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Bloody Beaches:The Marines at Peleliuby Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)

n D-Day 15 September1944, five infantry bat-talions of the 1st Ma-rine Division's 1st, 5th,and 7th Marines, in

amphibian tractors (LVTs) lumberedacross 600-800 yards of coral reeffringing smoking, reportedlysmashed Peleliu in the Palau Islandgroup and toward five selected land-ing beaches. That westward anchorof the 1,000-mile-long Caroline ar-chipelago was viewed by some U.S.planners as obstacles, or threats, tocontinued advances against Japan'sPacific empire.

The Marines in the LVTs had beentold that their commanding general,Major General William H. Rupertus,believed that the operation would betough, but quick, in large part be-cause of the devastating quantity andquality of naval gunfire and divebombing scheduled to precede theirassault landing. On some minds werethe grim images of their sister 2d Ma-rine Division's bloody assault acrossthe reefs at Tarawa, many monthsearlier. But 1st Division Marines,peering over the gunwales of theirlanding craft saw an awesome sceneof blasting and churning earth alongthe shore. Smoke, dust, and the geys-ers caused by exploding bombs andlarge-caliber naval shells gave op-

On the Cover: "Down from BloodyRidge Too Late. He's Finished —WashedUp—Gone As we passed sick bay, stillin the shell hole, it was crowded withwounded, and somehow hushed in theevening light. I noticed a tattered Marinestanding quietly by a corpsman, staringstiffly at nothing. His mind had crum-bled in battle, his jaw hung, and his eyeswere like two black empty holes in hishead." Caption by the artist, Tom Lea.

timists some hope that the defenderswould become casualties from suchpreparatory fires; at worst, theywould be too stunned to respondquickly and effectively to thehundreds of on-rushing Marinesabout to land in their midst.

Just ahead of the first wave oftroops carrying LVTs was a wave ofarmored amphibian tractors (LVTAs)mounting 75mm howitzers. Theywere tasked to take under fire any

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surviving strongpoints or weaponswhich appeared at the beach as thefollowing troops landed. And justahead of the armored tractors, as thenaval gunfire lifted toward deepertargets, flew a line of U.S. Navyfighter aircraft, strafing north andsouth along the length of the beachdefenses, parallel to the assaultwaves, trying to keep all beachdefenders subdued and intimidatedas the Marines closed the defenses.

The Divisions and their Commandershe Peleliu operation was to be conducted by twodivisions, one Marine and one Army. In the Pacificarea since mid-1942, the 1st Marine Division was

a veteran, combat-tested organization which launched thefirst offensive landing in the Pacific War when it attackedGuadalcanal on 7 August 1942. After a period in Austra-lia of rest, recuperation, and training of newly joined Ma-rines, the division made its second amphibious assault on26 December 1943 at Cape Gloucester on New Britain Is-land. When the division landed on Peleliu, its regiments(1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, all infantry, and 11th Marines,artillery) contained officers and enlisted Marine veteransof both landings as well as new troops. Before World WarII ended, the 1st Division was to participate in one last bat-tle, the landing on Okinawa.

Major General William H. Rupertus, the 1st Divisioncommander, had been with the division since early 1942.As a brigadier general, he was the assistant division com-mander to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift duringthe Guadalcanal campaign. He took command of the divi-sion for the Cape Gloucester operation. General Rupertuswas commissioned in 1913 and served as commander ofa Marine ship's detachment in World War I. During subse-quent years, he was assigned duty in Haiti and China. Fol-lowing the Peleliu campaign, he was named Commandantof the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. General Ruper-tus died of a heart attack on 25 March 1945, while stillon active duty. MajGen William H. Rupertus

The Army's 81st Infantry Division — the Wildcats — was It saw action in France at the Meuse-Argonne in World Warformed in August 1917 at Camp Jackson, South Carolina. I, and was deactivated following the end of the war. The

division was reactivated in June 1942. It went to several

MajGen Paul I. Mueller USA Pacific training bases before its first combat assignment,the landing on Angaur. After securing Angaur, it relievedunits of the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. When Peleliuwas secured, the Wildcats began training for OperationOlympic—the assault on Japan proper. The Japanese sur-rendered unconditionally after suffering two atomic bombattacks. As a result, instead of invading Japan, the 81st oc-cupied it. On 10 January, the 81st Infantry Division wasonce more deactivated.

