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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105746. December 2, 1996]

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYORELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, VICE MAYOR ROBINSON B.LOMO, COUNCILORS TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANOADORABLE, MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDESULLANO, MARIETO TAN, SR., HERMINIO SERINO,BENJAMIN DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, andELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, ROBINSON B. LOMO,TEOFILI GALORIO, CASIANO ADORABLE, MARIOAPAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE SULLANO,

MARIETO TAN SR., HERMINI SERINO, BENJAMINDANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, in their privatecapacities as taxpayer in the Province of MisamisOccidental and the Municipality of Jimenez, MisamisOccidental, and BENJAMIN C. GALINDO andBENHUR B. BAUTISTA, in their private capacities astaxpayers in the Province of Misamis Occidental andthe Municipality of Jimenez, MisamisOccidental, peti t ioners, vs., HON. VICENTE T. BAZ,JR., Presiding Judge REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 14, 10

th

JUDICIAL REGION, OROQUIETACITY, and MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN through itsMAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD, VICE MAYOR BASILIOM. BANAAG, COUNCILORS CONCEPCION E. LAGA-AC, MIGUEL F. ABCEDE, JUANITO B. TIU, CLAUDIOT. REGIL, ANCIETO S. MEJARES NAZIANCINO B.MARIQUIT, and FEDERICO QUINIMON, and THEPROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL through the

PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL andits members, VICE-GOVERNOR FLORENCIO L.GARCIA, BOARD MEMBERS MARIVIC S. CHIONG,PACITA M. YAP, ALEGRIA V. CARINO, JULIO L. TIU,LEONARDO R. REGALADO II, CONSTACIO C.BALAIS and ERNESTO P. IRA, and THECOMMISSION ON AUDIT, through its Chairman, HON.

EUFEMIO DOMINGO, and THE DEPARTMENT OFLOCAL GOVERNMENT through its Secretary, HON.LUIS SANTOS (now HON. CESAR SARINO), and THEDEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,through its Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE(now HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ), and The Hon.CATALINO MACARAOG (now HON. FRAKLINDRILON), EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THEPRESIDENT, respondents.

D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4,1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of OroquietaCity,[1]affirming the legal existence of the Municipality ofSinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation ofits boundary for the purpose of determining whether certainareas claimed by it belong to it.

The antecedent facts are as follows:The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive

Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to 68of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The full text of theOrder reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 258
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CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN,IN THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, andpursuant to the provisions of Section 68 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, there is hereby created, in the Province of Misamis Occidental, amunicipality to be known as the municipality of Sinacaban, which

shall consist of the southern portion of the municipality of Jimenez,Misamis Occidental, more particularly described and bounded asfollows:

On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of thelighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 84030W., 7,250 meters to point 2which is on the bank of Palilan River branch; thence following PalilanRiver branch 2,400 meters southwesterly 'to point 3, thence a straightline S 87000 W, 22,550 meters to point 4, where this intersects theMisamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west, by the present

Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; and on the south by thepresent Jimenez-Tudela boundary; and on the east, by the limits of themunicipal waters which the municipality of Sinacaban shall havepursuant to section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code,(Description based on data shown in Enlarged Map of Poblacion ofJimenez, Scale 1:8:000).

The municipality of Sinacabn contains the barrios of Sinacaban, whichshall be the seat of the municipal government, Sinonoc, Libertad, thesouthern portion of the barrio of Macabayao, and the sitios of Tipan,

Katipunan, Estrella, Flores, Senior, Adorable, San Isidro, Cagayanon,Kamanse, Kulupan and Libertad Alto.

The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus theportion thereof included in the municipality of Sinacaban.

The municipality of Sinacaban shall begin to exist upon theappointment and qualification of the mayor, vice-mayor, and a

majority of the councilors thereof. The new municipality shall,however, assume payment of a proportionate share of the loan of themunicipality of Jimenez with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporationas may be outstanding on the date of its organization, the proportion ofsuch payment to be determined by the Department of Finance.

Done in the City of Manila, this 30thday of August, in the year of Our

Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, and of the Independence ofthe Philippines, the fourth.

