K. Szczerski, Kraków 2009, pp. 104-105.

29 M. Pilecka, Postawy prounijne oraz oczekiwania społeczne wobec UE w kontekście przyszłej prezydencji Polski, „Biuletyn Analiz UKIE” 2009, No. 22, pp. 132-13�.

30 Polska prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej: współpraca administracji publicznej z sektorem pozarządowym. Ekspertyza Instytutu Spraw Publicznych na zlecenie Urzędu Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, L. Kolarska-Bobińska et al., Warszawa 2008, pp. 5, 92-94.

rities in May/June 201131. Three main priorities (European integration as a so-urce of growth; secure Europe: food, energy, defense; Europe benefiting from openness) create the axis of some other sub-priorities. The first priority encom-passes the following important elements: supporting of growth, Multiannual Financial Framework after 2013, deepening of the single market, convocation of the Single Market Forum. The second priority consists of another set of sub-elements: enhancing economic governance of the EU, reducing excessive defi-cits, external energy policy, food security, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The last priority is based on the following aspects: Eastern Partnership with its summit, democratization of North-African countries and deepening trade relations with them, enlargement, new framework for cooperation with Russia, common trade policy.

The choice of priorities is a starting-point for three remarks. Firstly, Poland presented the list of very general priorities, avoiding some elements that could be risky and politically difficult. Three main elements of the list are completely uncontroversial and unclear. Secondly, the primary background for this selec-tion was the general EU agenda with economic crisis and financial perspective on the top. Additionally, the government must have been aware that the goals connected with EU external policy could be achieved only in cooperation with new components of the EU institutional structure (high representative and the President of the European Council) with the role of rotating presidency stron-gly diminished. Thirdly, some priorities expressing Poland’s national interest have been also indirectly included in the program. These are first of all: CAP reform, external energy policy and the Eastern Partnership.

5. Poland’s EU Vision

In the conceptual context the most important element of Polish presidency was the address of the foreign minister, R. Sikorski, to the members of the Ger-man Association of Foreign Policy (DGAP) presented in Berlin in November 2011. The minister started with a comment on the Eurozone crisis and quota-tion of Kant who had said that the entire practice of lending money presuppo-sed the honest intention to repay. If this condition were universally ignored, the very idea of lending and sharing wealth would be undermined. Then the minister pointed to the two fundamental values (responsibility and solidarity) and tackled five basic questions. The first one referred to the grounds of the 31 Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 1 July 2011 – 31 December 2011, War-

saw 2011.

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crisis. The enlargement of the European Union was very far from causing the crisis and has arguably delayed the economic turmoil. Also the currency crisis was not the good answer to the question, since the euro was doing fine versus the dollar and other currencies. A partial reply could be found in the debt, go-vernment overspending, accounting chicanery and financial engineering. The conclusion was that the crisis was primarily about confidence and, more preci-sely, credibility. The solution should be the restoring of credibility32.

The second question related to the goals of EU reforms. The minister said that the very construction of the EU was wrong: a Europe with a dominant currency but no single treasury to enforce it; joint borders without a common migration policy; a common foreign policy divorced from real instruments of power and often weakened by member states. The future EU must override the cover of the nation state, while the choice is typical for the lives of federations: deeper integration or collapse. The decision has to be made whether the Union wants to become a proper federation or not. If renationalization or collapse are unacceptable, the only way is to make Europe governable and this way more credible. Europe must preserve democracy that respects the autonomy of its member states. This new European construction needs to balance responsibili-ty, solidarity and democracy33.

The third question addressed the ways to accomplish this vision. In eco-nomic terms the so-called „six pack” was mentioned as a good beginning that brings more transparency and discipline to the finances of member states. In the process of drawing up national budgets, finance ministers must show their books to their peers and to the Commission at a very early stage. In case of problems the Commission recommends corrective action. Members of the Eurozone who break the Stability and Growth Pact are subject to sanctions almost impossible to block. Still, the minister recalled more ambitious measures: the Commission and the Euro group should have the right to scrutinize in advance all major econo-mic reform plans with potential spill-over effect, impose sanctions on countries failing to effect policy recommendations and permit groups of countries to syn-chronize their labor, pensions and social policies. Rescue funds could be accessed only by member states which respect fiscal discipline and the sanctions would be automatic by giving the Commission, the Council and the Court of Justice of the European Union powers to enforce the ceilings on deficit and debt. Coun-tries in excess deficit procedure would have to present their national budgets for

32 R. Sikorski, Poland and the Future of the European Union, the Address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin, 28 November 2011.

33 Ibidem.

Commission’s approval. The latter would get powers to intervene in the policies of countries that could not fulfill their obligations. Persistent violating of rules makes the voting rights of such member states suspended. The European Central Bank should become a proper central bank34.

However, all those measures, in minister’s view, are also only the begin-ning. Poland, on its part, has supported the idea of a new treaty that would make the EU more effective. The Commission needs to be strengthened: the commissioners should be genuine leaders and truly represent common Euro-pean interests; the college of commissioners should be smaller with member states rotating to have their commissioner. European institutions with more powers need to have more democratic legitimacy, for instance the powers to supervise national budgets should be wielded only by agreement of the Euro-pean Parliament. Europe will only work if it becomes a polity, i.e. a community to which people shift a part of their identity and loyalty. The European public opinion should be given political expression: some seats in the European Par-liament, having its seat in a single location, could be elected from a pan-Euro-pean list of candidates. More political education for citizens and political elite is also needed. The posts of the President of the European Council and that of the European Commission should be combined or even elected directly by the European demos35.

In his further elaboration the minister underlined that the maintaining of coherence between the Eurozone and the EU as a whole is a crucial element of this vision. Community institutions must remain central. Instead of orga-nizing separate Eurozone meetings, the old practice should be used, where all may attend, but only members vote. The more power and legitimacy should be given to federal institutions. At the same time the member states should feel more secure: prerogatives dealing with national identity, culture, religion, lifestyle, public morals, and rates of income, corporate and VAT taxes, should forever remain in the purview of states. On the other hand, no member state (even the United Kingdom) should prevent the EU from forging ahead36.

The fourth question concerned the role of Poland in EU construction. The minister pointed out that his country was not the source of problems but rather a source of European solutions. During the transition Poland was helped by many other countries: United States, UK, France and, above all, Germany. The German solidarity from the last two decades was strongly appreciated. On its part, Poland,

34 Ibidem.35 Ibidem.36 Ibidem.

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by the end of the current parliament, will fulfill the criteria of membership in the Eurozone. What is most important, Poland also brings Europe a willingness „even to pool sovereignty with others” in return for a fair role in new Europe3�.

The fifth question referred to the role of Germany in (fighting against) the crisis. In Sikorski’s view, Germany is the biggest beneficiary of the current ar-rangements and therefore has the biggest obligation to make them sustainable. Some roots of the crisis could be found also in this state but because investors prefer the safety, the borrowing costs of Germany have been lower than they would have been in normal times. Moreover, the implosion of neighboring economies could make also Germany greatly suffer. Because of the size and history that member state has a special responsibility to preserve peace and democracy on the continent. The minister demanded of Germany that it helps the Eurozone, since nobody else can do it. As Polish foreign minister he said: „I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity”. Germany has become Europe’s indispensable nation and may not fail to lead without domination. Provided Germany includes that country in decision-ma-king, Poland offers its support38.

At the end of the speech the minister pointed to the possibility of the dan-ger of the late reform. He found standing still not sufficient: institutions and procedures that have worked in the past are not good enough to answer the cur-rent challenges. In the conclusion he underlined the global role of the European Union as the largest area of peace, democracy and human rights. Peoples in EU’s neighborhood perceive the EU as inspiration. The EU should act together and become a proper superpower in an equal partnership with the United States to be able to preserve the power, prosperity and leadership of the West39.

The Sikorski’s speech was strongly criticized by the right-wing opposition in Poland and generally supported by the coalition parties and the rest of opposition. The main element of the critique was the lack of previous EU debate in Poland. Many political leaders were rather surprised to have heard such a strictly federal approach to the Union. The vision of the EU presented in Berlin was discussed by the leading media all over Europe and also judged as the federal concept. Those are only preliminary evaluations based on some emotional attitudes and neglecting the possible tactical character of the speech made just before the sitting of the European Council in December 2011. Nevertheless, the address is the reference point for other EU visions to be worked out in Poland and – to some extent – elsewhere.

3� Ibidem.38 Ibidem.39 Ibidem.

6. Conclusions

The full exploration of Poland’s presidency in the Council must include the analysis of its implementation. After its completion the positive, negative and ambivalent results can be named. As the positive outcomes of Polish presi-dency can serve the following events: (a) the conclusion of the accession treaty with Croatia (though the negotiations were completed by Hungarian Presiden-cy); (b) the acceptance and entry into force of the ‘six pack’, i.e. the set of five regulations and one directive aiming at the stabilization of the Eurozone; (c) the interim conclusion of discussion on the European patent; (d) a political agreement on the program referring to the food for most deprived persons; (e) avoiding of exclusion of some member states (incl. Poland) from the general debate on EU future; (f) a good evaluation of the presidency by the European Parliament and the Commission; (g) high abilities of Polish officials in day-to-day EU administering.

To the negative outcomes belong: (a) a very limited influence on the re-sults of the European Council of December 2011 where decisions on the Fiscal Compact and further EU reform with some disintegrating elements have been made; (b) the exclusion from decision-making process concerning the details of the Eurozone reforms; (c) the lack of progress in human rights protection in Belarus and some other states; (d) disability to reach some goals connected with national interests (for instance in energy policy and the CAP); (e) the cre-ation of new domestic political cleavages concerning the debate on EU future.

There are also at least three results of Polish presidency to be judged rat-her ambivalently. The first one is the conclusion of the association agreement with Ukraine without further initialing. The reason was an objection of some member states to political situation in Ukraine in the sphere of human rights protection. Polish authorities were not able to persuade any of parties inte-rested to change their positions. The second unclear result is the conclusion of the climate change conference in Durban where all essential decisions had been actually postponed. The third outcome disputed is the Eastern Partner-ship Summit that ended with no far-reaching decisions and was symbolized by the absence of representation of Belarus.

A deeper analysis must take into account the theoretical insights creating the background of this paper. This allows to present five conclusions. Firstly, LI theory of European integration seems to offer a good explanation of state’s po-licy in the EU. The basic assumption of this theory is based, however, not only

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on the view that member states represent and defend their national interests but also on another view: that the leading role in the EU is played by the biggest states with their vital interests. With this in mind, the role of the member state holding the presidency is not as important as it could have been expected40: the case of Poland is an extremely interesting matter, since its success or failure can be used as a measure-tool of the real Poland’s position in the EU.

Secondly, in view of LI, national interests and their further expression re-sult to a great extent from internal (national) debate and should be seen on broader background of national institutions, cultures, traditions etc. Therefore legal, political, administrative and social dimensions of state’s position in the EU cannot be underestimated – on the contrary: they create the system of de-cisive factors of state’s behavior.

Thirdly and most importantly, the external element of LI vision is backed by Polish example only partially. Strong formal position in many EU institu-tions gives chance to build wide coalitions and use potential to express own interests, sometimes with clashes with other partners. The presidency, howe-ver, is not a good tool in this respect. The priorities chosen by Polish authorities result from two main sources, i.e. state’s own goals and the general EU agenda, while all-European objectives seem to prevail. The same applies to the imple-mentation phase of Polish presidency.

Fourthly and also importantly, the internal element of LI vision is supported by Polish case also to some extent only. The legal background of Polish EU mem-bership is well-developed and potentially effective, but at the same time there are many (largely rational) limitations that exclude many actors from Polish EU debate. The problem remains feasible in respect of political and social dimen-sions: European questions are quite intentionally excluded from a lively political debate, while the public is both strongly pro-European and non-aware.

Fifthly, the quality of administration seems to have been the vital element of Polish presidency. The group of highly-specialized officials with strictly de-fined tasks could decide on the success or failure: after all the presidency after the Treaty of Lisbon has been reduced to administrative functions with some occasional political elements. In this situation LI theory offers a rather limited background for analysis.

40 Cf. B. Crum, Can the EU Presidency Make Its Mark on Interstate Bargains? The Italian and the Irish Presidencies of the 2003-04 IGC, „Journal of European Public Policy” 200�, Vol. 14, No. 8, p. 1210.

Monika Kowalska

The Right to Trial and to Constitutional Complaint as Examples of Changes Adapting the Polish System of Guarantees of Individual

Rights to European Legal Standards

1. Introduction

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 199�1 clearly states the need for ensuring effective ways to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals. It results, inter alia, from the fact that the former constitution, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland of 22nd July, 19522, gave limited possibilities of enforcing human and civil rights established in it. In every modern democratic country not only constitutional regulation of individual rights but also the mech-anisms of their protection have developed under the influence of various factors and political systems. Undoubtedly, in the case of Poland such factors were his-torical experiences. On the other hand, there is a tendency to standardisation and referring to the proven European standards of a particular legal institution also in the scope of ways to protect individual freedom and rights.

In the light of the currently binding Constitution of Poland, the judiciary is constituted by courts (the Supreme Court, courts of general jurisdiction, ad-ministrative courts and military tribunals) and tribunals (Constitutional Tri-bunal and State Tribunal). Thus judicial power has been significantly increased and ipso facto its objective scope has been extended3. However, broadening the circle of public authorities ranked as the judicial power does not indicate that all of them are organs of the judiciary. In the light of Article 1�5 of the Constitution of Poland these organs are only Supreme Court, courts of general jurisdiction, administrative courts and military tribunals. Thus, the Constitution assumes that only courts have the jurisdiction, which is widely understood as law dis-putes settlement when using state coercive measures by appropriate authorities

1 Dz. U. 199�, No. �8, poz. 483.2 Dz. U. 1952, No. 33, poz. 232 with changes.3 B. Naleziński, Organy władzy sądowniczej, [in:] Prawo konstytucyjne RP, ed. by P. Sarnecki, Warszawa 2005, p. 390.

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The Right to Trial and to Constitutional Complaint as Examples of Changes...

by applying adequate rules of procedure. Thereby, the right to trial by jury is ex-ercised according to the rule, that law cases in which a citizen is a party, should be decided by independent courts. This rule arises from the essence of demo-cratic law state and is stated in the European Convention on Human Rights4.

In Poland bodies of judicial powers: realise justice (courts); verify legality of legislative acts (Constitutional Tribunal and also administrative courts in the scope of local laws acts); resolve conflicts of powers (Constitutional Tribu-nal and Supreme Administrative Court); considerate of the constitutional com-plaint (Constitutional Tribunal) and give law interpretation5. The Constitution of Poland defines the most important principles of court organization and op-eration, that is it defines several basic principles on which courts’ structure and their functioning procedure is based6.

Organizationally, the court system is not only separate from, but also inde-pendent on other bodies and authorities. Courts, as a separate power in the sys-tem of powers separation, are under the authority of neither legislature nor ex-ecutive in regard of judgment. Thus the two powers cannot control the courts’ decisions and a change of the decisions may be made only in appeal proceed-ings thus by the appeal or court cassation decision. Thus, the power of the Min-ister of Justice has been restricted to supervision over the court administration. Yet the Parliament may only define the system, organization and activity of the courts, but only when executing its legislative function. What is more, it estab-lishes which act is classified as the forbidden and its level of penalty�.

Referring to the rules of judiciary organization and the procedures of its functioning, the principle of two-tiered proceedings should be mentioned (Ar-ticle 1�6 par. 1 of the Constitution of Poland) which ensures that in every court case there must be a procedural possibility of appeal to a higher court to review the judgment delivered by the court in the first instance. The rule concerns legal proceedings, which constitute the majority of cases adjudicated by courts. The two tier principle is a minimum requirement and Article 1�6 par. 1 of the Constitution is deliberately formulated in an open-ended way that allows cre-ating further procedural steps, e.g. cassation. However, allowing cassation in particular types of cases depends on a legislator and is never a constitutional 4 Protocols No. 2, 3, 5, 8: The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Dz.

U. 1993, No. 61, poz. 284).5 L. Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne. Zarys wykładów, Warszawa 2010, p. 341.6 See: W. Skrzydło, Ustrój polityczny RP w świetle Konstytucji z 1997 r., Zakamycze 2000, p. 225.� See: M. Jabłoński, Uwagi o ewolucji gwarancji niezawisłości i niezależności sędziów i sądów powszechnych,

[in:] Studia nad prawem konstytucyjnym, ed. by J. Trzciński, B. Banaszak, Wrocław 199�, p. 89; J. Jaskiernia, Sądownictwo powszechne-założenia konstytucyjne i reforma dostosowawcza [in:] Sądy i Trybunały w Konsty-tucji i praktyce, ed. by W. Skrzydło, Warszawa 2005, p. 198.

requirement as the constitution does not bring into existence a three-tier prin-ciple of legal proceedings8.

But, what is more important and worth highlighting here, is that the cur-rent Constitution of Poland clearly points at judicial protection of infringed laws and freedoms in accordance with European standards. In Article 45 par. 1 of the Constitution it is stated that „Everyone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and independent court”. The article’s presence in the Constitution makes the right to trial by jury one of the individual rights and the human right that guarantees one’s human dignity, sense of security and creates a sense of be-ing protected by law while courts stand as guarantors of those rights9. What is more, the constitutional claim is a novelty introduced in 199� in Article �9 of the Constitution of Poland and it is a specific measure of constitutional rights and freedoms protection used in the Constitutional Tribunal.

2. The Right to Trial

The right to trial by jury, in a broad sense, means that in a particular coun-try courts and not administrative bodies of executive power or a civil servant are judiciary bodies (the principle of judicial justice). It creates the possibility of reference, when it is needed, to an independent, objective appraisal of an im-partial judge. And the notion of the right to trial by jury itself can be defined as a right to request recognition and decision on a criminal, civil and administra-tive case, given by a court independent on other state authorities and political parties, that is subordinate only to the Constitution and Acts of Parliament10. It is difficult to imagine a state ruled by law (Article 2 of the Constitution of Poland) without asserting the right to trial by jury.

The right to trial by jury, as an important mechanism guarantying the ba-sic human rights and freedoms, nowadays has a character of a universal rule and is present in most of the legal systems, among others in the Polish system from 199�, as a principle included in the Constitution. It is one of the basic rights of an individual in contact with the state. What is more, it is secondary to other rights and freedoms, whose protection it serves for. Since the need of its assertion appears only when exercising of other rights and freedoms is re-8 Adjudication of Constitutional Tribunal, May 30, 200�, sygn. akt SK 68/06 (Dz. U. 200�, No. 106 poz. �31).9 P. Sarnecki, Nota do art. 45, [in:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, ed. by L. Garlicki, Vol. III,

Warszawa 2003, p. 2.10 See: L. Wiśniewski, Gwarancje praw i wolności człowieka i obywatela w przyszłej konstytucji, [in:] Prawa, wolności

i obowiązki człowieka i obywatela w nowej polskiej konstytucji, ed. by Z. Kędzia, Poznań 1990 pp. �2-�3.

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stricted. The right to trial by jury gives to every subject of rights and freedoms unfettered access to procedures ensuring impartial, fair and public hearing.

For many years the rule has found lasting confirmation in international treaties, like in Art. 14 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights11 or particularly in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms („everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law…”)12, the document that includes not only the catalogue of fundamental human rights but also a mechanism of their effective protection. Since, in case of, for example infringement of the right to trial by jury guaran-teed by the Convention, there is a possibility of complaining to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

However it can be done on condition that the state recognized and implemen-ted the provisions of this Convention into its internal order, which Poland did in 1991. Adverse judgment of the Court, proving the human rights abuses, involves paying compensation. In the case of Poland, these kind of judgments are delivered relatively frequently as, contrary to expectations, the right to trial by jury, as well as other freedoms and rights, has been frequently violated in this country.