Major General Paul J. Mueller, USA, the commander ofthe 81st Division, was a graduate of the famous West PointClass of 1915. He commanded an infantry battalion inFrance in World War I, and during the interwar period hehad a succession of assignments to infantry commands,staff billets, and schools. In August 1941 he assumed com-mand of the 81st Infantry Division at Fort Rucker, Alaba-ma, and moved his division during its training periodsuccessively from Florida to Tennessee to California beforeits commitment to the battle for Angaur and Peleliu. Gener-al Mueller served on active duty until 1954, when he re-

- tired. He died in 1964.

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Captions by the artist, Tom Lea"Going In—First Wave For an hour we plowed toward the beach, the sun aboveus coming down through the overcast like a silver burning ball Over thegunwale of a craft abreast of us I saw a Marine, his face painted for the jungle,his eyes set for the beach, his mouth set for murder, his big hands quiet now inthe last moments before the tough tendons drew up to kill."

Meanwhile, to blind enemy observa-tion and limit Japanese fire upon thelanding waves, naval gunfire wasshifted to the hill massif northeast ofthe landing beaches.

That "massif," later to be called theUmurbrogol Pocket, was the first oftwo deadly imponderables, as yetunknown to the division commanderand his planners. Although GeneralRupertus had been on temporaryduty in Washington during most ofhis division's planning for the Peleliulanding, he had been well briefed forthe operation.

The first imponderable involvedthe real character of Umurbrogol,which aerial photos indicated as arather gently rounded north-southhill, commanding the landingbeaches some 2,000-4,000 yards dis-tant. Viewed in these early photos,the elevated terrain appeared clothedin jungle scrub, which was almost en-tirely removed by the preparatorybombardment and then subsequentheavy artillery fire directed at it. In-stead of a gently rounded hill, theUmurbrogol area was in fact a com-plex system of sharply uplifted coralridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes.It rose above the level remainder ofthe island from 50 to 300 feet, andprovided excellent emplacements for

cave and tunnel defenses. TheJapanese had made the most of whatthis terrain provided during their ex-tensive period of occupation anddefensive preparations.

The second imponderable facingthe Marines was the plan developedby Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, theofficer who was to command theforce on Peleliu, and his superior,Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue,back on Koror. Their concept ofdefense had changed considerablyfrom that which was experienced byGeneral Rupertus at Guadalcanal andCape Gloucester, and, in fact, negat-ed his concept of a tough, but quickcampaign.

Instead of relying upon a pre-sumed moral superiority to defeat the

As seen from the air on D-Day, 15 September 1944, Beaches White 1 and 2, onwhich the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, landed. Capt George P Hunt'sCompany K, 3/1, was on the extreme left flank of the 1st Marine Division.

Department of Defense Photo (USN) 253745

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attackers at the beach, and then touse bushido spirit and banzai tacticsto throw any survivors back into thesea, Peleliu's defenders would delaythe attacking Marines as long as theycould, attempting to bleed them asheavily as possible. Rather than de-pending upon spiritual superiority,they would combine the devilish ter-rain with the stubborn, disciplined,Japanese soldiers to relinquish Peleliuat the highest cost to the invaders.This unpleasant surprise for the Ma-rines marked a new and importantadjustment to the Japanese tacticswhich were employed earlier in thewar.

Little or nothing during the tripinto the beaches and the touchdownrevealed the character of the revisedJapanese tactical plan to the five Ma-rine assault battalions. Bouncingacross almost half a mile of coral

fronting the landing beaches (White1 and 2, Orange 1, 2, and 3), the trac-tors passed several hundred "mines,"intended to destroy any craft whichapproached or ran over them. These"mines" were aerial bombs, set to bedetonated by wire control from ob-servation points onshore. However,the preliminary bombardment hadso disrupted the wire controls, andso blinded the observers, that thedefensive mining did little to slow ordestroy the assaulting tractors.

As the tractors neared the beaches,they came under indirect fire frommortars and artillery. Indirect fireagainst moving targets generatesmore apprehension than damage,and only a few vehicles were lost tothat phase of Japanese defense. Suchfire did, however, demonstrate thatthe preliminary bombardment hadnot disposed of all the enemy's heavy

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fire capability. More disturbingly, asthe leading waves neared thebeaches, the LVTs were hit by heavyenfilading artillery and antiboat gunfire coming from concealed bunkerson north and south flanking points.