(SGD.) ELPIDIO QUIRINOPresident of the Philippines

By the President:

(SGD.) TEODORO EVANGELISTAExecutive Secretary

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171,[2]datedNovember 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of BarrioTabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, andSinara Alto,[3]based on the technical description in E.O. No.258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of MisamisOccidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while concedingthat under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban,nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreementit had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement wasapproved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in itsResolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950, which fixed thecommon boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows:[4]

From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow Macabayao Road until itintersects Tabangag Creek at the back of the Macabayao Elementary
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school. Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the MacabayaoRiver at upper Adorable. Follow the Macabayao River such that thebarrio of Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of theJimenez down and the sitios of San Vicente, Donan, Estrella, Mapulawill be a part of Sinacaban. (Emphasis added)

In its decision dated October 11, 1989,[5]the Provincial

Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. Itheld that the previous resolution approving the agreementbetween the municipalities was void because the Board had nopower to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No.258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to theConstitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg.337), 134.[6]The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No.13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seekingreconsideration.[7]

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition, and mandamusin the Regional Trial Court ofOroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed againstSinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and itsProvincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments ofLocal Government, Budget and Management, and the ExecutiveSecretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with thedecision in Pelaez v. Auditor General,[8]the power to createmunicipalities is essentially legislative and consequentlySinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had nolegal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis--visJimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed thatSinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervisionover the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoinedfrom assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; thatE.O. No. 258 be declared null and void; that the decision datedOctober 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the ProvincialBoard be set aside for having been rendered without

jurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be enjoined frompassing in audit any expenditure of public funds by Sinacaban;that the Department of Budget and Management be enjoinedfrom allotting public funds to Sinacaban; and that the ExecutiveSecretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervisionover said municipality.

During pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues to thefollowing:

A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legaljuridical entity, duly created in accordance with law;

B. If not, whether it is a de factojuridical entity;

C. Whether the validity of the existence of theMunicipality can be properly questioned in this actionon certiorari;

D. Whether the Municipality of Jimenez which hadrecognized the existence of the municipality for morethan 40 years is estopped to question its existence;

E. Whether the existence of the municipality has beenrecognized by the laws of the land; and

F. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board hadacquired finality.

On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision, thedispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the finding of this Court thatthe petition must be denied and judgment is hereby rendered declaringa STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban shall continueto exist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decisiondated October 11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawiganfixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and Jimenez, Missamis Occi.
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as null and void, the same not being in accordance with the boundariesprovided for in Executive order No. 258 creatingthe municipality of Sinacaban; dismissing the petition for lack ofmerit, without pronouncement as to cost and damages. With respect tothe counterclaim, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

The Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation

survey of the boundary of Sinacaban within 60 days from the time thedecision shall have become final and executory and another 60 dayswithin which to submit their report from the completion of the saidrelocation survey.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a defacto corporation since it had completely organized itself evenprior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for

forty years before the existence was questioned; that Jimenezdid not have the legal standing to question the existence ofSinacaban, the same being reserved to he State as representedby the Office of the Solicitor General in a quowarrantoproceeding; that Jimenez was estopped fromquestioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into anagreement with it concerning their common boundary; and thatany question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had beenrendered moot by 442 (d) of the Local Government Code of1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of thisCode shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existingmunicipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances orexecutive orders and which have their respective set of electivemunicipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity ofthis Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsiderationof the decision but its motion was denied by the RTC. Hencethis petition raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacabanhas legal personality to file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it isthe boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in resolution No.77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which shouldbe used as the basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial

claim.First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of

Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exist, then it has standing tobring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was notvalidly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaezv. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations isessentially a legislative matter and therefore the President waswithout power to create by executive order the Municipality of

Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in anumber of cases[9]later decided. However, we have since heldthat where a municipality created as such by executive order islater impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legalvalidity, its creation can no longer be questioned. InMunicipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,[10]thisCourt considered the following factors as having validated thecreation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallityof Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the Presidentbefore the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for

nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipalityhad never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the rulingin Pelaez no quo warrantosuit was filed to question the validityof the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) thefact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth classmunicipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court andconsidered part of a legislative district in the Constitutionapportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above
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all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the dejure character of the municipality must be deemed to have beenput to rest by the local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no.7160), 442 (d) of which provides that municipal districtsorganized pursuant to presidential issuances or executiveorders and which have their respective sets of elective officialsholding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall

henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on

Sinacaban the status of at least a de factomunicipal corporationin the sense that its legal existence has been recognized andacquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been inexistence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General wasdecided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it wasonly 40 years later that its existence was questioned and onlybecause it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desiredfor its revenue. This fact must be underscored because underRule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warrantosuit againsta corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commencedwithin five (5) years from the time the act complained of wasdone or committed. On the contrary, the State and even themunicipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabanscorporate existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 datedJune 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciaryReorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban isconstituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of theestablishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in thecountry. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognizedSinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with itregarding their common boundary. The agreement wasembodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board ofMisamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue ofthe Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioninglegislative districts throughout the country, which consideredSinacaban part of the Second District of MisamisOccidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of sanNarciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any

defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of thisCode shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existingmunicipal district organized pursuant to presidential issuances orexecutive orders and which have their respective set of electivemunicipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity ofthe Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160,