The right to trial by jury appeared in Poland as a result of structural trans-formations initiated at „round table” talks in 1989. The driver of the changes in this case appeared to be the Constitutional Amendment Act of 29 December 1989 which brought the notion of the law state and subsequent case law of the Constitutional Tribunal to constitutional principles13. Earlier, the right to trial was not approved by post-war lawmakers. Primarily, the gap was only filled by the resolutions of art. 45 of the Constitution of Poland adopted in 199�. Moreo-ver, the constitutional regulation in art. �� par. 2 clearly indicates that „statutes shall not bar the recourse by any person to the courts in pursuit of claims al-leging infringement of freedoms or rights.” The right to trial is additionally accredited by the principle of tiered proceedings as a procedural rule of court proceedings and decision making. According to it (art. �8 of the Constitution) each party has the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at the first stage. So, in art. 45 par. 1 the subject of the claim is the hearing of a case, while the principle of tiered proceedings concerns the decision-making process

11 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by the United Nations General As-sembly on December 16, 1966 ( Dz. U. 19��, No. 38, poz. 16�).

12 Protocols No. 2, 3, 5, 8: The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Dz. U. 1993, nr 61, poz. 284).

13 J. Zakrzewska, Konstytucyjna zasada państwa prawnego w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, „Państwo i Prawo” 1992, No. �, p. 3.

itself. Tiered proceedings regulations being raised to the constitutional rank shall prevent mistakes and arbitrariness of the court of the first instance.

However, it should be remembered that even in a democratic law state one meets difficulties or even obstructions in the mechanisms of realization of the judiciary’s protective function towards an individual as expressed in the right to trial by jury. Unfortunately, practice clearly confirms this fact, as ultimately evidenced by the huge number of complaints submitted by the Polish citizens to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg against the Republic of Poland. Many of them concern misuse of detention or delays in Polish court proceedings and thus the long term process of adaptation of the Polish legal system to European standards is put in a very bad light. Still, too widespread remains a situation when, even if a party obtains a favourable judgment, the consequences of civil rights violation appear to be irreversible. More reasons behind the lack of effective realization of the judiciary’s protective function towards an individual may be given. For, apart from frequent violation of the right to hearing of one’s case without undue delay, so relatively quickly, the ju-diciary system is characterized by an inflexible use of the procedures. The facts themselves that judges are obliged to apply the principle of legitimacy and they are unable to use the non-legal criteria are obstructions of effective protection of individual’s rights. Moreover, the fact of formalizing court proceedings itself is an impediment for the citizens unfamiliar with the legal system. What is more, legal proceedings are still too costly for a proportion of the population (court expenses, the costs of expertise or legal aid), the effectiveness of enforce-ment of court judgments is low and the quality of court judgments itself often leaves much to be desired. In addition, vulnerability to corruption, submission to political influence and technological disparities have to be mentioned. The result is a critical assessment of Polish judiciary by the society, hence the effec-tiveness of protection of individual’s rights is low. And although both the 199� Constitution of Poland and Polish legislation incorporate into Polish law the standards characteristic of modern democracies, putting things into practice is more difficult14. On the other hand, the situation results in gaining credibility, prestige and public confidence by non-judicial authorities and bodies, like e.g. Ombudsman, that can provide citizens with expert advice or may even provide an alternative offering non-judicial problem-solving mechanisms.

As mentioned before, the right to trial by jury has had an important place in many international treaties. Given treaties establish particular standards 14 J. Zakrzewska, Konstytucyjna zasada państwa prawnego w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, „Państwo

i Prawo” 1992, No. �, p. 3.

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whose specifications are developed by empowered authorities’ decisions and national law of each country. The foundations in this regard were laid by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, the right was enacted by The European Convention on Human Rights from 1950, and geographically, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966 (ratified by Poland as soon as in 19��) expanded the scope of the right’s impact. How-ever, the basic act providing certain European standards in this regard remains The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) from 1950 – the inter-national agreement signed by the Member States of the Council of Europe that entered into force on 3 September, 1953.

The Convention established the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The complaints to the Court may be lodged by countries (so called interstate complaint) as well as by individuals, groups or non-governmental organizations (so called individual complaint). Strasbourg Court hears com-plaints from every individual who believes that he or she became a victim of a state that has violated the rights enshrined in the Convention for the Protec-tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its protocols. Moreover, the following admissibility criteria has to be fulfilled in order for the complaint to be investigated by the European Court of Human Rights:

1. the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies;2. no more than six months passed from the last internal decision com-

plained of;3. complainant has directly or indirectly been the victim of the rights

violation;4. the right to claim is not misused;5. the claim is not manifestly ill-founded;

So the European Court’s of Human Rights mechanism of control of hu-man rights infringements is only complementary to domestic remedies, as the international protection can be provided for an entitled subject only after exhaustion of all available domestic remedies and after the particular state’s final decision in a case.

The European Convention on Human Rights is often defined as the jewel in the crown of the Council of Europe and it illustrates its place among other acti-vities and achievements of the organization. Since the essence and the specific nature of the Convention lies not only in listing of the basic human rights and freedoms but particularly in establishing a control procedure that makes the

demand for the rights restoration possible and that grants adequate financial compensation to those, who consider that their rights have been violated. In case of proving that a particular country has infringed the rules of the Conven-tion, the European Court of Human Rights may order pecuniary compensation to be paid to the injured party, nevertheless it cannot set aside the judgments of the domestic courts. However, in such a situation the country is automatically required to change the legal and factual situation so as to comply with the pro-visions of the Convention. Otherwise, the sanction for ignoring the European Court’s sentence may be the suspension of membership of the country in the Council of Europe or, in extreme cases, even its exclusion from the Council.

For Poland, The European Convention on Human Rights was signed by prof. K. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 26th November, 1991 (ratified on 19th January 1993), and since 1st May, 1993 (after the recognition by the Polish Government of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights) Polish citizens may use the institution of the so called Strasbourg complaint to the Euro-pean Court. The Polish accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg authorities was accompa-nied by awareness of inevitable emergence of complaints against Poland and thus adverse judgments. The Poles are eager to use this possibility and their number still grows. For instance, in 1999 the Court gave 3 judgments in such cases while in 2006 it gave 115 of them. Next to Russia, France, Italy or Turkey, Poland is among the leaders of the states whence most of the cases come to Strasburg. Most frequently, Poland is demanded to compensate for negligent operation of courts and irregularities in restriction of freedom. The European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that a state’s responsibility is to organize the judiciary system in such a way that it is able to pass a judgment „within a reasonable time.”

3. The Constitutional Complaint

However, it has to be remembered that judicial mechanisms serve to prote-ct the rights of individuals in the time of examining a particular case and with a consequence for it. So the aim of this kind of mechanism is not a particular protection of the rights granted in the Constitution. Yet, it is the function of a constitutional complaint. It is frequently defined in literature as a „crowning idea of a law state” or as its „pillar” and it is highlighted that without the con-stitutional judiciary and the constitutional claim in a modern law state there would be no sanctions for violations of individual basic rights by a legislator.

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While Article 45 par. 1 of the Constitution of Poland creates the subjec-tive right of everyone to a hearing of his case before court, the constitutional claim, in accordance with the provisions of Article �9 par. 1 of the Constitu-tion of Poland shall be granted only when constitutional freedoms and rights shall be protected – and what is particularly important – only when „a court or organ of public administration has made a final decision”15. This premise is concreted by Article 46 par. 1 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act16 where the notion of „after trying all legal means” is used. So the constitutional claim cannot be submitted without previous court or administrative procedure. Then, the right to the complaint is given only after a final decision in a given court or administrative procedure. In this regard, the complaint procedure is special and subsidiary.

The constitutional complaint has in its assumptions two functions to fulfil: it is both a way to protect the individual rights and freedoms and a way to elimi-nate from a legal system the normative acts contrary to the constitution. For the legal structure of the constitutional claim in Poland political and legal context existing at the time of making the decision about introducing the claim to the legal system as well as lack of the constitutional claim in the Polish tradition were of great importance. In most of the solidified democracies (like Germany, Austria, Switzerland), in accordance with the model of the constitutional claim established by them, the most important element of the claim remains the one whose direct aim is the protection of basic human and civil rights, but leaving its subsidiary characteristics intact. The apparent reason of this fact is particularly the well-established system of legal remedies aiming directly at protecting the constitution itself. While in Poland the model of the complaint was discussed in a situation when the legal solutions to effectively protect the constitution against violations by a legislator were not enforced (for example the lack of the Consti-tutional Tribunal’s finality of decision). Thus, it seems that the protection of the objective interest (protection of the doctrine of supremacy of the Constitution ) was of primary importance, and the protection of the subjective interest (i.e. the constitutional civil rights infringed by unconstitutional acts) was of a secondary importance. Hence the significance of the constitutional complaint extended be-yond the issue of deciding in individual cases.

In this regard, the introduction of the constitutional complaint has un-doubtedly contributed to more frequent statements of the Constitutional Tri-

15 Z. Czeszejko–Sochacki, Skarga konstytucyjna w prawie polskim, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, No. 1 (24), pp. 35, 3�-38, 43.

16 Ustawa z dnia 1 sierpnia 199� r. o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym (Dz. U. 199�, No. 102, poz. 643 with changes.)

bunal that interpret the substantive meaning and the rules of effective estab-lishing and exercising the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. In the course of the proceedings initiated by lodging the constitutional claim several rulings were issued which stated that some normative acts existing in the Polish judiciary system were unconstitutional. Thus, the constitutional complaint contributed to derogation from the Polish legal system of many un-constitutional bills and other normative acts, protecting in this way public in-terest in the broad sense and substantially contributing to the realization of the doctrine of supremacy of the Constitution. And as a tool of constitutional norm control, the complaint shall be regarded positively. The Tribunal’s deci-sions issued in these cases are also an important source of defining a current structure of the fundamental rights in a country and they influence the chang-es regarding the rights’ protection in state authorities actions.

The prototype of the constitutional complaint, nowadays functioning in many European countries and being an integral competence of the constitutional jurisdiction, appeared in the area of German legal traditions. The Austria-Hun-garian Constitution from 186� gave the prototype of the complaint. Then the Re-ich Court came into being, where the citizens could have appealed if their rights had been infringed. In 1920 the first Constitutional Tribunal in the history was set up in Austria, which had decision-making competence in case of a constitutional complaint. Gradually, the complaint became an important element in the legal systems of subsequent European countries. In 1931 it was incorporated into the Constitution of Spain and in 1951 it was included to the Federal Constitutional Court Act in the Federal Republic of Germany. After the fall of communism, the same trend could have been observed also in the countries of the former Soviet bloc being in transition after the experiences of „brown” and „red” totalitarian-isms. It may be the evidence of recognition of the constitutional complaint’s spe-cial role as a guarantee of individual’s fundamental rights. Since the constitutional complaint provides opportunity to assert the constitutional rights by a natural or legal person in a specific procedure in the Constitutional Tribunal in a situation when the rights had been infringed by acts of public authorities or of these au-thorities’ failure to act, after exhaustion of all available legal remedies1�.

1� See: B. Banaszak, Skarga konstytucyjna, „Państwo i Prawo” 1995, No. 12, p. 5; B. Banaszak, Skarga konstytu-cyjna i jej znaczenie w zakresie ochrony praw podstawowych, [in:] Podstawowe prawa jednostki i ich sądowa ochrona, ed. by L. Wiśniewski, Warszawa 199�, p. 1�5; L. Garlicki, Trybunał Konstytucyjny w projekcie Komisji Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego, „Państwo i Prawo” 1996, No. 2, p. 12; J. Trzciński, Nota do art. 79, [in:] Konstytucja RP. Komentarz, ed. by L. Garlicki, t. I, Warszawa 1999, p. 1; P. Tuleja, M. Grzybowski, Skarga konstytucyjna jako środek ochrony praw jednostki w polskim systemie prawa, [in:] Sądy i trybunały w Konsty-tucji i praktyce, ed. by W. Skrzydło, Warszawa 2005, p. 106.

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The complaint had been previously unknown to Polish legislation and it was introduced only by the Polish Constitution from 2nd April, 199� and the Constitutional Tribunal was entrusted with substantial powers of decision-making. In accordance to Article �9 par. 1 of the Constitution „everyone whose constitutional freedoms or rights have been infringed, shall have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal for its judgment on the conformity to the Constitution of a statute or another normative act upon which basis a court or organ of public administration has made a final decision on his freedoms or rights or on his obligations specified in the Constitution.”

Two classic models of the constitutional complaint may be distinguished in legal science18. The wide-scope model gives the complainant a right to chal-lenge the Constitutional Tribunal constitutionality of an individual decision (so a court or an administrative decision) on his/her rights and freedoms. Whereas the narrow-scope constitutional complaint model is based only on an allegation of unconstitutionality of a rule of law being a basis for a final decision on indi-vidual’s rights and freedoms. In this model, a complainant who makes the con-stitutional complaint, although formally he challenges a bill or other normative act, brings the complaint because of the adverse court or administrative decision that was based on this bill or other normative act. In Poland, the second model was chosen which, on the one hand was an expression of concerns about flood-ing the Tribunal with the complaints, but on the other hand it was particularly a consequence of the attitude of judges, who were concerned about giving the control over their legal decisions to the Tribunal and in this way undermining the principle of legal certainty and stability of courts’ judgments. The idea of introducing the individual constitutional complaint to the Polish legal measures while working on the project of the Constitution of Poland was at that time re-garded negatively by both the Supreme Court and the National Council of the Judiciary19. The complaint’s validity itself was negated as well as the possibility of challenging courts’ decisions with the complaint. These authorities took the position that questioning a legal basis by an individual constitutional complaint should not aim to question a particular court decision but, at most, the complaint may question constitutionality of a particular rule law.

Finally, the narrow-scope constitutional complaint model prevailed – in-troduced by Article �9 of the Constitution of Poland – limiting its range to

18 See wider: B. Banaszak, Modele skargi konstytucyjnej, [in:] Skarga konstytucyjna, ed. by J. Trzciński, Warszawa 2000, pp. 20-31; E. Zwierzchowski, Modele skargi konstytucyjnej w państwach europejskich, [in:] Prawa człowieka a nowa Konstytucja RP – wybrane zagadnienia stosowania i ochrony, ed. by A. Łabno, Warszawa 1998, s. 80.

19 See wider: Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, p. 33.

infringements of the individual’s constitutional rights caused only by acts of statutory law. It was an attempt to reconcile social expectations of admitting to the citizens a proper tool of protection of their constitutional rights and freedoms with the concerns that the Tribunal may become an „over-superior court” verifying the Supreme Court’s decisions. Finally, the principle of legal certainty and stability of courts’ judgments was saved and it was accepted that not the infringement of the complainant’s constitutional rights by public au-thorities alone but only the constitutionality of the base of actions of the au-thority may be the subject of the constitutional complaint on the basis of Polish legal measures. So the Constitutional Tribunal – functioning as a „court of law” – considering the constitutional claim has been practically deprived of a possibility to refer to a court or an administrative decision that, according to complainant, infringes his/her basic rights, retaining the right to decide about the constitutionality of the normative act being a basis of the contested decision or sentence. Consequently, in literature, criticism of the Polish constitutional complaint model, as protecting the rights of the complainant not effectively enough, may be frequently encountered20.

What is more, in the Polish model, the right to lodge the constitutional complaint is granted only to the subject whose constitutional rights or freedoms had been infringed. Since a regulation may be questioned by a natural or legal person only if the regulation concerns this person’s rights. So it is not possible to lodge a complaint in the name of a third party (as can be done, for example, in case of a complaint to the Polish Ombudsman), whose rights, in one’s opinion, had been infringed. Thus, there always has to appear a particular loss on the part of applicant and the applicant always has to have an interest in bringing the action. Consequently, the complaint cannot be treated as actio popularis. The subject lodging the constitutional complaint has to be personally interested in elimination of his/her right’s infringement. The constitutional complaint is an ad hoc claim which means that it may appear only in connection to a particular case and particular infringement of the complainant’s legal rights21.

It is good that the Constitutional Tribunal in its case-law tends to give a broad interpretation of the notion of „everyone” used in Article �9 of the Con-stitution of Poland. Thus, this notion refers to every natural person – a citizen,

20 See: M. Safjan, Pozycja Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 r., [in:] Pięć lat Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa 2002, p. 3�; P. Hofmański, Prawo do sądu w sprawach karnych jako gwarancja ochrony praw człowieka [in:] Podstawowe prawa jednostki i ich sądowa kontrola, ed. by L. Wiśniewski, Warszawa 199�, p. 21�.

21 M. Kowalska, Organy władzy sądowniczej, [in:] Organy władzy publicznej w świetle Konstytucji Rzeczypospo-litej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku, ed. by Z. Szeliga, Lublin 2006, pp.1�2-1�3.

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a foreign national or a stateless person. Moreover, it involves in its scope legal persons – like e.g. social organizations, associations or political parties22. They may lodge the constitutional claim to the Constitutional Tribunal however, only if they are „beneficiaries of particular fundamental rights”23. The Consti-tutional Tribunal issued its further opinion on the subject in its resolution from 23rd March, 200024. In accordance to it, the constitutional complaint is entitled not only to a natural person but also to a legal person, but only on the condi-tion that the complaint concerns the rights and freedoms of this person. Some rights, like ownership, or some freedoms, like freedom to conduct a business, concern, by their nature, not only the natural persons but also the subjects not being natural persons. Moreover, the Constitution establishes some rights con-cerning collective entities e.g. trade unions. Thus, the constitutional complaint is entitled to a legal person in a situation when the infringed law or freedom belonged to the category of the rights whose subject is a legal person lodg-ing the constitutional complaint. Legal persons may exercise the rights to e.g. ownership (art. 64 of the Constitution of Poland), hearing of one’s case (art. 45 of the Constitution of Poland) or compensation for any harm (Article �� par. 1 of the Constitution of Poland). Attention should also be given to the opin-ion expressed by Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, who inferred the legal persons’ right to lodging the constitutional complaint from slightly different indications. He stated that the Constitution of Poland uses the term „everyone” in case of the constitutional claim as well as in Article 45 par. 1 of the Constitution of Poland. Both of the regulations are procedural constitutional guarantees and the enti-tlement to lodge the constitutional complaint may be considered a particular qualified type of right to trial by jury so it can be assumed that a legislator gave the same meaning to the term „everyone” in both this cases.

Furthermore, in relation to legal persons, the constitutional complaint is secondary as, in accordance with the Tribunal’s case-law, the complaint is ad-missible only if it serves to protect individual’s rights25. So broad interpretation of the term „everyone” used by a legislator, is primarily derived from the con-text of Article 3� par. 1 of the Constitution of Poland („Anyone, being under the authority of the Polish State, shall enjoy the freedoms and rights ensured by the Constitution.”) or by analogy with the right to trial by jury (Article 45 par.

22 W. Kręcisz, W. Zakrzewski, Skarga konstytucyjna a kontrola konstytucyjności prawa miejscowego, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 1998, No. 5, p. 65; J. Trzciński, Zakres podmiotowy i podstawa skargi konstytucyjnej, [in:] Skarga konstytucyjna, ed. by J. Trzciński, Warszawa 2000, pp. 46-54.

23 Post. TK z 6 kwietnia 1998r. Ts 9/98,OTK –supl. 1999, No. 1, poz. 2�.24 SK 6/99,OTK ZU 2000, No. 2, poz. 66.25 Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki, pp. 39 - 41; J. Trzciński, pp. 46-54.