The defenses on the left (north)flank of Beach White 1, assaulted bythe 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieu-tenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol),were especially deadly and effective.They disrupted the critical regimen-tal and division left flank. Especial-iy costly to the larger landing plan,these guns shortly thereafter knockedout tractors carrying important ele-ments of the battalion's and the regi-ment's command and controlpersonnel and equipment. The bat-talion and then the regimental com-mander both found themselvesashore in a brutally vicious beachfight, without the means of commu-nication necessary to comprehendtheir situations fully, or to take theneeded remedial measures.

The critical mission to seize the"The Point" dominating the divisionleft flank had gone to one of the 1stRegiment's most experienced compa-fly commanders: Captain George P.Hunt, a veteran of Guadalcanal andNew Britain, (who, after the war, be-came a long-serving managing edi-tor of Life magazine). Hunt haddeveloped plans involving specific as-signments for each element of hiscompany. These had been rehearseduntil every individual knew his roleand how it fit into the company plan.Each understood his mission's criti-cality.

D-Day and H-Hour brought heav-ier than expected casualties. One ofthe company's platoons was pinneddown all day in the fighting at thebeach. The survivors of the rest ofthe company wheeled left, asplanned, onto the flanking point.Moving grimly ahead, they pressedassaults upon the many defensiveemplacements. Embrasures in thepiliboxes and casements wereblanketed with small-fire arms andsmoke, then attacked with demoli-

The Changing Nature of Japanese Tactics

Japan launched its December 1941 surpriseattacks in the expectation that its forces couldquickly seize a forward line of Pacific and Asian em-

pire. Thereafter, it expected to defend these territories stub-bornly enough to tire and bleed the Allies and then tonegotiate a recognition of Japanese hegemony.

This strategic concept was synchronized with the fanat-ic Japanese spirit of bushido. Faith in their army's moralsuperiority over lesser races led the Japanese to expect 19th-century banzai tactics to lead invariably to success. Expec-tations and experience meshed until their 1942 encounterswith the Allies, particularly with Americans in the Solo-mons. Thereafter, it took several campaigns to internalize

the lessons of defeat by modern infantry weapons in thehands of the determined Allies.

To Americans, these Japanese misconceptions werealarming, but cost-effective: It was easier, and less costly,to mow down banzai attacks than to dig stubborn defendersout of fortified positions.

By spring of 1944, the lessons had permeated to thehighest levels of Japan's army command. When GeneralHideki Tojo instructed General Inoue to defend the Palausdeliberately and conservatively, he was bringing Japanesetactics into support of Japanese strategy. Henceforth,Japanese soldiers would dig in and hunker down, to maketheir final defenses as costly as possible to the attackingAmericans.

tions and rifle grenades. A climaxcame at the principal casement, fromwhich the largest and most effectiveartillery fire had been hitting LVTs onthe flanks of following landingwaves. A rifle grenade hit the gunmuzzle itself, and ricocheted into thecasement, setting off explosions andflames. Japanese defenders ran outthe rear of the blockhouse, their

clothing on fire and ammunition ex-ploding in their belts. That flight hadbeen anticipated, and some of Hunt'sMarines were in position to cut themdown.

At dusk, Hunt's Company K heldthe Point, but by then the Marineshad been reduced to platoonstrength, with no adjacent units incontact. Only the sketchy radio com-

munications got through to bring insupporting fires and desperatelyneeded re-supply. One LVT got intothe beach just before dark, withgrenades, mortar shells, and water.It evacuated casualties as it depart-ed. The ammunition made the differ-ence in that night's furious struggleagainst Japanese determined to recap-ture the Point.

The skies over the landing beaches of Peleliu are blackenedwith smoke rising from the ground as the result of the corn-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94913bined naval and aerial prelanding bombardment, as amphib-ian tractors rush shoreward carrying the assault waves.

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The next afternoon, LieutenantColonel Raymond C. Davis' 1/1moved its Company B to establishcontact with Hunt, to help hang ontothe bitterly contested positions.Hunt's company also regained thesurvivors of the platoon which hadbeen pinned at the beach fightthroughout D-Day. Of equal' impor-tance, the company regained artilleryand naval gunfire communications,which proved critical during the se-cond night. That night, the Japaneseorganized another and heavier— twocompanies — counterattack directedat the Marines at the Point. It wasnarrowly defeated. By mid-morning,D plus 2, Hunt's survivors, togetherwith Company B, 1/1, owned thePoint, and could look out upon some500 Japanese who had died defend-ing or trying to re-take it.