442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutionaland statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in thecreation of new municipalities.[11]

This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previouslyexplained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the timethe 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is notsubject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement appliesonly to new municipalities created for the first time under theConstitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite wasoriginally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the previous Constitutionwhich took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, beapplied to municipal corporations created before, such as themunicipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

Third. Finally Jimenez argues that the RTC erred inordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacabanbecause the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are notenumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the
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parties entered into an agreement whereby the barangays inquestion were considered part of the territory of Jimenez.

E.O. no. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises onlythe barrios (now called Barangays) therein mentioned. What itsay is that Sinacaban contains those barrios, without sayingthey are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is thatthe technical description, containing the metes and bounds of itsterritory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered arelocation and consequently the question to which themunicipality the barangays in question belong.

Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalitiesagreed that certain barrios bellonged to Jimenez, while certainother ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement wassubsequently approved by the Provincial board of MisamisOccidental. Whether this agreement conforms to E.O. no. 258will be determined by the result of the survey. Jimenez

contends however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No,258, the agreement as embodied in resolution No, 77 of theProvincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban. This raises thequestion whether the provincial board had authority to approvethe agreement or, to put it in another way, whether it had thepower to declare certain barrios part of the one or the othermunicipality. We hold it did not if effect would be to amend thearea as described in E.O no. 258 creating the Municipality ofSinacaban.

At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77on February 18, 1950, the applicable law was 2167 of theRevised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:

SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. How settled. Disputesas to jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shallbe decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in which suchmunicipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the

municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of theprovincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved tothe Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the ExecutiveSecretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barriosin dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces,the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to anagreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an

appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary],whose decision shall be final.

As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General,[12]the power ofprovincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of anadministrative nature involving as it does, the adoption ofmeans and ways to carry into effect the law creating saidmunicipalities. It is a power to fix common boundary, in orderto avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoiningmunicipalities. It is thus limited to implementing the law

creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration ofboundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating amunicipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but itsamendment.[13]If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the ProvincialBoard of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technicaldescription of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used byJimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decisionof October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the ProvincialBoard. Its action is in accordance with the local GovernmentCode of 1983, 79 of which provides that I case no settlementof boundary disputes is made the dispute should be elevated tothe RTC of the province. In 1989, when the action was broughtby Jimenez, this Code was the governing law. The governinglaw is now the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.7160), 118-119.
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Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the casewithin one year form the start of proceeding as required by 79of the Local Government Code of 1983 and the 90-day periodprovided for in the Article VIII, 15 of the Constitution does notaffect the validity of the decision rendered. For even grantingthat the court failed to decide within the period prescribed bylaw, its failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the

case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possibleadministrative sanction.[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision ofthe Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 isAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero,Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, HermosisimaJr., Panganiban, andTorres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]Per Judge Vicente T. Baz, Jr.[2] Petition, Annex Z; Rollo,pp. 183-184.

SECOND DIVISION

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 142601

Present:

PUNO,J.,Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-

COMMISSION ON THE

SETTLEMENT OF LAND

PROBLEMS, MUNICIPALITYOF SAN

JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN,

SPS. ANGEL and ROSARIO CRUZ,

RUFINO LAAN, RUFINO

LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES

NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO andHERMINIA HAGOS, LEON

GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR and

HAYDEE BADILLO,Respondents.

GUTIERREZ,CORONA,AZCUNA, andGARCIA,JJ.

Promulgated:

October 23, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]assailing the

Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals dated November 16, 1999 and

Resolution dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495, entitled

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,petitioner, versus, THE

HON. RUFINO V. MIJARES, in his capacity asCommissioner, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND

PROBLEMS (COSLAP), MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE DEL

MONTE, BULACAN, represented by Hon. Eduardo V. Roquero, in

his capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,

JOSEPH ELMER S. GUEVARRA, Sheriff IV of the Ex-Officio
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Sheriff, Malolos, Bulacan, SPS. ANGEL A. CRUZ and ROSARIO C.

CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN, RUFINA LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES

NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO HAGOS and HERMINIA

HAGOS, LEON GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR R. BADILLO and

HAYDEE M. BADILLO, and LEONCIO LAAN, respondents.