1 of the Constitution of Poland), which is given not only to natural persons, and what is more important, it is confirmed by the Constitutional Tribunal’s case-law itself. This rule is restricted only in relation to foreign nationals with reference to their rights stated in Article 56 of the Constitution of Poland (i.e. the right of asylum in the Republic of Poland and the right to be granted the status of a refugee). This restriction is justified by the fact that the right of asy-lum, like any other human right, is primarily a discretionary act of state power, and only secondly is it a subjective right of an individual.

It is assumed that, in the doctrine of constitutional law, this kind of de-fining subjects entitled to lodge the constitutional complaint is primarily an expression of:

• an individualistic concept of citizens’ rights and freedoms, in which the introduction of a measure depends on a concerned individual;

• a shift of responsibility for the protection of rights and freedoms to the directly concerned subjects; a state can support the described protec-tion by means of competences of some authorities to apply for abstract or concrete control in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity of a state;

• admission, that the guarantee of substantive rights realization has to be stated directly in the Constitution of Poland (the guarantees are formulated, amongst other things, because of the uncertainty as to respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms)

• an attitude, that the Constitution of Poland is directly applicable by „everyone” in respect of fundamental individual rights, in particu-lar case of infringement of his/her constitutional rights, to realize the constitutional citizen rights by giving the right to the constitutional court26.

However, it has to be remembered that the constitutional complaint is not universal and is not intended to protect any and all rights, but only the fundamental ones. Thus the statutorily guaranteed rights and freedoms are protected but only by courts, and their warranty is definitely the right to jury trial. While the basis of the constitutional complaint is provided by infringe-ment of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms – which is a kind of limitation in itself2�.

26 B. Szmulik, Skarga konstytucyjna – polski model na tle porównawczym, Warszawa 2010, p. 112 2� See wider: J. Trzciński, pp. 55-65; B. Naleziński, Przedmiot skargi konstytucyjnej w Polsce – wybrane zagad-

nienia na tle orzecznictwa TK, [in:] Konstytucja i sądowe gwarancje jej ochrony. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Pawła Sarneckiego, Kraków 2004, p. 164.

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The constitutional complaint may be appealed to the Constitutional Tri-bunal „for its judgment on the conformity to the Constitution of a statute or another normative act”. A subject of the constitutional complaint – due to the model applied in Poland – may solely be a normative act, provided that in this procedure only the law that was a basis for a court or administrative decision may be questioned. Whereas the Constitutional Tribunal dismisses the con-stitutional complaints submitted solely against a particular court or admin-istrative decision as the Article �9 par. 1 of the Constitution of Poland rejects a constitutional complaint investigation of individual decisions. However, the right to lodge the constitutional complaint arises only when a court or organ of public administration has made a „final” decision on the complainant’s freedoms, rights or duties. For the essence of the constitutional complaint is its exceptional and subsidiary nature. That is why the constitutional complaint may be launched only in a situation when the complainant has no more pro-cedural measures in the case. So the Constitutional Tribunal intervenes only after exhausting all legal procedures permitting to decide on the case that may be started by the complainant himself28. However, the constitutional complaint has to be submitted within 90 days of the delivery of the final decision to the complainant29. It is a final date which is fixed and non extendable.

Originally, a registration fee was charged for the constitutional complaint, but the duty has been abolished as it constituted a barrier for initiation of pro-ceedings before the Tribunal. However, the rule of so called „compulsory rep-resentation by a lawyer” was preserved and it imposes an obligation to write a complaint for the complainant by a lawyer (unless the complainant is a judge, a public prosecutor, a notary, or a professor or doctor of law studies). It was ar-gued, that the constitutional complaint is of exceptional nature and that there is a need of correct formulation of the complaint and of limitation of the cases when the complaint would be premature, unnecessary or inadmissible. How-ever, in the case when the complainant is not able to bear the costs of legal aid, he may ask the proper district court for appointment of a public solicitor and by the time the court considers the application, the three-months deadline to lodge the complaint is delayed. Moreover, the Constitutional Tribunal notifies the Ombudsman each time when the constitutional complaint is lodged and the Ombudsman may apply for participation in the proceedings, becoming a party. A peculiarity of the proceedings initiated by the constitutional com-

28 M. Kowalska, p. 1�3.29 And so the term has been extended by the legislature, as in the original version of the complainant had only 60

days to lodge a constitutional complaint after a final decision in his case.

plaint is the opportunity of the Constitutional Tribunal to issue a provisional decision on withholding or suspension of the sentence that was appealed, if carrying out of the sentence would have irreversible effects which serves to protect the individual civil rights.

The consequences of the Constitutional Tribunal decisions given in the constitutional complaint proceedings have, by their nature, a twofold mean-ing. It has to be remembered that, on the one hand, they may lead to changes in the legal order. On the other hand, they may bring changes in the legal situ-ation of the complainant and the people, in respect of whom some particular and individual court and administrative decisions had been made on the basis of the appealed regulations or on the basis of which proceedings are underway (opportunity for healing a legal situation of an individual)30. Since this kind of judgment, in accordance to Article 190. par. 4 of the Constitution of Poland „shall be a basis for reopening proceedings, or for quashing the decision or other settlement in a manner and on principles specified in provisions applica-ble to the given proceedings”. So, although the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal stating unconstitutionality of a regulation is passed in relation to fin-ished proceedings, at the same time it is a reason to reopen the proceedings or to quash the decisions – thus to retroactive authorization of an individual legal situation by deciding on the case (with retroactive effect) on the grounds of already constitutional legal basis. The aim of this regulation is undoubtedly correcting the legal consequences of relying on the unconstitutional legal pro-visions, which requires setting aside legitimate acts of law enforcement that had been issued on the bases of these provisions and is a consequence of the model of the constitutional claim applied in Poland. On the other hand, what is worth mentioning, the Polish legal measures, which is not common in the measures of other countries, offer the opportunity for retroactive authoriza-tion of individual court decisions also in cases of questioning constitutionality of the legal provision being the basis of this decision, made in the proceeding of abstract review of constitutionality of legislation. It offers a broad scope of setting a decision aside, which remains, as it seems, in compliance with the principle of social justice or of the rule of law.

Taking everything into consideration, the constitutional complaint has existed in European legal culture for almost one and a half century. That was the time needed for forming certain basic principles, on the basis of which the inalienable rights of the individual may be protected more and more effectively. 30 See wider: J. Repel, Skutki prawne orzeczenia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w sprawie skargi konstytucyjnej, [in:]

Skarga konstytucyjna, ed. by J. Trzciński, Warszawa 2000, pp. 215-219.

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In the present legal system, the constitutional complaint is one of many tools for the protection of fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, it is conspicu-ous that it is a tool of an exceptional nature, having an influence on the whole system of public-law order in a country. Frequently, the complaint is used by the citizens as a final resort in a situation when other legal institutions had failed and appeared to be ineffective tools of protection of the infringed consti-tutional rights or freedoms. It creates an opportunity for a complainant to di-rectly initiate, in front of the Constitutional Tribunal, the proceedings aiming at reforming the current unconstitutional legislation. The essence of the com-plaint is questioning by an individual constitutionality of a bill or a normative act on the basis of which a final decision on the individual freedoms, rights or duties was made. And this makes it possible for the Constitution to become an applicable norm that is directly and effectively enforceable. The constitution is no longer, as it was in the communist system, only a political ideological decla-ration. It has become a collection of fundamental rules and principles carrying a guarantee of inherent human freedoms and rights.

It is worth mentioning here that the appearance of the constitutional com-plaint itself in the Polish legal system contributed to the fact that the Constitu-tional Tribunal adjudicated on numerous cases relating to certain fundamental issues among other things related to: property rights protection, property and intestacy laws, the right to trial by jury, the right to compensation in case of un-lawful acts of public authorities, the right to higher education at a state univers-ity or the right to equal treatment in relation to various constitutional rights of individuals. These achievements would not be possible without such intensive adjudication of the Constitutional Tribunal, that after some time became a real repository of knowledge about this institution. Undoubtedly, it promotes a bet-ter use of the constitutional complaint in practice.

Despite the fact that the constitutional complaint has advantages and fun-ctions presented above, there are critics of the complaint who raise numerous concerns about its current regulations. First of all, an apparent objection is raised concerning limited constitutional complaint foundation as the compla-int may be lodged only when the infringements of rights and freedoms result from an unconstitutional normative act (so called narrow-scope constitutio-nal complaint model) and as a consequence no individual decision may be the subject of the complaint. This complaint model is also known as a complaint against a rule. It is a significant difference between the Polish complaint and the complaints applied in many other European countries, where most of the

complaints are lodged against individual court and administrative decisions. Moreover, the Constitution of Poland does not allow for lodging the complaint in a situation when the constitutional rights and freedoms are infringed by implementation of a normative act itself.

Regulation introduced in Article 190 par. 4 of the Constitution of Poland has also attracted a lot of criticism. In accordance to it, a judgment of the Con-stitutional Tribunal on the non-conformity to the Constitution of a normative act shall be a basis for reopening of proceedings. In the opinion of some re-presentatives of legal professions, stating by the Constitutional Tribunal un-constitutionality of a normative act should have an effect of annulment of the decisions made on the basis of such act and the case should be transferred to the competent authority or court for reconsideration. It is emphasized, that this regulation provides another argument supporting the thesis that the constitu-tional complaint constitutes a tool for protection of normative act constitutio-nality and not for direct protection of complainants’ freedoms and rights.

The question therefore arises of whether the constitutional complaint in Polish solutions does not perform an objective function (guarantee of the supremacy of constitutional norms) rather than subjective one (protection of the human rights). Although the complaint offers the possibility of controlling legal norms, which is a value in itself, it does not effectively and directly protect the infringed rights of a complainant. Finally, the complainant does not obtain, in regards to his consti-tutional rights, removal of the infringement itself but only the cause of the infrin-gement. As the tribunal, in case of a positive decision on the complaint, decides on repealing the appealed normative act, however it does not annul the court or ad-ministrative decisions based on this act. Obviously, the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision open the complainant the way to set aside the individual decision infrin-ging his rights in an extraordinary procedure. However, the subsidiary nature of the complaint itself determines the lawsuit over defending the constitutional rights of the complainant to be laborious and long-lasting. As, at first, the citizen will have to undergo „normal” procedures, in which he is given a final decision infrin-ging his basic rights, secondly he lodges the constitutional complaint to the Con-stitutional Tribunal, however recognition of the complaint means only derogation of the unconstitutional legal basis for the individual decision, and does not change legal consequences of the decision. In order to achieve this aim the complainant needs to – having the Tribunal’s decision – insist on reopening proceedings, or on quashing the decision. As it is clearly seen, using the constitutional complaint pro-cedure requires from an individual great determination to assert his rights.

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Another objection concerns an obligation to entrust writing of a complaint to a lawyer, which makes the constitutional complaint more restrictive. The su-pporters of this opinion present numerous arguments for its support e.g. a po-ssible disagreement between the lawyer and the complainant as to the claim’s admissibility or validity or a possible delay in attorney appointment.

4. Conclusions

Taking all the above reflections on the constitutional claim into account, it should be stressed that the complaint is undoubtedly the citizen’s right to concern for the legal order, as well as it is an evidence that Polish constitutional system is heading for building a civil state. The complaint proves that legis-lative power is under control of those, for whom it passes the law. And if this law infringes the constitutional freedoms everyone, not only public authorities, may apply to the Constitutional Tribunal to examine if the Parliament had not infringed the Constitution. And that makes the constitutional complaints one of the most important tools for the protection of the human rights guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

Piotr Tosiek

Challenges of Europeanization in New EU Member States1

1. Introduction

Enlargements of 2004 and 200� strengthened the political position of the European Union on international scene and influenced the model of decision-making within the EU. There are many explanations of this process and its re-asons. The first is a political reason equaled to an export of stabilization, the se-cond is an economic reason relating to the expansion of patterns of free market economy aimed at creation of the biggest world player in this respect. The third is a cultural explanation referred to the return of some European countries to the mainstream. One of the perceptions could also be the concept of collecti-ve guilt. Decisions of the old member states to enlarge are seen as a historical restitution for countries affected by the Munich Agreement, the Molotov–Rib-bentrop Pact, and the Yalta–Potsdam conferences. This specific background contributed to the urgency and geographical scope of the enlargement2.

All those explanations are connected with the history while the real prob-lem for today is an actual behavior of new member states in the EU decision-making system. The main thesis of this paper is rooted in the view that member states play a leading role in the EU system but newcomers have – both together and as single players – a moderate impact on creation of the most important decisions. At the same time they are becoming full EU members in terms of internal and external behavior (which is equaled to Europeanization) but this process meets some obstacles. The following elements will be discussed: the position of member states in the Nice system and its limitations in the Lisbon system; the challenges connected with the membership and Europeanization; and the evaluation of political significance of new member states after first years of membership.

1 The article was written within the research project entitled Committee Decision-Makers in the European Union. Ex-perience of Polish Governmental Administration (N N116 191139) granted by the Polish National Science Centre.

2 A. Lasas, Restituting Victims: EU and NATO Enlargements through the Lenses of Collective Guilt, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2008, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 101-104.

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Challenges of Europeanization in New EU Member States

2. New Member States in EU Decision-Making System

Analysis of the role of a member state in the EU system should start from intergovernmental assumptions3. In this view the European Council and the Council remain the most important decision-making institutions. There are three sources of bargaining power in those bodies: state sources of power, in-stitutional sources of power and individual sources of power. The state dimen-sion is the most fundamental, whereas the institutional and individual dimen-sions play a secondary role and mainly mediate the impact of structural power asymmetries4.

Another problem is a peer selection in EU intergovernmental negotiations. Saam and Sumpter find six mechanisms in this respect: peer selection based on ex ante co-ordination, preference, salience, power, neighborship or random pro-cesses. The first one is connected with the accomplishment of national preferen-ce formation and economizing on transaction costs: EU member states choose those governments to cooperate which they have already contacted before. The second mechanism is based on the preference for the negotiation outcome. The reason for choosing a peer is very pragmatic and irrespective of other features: EU member states choose those governments which have a preference for a si-milar negotiation outcome. The third model relates to high intensity of national preferences. The states with a high salience with respect to an issue are chosen as good cooperators. The fourth option refers to the powerful position of a gover-nment. Taking into account the right to veto a more cautious hypothesis can be proposed: EU Member States prefer less powerful governments rather than those powerful. The fifth mechanism is based on geographical neighborship. However, governments that produce negative externalities or benefit from positive exter-nalities of their neighbors have a tendency to use the domestic policies of their neighbors. In the sixth model the peers are selected at random but a completely random network may be difficult to motivate, since governments rather base on their peer selection in some manner. An alternative explanation is rooted in the hypothesis that decisions are made through knowledge of what positions are held by the other governments. It has to be stressed that those idealistic models can be applied simultaneously or in an interfered way5.

3 Cf. A. Moravcsik, K. Nicolaidis, Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 1999, Vol. 3�, No. 1, pp. 59-85.

4 J. Tallberg, Bargaining Power in the European Council, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 2008, Vol. 46, No. 3, p. 685.

5 N. J. Saam, D. Sumpter, Peer Selection in EU Intergovernmental Negotiations, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2009, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 358-361.

There are also other explanations of the very nature of the EU that do not seem to be far away from the state-centric concept while approaching to some federalist visions. This is exemplified in the works of Schmidt who suggests transforming (the perception of) the EU into a regional state, i.e. the entity with state-like qualities and powers in many policy domains, with its ever-enlarging territorial reach and its member states’ differentiated participation in policies. It is a new perception of the well-known notion. Firstly, the state in regional state is a reflection of EU’s state-like qualities in areas such as interna-tional trade, monetary policy, competition policy and jurisprudence. Secondly, the regional in this category suggests that the EU is not a nation-state but its members are themselves nation-states in a regional union6.

With this in mind, it has to be noticed that the formal position of member states in the institutional system should create a basis for the building of coa-litions enabling their participants to articulate own interests and achieve goals equaled to efficient decisions. Another problem is the ability and willingness of some member states to influence rules, proceedings and decisions.

The most important institution from the point of view of state’s influence is the Council. The majority of Council’s decisions in 2004-2011 were taken formally according to the qualified majority rule. The number of weighted votes and the threshold of majority were modified twice in this period. A decisive element can be the blocking minority. Table 1 presents figures relating to pre-Lisbon state of the art. In the first six months after 2004 enlargement the blocking minority was equaled to 29,8% of the total votes cast, while all new member states taken together (EU10) represented exactly that power. In the Nice system the blocking minority threshold went down to 28% but all new members gathered only 93,3% of this value. After 200� enlargement the blocking minority went down once again to 26,4%, while new members (EU12) have at their disposal 118,�% of this minority.

Table 1. Blocking minorities in the Council before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon

Time Total number of votes Blocking minority Number of votes EU10/12

1.05.2004-31.10.2004 124 37 37

1.11.2004-31.12.2006 321 90 84

1.01.2007-30.11.2009 345 91 108


6 V. A. Schmidt, Re-Envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy, „Journal of Common Mar-ket Studies” 2009, Vol. 4�, Annual Review, pp. 25-26.

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The respective thresholds are modified, when the new double majority sy-stem from November 2014 is applied (Table 2). The blocking minority is equa-led to 35% of the total EU population and at least four member states. Newco-mers (EU12) represent 20,�% of the total population and hardly 59,1% of the blocking minority.

Table 2. Blocking minorities in the Council after entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon

Time Total number of votes Blocking minority Number of votes EU12

1.12.2009-31.10.2014 345 91 108

1.11.2014-31.03.2017 499,7(345)

174,9(91)

103,3(108)

1.04.2017- 499,7 174,9 103,3


In order to strengthen the position of member states belonging to the mi-nority the new Ioannina compromise has been introduced. This mechanism predicts the postponement of a decision. Table 3 presents the rules of the com-promise during the transitional period and thereafter. If the double majority system applies before 1 April 201�, the states representing three quarters of the blocking minority (for instance 26,25% of the total EU population) may indicate their opposition to the Council adopting an act by a qualified majority and – as a result – the Council shall discuss the issue again. New member states’ power is equaled to �8,�% of the votes required. A new variant will be introduced on 1 April 201�: the threshold goes down to 55% of the blocking minority (19,25% of the total population), while new member states have 10�,4% of this value.

Table 3. Variants of Ioannina compromise after entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon

Time Blocking minority Ioannina minority Number of votes EU12

1.11.2014-31.03.2017 174,9 131,2 103.3

1.04.2017- 174,9 96,2 103,3


The analysis of the formal position of new member states in the Council can serve as a starting point to further research. Being the precondition of sta-tes’ behavior, the voting power can serve as an important tool of negotiations with other partners (inside and outside the system). The more detailed findings are discussed in the conclusions.

3. Europeanization Challenges

The membership in the European Union is not the final stage of the game. On the contrary, this is the beginning of a very demanding phase of state’s acti-vities. With regard to the new member states four main challenges connected with four main spheres of problems should be identified. The first is the deci-sion-making challenge addressed to the perception of the EU system as a tool of achieving national goals. The second is the post-conditionality challenge re-lating to continuation of reforms implied by the process of membership nego-tiations. The third is the compliance challenge referred to problems that arise from the transposition, implementation and application of EU law. The fourth challenge is linked to the perception of the position of EU norms in internal legal systems of new member states.