The undisputed facts are:

Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute

between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (one of

herein respondents) and the City of Caloocan. In order to resolve the

long-challenged conflict, the Sangguniang Bayanof San Jose del

Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-94[3]on February

10, 1994. This resolution recognizes the official boundary ofrespondent municipality and the City of Caloocan, described as

follows:

ON JOINT MOTION of all members present;

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved to recognize theofficial boundary of the Municipality of San Jose delMonte, Bulacan and the City of Caloocan, Metro

Manila as the true and correct line marking between thetwo Local Government Units as shown by the attachedcertified true copy of the geographic position and plaingrid coordinates of Caloocan, Rizal per CAD-267specifically from MBM (Municipal BoundaryMonument) 22 to MBM 33;x x x

On August 8, 1995, another Resolution[4]was passed by

the Sangguniang Bayanof San Jose del Monte recognizing the

geographic position and plane coordinates of Tala Estate, Caloocan

City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the lot lines delineating the

boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and

Caloocan City. This prompted the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR), Region III to conduct a relocation survey.

On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a

Comprehensive Report,[5] some excerpts of which provide:

ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS1. The geographic positions of MBM Nos. 22 to33, Cad 267, Caloocan Cadastre was the basisfor the establishment of the true and correctboundary between the municipalityand Caloocan City. However, during thedialogue with concerned government agencieson May 12, 1995, the municipality of SanJose del Monte, Bulacan, emphasized that theboundary between the two local government

units is the imaginary straight line between twoboundary monuments, starting from MBM Nos.22 to 33.

2. The FNSP-G surveying team plotted/draftedin a topographic map all pertinent recordsaffecting boundary disputes of the two locality,such as the geographic positions and coordinates
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of MBM Nos. 22 to 33 Cad 267 CaloocanCadastre, BM Nos. 11 to 23 of Tala Estate lotlines. Tala Estate lot lines were plottedapproximately by scale, because there were norecords on its geographic coordinates andincomplete cadastral maps. The findings are thefollowing:

a) The plotted positions of MBMNos. 23 to 30, 32 and 33 Cad 267Caloocan Cadastre are almostidentical or equivalent to BMNos. 12 to 16, 18 to 20, 22 and 23of Tala Estate.

b) The lot lines of Tala Estatetraverses thru Marilao River.

c) The northern portion of the lotlines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3 SWO-41615 Tala Estate indicated that ittraverses thru Marilao River.

3. In Municipal Resolution No. 06-08-95 dated August 8, 1995, it is requested that thegeographic positions of BM Nos. 11 to 24, TalaEstate shall be recognized as the official lots

lines which delineates the boundaries of SanJose del Monte, Bulacanand Caloocan City. Moreover, the resolution isopposed to the delineation of Marilao River asthe boundary of two localities, as embodied inSWO-41615.

4. If the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615 will be the basis for the boundaries of thetwo LGUs, Marilao River will be the naturalboundary between the two LGUs; if BM 11 to24, Tala Estate shall be the basis for theboundaries, some northern portions of Parcels 1,2 and 3, SWO-41615, portions of Bankers

Village and Pangarap Village belongs to theMunicipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del

Monte Sangguniang BayanResolutions contradict the delineation

embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare property

allotted by the government mainly for housing and resettlement site

under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA),

pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President

Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.

Uns

atisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a

complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems

(COSLAP),[6]against petitioner NHA. Several residents of San Jose

del Monte, namely: spouses Angel and Rosario Cruz, Rufino Laan,

Rufina Laan Santos, Andres Nepomuceno, spouses Alberto andHerminia Hagos, Leon Guilalas, spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo,

and Leoncio Laan (herein private respondents) joined the municipality

as complainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are

within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte; that Presidential

Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and that the
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NHAs Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their

landholdings. They prayed that the NHA be ordered to award them

damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a

party in their complaint.

On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution rulingthat the correct boundary between respondents San Jose del Monte

and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of

the Sangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The COSLAP likewise

held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are mere

incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land

covered by the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San

Jose del Monte, encroaches upon respondents properties.

On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the

Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of

Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held

on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of respondent

municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to

provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundary

between the two local government units. During the meeting,

petitioner NHA posed strong opposition to the COSLAP Resolution,

contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary

dispute. Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their

respective position papers within 30 days.

Instead of submitting a position paper, respondent municipality

filed with the COSLAP a motion for execution of its Resolution

dated June 22, 1998. On May 17, 1999, the COSLAP granted the

motion and issued a writ of execution.

Petitioner NHA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petitionfor certiorari alleging that in issuing the June 22, 1998 Resolution and

the writ of execution, COSLAP acted without jurisdiction.