3.1. Decision-making Challenge

The decision-making in the EU is a very complicated phenomenon. For the newcomers it creates the challenge with regard to (social) learning and ability to act within the system in a functional and efficient way. Copsey and Haughton suggest analyzing four hypotheses on national preference formation in the new member states. The first is rooted in the view that states prioritize those areas of European policy that are perceived to compensate for their shortcomings. The actual behavior seems to support this view. All the newcomers are relatively active if, for instance, the questions of structural policy or budget are on the agenda. The second hypothesis relates to the economic situation: as some of the new member states become richer they will become less keen on distributive politics. This is also supported by the existence of clashes in the sphere of agri-cultural policy: some states are not interested in big reforms while some others perceive this whole policy as an obstacle to economic progress. The reason is of course the economical structure of those states. The third hypothesis is focused on the future: regardless of the government in power new member states will

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advocate further enlargement of the Union. This attitude can be explained by geographical position and historical experience. They, possibly with the excep-tion of Cyprus and Malta, are interested in an eastward export of stabilization and their shift to the very core of the EU. The fourth hypothesis refers to social transition: where trade unions are weak and the business lobby is powerful, preferences will be shaped by the interests of employers. This remark is con-nected with the liberal pattern of reforms undertaken in member states from Central and Eastern Europe�. Moreover, the same authors argue that first of all smaller states can shift their economic preferences as they become net contri-butors to the EU budget. They predict a growing divergence in the positions of new member states in other spheres as well8.

In their case-study Dür and Mateo suggest that at least in negotiations of the EU Financial Perspective 200�-2013 there were no big differences in behavior of old and new member states. The authors cautiously find this conclusion actu-al also in other areas9. They propose analyzing some hypotheses relating to the attitudes of member states: (1) large countries with more power resources rely more on hard bargaining tactics than smaller countries; (2) the bigger the net contribution to the EU budget of a country, the more it relies on hard bargaining; (3) governments of countries with Eurosceptic populations rely more on hard bargaining than governments with pro-European populations; (4) new member states are more likely to resort to hard bargaining than old member states10.

Rant and Mrak confirm those views and go even further. The empirical exploration of negotiations on the EU Financial Perspective 200�-2013 – com-paring hypothetical coalitions based on quantified national interests (partial net budgetary balances) and the actual coalitions – shows that the national interests were the driving force behind this process. The main issue was a con-frontation between net contributors and net recipients over the cohesion policy issue11. New member states, with Poland on the top, participated very actively in that clash-like process.

Neuman-Stanivukovic and Neuman, on the Czech example, analyze another element of the decision-making challenge. They describe the European Union as a multi-level governance system with multiple centers of legislative initiative and � Cf. N. Copsey, T. Haughton, The Choices for Europe: National Preferences in New and Old Member States, „Jour-

nal of Common Market Studies” 2009, Vol. 4�, No. 2, pp. 2�2-2�3.8 Ibidem, p. 284.9 A. Dür, G. Mateo, Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU’s Financial Perspective,

2007–13, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 2010, Vol. 48, No. 3, p. 5�5.10 Ibidem, pp. 565-56�.11 V. Rant, M. Mrak, The 2007–13 Financial Perspective: Domination of National Interests, „Journal of Common

Market Studies” 2010, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 369.

decision-making along vertical lines. Such a system is in conflict with non-fede-ral tradition of most newcomers. At the same time, both territorial organization and foreign policy go into the core of the very notion of statehood: competen-ces of regions and their participation in national decision-making is legislatively protected but they find the same barriers of centralized traditions and a political culture as non-state actors with strictly informal ties with the EU12.

However, the membership offers intrastate actors new ways of influence and contributes to the pluralization of domestic interests. This impact is con-ditioned by domestic institutions and political culture and varies across policy areas. On the other hand, the lack of a consensus-based approach to gover-nance is reflected in the top-down and hierarchical connections between the central government and the intrastate actors. Democratic culture does not al-low for a polycentric organization of governance. State’s communication with the EU is mainly uniform and centrally coordinated. This has implications on EU governance: connecting Europeanization and denationalization of dome-stic governance, resulting in furthering of the EU’s heterarchical structure, is only partly backed by Czech experience. The consolidation of polycentrism that would highlight the presence of the intrastate sector in the Union is missing. The decisive role is played by the domestic setting: institutional memory and political culture13.

3.2. Post-conditionality Challenge

Pridham, limiting his research to two new member states, discusses the problem of political conditionality during the process of EU eastern enlarge-ment and its continuation in the membership phase. He presents four hypothe-ses. The first relates to Routinization and Status Quo Bias, where continuity established through habit extends beyond EU entry and favors the durability of conditionality. The second is called Pressures for Reversal. In this view Euro-peanization has its own limitations, since the top-down conditionality during accession left little space and little time for value commitment to emerge. The third hypothesis is focused on Post-Accession External Pressures. The conti-nuity may come from a more diffuse situation, while other pressures than di-rect monitoring of the political conditions assume an importance following

12 S. Neuman-Stanivukovic, M. Neuman, Domestic Preference Formation in the Czech Republic vis-ŕ-vis the EU’s Foreign and Regional Policy: Polycentrism or Statecentrism?, paper presented at the Fifth Pan-European Confer-ence on EU Politics, Porto, 23-26 June 2010, pp. 1, 26.

13 Ibidem, pp. 2�-28.

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EU entry (for instance the procedure of Art. � TEU). The external impact may operate informally through pressure from other member states or through ex-posure (for instance by the media). The fourth hypothesis is called Social Le-arning. Norms and beliefs are being created and a shift from instrumental to conviction-based behavior of the political elites can be noticed. Participating in European policy networks plays also crucial role in this respect14.

Verification of those hypotheses gives rise to some interesting conclusions and further research. The Status Quo Bias hypothesis earns high ranks, since new structures and agencies created during the accession have remained in pla-ce and, depending on their performance, may provide a framework for further action. This is also true of the legislation. On the other hand, the Pressures for Reversal hypothesis has not been supported: there have been only some exam-ples where domestic pressures have enjoyed more political space. The third one, Diffuse External Pressures hypothesis, is also disputed. The out-of-EU actors are not able to monitor the situation effectively and the peer pressure is hardly present. The last option, Social Learning, could serve as a relatively good des-cription of post-accession situation. However, social learning at a deeper level than elites is necessary to complete the process. In conclusion, the post-acces-sion situation in terms of conditionality is very complex15.

In another contribution Dimitrova seeks to explain the consequences of conditionality in different respects. She identifies veto players and non-state actors linked to them as the key actors that will affect the outcome of the post-enlargement bargaining over the new rules16. In the post-communist context the opposition between a weak state and strong actors seem to be the decisive factor of political decision-making: the process of state building may be con-ceptualized as a competition over institutions between post-communist elites. This has as a consequence a weakened ability to implement policy visions and regulate society. If state institutions are weak, informal networks emerge to take over some of their functions while non-state actors have influence on furt-her course of the state1�.

Three possible outcomes of this situation with regard to the EU rules are predicted: (a) reversal of new rules; (b) institutionalization – where formal and informal rules align; (c) ‘empty shells’ – where actors ignore new rules but in-

14 G. Pridham, The EU’s Political Conditionality and Post-Accession Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakia and Latvia, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 2008, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 3�1-3�2.

15 Ibidem, pp. 383-385.16 A. L. Dimitrova, The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do New European Rules

Remain Empty Shells?, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2010, Vol. 1�, No. 1, p. 13�.1� Ibidem (quoting other authors), pp. 143-144.

formal rules are used. Some hypotheses based on the above are also discussed. Firstly, when formal rules are part of EU law, the most likely outcomes are institutionalization or ‘empty shells’. Similarly, when formal rules are part of EU law, but the veto players’ preferences are against these new rules, two sets of rules will be established as parallel structures, leading to ‘empty shells’. Second-ly, when formal rules are not part of EU law, reversal or institutionalization are equally possible and – when non-EU rules are opposed by veto players – they will be reversed. Thirdly, when veto players prefer new rules from the status quo, the old and new rules align and there is institutionalization18.

Another problem is explored by Rohrschneider and Whitefield. They pre-sent the partisan context of conditionality in the post-accession phase, analyzing party positions towards European integration between 2003 and 200�. They are sure that parties in the new member states are effective in meeting the minimal requirements identified as preconditions for effective representation, while the mechanism of presentation through parties is emerging in new democracies19.

On the other hand, Vaduchova presents the results of a broad research on corruption in member and candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe. She underlines that while the EU’s handling of levels of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania was right through the pre-accession process, it was shocked into more dramatic action from 2006. In the candidate or possibly candidate states (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) the challenges of tackling corruption and organized crime are even greater than in Bulgaria and Romania. The consequences of 200� accession show that post-accession pressure has only modest results and – to be effective – EU pressure must be applied before accession. Moreover, the domestic pres-sure is an important element as well: the media, the electorate and civil society are the most effective promoters of anti-corruption policy, while the state ad-ministration and the judiciary can be the main laggards in this respect20.

Epstein and Sedelmeier analyze another element of the post-accession conti-nuity. They assume that conditionality has been particularly effective when the EU offered a credible membership incentive and when the governments did not consider the domestic costs of compliance threatening to their power. Still, af-ter EU’s eastern enlargement the influence of international institutions could be

18 Ibidem, p. 146.19 R. Rohrschneider, S. Whitefield, Consistent Choice Sets? The Stances of Political Parties towards European Integration

in Ten Central East European Democracies, 2003-2007, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2010, Vol. 1�, No. 1, pp. �1.

20 M. A. Vaduchova, Corruption and Compliance in the EU’s Post-Communist Members and Candidates, „Journal of Common Market Studies” 2009, Vol. 4�, Annual Review, pp. 59-60.

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decreased21. The reality shows, however, that the influence of the EU did not end with the enlargements. The new member states’ compliance has been durable both with the EU law and to some extent in areas of political conditionality22.

3.3. Compliance Challenge

Falkner and Treib analyze the problem of compliance in the old and new member states. They try to use their earlier studies on old member states, in which they identified three worlds of compliance. The main question is connected with an expectation that the new member states might behave according to their own logic, such as decreasing their compliance efforts after accession to take the revenge for conditionality. This expectation is not, however, supported by their study23.

The first model of compliance, typical for Denmark, Finland and Sweden, is called the world of law observance, where the compliance goal typically over-rides domestic concerns and transposition of EU law is usually in time and correct. Further application and enforcement is also successful, as the trans-position laws tend to be well considered and well adapted to the specific cir-cumstances. The second type, the world of domestic politics, is characteristic for Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Its main ele-ment is the domination of domestic concerns in case of a conflict of interests. Transposition is likely to be timely and correct where no domestic concerns dominate but in cases of a clash between EU requirements and domestic inte-rests non-compliance is the outcome. Moreover, application and enforcement are not a major problem – the main obstacle is political resistance at the trans-position stage. The third model (France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal) is equaled to the world of transposition neglect: as long as there is no powerful action by supranational actors, transposition obligations are not recognized and negligence at the transposition stage is the crucial factor. In some cases literal translation takes place at the expense of careful adaptation to domestic conditions with shortcomings in enforcement and application24.

In case of some member states the authors suggest creation of the fourth category: the ‘world of dead letters’. A typical behavior is then the transposition

21 R. A. Epstein, U. Sedelmeier, Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe after Enlargement, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2008, Vol. 15, No. 6, p. �95.

22 Ibidem, p. 803.23 G. Falkner, O. Treib, Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New Member States, „Journal

of Common Market Studies” 2008, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 293.24 Ibidem, pp. 296-298.

in a compliant manner, depending on the political constellation of domestic actors, with non-compliance at the later stage. The most important shortco-mings can be found in the court systems, the labor inspections and civil society systems. Ireland, Italy and four new member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia) belong to this group25.

Problems of compliance are also discussed by Steunenberg and Rhinard. After completing the empirical study, they find two relationships: the positive relationship shows that the higher the number of procedural veto players, the longer the transposition process, while the negative relationship means that the more experience a particular administrative unit has in transposing directives, the shorter the transposition time. The authors underline that much of scholar-ly attention in the field of transposition goes towards parliamentary actors and prime ministers but it is more likely the case that lower-level actors working within particular settings are the real players in transposition. Transposition is sometimes solely decided in an administrative context26.

Steunenberg and Toshkov present the results of their research on transposi-tion performance in all 2� member states. They find that the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe are doing well and are not worse than the rest of the EU in terms of transposition timeliness2�. Quite the opposite, new member states do better than many of the older member states. The authors underline, however, that transposition does not equal actual implementation28.

Sedelmeier, also pointing at the problem of compliance, starts from the as-sumption that hypothetically post-accession compliance with EU law will de-teriorate. He concludes, however, that the actual data on infringements suggest that all of the new member states outperformed all of the old members during the first four years of membership. This relates to the experience of pre-acces-sion conditionality connected with a greater susceptibility to shaming and an institutional investment in legislative capacity29.

The first element explaining good compliance is the threat of post-accession sanctions like financial penalties or safeguard clauses but empirical evidence shows that they do not create any special danger. The second element, offering a better ex-planation, is connected with the outcomes of conditionality, i.e. legislative capacity 25 Ibidem, pp. 308-309.26 B. Steunenberg, M. Rhinard, The Transposition of European Law in EU Member States: Between Process and

Politics, „European Political Science Review” 2010, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 515-51�.2� B. Steunenberg, D. Toshkov, Comparing Transposition in the 27 Member States of the EU: the Impact of Discre-

tion and Legal Fit, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2009, Vol. 16, No. �, p. 951.28 Ibidem, p. 966.29 U. Sedelmeier, After Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with EU Law in East Central Europe, „Journal

of European Public Policy” 2008, Vol. 15, No. 6, p. 806.

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and socialization. New member states made an institutional investment to increase the effectiveness of national adoption of EU law, which allowed them to transpose it into national legislation within a very short time. This was a result of special emergency-like procedures focused on the executive bodies and abandoning long parliamentary discussions. On the other hand, an emphasis on formal compliance may mask or generate problems of non-compliance with regard to practical appli-cation and enforcement. Socialization, another conditionality consequence, relates to perceiving good compliance as appropriate behavior. The elites remain sensitive to criticism and are more susceptible to the shaming strategies30.

3.4. Primacy Challenge

Sadurski seeks to analyze another element of the activity of new member states: the behavior of their constitutional courts. Many of them questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law on the basis of being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and democratic principles according to the legal reasoning framework used earlier in the Solange doctrine of the German constitutional court. A very important argument is a paradox: while accession to the EU was the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post-communist states, the supremacy of EU law is now resisted on these grounds31. The outcome of such a behavior is really far-reaching: the balance between the national and the European laws has shifted towards the national side because a number of new entrants have added their weight to the claims of the courts in old Europe, according to which supremacy cannot override national constitu-tional rules. On the other hand, looking for an explanation of this behavior, it is stressed that it reflects the uncertainty on the part of constitutional judges of the new member states, as to how to cope with the new situation32.

In another contribution Albi discusses the human rights protection issue. He points at an irony caused by the accession of new member states. The consti-tutional courts, after many years of pre-accession strategy aimed at protection of fundamental rights after the fall of the communism, started to downgrade the protection standards after accession. Their activities are based on the new constraints of supremacy of EU law33.

30 Ibidem, pp. 820-822.31 W. Sadurski, ‘Solange, chapter 3’: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – Democracy – European Union,

„European Law Journal” 2008, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 1.32 Ibidem, p. 29.33 A. Albi, Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession Conditionality and Post-Accession Conun-

drums, „European Law Journal” 2009, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 46.

The problem of primacy is connected with the perception of the role of de-mocracy and parliaments in new EU member states. In their study Loewenberg, Mishler and Sanborn emphasize that in Western Europe legislatures preceded democratization and contributed to the establishment and maintenance of de-mocratic regimes, while in Central and Eastern Europe legislatures and de-mocratic regimes appeared simultaneously. Attachment to democracy is based on institutional structures, economic performance and records in protecting human rights. Attachment to the parliaments, on the other hand, is influen-ced by cultural factors. Similarly to the experience of older democracies, atti-tudes towards parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe are interconnected with the attitudes to democracy. Attaching citizens to new political institutions must therefore include the respect for the actions of these institutions34.

What is more, it has to be underlined that primacy is a generally disputed issue. Member states must take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the treaties or resulting from action taken by EU. They abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the EU. However, the closer definition must have been reached by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its famous judgements, with the Costa case on the top. To put it briefly, it stems only from the case law that the EU law is a specific legal order independent from both international and natio-nal laws, while national provisions cannot be applied unless they correspond with EU provisions.

This blurry system was not reformed in the Treaty of Lisbon. The provi-sions on the character of the legal system and primacy are still not to be found in the primary law. The only new factor is declaration attached to the final act of the new treaty. According to this declaration „in accordance with well set-tled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law”. In the same document the opinion of the Council Legal Service is recalled: „It results from the case law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a cor-nerstone principle of Community law. According to the Court, this principle is inherent to the specific nature of the European Community. At the time of the first judgment of this established case law (…) there was no mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still the case today. The fact that the principle of primacy will

34 G. Loewenberg, W. Mishler, H. Sanborn, Developing Attachments to New Political Institutions: a Multi-Level Model of Attitude Formation in Post-Communist Europe, „European Political Science Review” 2010, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 4�5-4�6, 489-491.

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not be included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and the existing case law of the Court of Justice”. The result of the treaty changes is maintenance of the former state of the art35.

4. Conclusions

The old elements of the position of the member state in the EU decision-making system are up-to-date after the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. With regard to the formal position of new member states in EU institu-tions six conclusions can be outlined. Firstly, all the newcomers represent, both in the Nice and the Lisbon system, a big absolute voting power in the Council. Secondly, in the Nice system their relative voting power is also high but the situation will change after the introduction of the double majority principle of the new treaty. Thirdly, all the new member states taken together have at their disposal the number of votes that allows them to block decisions made by the qualified majority. The double majority method will marginalize that group, giving it the voting power very distant from the blocking minority threshold. Fourthly, the second variant of the Ioannina compromise can be the right tool for new member states to suspend some decisions. On the other hand, the ex-perience from 1995-2004 showed no real power of this mechanism, which was applied rarely. Fifthly, distribution of places in almost all other institutions is based on the principle of equality. The main exception is the European Parlia-ment and – as a result of economical situation or political choice – the Euro-pean Central Bank. Some preferences to bigger member states can be seen in the Court of Justice of the European Union as well. It has to be added, however, that some of those institutions are working according to supranational logic.

An overall analysis of the Europeanization challenges that the member sta-tes have (had) to face results in four conclusions. Firstly, new member states cannot be perceived as a monolith group, though the majority of them have post-communist heritage, a similar geographical position, historical experience and economic situation. Secondly, there is no undisputed leader in this group, with Poland as (formally) best prepared to this role as a country belonging to six biggest EU members. A good opportunity could have been Polish presidency in the Council in 2011. The rotating presidency – even after diminishing of its role in the new state of the art – does still constitute an important instrument of

35 Cf. P. Tosiek, The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon – Still a Hybrid Legal and Political System, [in:] Beyond Borders. External Relations of the European Union, ed. by J. Janczak, Poznan 2008, pp. 132-138.

the European policy of the member state36. On the other hand, the Slovenian, Czech and Hungarian presidencies have not reflected that rule. Thirdly, the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon have great impact on the activities of all EU members. Apart from technical and administrative modifications the new treaty can create the ground for the great change of the logic of EU fun-ctioning in some areas. Fourthly, the successes and failures of the newcomers in their first years of membership must be further analyzed.

Summarizing the problems discussed above the following phenomena can be perceived as successful for the newcomers from Central and Eastern Eu-rope: (a) a moderately smooth inclusion in the decision-making process (e.g. Financial Perspective 200�-2013, Eastern Partnership); (b) a good continuation of reforms initiated by the conditionality rule; (c) high ranks in transposition of EU law. The following phenomena are rather failures: (a) a limited impact on the shape of many decisions (e.g. Services Directive); (b) the existence of conti-nuous problems (e.g. corruption, weak administration); (c) problems with the application of EU law. The ambivalent element is the climate change policy3�.