On November 16, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the

petition for having been filed out of time and for petitioners failure to

avail of the remedy of appeal.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it wasdenied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a

quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become

final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question.[7]

The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has

jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between respondent

municipality and Caloocan City.
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(d) Boundary disputes involving acomponent city or municipality onthe one hand and a highlyurbanized city on the other, ortwo (2) or more highly urbanizedcities, shall bejointly referred for

settlement to the respectivesanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails toeffect an amicable settlement withinsixty (60) days from the date thedispute was referred thereto, it shallissue a certification to thateffect. Thereafter, the dispute shallbe formally tried by the Sanggunian

concerned which shall decide theissue within sixty (60) days fromthe date of the certification referredto above.

Section 119. Appeal. Within the time andmanner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party mayelevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to theproper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over thearea in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide

the appeal within one (1) year from the filingthereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed areaprior to the dispute shall be maintained and continuedfor all legal purposes.

Rule III implementing the above provisions states:

Rule III

SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Art. 15. Definition and Policy. There isboundary dispute when a portion or the whole of theterritorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more

LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUsshall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.

Art. 16. Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes shall be referred forsettlementto the following:

(a) Sangguniang Panlungsod orSangguniang Bayan for disputesinvolving two (2) or more

barangays in the same city ormunicipality, as the case may be;(b) Sangguniang panlalawigan

for those involving two (2) ormore municipalities within thesame province;

(c) Jointly, to the sangguniansof provinces concerned, for thoseinvolving component cities ormunicipalities of different

provinces; or(d) Jointly, to the respectivesanggunians, for those

involving a component city or

municipality and a highlyurbanized cityor two (2) ormore highly-urbanized cities. x xx

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Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case, the

COSLAP should have referred respondents complaint to

the Sangguniang Panglungsodof Caloocan City and the Sangguniang

Bayanof San Jose del Monte. Their decision may be appealed to the

proper Regional Trial Court.

Consequently, we rule that the COSLAP does not have

jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between San Jose del Monte

and Caloocan City. We have consistently ruled that a judgment for

want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of

any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant

to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it

can never become final and any writ of execution based on it isvoid.[9] Such nullity is correctable only by certiorari.[10] And

certiorari cannot be dismissed for timeliness inasmuch as a void

judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity

does not prescribe.[11] Having no legal effect, the situation is the same

as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties

in the position they were in before the trial.[12]

Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in disposing NHAs

petition for certiorari. It should have dismissed the petition, not on the

grounds that it was filed late and that certiorari is not a substitute for a

lost appeal, but solely on the ground that the COSLAP has no

jurisdiction over the subject boundary dispute.

WHEREFORE, we GRANTthe petition. The assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

54495 are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

STA. LUCIA REALTY &

DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

Petitioner,

- versus-

CITY OF PASIG,

Respondent,

G.R. No. 166838

Present:

VELASCO, JR .,*

Acting Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,**

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ,JJ.
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UNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF

IZAL,

Intervenor.

Promulgated:

June 15, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:

For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision[1]

and the January 27,

2005 Resolution[2]

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603,

which affirmed with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision[3]

and

October 9, 1998 Order[4]

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig

City, Branch 157, in Civil Case No. 65420.

Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) isthe registered owner of several parcels of land with Transfer

Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which

indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,

Municipality of Pasig[5]

(Pasig).

The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated

with that covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio

Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal

(Cainta). The two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into

three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all

bearing the Cainta address, were issued.

TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT

Nos. 92869 and 92870.
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The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a

commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center,

Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.[6]

Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos.532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9,

1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with

respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,

Pasig City.[7]

On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition[8]

for the

settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC,

Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil

Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date.

On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,[9]

docketed as

Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate

taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT

Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the

improvements thereon (the subject properties).

Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously

paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-

in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and

the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject

properties were within its territorial jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further

argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered bythe above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.

[10]

Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention

when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be

greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had

been collecting the real property taxes on the subject properties even

before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta further asseverated that the

establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the

subject properties are within its metes and bounds.[11]

Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of

the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the

Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta

and Pasig, presented a prejudicial question to the resolution of the

case.[12]
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The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for

lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its

ownership and location,[13]

the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a

Decision in favor of Pasig:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment

is hereby rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta.

Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:

1) P273,349.14 representing unpaid realestate taxes and penalties as of 1996, plusinterest of 2% per month until fully paid;

2) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneysfees; and

3) The costs of suit.

Judgment is likewise rendered against theintervenor Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it torefund to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. therealty tax payments improperly collected and received

by the former from the latter in the aggregate amountof P358, 403.68.[14]

After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig,

on September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

RTCs August 10, 1998 Decision.

The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasigs motion in anOrder

[15]and modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes

due on the improvements on the subject lots:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is hereby

granted. Accordingly, the Decision, dated August 10,

1998 is hereby modified in that the defendant ishereby ordered to pay plaintiff the amount

of P5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and

penalties on the improvements on the subject parcels

of land whereon real estate taxes are adjudged as due

for the year 1996.[16]

Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to

include the RTCs October 9, 1998 Order in its protest.
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On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution

Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several

oppositions, on the assertion that there were no good reasons to

warrant the execution pending appeal.[17]

On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of

Execution against Sta. Lucia.

On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition

for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of

Appeals to assail the RTCs order granting the execution. Docketed

as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was raffled to the First Division

of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22, 2000, ruled in favor

of Sta. Lucia, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE

COURSE and GRANTED by this Court. The assailed

Order dated April 15, 1999 in Civil Case No. 65420

granting the motion for execution pending appeal and

ordering the issuance of a writ of execution pending

appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and

declaredNULL and VOID.[18]

The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case

presented a prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x

Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties.[19]

Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition

for Certiorarifiled before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this

was denied on June 25, 2001 for being filed out of time.[20]

Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was

raffled to the (former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals anddocketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of

Appeals rendered its Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTCs

judgment:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is

hereby AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATIONthat the

award of P50,000.00 attorneys fees is DELETED.[21]

In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there

was no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings.[22]

Elucidating

on the legal meaning of a prejudicial question, it held that there
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can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both

civil.[23]

The Court of Appeals further held that the elements of litis

pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta to be present,

were not met.

Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for

Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution

dated January 27, 2005.

Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions

for Certiorariwith this Court. Caintas petition, docketed as G.R. No.

166856 was denied on April 13, 2005 for Caintas failure to show any

reversible error. Sta. Lucias own petition is the one subject of this

decision.[24]

In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of

the Court of Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AFFIRMING [WITH MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

SUSPENDING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY OF

THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH WILL FINALLY

DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES

III.


HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES

THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA WAS VALID

PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES

IV.
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HOLDING THAT IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE

BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY RESOLVED,

THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE PAYING THE

REALTY TAXES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH

THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO PRESERVE THE STATUS

QUO.[25]

Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts

correctly decided the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their

faces that the subject properties are situated in its territorial

jurisdiction. Pasig contends that the principles of litis pendentia,

forum shopping, and res judicataare all inapplicable, due to the

absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains that the

boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the

complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed before the

Pasig RTC. It avers that the doctrine of prejudicial question, which

has a definite meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two cases

involved are both civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal

ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of both cases, the

suspension of the proceedings in the Pasig RTC is baseless.

Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal

authority over the subject properties, which fall within its territorial

jurisdiction. Cainta claims that while it has been collecting the realty

taxes over the subject properties since way back 1913, Pasig only

covered the same for real property tax purposes in 1990, 1992, and

1993. Cainta also insists that there is a discrepancy between thelocational entries and the technical descriptions in the TCTs, which

further supports the need to await the settlement of the boundary

dispute case it initiated.

The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down

into two basic issues:

1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in

deciding Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the

resolution of the boundary dispute case between

Pasig and Cainta; and

2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real

property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have

always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in

Sta. Lucias TCTs.
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We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute

between Pasig and Cainta would determine which local government

unit is entitled to collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia.[26]

The Local Government Unit entitled

To Collect Real Property Taxes

The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that

the resolution of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not

necessitate the assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and

bounds of their respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v.

Court of Appeals[27]

wherein we said that a certificate of title is

conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location.[28]

The Court

of Appeals even referred to specific provisions of the 1991 Local

Government Code and Act. No. 496 to support its ruling that Pasig

had the right to collect the realty taxes on the subject properties as

the titles of the subject properties show on their faces that they are

situated in Pasig.[29]

Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the Real Property Tax

Code, the authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the

locality where the property is situated:

Sec. 5.Appraisal of Real Property. All real

property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be

appraised at the current and fair market value

prevailing in the locality where the property is

situated.

x x x xSec. 57. Collection of tax to be the

responsibility of treasurers. The collection of the

real property tax and all penalties accruing thereto,

and the enforcement of the remedies provided for in

this Code or any applicable laws, shall be the

responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or

municipality where the property is

situated. (Emphases ours.)