The experience of new member states can serve as the background of instru-ctions for future enlargements. Some analysts assume, however, that there are many differences between Central and Eastern Europe and other states in this respect. Freyburg and Richter point, for example, at the fact that political developments in South-Eastern Europe raise doubts about the effectiveness of the European Union’s external democracy promotion via political conditionality and thus it is questiona-ble whether the EU can repeat its success as it is widely acknowledged in Central and Eastern Europe. If national identity cannot find a single way with democratic requirements, the compliance is blocked. Democratic change is only possible af-ter the identity change38. Epstein and Sedelmeier add that in post-200� candidate countries, and in those countries with no current membership perspective, the incentives that the EU has to offer are less powerful because of a combination of higher domestic costs and fewer credible rewards. The EU should not expect repro-duction of the policies that were successful in eastern enlargement. The EU needs to rethink how to use its incentives more effectively or how to go beyond conditio-nality through different mechanisms of influence and external governance39.

36 Cf. idem, State’s Influence on EU’s Policy: the Case of Polish Presidency (in this volume).3� Cf. K. Smyk, Political Perspective, [in:] 5 Years of Poland in the European Union, ed. by M. Kaluzynska, K. Smyk,

J. Wisniewski, Warsaw 2009, pp. 351-3�4. 38 T. Freyburg, S. Richter, National Identity Matters: the Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the West-

ern Balkans, „Journal of European Public Policy” 2010, Vol. 1�, No. 2, pp. 263, 2�6.39 R. A. Epstein, U. Sedelmeier, p. 803.

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Grzegorz Chałupczak

European Employment Strategy – Evolution and Development Perspectives

1. Introduction

The economic crisis at the end of the first decade of the 21st century brought far reaching social effects., including also the sphere of employment. Despite the fact that since the half of the 1990s millions of jobs were created in the Eu-ropean Union (EU) and the number of employed persons increased, since 2008 no significant progress in this sphere has been noticed. The result of this is the increase of unemployment which affected in the EU about 25 million people1. The predictions for the next years are not optimistic and they assume high, 10%, unemployment rate which may exacerbate the social impact of the crisis2.

To prevent such negative tendencies in the labour market, the concept of coordinated policy (strategy) of employment was developed. It should be stressed that the policy of employment, developed at the level of the Europe-an Union is a relatively new policy because it was formed in the 1990s. There is no uniform i.e. common policy of employment because we can distinguish the policies of employment of the member states of the EU and the strategy of employment of the European Union.

One of the instruments of the EU policy is the European Employment Strategy which is the element of the strategy Europe 2020”. The aim of Employ-ment Strategy is to support the actions that enable achieving , up to 2020, the employment rate to �5%, increasing the percentage of graduates to at least 40% and reducing the number of people at the risk of poverty and social exclusion at least by 20 million3. The European Employment Strategy, through “the open coordination method” enables the EU states to exchange information, conduct discussions and coordinate the policy of employment. Every year the national 1 The report of the Economic and Monetary Committee concerning the European semester for the needs of

coordination of economic policy: implementation of priorities for 2012 (2012/2150(INI)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get (20.10.2012), p. 21.2 Communication of the Commission. The annual analysis of economic growth for 2012 ., Brussels, 23.11.2011,

KOM(2011) 815 final version, VOL. 1/5, p. 2.3 Europe 2020 indicators, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/head-

line_indicators (20.10.2012).

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governments and European institutions prepare the so-called package concer-ning employment which comprises, among others, guidelines concerning the employment. The guidance lines concerning national employment policy sug-gested by the Commission, agreed upon by the national governments and con-firmed by the council comprise common priorities and aims in this sphere.

Reflections contained in this paper are limited to the analysis of the evo-lution of a given instrument of the European Union’s employment policy i.e. the European Employment Strategy, the development of its assumptions and particular actions defined in guidelines concerning employment from 199� till the present time. In the summary the author tried to determine further actions whose aim is to accomplish the targets of the strategy “Europe 2020” in the sphere of employment and to determine main determinants and directions of development of the European Employment Strategy.

2. The origins of the Community Employment Policy

The first actions undertaken in the sphere of employment can be noticed during the formation of the European Communities. The Treaty which establis-hed the European Coal and Steel Community, signed in Paris on 18th April 1951 assumed as one of its aims to induce the increase of employment and to raise the standards of living in the member states4. It was to happed due to the removal of barriers for the employees employed in the coal or steel industries, due to un-dertaking actions whose aim was to create new jobs as well as building protecti-ve instruments for the unemployed or who were the subjects of retraining5.

Similar to the contents of the Treaties of Rome from 195�6 which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Com-munity (EURATOM) there were concluded the provisions concerning the prin-ciples of constructing the labor market and the employment policy in the uniting Europe. Under the provisions of the treaty about EEC, the European Social Fund

4 Traktat ustanawiający Europejską Wspólnotę Węgla i Stali, Paryż, 18.04.1951, http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Traktat_EWWiS.pdf (20.10.2012). (The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18th April 1951, Paris, http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Trak-tat_EWWiS.pdf (20.10. 2012).

5 A. Marszałek, M. Bijak-Kaszuba, Europejska Wspólnota Węgla i Stali, [in:] Integracja europejska. Podręcznik akademicki, ed. by A. Marszałek, Warszawa 2004, p. ��.

6 Traktat ustanawiający Europejską Wspólnotę Energii Atomowej, Traktat ustanawiający Europejską Wspólnotę Gospodarczą, Konwencja w sprawie niektórych instytucji wspólnych dla Wspólnot Europejskich i inne, Rzym, 25.03.195�, http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Traktaty_rzymskie.pdf (20.10.2012). (The treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. The Convention concerning some institu-tions common for European Communities and other. Rome, 25th March 195�, http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Traktaty_rzymskie.pdf (20.10. 2012).

was formed which was the financial instrument of the employment policy and the instrument of combat the unemployment in the area of the Community. The fund was set to increase the abilities of employment of the employees in the sphere of the internal market and in this way to contribute to the increase of the living con-ditions�. Besides, the principle of the free movements of workers should be regar-ded as the instrument of employment policy (Article 48 of the Treaty of EEC). The Treaties of Rome also constituted the basis for formation community employment policy through regulations included in the secondary community law.

However, the employment policy gained importance only in the second half of the 19�0s, mainly due to social programmes announced by the European Commission. The instruments provided for in the abovementioned program-mes tended not only to reach the full employment or to improve the conditions of performing work but to increase the role of social partners in making eco-nomic, social-political decisions by the Communities as well.8 The community law started to enter the area of social and health security of employees, the field of equal rights for men and women in employment or the sphere of fighting down the poverty by means of formation of new jobs.

The signing, on 1�th February 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) gave the Community Employment Policy a new direction9 which assumed unification of the social legislation in all member states in order to build a community’s social policy. The member states committed themselves to pay special attention to the support of modifications, especially in the field of labor environment, health protection of the employees and they acknowledged as their target the harmonization of conditions in this sphere10. The first step which was suppo-sed to accomplish the duties was the acceptance of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers which guaranteed social entitlements for all workers employed on the territory of the Community.

The provisions of the Treaty about the European Union from 1992 consti-tuted the continuation of the chosen direction11. The Treaty anticipated, among others, the support of high level of employment and social security, raising the

� Art. 123 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25th March 195�, http://pols-kawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Traktaty_rzymskie.pdf (20. 10. 2012).

8 K. Głąbicka, Europejskie strategie i ich skutki dla polskiej polityki społecznej, [in:] Strategie w polityce społecznej, ed. by M. Grewiński, A. Karwacki, Warszawa 2009, p. 139.

9 Jednolity Akt Europejski, Luksemburg, 1�.02.1986, (Dz. Urz.(Official Gazette) WE 198� L 169, p. 1), http://pol-skawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/JAE.pdf (20.10.2012).

10 Under Article 21of the Single European Act, the Article 118a containing the appropriate commitments was introduced into the EEC’s Treaty

11 Traktat o Unii Europejskiej, Maastricht, �.02.1992, (Dz. Urz.(Official Gazette) WE 1992 C 191, p. 1), http://pol-skawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Traktat_z_Maastricht.pdf (20.10.2012).

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standards and quality of living, economic and social cohesion and solidarity between the member states12.

The employment policy was of particular importance due to unfavourab-le tendencies on the labour market of member state in the last decade of the 20th century. The activity of the European Commission, which, in 1993, issued the so called White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. The Challenge and the way Forward into 21st Century” played an important part in this field13. This document was a specific declaration of formation till 2000 15 million new jobs which was supposed to be achieved by reaching a high level of economic growth and by conducting structural changes resulting in improving the competitiveness of economies of the states of the Community. The White Paper assumed the formation of new jobs, investment in human re-sources, adjustment of the labour law to the needs of the labour market or the increase of the elasticity of the labour market. The employment policy was to be accomplished in the following fields: improvement of the system of education and trainings, the increase of employment absorption in the process of econo-mic growth, the reduction of non-wage labour costs, the growth of efficiency of the policy of the labour market, improvement of instruments directed to help the problem groups of the labour market ( the young people, long-term unem-ployed, older employees and unemployed women)14.

The White Paper became a political and institutional-legal basis of coordi-nated policy, called the European Employment Strategy which was introduced into the Primary Community law under the provisions of the Treaty of Am-sterdam signed on 2nd October 199�15.

3. The Evolution of the European Employment Strategy

The Treaty of Amsterdam changed the provisions of the Treaty which es-tablished the European Community through specifying the employment po-licy as one of the main elements of the policy of the European Union16. One of 12 Under Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, article 2 of EEC was amended.13 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. The Challenge and the Way Forward into 21 Cen-

tury, COM (93)�00 Final, 05.12.1993.14 W. Anioł, Polityka socjalna Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2003, p. 118.15 Traktat z Amsterdamu zmieniający Traktat o Unii Europejskiej, Traktaty ustanawiające Wspólnoty Europe-

jskie i niektóre związane z nimi akty, Amsterdam, 2.10.199�, (Dz. Urz. OfficialGazetteWE199�C340,p.1), http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/prawo/traktaty/Traktat_amsterdamski.pdf (20.10.2012). (The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union. The treaties establishing the European Communi-ties and some acts connected with them).

16 The Amendment concerns Title VIII (former Title VI) In which articles from 125 (former 109n) to 130 are included. The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force of 1st May 1999.

the main goals of the EU was the increase of the employment level. This goal was equivalent to other economic goals as the economic growth and stabili-zation. The member states and the Community committed themselves to the actions whose aim were to work out the strategy for employment especially to support skilled labour force which was able to adjust itself as well as to support the labour markets which reacted to economic changes.

The European Employment Strategy, as it has been mentioned earlier, is a collection of principles and priorities which designate the direction of action of the Union concerning the employment policy1�. This strategy is based on the open method of coordination of employment policy conducted by the member states and accomplished, from one hand, with the participation of the so-called guidelines in the field of employment and on the other hand on the basis of national action plans. The increase of the competitiveness of economies of the member states and the increase of effectiveness of functioning of the common market of services, goods and capital is supposed to be the additional instru-ment which strengthens the strategy18. Especially, it refers to the development of the sector of services, information technology and environmental protection, creation of conditions for the development of entrepreneurship, particularly in the sector of small and medium enterprises, the reconstruction of the tax sy-stem; these actions are supposed to create new jobs19.

The European Employment Strategy, during the first years of its duration, assumed the formation of bonds between the economic growth of the European Union and the creation of new jobs. The Strategy defined the transnational tasks of cooperation of the member states which was supposed to limit unemploy-ment, reduce poverty and social marginalization. One of its main assumption was undertaking actions to keep the ability for employment and the creation of new workplaces. Besides, the Strategy promoted the new approach to the orga-nization of work relying on the creation of conditions which allowed for active reaction of economic entities to the changes in the economic situation.

The actions undertaken within the European Employment Strategy were spe-cified, in the guidelines, as the so-called four pillars, defined due to the basis of the aim of a given group of activity, i.e. widening the abilities of getting the work, enco-

1� According to the accepted practice, the concrete tasks of the European Employment Strategy are planned during summit meetings of the leaders of the EU. The first summit, where the first elements of the European Employment Strategy were noticed, was held in November 199� in Luxemburg. See: S. Golinowska, Kompetencje Unii Europe-jskiej w dziedzinie polityki społecznej oraz polityki rynku pracy, „Polityka społeczna” 1999, No. 10, p. 21.

18 E. Lewkowicz, Europejska Strategia Zatrudnienia w latach 1997-2010, Lublin 2012, p. 35.19 Posiedzenie Rady Europejskiej w Wiedniu, 11-12 grudnia 1998, „Monitor Integracji Europejskiej” 2002,

No. 53, p. 166.

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uraging the entrepreneurship, supporting the adjustment processes in enterprise and among its employees, strengthening the policy of equality of chances20.

The actions falling within the scope set by the first pillar were directed to prevent the unemployment among young people and to solve problems of long-term unemployment21. The aim of these actions was to ensure activity for each young person before the six months of the period of unemployment – in the form of education, retraining, professional placement, employment or any other form of professional activity. For other persons individual actions were applied in order to adjust them to work which were supposed to shorten the period of unemployment to, maximum, a year. The abovementioned preventive and activating means were to be used together with the means that promoted the employment of people on the long-term unemployment. The necessity of gradual exchange of passive forms of fight against the unemployment for active instruments of enlarging the employment was stressed22. Apart from the action of government institutions, the engagement of social partners was very impor-tant. Their task was to conduct trainings for the unemployed or the people who were undergoing the retraining courses; the partners should enable them to practice internships and to ensure lifelong learning. The changes in the system of education which tended to acquire not only the knowledge but also abilities which enabled the students the adaptation to the ongoing changes in the eco-nomy and the labour market were postulated.

The second pillar referred to the actions for the promotion of a new culture of entrepreneurship in the EU. These actions were to facilitate the running of the enterprises and their management through establishment of clear, stable rules and through improvement of the conditions of the development of the risk capital markets23. Cheap credits offered by the European Investment Bank, lowering and simplification of administrative and fiscal burdens connected, first of all, with the employment of additional employees for the sector of small and medium enterprises were the instruments which should contribute to the achievement of the objective24. The reduction of barriers in fiscal and social security systems, the use of new technologies for formation and development of enterprises and the promotion of production and consumption which were 20 The Extraordinary European Council Meeting concerning employment, Luxemburg, 20-21 November 199�.,

„Monitor Integracji Europejskiej” 1998, No. 15, pp. �9-83.21 Ibidem, p. �9.22 K. Głąbicka, Polityka społeczna w Unii Europejskiej: aspekty aksjologiczne i empiryczne, Warszawa 2001, p. 259.23 The Extraordinary European Council meeting ..., p. 81.24 Sector of small enterprises generated at the beginning of the 21st century one third of all jobs. The next 30% of

jobs created the so-called medium enterprises. See: M. Kabaj, Strategie i programy przeciwdziałania bezrobociu w Unii Europejskiej i w Polsce, Warszawa 2004, p. 62.

environmentally friendly were the instruments to support the development of the entrepreneurship. The increase of expanses on the researches and the deve-lopment of science was also suggested.

The third pillar was a direct reaction to the phenomena connected with the reconstruction of enterprises caused by the application of new technologies or with the new conditions of functioning of the market. The adaptive ability was defined as a process of adaptation of both employees and employers to the changes in technology and on the labour market. Two actions were agreed upon this task: modernization of the organization of work and the support of adaptive abilities in enterprises. For this purpose, the social partners were encouraged to commit agreements which would form the basis for moderni-zation of the work; the modernization included: introduction of flexible forms of employment, annual settlement of the time of work, the reduction of over-time hours, the development of part-time employment or lifelong learning25. The member states were obliged to introduce into the inner legal order more elastic solutions concerning the labour market. In order to increase the level of qualifications inside the enterprise, the member states were supposed ,on the one hand, to review the barriers which made the investment into the so-called human resources difficult and on the other hand they were obliged to form incentives for the development of further training26.

The accomplishment policy for equality of chances constituted the con-tents of the fourth pillar . The policy assumed combating the manifestations of discrimination against women in employment, supporting the reconciliation of work and family, facilitation of the return to active professional life and in-clusion of the disabled in the active, professional life2�.

In this sphere, the active support of the increase of employment of women and the development of services which would provide care for children and the elderly were postulated28.

As it has been mentioned earlier, the determination of guidelines of the Euro-pean Council for the policy of employment which should apply to all member states was one of the instruments that served realization of the European Employment Strategy. The first guidelines which were based on the four abovementioned pillars were accepted during the Luxemburg Summit in November 199�. Until 2003 the amendments introduced to the guidelines were relatively small and they only en-25 The Extraordinary European Council meeting ..., p. 82.26 Ibidem,2� Ibidem, pp. 82- 83.28 W. Rosiński, Polityka zatrudnienia Unii Europejskiej, [in:] Unia Europejska – dziś i jutro, ed. by K. Waluch,

Płock 2006, pp. 344-345.

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riched the guidelines by six horizontal objectives: attainment of full employment, encouragement of lifelong learning, support of the role of social partners, provi-ding balance between the four pillars of the policy, description of common indica-tors for the evaluation of progress and improvement of the quality of jobs29.

On 23rd-24th March 2000 during the summit in Lisbon, the Council of Eu-rope accepted the Lisbon Strategy for the Economic Growth and Jobs whose one of the main aims was the attainment of full employment in the European Union till 201030. It was the departure from the current trend which assumed the use of instruments of direct fight with the unemployment for creation of conditions that enabled full employment. The European Union was supposed to be “ based on knowledge and at the same time the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world ready for systematic economic growth and enabling its inhabitants a greater number of better jobs under greater social coherence”31. In this respect, the Lisbon Strategy tended to improve competitiveness of European labour force (in the context of the development of information technology), to modernize so-cial security systems, to liquidate administrative barriers, to facilitate the creation of small and medium enterprises, to form administrative and legal milieus which favoured the formation of enterprises and the conduct of economic activity32. The Lisbon Strategy assumed the increase of employment rate in the member states of the EU to �0% of the population at the age 15 – 64 ( women to 60%) and the increase of the employment rate of people at the age 55-64 to the level of 50%33.

The new guidelines of the employment policy were accepted by the Euro-pean Council in July 2003. Revised European Employment Strategy concen-trated on three, not four , pillars which constituted the targets of the Lisbon Strategy: full employment, improvement of quality and productivity of work and strengthening social coherence and integration34. Within the first target

29 P. Pochet, The Open Method of Co-ordination and the Construction of Social Europe. A Historical Perspective, [in:] The Open Method of Co-ordination in action – The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, ed. by J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet, Brussels 2005, p. 51.

30 In 2002 the European Commission assessed the Employment Strategy for 199�-2001. .Since 199� there has been formed 10 million of New jobs (6 million for women) and the number of the unemployed diminished by 4 million. See. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions. Taking stock of five years of the European Employ-ment Strategy, Brussels, 1�.0�.2002, COM (2002) 416 final.

31 The meeting of the European Council in Lisbon: 23 – 24 March 2000 r.: Conclusions of the Presidency, „Moni-tor Integracji Europejskiej” 2002, No. 53 part II, p. 13.

32 E. Lewkowicz, p. 42.33 E. Kwiatkowski, A. Rogut, T. Tokarski, Czy cele zatrudnieniowe strategii lizbońskiej są realistyczne?, [in:] Unia

Europejska w kontekście strategii lizbońskiej oraz gospodarki i społeczeństwa wiedzy w Polsce, ed. by E. Okoń-Horodyńska, K. Piech, Warszawa 2006, p. 42.