This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also

known as the 1991 the Local Government Code, to wit:

Section201. Appraisal of Real Property. All

real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be

appraised at the current and fair market value

prevailing in the locality where the property is

situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate

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the necessary rules and regulations for the

classification, appraisal, and assessment of real

property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.

Section 233.Rates of L evy. A province orcity or a municipality within the Metropolitan ManilaArea shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property taxapplicable to their respective localities as follows: x xx. (Emphases ours.)

The only import of these provisions is that, while a local

government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real

estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it isimperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably

within its geographical boundaries.

Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial

boundaries, this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on

Elections[30]

said:

The importance of drawing with precise strokesthe territorial boundaries of a local unit of governmentcannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must beclear for they define the limits of the territorial

jurisdiction of a local government unit.It can

legitimately exercise powers of government only

within the limits of its territorialjurisdiction. Beyond these limits,its acts are ultravires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in theboundaries of local government units will sow costlyconflicts in the exercise of governmental powers whichultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is

the evil sought to be avoided by the Local GovernmentCode in requiring that the land area of a localgovernment unit must be spelled out in metes andbounds, with technical descriptions.[31](Emphasis ours.)

The significance of accurately defining a local government

units boundaries was stressed inCity of Pasig v. Commission on

Elections,[32]which involved the consolidated petitions filed by the

parties herein, Pasig and Cainta, against two decisions of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) with respect to the plebiscites

scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its creation of two

newBarangays. Ruling on the contradictory reliefs sought by Pasig

and Cainta, this Court affirmed the COMELEC decision to hold in

abeyance the plebiscite to ratify the creation ofBarangay

Karangalan;but set aside the COMELECs other decision, and

nullified the plebiscite that ratified the creation ofBarangay Napico in

Pasig, until the boundary dispute before the Antipolo RTC had beenresolved. The aforementioned case held as follows:

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No.125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
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2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R.No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Orderin UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SETASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the Cityof Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on thesame is ordered held in abeyance until after the

courts settle with finality the boundary disputebetween the City of Pasig and the Municipality ofCainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.[33]

Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect

real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the

subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction;

otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.

Certificates of Title as

Conclusive Evidence of Location

While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as

to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an

action for the very purpose of attacking the statements

therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,[34]

we

proclaimed that:

We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a

certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters

contained therein and conclusive evidence of the

ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it

bears stressing that while certificates of title areindefeasible, unassailable and binding against the

whole world, including the government itself, they do

not create or vest title. They merely confirm or record

title already existing and vested. They cannot be used

to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they

be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither

do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of

other.[35]

In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente

Coronado,[36]

we set aside the lower courts ruling that the property

subject of the case was not situated in the location stated and

described in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in

line with the doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of

ownership and location. However, we refused to simply uphold the

veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the case back

to the trial court for the determination of the exact location of the

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property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before

it.[37]

InCity Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,[38]this Court

reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property thatwas outside its territorial jurisdiction, viz:

In this case, it is basic that before the City of

Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to

tax delinquency, the subject property should be under

its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected

to know such basic principle of law. The failure of thecity officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is

within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the

same constitutes gross negligence.[39]

(Emphasis ours.)

Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the TCTs

of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the

metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in

the TCTs, reveal that they are within Caintas boundaries.[40]

This only

means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated

and the location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance

therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be

conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both the

stated and described locations point to the same area.

The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute casebetween Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best

determine once and for all the precise metes and bounds of both

Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial jurisdictions.The resolution

of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the extent and reach of

each local governments authority, a prerequisite in the proper

exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation. This

was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v.

Commission on Elections,[41]and by the First Division of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we

cannot adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case.

The Prejudicial Question Debate

It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real

property taxes it already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its

boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently

argued that the boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial

questionthat would entail the suspension of its collection case
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against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of Pasig v.

Commission on Elections,[42]

when it sought to nullify the COMELECs

ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the boundary

dispute case), the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay

Karangalan. We agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary

dispute case presented aprejudicial question

and explained ourstatement in this wise:

To begin with, we agree with the position of theCOMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving theboundary dispute between the Municipality of Caintaand the City of Pasig presents aprejudicialquestionwhich must first be decided before plebiscites

for the creation of the proposed barangaysmay be held.The City of Pasig argues that there is no

prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civiland criminal action and does not come into play whereboth cases are civil, as in the instant case. While thismay be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad

v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,that, in the

interest of good order, we can very well suspend

action on one case pending the final outcome of

another case closely interrelated or linked to the

first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasigvigorously claims that the areas covered by theproposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are withinits territory, it can not deny that portions of the samearea are included in the boundary dispute case pending

before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,whether the areas in controversy shall be decided aswithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality ofCainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to thecreation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan andNapico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation ofa barangayis for its territorial jurisdiction to be

properly identified by metes and bounds or by more orless permanent natural boundaries. Precisely becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pendingcivil case, until and unless such issue is resolved withfinality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of theproposed barangayswould only be an exercise infutility. Not only that, we would be paving the way forpotentially ultra viresacts of such barangays. x xx.[43](Emphases ours.)