34 Decision of the Council from 22nd July 2003 for the directives of the Policy of employment of the Memebr States, (2003/5�8/WE), Dz. U. L 19� zfrom5.08.2003, p. 330.

of the employment policy, the state members were to contribute to achieving an average of total employment rate which was supposed to be 6�% in 2005 and �0% in 2010; for women 5�% and 60% respectively and for the elderly (age 55-64) 50% in 2010.The demand to raise the quality and productivity of work should be referred to the following actions: lifelong learning, planning of the career paths, planning of the health and safety, of social integration and of the access to the labour market35. Within the third target it was stressed that em-ployment was the main means to achieve the social integration. The employ-ment policy of the member states was to favour the increase of the participation in employment through the promotion of access to the employment of all men and women capable to work, fighting with the discrimination on the labour market and through prevention of exclusion36. In order to strengthen the eco-nomic and social cohesion the states should strive for the reduction of regional disproportions and for social and economic support of restructuring.

The abovementioned targets of the Lisbon Strategy were clarified in ten employment guidelines which were the priorities for actions for the member states and also formed the basis for National Action Plan for Employment. The employment guidelines, prepared and accepted by the European Council and approved by the European Commission for 2003-2005 comprised:

1. active and preventive actions for the unemployed and economically inactive persons

2. creation of jobs and the entrepreneurship3. support of adaptation abilities and mobility on the labour market4. the promotion of the human capital and lifelong learning 5. the increase of the supply of labour and the promotion of active ageing6. the policy of equal chances for men and women�. the support of the integration and fighting with discrimination of pe-

ople in unfavourable conditions on the labour market8. the development of financial incentives to work9. transformation of illegal work into the regular employment10. the reduction of regional differences in employment3�.

35 I. Wolińska, Europejska Strategia Zatrudnienia- nowe wytyczne, „Rynek pracy” 2003, No. 3, pp. 11-12.36 Ibidem.3� Annex to the decision of the Council from 22nd July 2003 for the directives of the Employment Policy of the

member states, (2003/5�8/WE), Dz. U (Official Gazette). L 19� from 5th Aug.2003, pp. 333-33�.

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The general contents of the guidelines did not undergo fundamental chan-ges. A greater emphasis was put on the professional activity of older workers and on programmes of lifelong learning. It should be stressed that the new guidelines were more target oriented. The earlier ones concentrated more on the process of implementation of targets. The new guidelines did not undergo the review every year but were drawn for three years which was to improve the efficiency of the Strategy38.

The review of the European Employment Strategy was announced in the Com-munication of the European Commission for reconstruction and employment39. The Communication stated that the frames of the employment policy would be based on the three priorities: on the attraction and keeping the greatest number of people on the labour market, on the increase of the adaptability of employees and enterprises and the increase of investments in the human capital. The priorities were reflected in the guidelines for the years 2005-2008 and 2008 – 2010.

Until 2005 the coordination of national employment policies at the Union’s level was based, in full, on the provisions of Article 128 of TEC. Since 2005 the implementation of the Employment Strategy was included into the cycle of mana-gement of the new Lisbon Strategy. The annual National Action Plans for Employ-ment, which the member states developed every year, were opted out. They beca-me the part of the National Reform Programmes which comprised three years40. After the changes, the tasks concerning employment became less visible and they were connected more with the economic and financial policy than with the social one. The domination of economic and financial tasks and a clear emphasis on the increase of jobs, not the quality of work and the social inclusion were the expres-sions of a new ideology which assumed that the economic growth would lead to the increase of employment which, in turn, would bring comprehensive benefits.

The European Commission underlined that the gravity center of the Lisbon Agenda should be moved into the direction of supporting the actions which favoured the economic and employment growth in accordance with the task of the balanced development41. Bearing in mind those tasks, in April 2005 the

38 In March 2005 the document titled “Wspólne działanie na rzecz wzrostu gospodarczego i zatrudnienia” (Com-mon Actions for Growth and Employment ). The document called for the concentration of European actions, mobilization of support for introduction changes and for simplification and rationalization of the Lisbon Strat-egy. See: Komunikat na Wiosenny Szczyt Rady Europejskiej, Wspólne działania na rzecz wzrostu gospodarczego i zatrudnienia: Nowy początek strategii lizbońskiej, Brussels 02.02.2005, COM(2005) 24 końcowy, pp. 5-6.

39 Komunikat Komisji, Restrukturyzacje i zatrudnienie. Antycypacja i towarzyszenie restrukturyzacjom na rzecz poprawy zatrudnienia: rola Unii Europejskiej, Bruksela 31.3.2005, COM(2005) 120 końcowy, p. �.

40 J. T. Weishaupt, K. Lack, The European Employment Strategy: Assessing the Status Quo, http://www.spaef.com/file.php?id=126� (25. 03. 2012).

41 Komunikat na Wiosenny Szczyt…, p. 14.

European Commission suggested the acceptance of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs 2005-2008 which were to serve the implementation of priorities of the renewed Lisbon Strategy. The European Council accepted the collection of integrated guidelines in July 200542.

Taking into consideration the connections between economic policy and the policy of management, Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and Employ-ment Guidelines were joined into one, comprehensive document. This allowed for the submission of one strategic vision to the member states. Thus, the Em-ployment Guidelines constituted part of the Integrated Guidelines for the pe-riod 2005-200843. The document comprised the set of particular guidelines in three dimensions: macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment. Out of 24 guidelines, 8 of them concerned employment (integrated guidelines 1�-24)44. The guideline no. 1� invoked the member states to the implementation of the employment policy directed on the targets of the Lisbon Strategy i.e. it postula-ted the full employment, the improvement of the quality and quantity of work and strengthening social and territorial cohesion. The remaining guidelines concerning the employment were divided into three parts.

The first part concerned the attraction and keeping on the labour market the greatest amount of people and the modernization of the systems of social wel-fare. The guideline no. 18 - promotion of the work attitude in accordance with the cycle of human life – called the member states upon actions which tended to increase the participation of women and to eliminate differences in employment due to gender. The guideline supported the active ageing and formation of mo-dern welfare systems .The guideline no. 19 concerned the increase of the work attractiveness and making the work profitable for people who were looking for it. In this sphere facilitation of the access to trainings, counseling and creation of new jobs in the sector of services were postulated. The guideline no. 20 – better adjustment to the needs of the labour market – assumed modernization and the increase of the importance of the institutions of the labour market in order to help to solve the problems of social-professional adaptation.

Two guidelines constituted the second part. This part referred to the increased adaptation ability of employees and enterprises. The guideline no. 21, called the member states for promotion of elasticity while ensuring the security of employ-

42 Decision of the Council from 12 July 2005 for the directives of the policy of employment of the member states, (2005/600/WE), Dz.U. L 205 form 6 August 2005.

43 Komunikat Komisji, Wzrost i zatrudnienie - Zintegrowane Wytyczne na lata 2005-2008, KOM(2005) 141 końcowy.

44 Annex to the decision of the Council from 12 July for the Policy of employment of the member states(2005/600/WE), Dz.U. L 205 from 6 Aug.2005,Guidelines for Growth (2005–2008), (Integrated guidelines nos. 1�–24), pp. 23-2�.

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ment and for the reduction of the segmentation of the labour market. The guide-line no. 22 pointed to the necessity of formation of conditions which favoured the formation of new jobs. It stated that the development of the wage system should be adjusted to the changes of work efficiency in the whole economic cycle and to the situation on the labour market. Actions towards the reduction of the labour costs should be undertaken, especially as far as the low-wage labouir was concerned.

The third part was connected with the increase of investments in the hu-man capital and lifelong learning. The guideline 23 stated that the member states were to aim to facilitate the access to the professional education and to secondary and higher education. Besides, it indicated the necessity of elabo-ration of effective systems of lifelong learning which were to be available for all. The last guideline underlined that it was necessary to adapt the systems of education and training to the new requirements of professional competence.

On 14th December 200� during the meeting of the Council of Europe it was determined that Integrated Guidelines should be left in an unchanged form, only their justifications should be updated45. The scope of guidelines concer-ning the employment policy for the years 2008-2010 were identical with the guidelines determined in 2005 but the member states were to concentrate more on their implementation46. In the new cycle of the European Employment Stra-tegy the importance of the concept of flexicurity which assumed the elastic labour market and social security was stressed. According to the guidelines, the model of flexicurity comprised “a well-thought-out connection of elastic and stable conditions of agreements, complex strategies in the scope of lifelong learning, effective, active policies of the labour market and modern, proper and lasting systems of welfare protection”4�.

The legal basis of the functioning of the European Employment Strategy underwent editorial changes from the moment of entry into force the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon48. The rules concerning the employment are in the Tit-le IX of the Treaty concerning the functioning of the European Union which

45 Posiedzenie Rady Europejskiej w Brukseli – Konkluzje Prezydencji, Bruksela 14 grudnia 200� r., „Monitor Europejski” 200�, No. 43, p. 34.

46 Decision of the Council from 15 July 2008 for guidelines In the Policy for employment of the member states, (2008/618/WE), Dz.U. L 198 from 26 July. 2008 p. 4�.

4� Annex to the decision of the Council from 12 July 2008 for the Policy of employment of the member states(2008/618/WE), Dz.U. L 198 from 26 Aug..2008, Guidelines for the employment policy of the member states , (Integrated guidelines nos. 1�–24), p. 52.

48 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty of the European Union and establishing the European Community drawn up in Lisbon on 13 Dec.200� (Dz. U. from 2009 r., No. 203, item 1569). The Treaty came into force on 1 Dec. 2009.

comprises Articles from 145 to 15049. In this Treaty the community employment policy was determined again as the element of economic and social development of the European Union which as one of its targets determined the attainment of full employment (Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Treaty). The treaty introduced the so-called horizontal social clause according to which at determination and implementation of its policies, the Union took into consideration requirements associated with the promotion of high level of employment, with the protection of proper social welfare, with combating the social exclusion and with high level of education and health protection (Article 5a of the Treaty).

The financial and economic crisis which started in 2008 caused vast dec-rease of employment and led to the worsening the state of public finances. The crisis made it clear that there was a strict interdependence between the eco-nomies and labour markets of the member states. The crisis made the Union determine a new strategy for the next decades, which was named as the stra-tegy “Europe 2020” which was based on smaller number of guidelines which replaced the previous 24 and which referred to both the issues of employment (guidelines no. �-10)50 and general economic policy51.

The guideline no.� concerning the employment policy of the member states refers to the increase of the participation of women and men in the labour mar-ket, limitation of structural unemployment and the promotion of the quality of employment52. The abovementioned guideline assumes that the stimulation of activity is the key to the increase of the participation in the labour market. Thus, the member states should introduce to their policies concerning the la-bour market the principles of the elastic model of the labour market and social security (flexicurity). So the combination of the elastic forms of employment, the active policy in the scope of the labour market, effective lifelong learning and policies which promote the mobility of the labour force and proper social

49 Articles 145-150 of the Treaty about EU functioning respond to the articles 125-130 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. See: Wersje skonsolidowane Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej i Traktatu o funkcjonow-aniu Unii Europejskiej sporządzone na podstawie tekstów opublikowanych w Dz. Urz. UE 2008 C 115, p. 1, uwzględniające zmiany wprowadzone przez protokół o sprostowaniu do Traktatu z Lizbony (Dz. Urz. UE 2009 C 290), http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/oide/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14429&Itemid=420 (20.10.2012).

50 Decision of the Council from 21 Oct. 2010 for guidelines concerning the employment policy of the member states., (2010/�0�/UE), Dz.U. L 308 from 24 Nov.1.2010, pp. 46-48.

51 Guidelines for the employment Policy of the member states are connected with the guidelines for the economic policies of the member states and the Union attached to the recommendation of the Council from 13 July 2010 for general recommendations of the economic policies of the member states and the Union. (Dz.U. L 191 from 23 July.2010, p. 28.). Together they form Integrated guidelines for the strategy “Europe 2020”.

52 Annex to the decision of the Council from 21 Oct. 2010 for the guidelines of the employment policy of the member states, (2010/�0�/UE), Dz.U. L 308 from 24.Nov.2010, Guidelines for the policy of employment of the member states, p. 49.

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security systems which guarantee the movement on the labour market is postu-lated. These elements should be accompanied by clear determination of rights and duties of the unemployed who are to look actively for work.

In order to increase competitiveness and participation in the labour mar-ket, especially among low-skilled workers, the member states should support building of proper frames for the wage negotiation systems and changes of la-bour costs. Thus, the reorganization of the tax systems and the benefits system as well as the abilities of the public service to provide the necessary assistance seem necessary to increase the factor of professional activity and to stimulate the demand for work. The public institutions should promote the activity of the elderly, the integration of the young people on the labour market, the disabled and other groups which are in a difficult situation. The aim of the European Union in the sphere of employment is the increase till 2020 the employment rate of women and men at the age 20-64 to �5%, through, among others, the increase of participation of the young, the elderly and the low-skilled workers in the labour market53.

In turn, the guideline no.8 assumes the development of the resources of skilled workers which respond to market needs and the promotion of lifelong learning54. It refers, especially, to the promotion of efficiency on the labour market, to the assurance of learning and skills opportunities adjusted to the current and future needs of the labour market. The guideline postulates the de-velopment of high quality elementary education and professional training that should be accompanied by effective incentives for lifelong learning. The mem-ber states should develop systems of recognition of acquired competencies and remove barriers in professional and geographical mobility of workers, promote the acquisition of interdisciplinary competencies in order to support creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship. Especially, the efforts should be focused on the support of people with low and obsolete skills and on the increase of the chances of the elderly on the labour market.

The regular monitoring of the results of the policy of upgrading skills and the policy of anticipation of the needs in the sphere of the skills is the necessary element. It is assumed that it should help in determination of the areas which need improvement and in the adaptation of education and training systems to the present and future needs of the labour market. In those actions, the mem-

53 Referring the abovementioned tasks to Poland it should be stated that it is assumed that the employment rate of women and men At the age 20-64 will reach �1% till 2020. See: Europe 2020 indicators, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/headline_indicators [access (25.03.2012).

54 Annex to the decision of the Council from 21 Oct. 2010…, p. 49.

ber states should make use of, in appropriate cases, financial resources of the European Social Fund and of other funds of the EU.

The quality and efficiency improvement in education and training systems at all levels and the increase of the number of people who study at higher school institutions are the most important tasks described in the guideline no. 9 of the European Employment Strategy55. In order to ensure the universal access to high quality education and training and to increase the efficiency of the educa-tion process, the member states should efficiently invest in the systems of edu-cation and training. According to the lifelong learning principle, the prescribed actions should be used at all levels of education. According to the analyzed gu-ideline, the member states should reduce restrictions in the access to the educa-tion systems by entering into force the national frames of qualifications which would enable both the formation of elastic educational paths and the partner-ship of the representatives of the world of education and the representatives of the labour market as well. The increase of the number of people who study at higher school institutions is one of the most important postulates. Measures to prevent the premature graduation should be taken; this, in a measurable way, should reduce the number of young, unemployed people.

The reduction of the indicators of early school leaving, to the level below 10%, with simultaneous increase of the percentage of people at the age 30-34 with higher education to at least 40% is one of the main aims of the employ-ment policy of the European Union. The member states are to determine their national aims on the basis of the abovementioned aim56.

The next guideline of the European Employment Strategy (no.10) conne-cts the expansion of employment opportunities with the prevention of poverty and its reduction and with the promotion of the full participation in the society and economy. For this purpose the European Social Fund and other EU funds should be used. The efforts of the member states should also concentrate on the common access to cheap, sustainable and high quality services, particularly in the social sphere. Services of general public interest, including the internet services, play an important role. The strengthening of the position of citizens and propagation of participation in the social life of people removed from the labour market with simultaneous prevention of poverty will help to fight with the social exclusion. The systems of pensions and benefits should focus on the

55 Annex to the decision of the Council from 21 Oct. 2010…, p. 50.56 For Poland the aims were determined At the level of 4.5% for the premature graduation and 45% for people

with higher education. Europe 2020 indicators, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/ headline_indicators (25.03.2012).

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protection of incomes during the periods of work change and the limitation of poverty, first of all in groups that are most exposed to the social exclusion such as the parents who raise children alone, the disabled, children and teena-gers, older women and men, legal migrants and the unemployed. The member states should also actively promote social economy and social innovations to support people in a difficult situation. The focus of all these actions should be the promotion of gender equality, too. The European Union, as the main aim in analyzed sphere of the Employment Strategy determines the reduction till 2020, by at least 20 million the number of people in the member states that are threatened with poverty or social exclusion5�.

The analyzed indicators which concern the policy of employment of the member states are determined in the annex to the decision of the Council from 21st October 2010 (2010/�0�/EU) did not undergo changes in 2011 and 2012 and the member states are obliged to include them in their employment policy58. At the same time the Council stated that the guidelines which concern the em-ployment and that were accepted in 2010 should not undergo changes till 2014 and the states should concentrate on their implementation.

4. Conclusions

The financial and economic crisis determined the actual shape of the Eu-ropean Employment Strategy which functions as the element of the strategy “Europe 2020”. There is no doubts that the economic situation in the member states of the EU will determine the directions of development of the commu-nity employment policy. This conclusion seems to be supported by the main aim described in the strategy “Europe 2020”i.e. recovery from the crisis and directing EU economy to the intelligent and balanced growth which favours social inclusion and together with high employment serves social efficiency and coherence. The aims which are specified in proper guidelines are the aims which show the direction of further actions not only of the member states but the European Union as well. Under the strategy “Europe 2020” the member states and the European Union should continuously carry out reform to achie-ve an intelligent growth i.e. the growth whose driving force is knowledge and innovations. The programmes of the reforms should also tend to reach “the ba-5� For Poland his number is determined at the level of 1.5 million people. Europe 2020 indicators, http://epp.

eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/europe_2020_indicators/headline_indicators (25.03.2012).58 See: Decision of the Council from 19 May 2011 for guidelines for the policy of employment of the member states,

(2011/308/UE), Dz.U. L 138 from 26May 2011, p. 5�; Decision of the Council from 26 April 2012 for guidelines for the policy of employment of the member states, (2012/238/UE), Dz.U. L 119 from 4.05.2012, p. 4�.

lanced growth” which means the formation of balanced and competitive eco-nomy that makes use, in an effective way, of energy and resources and it also represents equitable share of costs and benefits.

The member states should still concentrate all their efforts on raising the professional activity rate and on limiting the structural unemployment, on de-veloping the resources of skilled labour force which corresponds to the needs of the labor market. Activities involving the promotion of the quality of em-ployment and lifelong learning, which serve to improve the efficiency of educa-tional and training systems at all levels and to increase the number of student at higher schools and which promote social inclusion and combating poverty are very important.

Both the policy accomplished by the European Union and the reform programmes conducted in the member states should aim at the growth that favours the social inclusion i.e. they should build a coherent society through strengthening the position of citizens so that they could foresee the changes and cope with them and thus they could function actively in the society and economy. Thus, the future reforms that will be conducted in the member sta-tes should ensure their citizens the opportunities for earning money all their lives which will reduce the poverty and social exclusion due to removal of ob-stacles in participation in the labour market. Therefore, the programmes of the reforms in the member states should ensure the effective functioning of labour market through investment in education and training systems, proper development of skills, the increase of the quality of jobs and combating the structural unemployment especially among the young.

The assumptions of the internal policy which tends to achieve balance be-tween professional and private life and which provide professional support and innovations in the way of organization of work should be aimed at the increase of the indicators of employment, particularly of the young, the elderly and wo-men. In subsequent years all instruments focused on the elimination of bar-riers for new workers to labour market, on the promotion of self-employment, of entrepreneurship and creation of new jobs in all spheres of the economy will play an important role.

The development of public services both in the sphere of social welfare or employment services cannot be forgotten. Such services and instruments sho-uld be widely available also for the young and people at risk of unemployment. The systems of social security , including pensions and the access to health care should be modernized in order to ensure proper support for the unemployed

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and at the same time to encourage them to the participation in the society to return on the labour market.

In the cooperation with the social partners and enterprises, the member states should improve the access and quality of trainings and professional co-unseling. These improvements should be connected with the systematic infor-mation on vacancies and professional abilities, with the promotion of entrepre-neurship and with better forecast of future needs in the skills. The investment into the development of human resources, the increase of skills and the par-ticipation in the lifelong learning programmes should be promoted by means of common financial outlays of governments, private persons and employers. To support the young, especially the unemployed young people, who do not take part in professional training the programmes whose aim is to help those people in finding their first employment, acquire professional experience or enable them to continue training of learning, including the internships should be implemented.

The reforms also should aim at providing opportunities to acquire the most important skills necessary to increase chances on the labour market. The international mobility of learners should be stimulated; educational mobility of the young will become a norm. It will require strengthening of the system of lifelong learning and of comprehensive policy of active professional develop-ment in order to form wider perspectives at various stages of life and to protect people against the risk of exclusion. A particular attention should be paid to the situation of women on the labour market and on actions which will level the position of women in this sphere.

To sum up, it should be said that the member states should still undertake efforts to increase the rate of professional activity and to limit the structural unemployment, to increase the resources of skilled workforce that respond to the needs of the labour market or to promote the quality of employment and to propagate lifelong learning. The undertaken actions should tend to improve the efficiency of educational and training systems at all levels and to increase the number of people who study at colleges and universities.

Justyna Misiągiewicz

European Union and Energy Security Challenges

1. Introduction

One can safely assume, that nowadays energy is an important part of in-ternational security. The interdependency in the energy field is a significant dimension of the contemporary relations between states and transnational cor-porations. Sufficient supplies of energy are inherent elements of the economical development of every state and nation.

Energy security is becoming a key issue for the European Union. The EU is one of the world’s fastest growing energy markets. For the foreseeable future, the Europe’s energy dependence will probably increase. Facing a shortage of energy, Europe is dependent on imports and EU member states need to di-versify their energy supplies. The growing energy needs have given European Union a strong interest in developing ties with energy - producing states to build necessary pipeline infrastructure. In such circumstances, the role of the exporters and the transit states is becoming crucial.

This analysis surveys the brief overview of the concept of the energy secu-rity, and the developments in the European Union’s energy policy. We will also provide a comprehensive analysis of the role of the Turkey as a corridor for the hydrocarbons and the indispensible role of Russia as a main exporter of the energy sources to the European markets.

2. Energy Security in the Contemporary International Re-lations

Nowadays, energy security is a growing concern in the state foreign policy. With energy rising prices, major consuming states are struggling to formulate effective long – term energy policies1. Energy policy-making cannot be seen in isolation from the international system development. Energy relations in the 1 A. Tekin, P. A. Wiliams, Turkey and EU energy security: the pipeline connection, „East European Quarterly”

2009, Vol. 4, p. 419.

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world will be shaped along the lines of the organization of the future interna-tional political and economic system2. The interdependency in the energy field is a very important dimension of the contemporary relations between states and transnational corporations. Upstream and downstream investments have no borders or limits. Thereby, there is a necessity to improve a dialog between producers, consumers and transit states to ensure the energy security. Nowa-days, private companies are very influential actors in producing and delivering energy to consumers.

Energy security is a quite new term used in international relations a few years ago. According to the most analysts, it means „assured delivery of ad-equate supplies of affordable energy to meet a state’s vital requirements, even in times of international crisis or conflict”3. The European Commission defines energy security as „the ability to ensure that future essential energy needs can be met, both by means of adequate domestic resources worked under economi-cally acceptable conditions or maintained as strategic reserves, and by calling upon accessible and stable external sources supplemented where appropriate by strategic stocs”4. We can also describe energy security as „the reliable and affordable supply of energy on a continuing, uninterrupted basis”5.

Analyzing the term of energy security we should underline, that it is strong-ly connected with the economy security. It is related to micro- and macroeco-nomic developments. Imports and export of energy may have a key impact on the balance of payments. Subsidies, taxation and the costs or revenues of state owned companies may have a considerable influence on every national budget. Moreover, the costs of energy are an important factor in the rate of inflation and in the international competitive position of a state’s economy6.

Sufficient supplies of energy are inherent elements of the economical de-velopment of every state and nation. The world demand for oil and gas is com-monly expected to grow over the foreseeable future. This growth will predomi-nantly take place in the emerging economies, developing markets and to a lesser extent in industrialized countries. In non-OECD (Organization for Economic

2 A. Correlje, C. van der Linde, Energy supply security and geopolitics: A European perspective, „Energy Policy” 2006. No. 34, p. 533.

3 M. T. Klare, Energy Security, [in:] Security Studies: an Introduction, ed. by P. D. Williams, London, New York 2008, p. 484.

4 EUROGULF: An EU-GCC Dialogue for Energy Stability and Sustainability, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/studies/2005_04_eurogulf_kuwait_en.pdf, p. 24. (12.09.2011).

5 M. T. Klare, p. 485.6 D. R. Bohi, M. A. Toman, Energy security: externalities and policies, „Energy Policy” 1993, No. 21 (11), p. 22; D.

W. Jones, P. N. Leiby, I. K. Paik, Oil price shocks and the macroeconomy: what has been learned since 199�, „The Energy Journal” 2004, No. 25 (2), pp. 1–32.

Cooperation and Development) states like China and India, the demand for oil is rapidly increasing in association with economic growth and huge trans-port needs. It is estimated, that the world energy consumption is expected to grow by �2% between 2003 and 2030. According to the British Petroleum (BP) Statistical World Review of Energy, the main sources of world primary energy consumption is oil (34,8%), coal (29,3%) and gas (24,1%)�.

To ensure the energy security, every consumer state should diversify sou-rces of supplies. Being addicted to only one energy producer is very dangerous from the economical point of view and makes state vulnerable to political pres-sure. Thereby, energy security also incorporates a foreign policy dimension in terms of maintaining good relations with various energy producing states. No-wadays, more than 30 years after the first oil crisis, „widespread concerns are expressed again about the security of oil supply. In the face of a set of radically new challenges, doubts are expressed about the ability of the energy industry to timely and adequately invest in the production, transport and conversion facilities required to meet the expected growth in demand”8. Moreover, world oil and gas production is mostly concentrated in politically unstable regions: Africa, Persian Gulf or Caspian region. It is connected with the risk to the uninterrupted flow of energy supplies9. Oil and gas facilities become a target of attack by insurgents, terrorists or separatist groups. According to R. Ebel from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, „pipelines are very soft targets”10. That is why the need to protect the production and transportation infrastructure will probably grow.

3. Energy Security of the EU

The energy security is a key determinant of EU activity on the internatio-nal scene. European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, said that „when we talk about European energy policy, security of supply is today our foremost concern”11. He confirmed that, until viable alternatives replace them, ensuring a constant flow of hydrocarbon resources is the EU’s premier energy security priority12.� BP Statistical World Review of Energy, June 2009, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/glo-

balbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2009.pdf (12.04.2010).

8 A. Correlje, C.van der Linde, p. 532.9 M. T. Klare, Energy Security, p. 486.10 Ibidem, p. 48�.11 J. Barroso, European Energy Policy for the 21st Century 2009, Berlin, 24 June.12 S. Wood, Europe’s Energy Politics, „Journal of Contemporary European Studies” 2010, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 30�.

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The economies of the member states of the European Union need energy resources and seek to improve relations with oil and gas rich states. Several economic developments in the first decade of the XXI century have influen-ced Europe’s sense of vulnerability in respect of its energy supplies13. Nowa-days, there is an increasing dependence on the energy resources in European Union. This is a very dangerous phenomenon because of the risk of becoming dependent on only one supplier. In such circumstances, energy can be used as a political and economical weapon by the states that can control the energy re-sources, prices and the transport lines14. That is why it is necessary to diversify the energy resources deliveries.

The energy security becomes a very important issue for the EU especially after winter 2006, when Russia briefly suspended natural gas exports to Ukrai-ne. This move had a knock – on effect on the rest of Europe because substantial amounts of Russian gas are transported to Europe via Ukraine and because of the fact, that European Union is dependent on Russia for its gas demand15. Such situation was a consequence of the new Gazprom’s market rules in its energy dealings with former Soviet republics announced in 2005. According to them, Ukraine had to pay similar prices to those charged to the EU customers16. In implementing it, Gazprom raised the price of gas sold to Ukraine from about 50 USD per 1,000 cubic meters in 2005 to 230 USD per 1,000 cubic meters in 20061�. That is why Kiev refused to pay the new high price, and Gazprom reduced gas supplies going through Ukraine. Another significant diplomatic quarrel between the EU and Russia concerning energy deliveries took place in January 2009. Following Gazprom’s decision to stop deliveries through its Ukrainian pipelines many European states experienced a massive drop in gas deliveries. This has once again demonstrated the energy vulnerability of the European Union and its eastern neighborhood and highlighted the need for a concerted approach towards the energy sector18.

Until recently, no significant common policy had emerged in the energy security issue and energy imports in the EU. The basis for EU energy legisla-tion is weak and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Energy policy

13 G. Bahgat, Europe’s energy security: challenges and opportunities, „International Affairs” 2006, No. 82, p. 961. 14 D. Rogojanu, The role of Turkey in the energy security Environment of the European Union, „Philobiblon” 2009,

No. 14, p. 622.15 G. Winrow, Possible consequences of a new geopolitical game in Eurasia on Turkey as an emerging energy trans-

port hub, „Turkish Policy Quarterly”, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 50.16 G. Bahgat, p. 961.1� Ibidem, p. 961.18 M. Neuman, EU–Russian Energy Relations after the 2004/2007 EU Enlargement: an EU perspective, „Journal of

Contemporary European Studies” 2010, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 342.

is still largely regarded as member states’ own responsibility19. Nonetheless, European Commission has played an active role in pushing the EU’s common energy security strategy and published a Green Paper in November 2000, (To-wards a European strategy for the security of energy supply) which underlined the necessity to security supplies and initiated a serious debate about this prob-lem20. Thereafter, in 2006, European Commission issued an Annex to the Gre-en Paper (A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy). It identifies security of energy supplies as one of the most important objective of a common energy policy21. This document also stressed the strategic impor-tance of Turkey for gas and oil delivering to the EU22. The Green Paper also includes some other EU energy policy priorities:

• encouraging solidarity among the EU members;• establishing a more sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix;• encouraging a strategic energy technology plan;• creating an effective external energy policy that enabled the EU to

speak with one voice to foreign actors23.

In November 2008, European Commission introduced the Second Energy Strategy Review as a communiqué about the energy security for the European Council and the European Parliament24. Taking under consideration the grow-ing uncertainty of the security of energy resources supplies, the most impor-tant aim of this plan is encouraging the EU member states to act commonly on behalf of the energy security25. Presenting the Commission’s Second Energy Strategy Review package, José Manuel Barroso said, that „energy prices have risen by an average of 15% in the European Union in the last year. 54% of Europe’s energy is imported at a cost of �00 euros for every EU citizen. We have to address this urgently, by taking measures to increase our energy efficiency

19 F. Hoogeveen, W. Perlot, The EU’s Policies of Security of Energy Supply Towards the Middle East and Caspian Region: Major Power Politics?, „Perspectives on Global Development and Technology” 200�, No. 6, p. 48�.

20 A. Tekin, S. A. Wiliams, p. 420.21 F. Hoogeveen, W. Perlot, p. 48�.22 Annex to the Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy: What is at

Stake – Background Document, COM (2006)105 Final, XXX, Brussels – SEC 31�/2(2006), p. 3�.23 G. Bahgat, p. 962.24 E. Wyciszkiewicz, Drugi strategiczny przegląd energetyczny – nowe propozycje KE w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa,

„Biuletyn PISM” 2008, No. 59 (52�), http://www.pism.pl/biuletyny/files/358.pdf, (01.2010).25 Zabezpieczenie przyszłości energetycznej Europy: Komisja przedstawia propozycje dotyczące bezpieczeństwa en-

ergetycznego, mechanizmu solidarności oraz racjonalizacji zużycia energii, Brussels, 13 November, 2008, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1696&format=HTML&aged=0&language=PL&gui Language=en, (02.01.2010).

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and reduce our dependence on imports. We have to invest and diversify”26. In achieving the aims of the energy policy it is important to focus on energy issues in the context of EU’s external relations2�. European Commission pointed out that more attention should also be paid to solidarity among member states in their foreign relations28. EU also needs some regulations to coordinate member states’ energy investments plans abroad29.

Nevertheless, EU have so far failed to launch an efficient coordination and a comprehensive energy security policy. European Union with 2� mem-ber states are gradually becoming one of the greatest energy consumer in the world. That is why, the security of energy sources and routes or the creation of a common energy policy must be discussed much more when ever before30. In such circumstances, Turkey will make possible for the European Union to avoid the energy transmission through Russia. EU will probably systematically include Turkey in developing its energy strategy31. Emre Engür, deputy head of the business department of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (BOTAŞ, Boru Hatlarý Ýle Petrol Taţýma Anonim Ţirketi), sa ys that Turkey has a unique geo-strategic location because areas around Turkey account for �3% of the world’s gas reserves32. According to Engür’s estimates, 15% of the EU’s gas imports will be transported via Turkey by 202033. Turkey is a challenge and a chance for European energy security as a natural bridge to the oil and gas rich Caspian region. That has been its bargaining power in the process of accession negotia-tions with the EU since 2005.

Europe’s interest in energy cooperation with the Caspian region and the Eastern European states has been institutionalized since 1995 in Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE)34. This is an international energy co-operation program between the European Union and the partner states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan35. On behalf of the Euro-26 Securing your energy future: Commission presents energy security, solidarity and efficiency proposals,

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1696&format=HTML&aged =0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (02.01.2010).

2� Ibidem.28 Ibidem.29 Plan bezpieczeństwa energetycznego dla UE, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/144349/Plan-bezpieczenstwa-energetyc-

znego-dla-UE/, (13.11.2008).30 D. Rogojanu, p. 622.31 K. Barysch, Turkey’s role in European energy security, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec0�.

pdf, (12.05.2010).32 G. Winrow, p. 50.33 Ibidem, p. 50.34 G. Bahgat, p. 9�1.35 INOGATE, http://www.inogate.org/index.php?lang=en, (03.03.2011).

pean Union, the INOGATE is represented by three Directorates-General of the European Commission36. It aims to promote European investment in the Caspian basin or Central Asia states and to cooperate in supplying energy re-sources to the EU3�. Another deal came into force in February 2001, known as INOGATE Umbrella Agreement. It organized an institutional and legal system to rationalize and facilitate the development of interstate oil and gas transpor-tation infrastructure. The agreement was also designed to attract the invest-ment necessary for their construction and operation38.

According to P. Noel, „the most efficient solution to the Russian gas prob-lem lies not in the development of an external energy policy, but in further re-structuring of the EU’s internal gas market”39. One of the EU important energy project in this context, is the building of a single liberalized electricity and gas market (SLEGM)40. The main aim of liberalization is to establish a high level of competition between energy companies on the European market. It should lead to the leveling of energy tariffs in different member states and a general price reduction41. It is also believed, that such a market would create a maxi-mum degree of solidarity among the European gas consumer states and would increase collective security through redistribution of the gas flows in the case of emergency or crisis42. However, in practice, the project is very problematic, because of the fact, that separate liberalized markets of the EU member states have emerged instead of a single EU market43. Moreover, governments of many European states pursue an openly protectionist strategy, countering the take-over of national companies by other EU firms and encouraging the merger of national corporations44.

The entry into force the Lisbon Treaty has significantly expanded EU com-petency in the energy sector, especially in the internal dimension, but its powers in external energy strategy still remain very modest. According to the article 194(1)TFEU „Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between member states, to … ensure security of energy supply in the Union … any me-asures in energy policy shall not affect a member state’s right to determine the

36 Ibidem.3� G. Bahgat, p. 9�1.38 Ibidem, p. 9�1.39 P. Noel, Beyond dependence: how to deal with Russian gas, „ECFR Policy Brief” 2008, p. 8.40 N. Kaveshnikov, The issue of energy security In relations between Russia and the European Union, „European

security” 2010, Vol. 19, No. 4, p. 591.41 Ibidem, p. 591.42 Ibidem, p. 591.43 Ibidem, p. 591.44 Ibidem, p. 591.

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conditions for exploiting its own energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”45. Thereby, EU states are free to regulate energy policy, and the ability of the Commission to negotiate energy issues with third countries will be based on coincidence of the member states interests and their intention to reach a consensus46.

4. The EU Energy Mix

European Union is one of the world’s fastest growing energy markets and one of the biggest importer of energy resources4�. According to the forecasts, by 2030 the energy resources requirement in EU will grow 26,3% comparing with 200048. The EU’s energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels (diagram 1).

Oil provides the largest share of all energy consumed and is predicted to retain this position in 2030, reducing slightly to 35,3%49. Oil will predomina-te as a fuel for road transportation50. The use of natural gas, the second most prominent fuel, is growing very fast recently. Less emissions compared to oil and coal, lower cost compared to renewable energy, and flexibility compared 45 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, http://eurlex.europa.eu/Lex-

UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF (12.06.2012).46 N. Kaveshnikov, p. 594.4� A. Tekin, S. A. Wiliams, p. 421.48 S. Frączek, Próba oceny bezpieczeństwa energetycznego krajów UE, http://www.univ.rzeszow.pl/nauka/konfer-

encje/rl_most/40-Fraczek.pdf, (02.01.2010).49 S. Wood, p. 309.50 Ibidem, p. 309.

to nuclear, encourage its use. The relative share is predicted to increase only marginally to 25,�% by 203051. It is consumed in the industrial and residential sectors and in electricity generation52. Coal, having been Europe’s main non-transport fuel for centuries, cannot be rapidly replaced. It is cheaper than most alternatives and several member states have large deposits of these energy re-source. Nonetheless, coal production in the EU 2� fell from 366 million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 1990 to 191 mtoe in 200653.

The EU has been a leading political and financial supporter of renewab-le energy sources (RES). Renewables Directive that became law in June 2009, prescribes that this energy source constitutes at least 20% of total EU energy consumption by 202054. The EU biofuel strategy had a target of 10% of auto fuel by 202055. At Kyoto in 199�, the EU 15 agreed to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG emissions) of which CO2 is about 80%. In 2001, a 6th Environment Action Programme (EAP) was adopted56. It has helped ensure that environment le-gislation is in place to tackle most environmental challenges in the EU. CO2 emissions for the EU2� were 9,230 kg per capita in 2006 comparing to 9,290 kg in 19905�. Thereby, climate change has become the most conspicuous focus and a concern for 8�% of the EU population. In March 200�, an emissions cut of 20% by 2020, with an endorsed objective of 30%, was agreed58.

The EU is the world’s biggest consumer of nuclear generated electricity. It is consuming 34,3% of world’s nuclear energy (205,3 mtoe)59. The nuclear energy used by EU states in 2005 constituted 30% of its electricity and 12% of its total energy consumption60. One of the Green Paper’s priority was achieving a more sustainable, efficient and diverse energy mix which raised was in the prospect of nuclear energy use. It started a debate on the future role of nuclear energy in the EU. The Commission noted that „should the intention be to replace exist-ing nuclear plants by new ones, decisions are required”. In the same time, the „role of nuclear power in Europe received an unexpected boost when linked to

51 Ibidem, p. 309.52 G. Bahgat, p. 96�.53 S. Wood, p. 308.54 Ibidem, p. 309.55 Ibidem, p. 309.56 The Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community 2002-2012, http://ec.europa.eu/envi-

ronment/newprg/index.htm (12.05.2012).5� European Commission (2009a) Energy and Transport in Figures (Luxembourg).58 Council of the European Union (200�) Presidency Conclusions, 8–9 March, pp. 10–14 and Annex I.59 BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2012, http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_

uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statisti-cal_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.pdf (14.07.2012).