It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term prejudicial

question, as appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had

been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to its

ordinary meaning, than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of

Court.[44]

Nevertheless, even without the impact of the connotation

derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state that a trial court

may control its own proceedings according to its sound discretion:

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND

JUDICIAL OFFICERSRule 135
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SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts.

Every court shall have power:

x x x x

(g) To amend and control its process

and orders so as to make them

comformable to law and justice.

Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent

power in our own decisions, to wit:

The court in which an action is pending may, in

the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper

application for a stay of that action, hold the action in

abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in

another court, especially where the parties and the

issues are the same, for there is power inherent in

every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on

its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,

for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of

parties to the second action cannot be properly

determined until the questions raised in the first action

are settled the second action should be stayed.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to

the power inherent in every court to control the

disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its

time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants. But if

proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order

to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious

litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between

litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or

not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the

SECOND CASE is submitted to its sound discretion.[45]

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should

have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in

view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case

before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasigs and

Caintas rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax

collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to

pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local

government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the

contending local government units herein been delineated with

accuracy, then there would be no controversy at all.

In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is

directed to deposit the succeedingreal property taxes due on the

subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the

Philippines.
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30,

2004 Decision and the January 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and

the Municipality of Cainta are both directed to await the judgment in

their boundary dispute case (Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before

Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo City, to determine

which local government unit is entitled to exercise its powers,

including the collection of real property taxes, on the properties

subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and

Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property

taxes due on the lots and improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250,

598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 384

G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991

LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D.MENZON, petitioner,vs.LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR, LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA in hiscapacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte andHead of SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and LeyteProvincial Treasurer FLORENCIO LUNA,respondents.

Zozimo G. Alegre for petitioner.

The Provincial Attorney for respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court

dated August 28, 1990 which initially denied the petitionfor certiorariand mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governorof Leyte, Aurelio D. Menzon. In the August 28 resolution, theCourt stated that Mr. Menzon cannot successfully assert theright to be recognized as Acting Vice-Governor and, therefore,his designation was invalid. In this motion, the primary issue isthe right to emoluments while actually discharging the duties ofthe office.

The facts of the case are as follows: On February 16, 1988, by

virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in theprovince of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government LuisSantos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla asActing Governor of Leyte.

On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a seniormember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designatedby Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for theprovince of Leyte.

The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator AlbertoRomulo on March 29, 1988.

On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U.Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department ofLocal Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality ofthe appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor ofLeyte.

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In his reply letter dated June 22, 1989, Undersecretary JacintoT. Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337 has no provisionrelating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in caseof a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as thetemporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of theGovernor, could concurrently assume the functions of both

offices.

As a result of the foregoing communications between Tente U.Quintero and Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the SangguniangPanlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issuedResolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of thepetitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The pertinentportion of the resolution reads:

WHEREAS, the circumstances obtaining at

present in the Office of the Vice-Governor is thatthere is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in saidoffice. The Honorable Leopoldo E. Petillaassumed the Office of the Vice-Governor after hetook his oath of office to said position.

WHEREAS, it is the duty of the members of theBoard not only to take cognizance of the aforesaidofficial communication of the Undersecretary,Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., but also to uphold the law.

WHEREAS, on motion of the Honorable MacarioR. Esmas, Jr., duly seconded by the HonorableRogelio L. Granados and the Honorable RenatoM. Rances.

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved not torecognize Honorable Aurelio D. Menzon as ActingVice-Governor of Leyte. (Rollo, p. 27)

The petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting LDPRegional Counsel, Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarification fromUndersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. regarding the June 22,

1989 opinion.

On July 12, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar replied andexplained his opinion. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:

This has reference to your letter dated July 10,1989, requesting for clarification of our letter toProvincial Administrator Tente U. Quintero datedJune 22, 1989, which states in substance, that"there is no succession provided for in case of

temporary vacancy in the office of the vice-governor and that the designation of a temporaryvice-governor is not necessary.

We hold the view that the designation extended bythe Secretary of Local Government in

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