60 S. Wood, p. 310.

Diagram 1.

Source: http://www.investingdaily.com/pf/17516/alternative-energy-dont-believe-the-

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a landmark climate change deal”61.

5. The Role of Turkey as an Energy Corridor

The geographical position of Turkey, between European and Asian conti-nents, enables to play a specific role as the transit state for the oil and gas from the Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East to Europe. Turkey is also a very absorbent market for the energy resources. Thereby, it is a very impor-tant economical partner for countries rich in oil and gas (table 1) and for those, who need such resources. Thereby, Turkey is a challenge for the European ener-gy security. Probably, future Turkish accession to the EU will ensure reliable delivery of oil and gas.

Table 1. Oil and gas potentials of Turkey’s neighbors (2011).

Oil proved

reserves(billion barrels)

Oil proved

reservesshare of

total

Oilpro-duction

(tho-usand b/d)

Oil pro-

ductionshare of

total

Gas proved

reserves(trillion

cubicmeters)

Gas proved

reservesshare of

total

Gas pro-duction (billion

cubic meters)

Gas pro-ductionshare of

total

Azerbaijan 7,0 0,4% 931 1,1% 1,3 0,6% 14,8 0,5%

Kazakhstan 30,0 1,8% 1841 2,1% 1,9 0,9% 19,3 0,6%

Turkmeni-stan 0,6 ? 216 0,3% 24,3 11,7% 59,5 1,8%

Iran 151,2 9,1% 4321 5,2% 33,1 15,9% 151,8 4,6%

Iraq 143,1 8,7% 2798 3,4% 3,6 1,7% 1,9 0,1%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012, http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2012.pdf (13.07. 2012).

The relations between European Union and Turkey are based on institu-tional dimensions. The EU is now trying to persuade Turkey to align itself with the energy acquis through joining the Energy Community Treaty (ECT). The ECT, signed in October 2005 and in force since June 2006, is aimed to create an integrated energy market and potential accession of the new member states

61 Ibidem, p. 314.

on the basis of the acquis62. Since 2009 Turkey has been in the process of nego-tiating a membership in the Energy Community Treaty63. The key field of coo-peration between Turkey and the European Union are the common pipeline projects. There are many projects of energy infrastructure to transport oil and gas through the Turkish territory. We should mention the Nabucco pipeline, which will carry Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Europe via Turkey. As far as the existing oil pipeline infrastructure, the most important is the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline. Ceyhan city will probably become a major energy hub and oil outlet terminal in the Eastern Mediterranean Region.

Turkey has concentrated its efforts on the transportation of Caspian oil and gas reserves to Western markets, which was often referred to as the „Silk Road of the 21st Century”64. Nowadays, the idea to restore the Silk Road connecting Eastern Asia with Western Europe via the post-Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia has been gaining importance65. In this context, the western route through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to EU is very important. The key project is the 1,�68 kilometers long Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (map 1). It is a very valuable venture not only economically but also politically for Tur-key, European Union, United States and Caspian states rich in oil and gas. The construction of this pipeline started in 2002, the cost of this venture was about 4 billion USD66. Officially, the pipeline has operated since 13 July 20066�. It can transport up to 1 million barrels per day (approximately 1,5% of the world’s oil supply), and it is the second longest pipeline in the world68. On 16 June 2006, Kazakhstan has officially joined the BTC oil pipeline project. According to the agreement between Presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Kazakh crude oil will be shipped to Baku across the Caspian Sea, and then pumped through the BTC pipeline to Ceyhan (Aktau – BTC Project)69.

62 http://www.energy-community.org/ (13.05.2010).63 A. Balcer, W stronę strategicznego partnerstwa Unii Europejskiej i Turcji w polityce zagranicznej, „Demos Eu-

ropa” 2010, p. 1�.64 Ibidem.65 A. Łoskot, Turcja – korytarz tranzytowy dla surowców energetycznych do UE?, „Prace OSW” 2005, No. 1�, p. 19;

I. Soysal, S. Aslantepe, Turkish Views on Eurasia, Istanbul, 2001, p. 4�.66 D. Fink, Assessing Turkey’s Future as an Energy Transit Country, „Research Notes” 2006, No. 11, p. 1.6� „Turkish Daily News” 2006, 14 July.68 Turkey’s Energy Strategy, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_

strategy_en.pdf (12.04.2010).69 Ibidem.

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There are also two gas transportation projects: the Baku – Tbilisi - Erzu-rum (BTE) pipeline and Turkey – Greece – Italy Interconnector (TGI) (map 2). The construction of the gas pipeline to connect the Caucasus and Europe was begun in July 2005 and inaugurated on 18th on December 200��0. The gas both for BTE and TGI is extracted from the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan. The pipeline is crossing the Turkish territory, reaching Greece, and from there it is to be extended toward Italy via underground pipeline crossing the Adriatic Sea. The future extension opening is scheduled for 2015�1. The capacity of the pipeline is approximately 250 million cubic meters per year�2.

�0 D. Rogojanu, p. 629.�1 Ibidem, p. 629.�2 Ibidem, p. 629.

The future and still not realized gas pipeline project is Nabucco (map 3). The Presidents of Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania signed an agre-ement about the construction of the pipeline on 13th July 2009. According to this decision, the gas from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East will be transported to Europe via Turkey. The main aim of the pipeline is to secure the gas deliveries to European Union without the Russian participation. The 3,300 kilometers long, Nabucco pipeline will go from Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq and Turkmenistan through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria. The project got the support from the United States and the European Union�3. Turkey is a key transit state for the Nabucco pipeline. 60% of it will go through its terri-tory. From the Turkish perspective, Nabucco has not only economical dimension but it is also a significant political move. According to the Turkish elites, if Turkey becomes the main energy bridge between East and West, it will speed up its pro-cess of integration with the EU and increase its regional position�4.

Turkey and the EU could benefit a lot from cooperating in the energy field. The European Union would gain a reliable alternative supply route. Turkey wo-uld gain transit fees and other energy - related incomes, but more importantly, the opportunity to prove that it is an indispensable partner for, and eventually member of, the European Union�5. Thereby, the serious challenge for the reali-zation the Nabucco pipeline is the antagonistic Russian attitude. Russia tries to

�3 „Best OSW” 2009, No. 25, p. 2.�4 Ibidem, p. 3.�5 K. Barysch, Turkey’s role in European energy security, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec0�.

pdf (12.05.2010).

Map 1. BTC pipeline.

Source: http://www.oilfund.az/pub/tiny_upload/map.jpg (02.04.2011).

Map 2. TGI Pipeline.

Source: http://cambridgeforecast.wordpress.com/2008/02/10/turkey-greece-italy-gas-pipeline/(02.03.2011).

Map 3. Nabucco pipeline project.

Source: http://www.nabucco-gaspipeline.com/english/800px-Nabucco_Gas_Pipeline-en_svg.png (12.03.2011)

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convince the EU members and the potential suppliers to give up the Nabucco project. From the other side, Moscow refused to participate in this project�6.

6. The Role of Russia as an Energy Exporter

Energy security is the most important element in Russia’s national secu-rity. In December 2005, President W. Putin called Russia as „energy superpo-wer”��. He also declared, that „energy sector is the most important element of the world’s economical development”�8. Russia is the world’s biggest source of gas and takes eight’s place regarding oil reserves�9. According to the 2011 Bri-tish Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, it is estimated, that Russia has 10,6 thousand million tones of proven oil reserves (5,6% world’s reserves), and 44,8 trillion cubic meters of gas (23,9% world’s reserves)80.

Thereby, Russia is the EU’s biggest energy policy challenge. Russia provides 33,5% of EU crude oil imports, 42% of its gas imports, and 26% of coal imports. There simply is no readily available alternative to the supplies the EU receives from Russia, particularly natural gas. Unlike oil, gas is extremely difficult and expensive to ship via tankers, pipelines are the most convenient method of transportation81. Russia’s share of the energy supply grows ever larger. More then seven eastern Eu-ropean countries receive at least 90% of their crude oil imports from Russia, and six EU states are entirely dependent on Russian natural gas imports82. Russia have used energy resources as the instrument of an effective foreign policy. To protect future income flows, „it needs to strengthen relations with individual buyers by signing long-term contracts, invest in the exploration of new gas and oil fields, bui-ld new transport routes and maintain existing ones, proliferate into the upstream parts of the energy chain such as consumer retail and prove itself as a reliable ener-gy supplier”83. Thereby the Russian Federation articulated clear strategy regarding energy relations with its partners, the European Union’s position is less clear84.�6 „Best OSW” 2009, No. 25, p. 2.�� E. Wyciszkiewicz, Rosyjski sektor naftowo – gazowy – uwarunkowania wewnętrzne i perspektywy rozwoju, [in:]

Geopolityka Rurociągów. Współzależność energetyczna a stosunki międzypaństwowe na obszarze postsowieckim, ed. by E. Wyciszkiewicz, Warszawa 2008, p. �.

�8 Ibidem, p. �.�9 CIA The World Factbook, Russia, Oil, natural gas - proved reserves, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html (12.09.2011).80 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_

english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/statistical_re-view_of_world_energy_full_report_2011.pdf (12.09.2011).

81 Z. Baran, EU energy security: time to end Russian leverage, „Washington Quarterly” 200�, No. 30(4), p. 132.82 Ibidem, p. 132.83 M. Neuman, p. 343.84 Ibidem, p. 344.

Russia has further sought to increase Europe’s dependence on its energy supplies by acquiring significant stakes in the energy distribution companies and infrastructure of EU member states, through the state monopolists on the energy sector, Gazprom, Transneft, and Lukoil85. Those companies control the Russian oil and gas pipeline network and consequently handle all Russian and Central Asian exports, directly or through joint venture structures86. Especial-ly, Gazprom is trying to be very influential on the European energy market8�. It keeps investing in Europe’s strategic energy assets, thereby „locking Europe into a deeper, long-term dependence”88. For many years, it has owned signifi-cant shares of energy companies throughout the former Soviet Union. It is the largest or second-largest shareholder in the gas infrastructure of Estonia, Lat-via, and Lithuania. Recently, Gazprom has been expanding its influence even further into the domestic gas distribution networks of western Europe. In the past two years, Gazprom has signed deals with Eni (Italy), Gasunie (the Neth-erlands), BASF (Germany), E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany), and Gaz de France89.

The Central Asian states have been providing Russia with cheap gas which has enabled Gazprom to export Russian gas to Europe at a much higher price. That is why, Russia is against the attempts of the Central Asians to transport and sell their gas to European markets. W. Putin administration was trying to increase its control on Central Asian energy. The instrument of this policy was the project of a Eurasian Alliance of Gas Producers which would have included Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However this idea failed to materialize90.

It is important to analyze main oil and gas routs from the Russian territory to the European market. The oldest and the biggest oil transportation system from Russia to Europe is the Friendship Pipeline (Drużba) (map 6) which con-nect Siberia and the Middle - Eastern Europe. This pipeline exists from 1962 as a main source of oil for Europe91. It is going through Belarus to Płock and Germany, through Ukraine to Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. It can transport 100 mln tones of oil annually92. Another old pipeline infrastructure system is the Jamal gas pipeline. It connects Jamal Peninsula with Western 85 A. Cohen, Russia: the flawed energy superpower, [in:] Energy Security Challenges for 21st Century, ed. by G. Luft,

A. Korin, Santa Barbara 2009, p. 92.86 Z. Baran, p. 133.8� I. Falaleyev, Gazprom: Leveraged to European Growth, „Salomon Brothers” 1996, No.18, p. 14; S. O’Sullivan,

Gazprom: A Strategic Assessment, „MC Securities” 1996, London, p. �.88 Z. Baran, p. 142.89 Ibidem, p. 133.90 G. Winrow, p. 51.91 Druzhba Pipeline, „Pipelines International” 2009, No. 9, http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/druzhba_

pipeline/008045/# (04.04.2011).92 E. Wyciszkiewicz, p. 32.

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Europe. The Polish and Belarusian part of the pipeline was built in 1999. It can transport about 32 billion cubic meters of gas annually93. The Russian and Belarusian part is controlled by Gazprom and in Poland by EuRoPol Gaz (con-sortium PGNiG, Gazprom, GasTrading).

Nowadays, Russia is concentrated on two important gas pipelines: Nord Stream (55 billion cubic meters annually), and South Stream (63 billion cubic meters annually). Their main aim is to connect Western Europe directly with Russian resources without the participation of the Eastern European states94. Those pipelines will bypass them in the north (through the Baltic Sea) and south (through the Black Sea and Balkans). In 15th of May 2009 in Sochi, Gasprom and its counterparts from Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy signed series of agree-ments regarded the realization of South Stream (map 5) gas pipeline project. The pipeline will run under the Black Sea from the Russian coast (Beregovaya) to the Bulgarian coast. It is planned to operate in 2015. It is an element of the gas pipeline competition in Europe and bipolar energy policy in EU. Some of the European states supported both Russian and Nabucco projects95. The Nord Stream (map 4) project is already realized, but it will probably develop in next few years. The twin pipelines are going from Vyborg to Greifswald. The main investor is Gasprom. The capacity of each pipeline is planned as 2�,5 billion cubic meters annually96.

93 Gazociąg jamalski, http://szczesniak.pl/node/259 (12.09.2011).94 Nord Stream i South Stream nie rozwiążą problemów Gazpromu, „Komentarze OSW” 2010, No. 1.95 „Best OSW” 2009, No.19, p. 4.96 Zapewnione finansowanie drugiej nitki gazociągu Nord Stream, „Best OSW” 2010, No.12, http://www.osw.

waw.pl/pl/publikacje/best/2010-12-29/zapewnione-finansowanie-drugiej-nitki-gazociagu-nord-stream (04.10.2011).

Another interesting project is Blue Stream pipeline (map 5)9�. It runs from Isobilnoye in southern Russia, to the Black Sea, then on to the Turkish port of Samsun98. The pipeline was officially opened in November 2005 during the offi-cial ceremony attended by the Prime Ministers of Turkey, Italy and Russia. The most important shareholders of this project are Calik Energy Company (Tur-key), Gazprom (Russia) and Eni (Italy)99. It is the world’s deepest gas pipeline. The Blue Stream pipeline is planned to transport about 40 billion cubic meters annually (now it is only 16)100. The extension of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline to Ceyhan and then to Ashkelon with a view to supplying Israel with Russian natural gas is taken under consideration.

Another important Russian infrastructure project is Baltic Pipeline System (BTS) (map 6). It is transporting oil from Ural and Western Siberia to the Baltic Sea. The Trnasneft is the operator of this huge pipeline system. It increased ener-gy export abilities of Russia. The aim of this project is to bypass Belarus, Baltic states and Poland as a transit area and to sell oil directly from Russia to the We-stern European partners. It started to operate in 2001 and have capacity �5 mln tones annually. Russia started to build the BTS -2 pipeline system in 2009 from Unercza to Ust-Ługa port. Its planned capacity is 50 mln tons annually101.

9� US Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html (22.06.09).98 D. Fink, p. 5.99 Ibidem, p. 5.100 D. B. Sezer, Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership, [in:]

Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. by K. Kirisci, B. Rubin, London 2001, p. 163.101 Ruszyła budowa ropociągu BTS-2, „Tydzień na Wschodzie” 2009, No. 6.

Map 4. Nord Stream pipeline.

Source: http://weglowodory.pl/nord-stream-czyli-gazociag-polnocny-informacje/ (12.09.2011).

Map 5. Blue Stream pipeline and the South Stream pipeline project.

Source: http://therearenosunglasses.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/1-south-stream-pipeline.jpg (12.03.2011).

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Until recently, the existing pipelines in the Caspian Region were designed to link the former USSR internally and were routed though Russian territory102. The port of Novorossiysk is the most important Black Sea terminal, from which Caspian oil and gas are transported in tankers to European markets. The key Russian energy transit project there, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (map �). The main pipeline connects the Tengiz oil fields in western Kazakhstan with the new Black Sea Marine Terminal in Russia. In October 2001, CPC for the first time loaded crude oil at its Marine Terminal Yuzhnaya Ozerevka, near the Rus-sian city of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea103. This pipeline is 1,460 km long with planned capacity 1,343 billion pounds per day104. CPC project reflects coopera-tion between Russia and transnational corporations105. Probably in the future, Russia will continue to be the main outlet for oil shipments from Kazakhstan106.

Another transit option for energy resources through the Russian territory is the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline known as the Northern Corridor. It star-ted to pump oil in 199�. The pipeline is going from Baku port in Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk, from where oil with tankers is transported from the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea. It has a potential of exporting 5 million tons of oil per year10�. This energy corridor

102 G. Bahgat, American oil diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, Gainesville 2003, p. 166.103 CPC, http://www.cpc.ru/portal/alias!press/lang!en-us/tabID!335�/DesktopDefault.aspx (02.03.2011).104 A. L. Griffiths, Global Perspectives on oil and security, Dalhousie 2006, p. 32�.105 G. Bahgat, Central Asia and Energy Security, „Asian Affairs” 2006, Vol. 3�, No. 1, p. 8.106 Ibidem, p. 9.10� R. Ibrahimov, Azerbaijan: Happiness is the Availability of Export Corridors, http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.

asp?id=552 (04.04.2011).

has some negative elements. First of all, oil from Novorossiysk is transported in tankers through the Turkish Straits, which is connected with the ecological risk for the more than 10 million populated metropolis, Istanbul. In addition, the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline is not economically advantageous transit ro-ute for Azerbaijan108. In comparison with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline it eventually became less beneficial, which led to the stoppage of pumping oil to Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline from April 2008.

There is still no common European strategy to deal with a strong and deter-mined Russia, that uses control of energy supplies, transportation, and distri-bution to reestablish itself as a major world power109. Javier Solana expressed 108 Ibidem.109 Z. Baran, p. 142.

Map 6. BTS and Friendship (Drużba) pipelines.

Source: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2008-12-03/rosja-podjela-ostateczna-decyzje-o-budowie-ropociagu-omij (03.10.2011).

Map 7. CPC pipeline

Source: CPC, http://www.cpc.ru/portal/alias!press/lang!en-us/tabID!3357/DesktopDe-fault.aspx (02.02.2011).

Map 8. Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline

Source: http://www.socar-germany.de/eng/socar/scp.html (04.04.2011).

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his concern about Russia’s role as a EU’s energy partner, when he declared that „there is a justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in investing in future leverage than in future production. It is up to us to avoid the kind of fragmented bilateral negotiations which leave us all worse off”110.

7. Conclusion

Energy security is a very important factor of the contemporary interna-tional relations. It is strongly connected with the economical survival of every state and nation. European Union, as one of the biggest energy consumer in the world, is mostly dependant on hydrocarbon deliveries from Russian Federa-tion. In such circumstances, Russia is capably using its predominance influen-ce on European energy market also for political purposes. Thereby, European states have to look for alternative sources of oil and gas. The diversification po-licy should include Turkey, as an energy hub transporting resources from the Caucasus, Central Asia or Middle East. Such a role, makes Turkey a key player on international scene not only in Europe, but also in surrounding regions. Multiple pipeline projects realized and others under construction will inevi-tably contribute to EU’s energy security interest and could make it much more effective in accord with the idea of the European Neighborhood Policy.

110 M. Neuman, p. 342.

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