To the right of Puller's struggling3d Battalion, his 2d Battalion, Lieu-tenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetzcommanding, met artillery and mor-tar opposition in landing, as well asmachine-gun fire from still effectivebeach defenders. The same was truefor 5th Marines' two assault battal-ions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W.Boyd's 1/5 and Lieutenant ColonelAustin C. Shofner's 3/5, whichfought through the beach defenses

and toward the edge of the clearinglooking east over the airfield area.

On the division's right flank,Orange 3, Major Edward H. Hurst's3/7 had to cross directly in front ofa commanding defensive fortificationflanking the beach as had Marines inthe flanking position on the Point.Fortunately, it was not as close as thePoint position, and did not inflictsuch heavy damage. Nevertheless, itsenfilading fire, together with somenatural obstructions on the beachcaused Company K, 3/7, to land leftof its planned landing beach, ontothe right half of beach Orange 2,3/5's beach. In addition to being outof position, and out of contact withthe company to its right, CompanyK, 3/7, became intermingled with

Marines and corpsmen scramble ashore and seek any cover they can to escape theincoming murderous enemy mortar and artillery fire. Behind them, smoking andabandoned, are amphibian tractors which were hit as they approached the beach.

Caption and photograph by Phillip D. OrrSituated in a cave overlooking the airfield is this heavy caliber Japanese antiboatgun. It had a field of fire which included the invasion beaches and the airfield.

Damaged heavily in the D-Day bombardment, this Japanese pillbox survives onthe southern promontory of White Beach. Now vacant, its gun lies on the beach.

Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr

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Company K, 3/5, a condition fraughtwith confusion and delay. MajorHurst necessarily spent time regroup-ing his separated battalion, using asa coordinating line a large anti-tankditch astride his line of advance. Hiseastward advance then resumed,somewhat delayed by his efforts toregroup.

Any delay was anathema to the di-vision commander, who visualizedmomentum as key to his success. Thedivision scheme of maneuver on theright called for the 7th Marines(Colonel Herman H. Hanneken) toland two battalions in column, bothover Beach Orange 3. As Hurst'sleading battalion advanced, it was tobe followed in trace by LieutenantColonel John J. Gormley's 1/7.

Gormley's unit was to tie into Hurst'sright flank, and re-orient southeastand south as that area was unco-vered. He was then to attacksoutheast and south, with his left onHurst's right, and his own right onthe beach. After Hurst's battalionreached the opposite shore, bothwere to attack south, defendingScarlet 1 and Scarlet 2, the southernlanding beaches.

At the end of a bloody first hour,all five battalions were ashore. Thecloser each battalion was to Umur-brogol, the more tenuous was itshold on the shallow beachhead. Dur-ing the next two hours, three of thedivision's four remaining battalionswould join the assault and press forthe momentum General Rupertus

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deemed essential.Following close behind Sabol's

3/1, the 1st Marines' Colonel Pullerlanded his forward command group.As always, he was eager to be closeto the battle, even if that locationdeprived him of some capacity to de-velop full supporting fires. Withlimited communications, and nowwith inadequate numbers of LVTs forfollow-on waves, he struggled toascertain and improve his regiment'ssituation. His left unit (Company K,3/1) had two of its platoons desper-ately struggling to gain dominance atthe Point. Puller's plan to land MajorDavis' 1st Battalion behind Sabol's3/1, to reinforce the fight for the leftflank, was thwarted by the H-hourlosses in LVTs. Davis' companies had

Naval Gunfire Support for Peleliun their earlier operations, especially at Guadalcanal,the primary experience of 1st Division Marines withnaval gunfire was at the receiving end. On New Bri-

tain, the character and disposition of Japanese defenses didnot call for extensive pre-landing fire support, nor did sub-sequent operations ashore. The naval gunfire to which theGuadalcanal veterans were exposed frequently and heavi-ly damaged planes and installations ashore. Its effect upondug-in Marines was frightening and sobering, but rarelydestructive.

During the planning for Peleliu, the division staff ini-tially had no trained naval gunfire (NGF) planner. Whenone arrived, he was hampered by the cumbersome com-munications link back to higher headquarters, LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith's Fleet Marine Force, Pacific(FMFPac), in Honolulu, which would provide the essen-tial targeting information for the division's NGF plan.FMFPac also would plan and allocate the available gunfireresources to the targets deemed important by the divisionstaff's planners. The preoccupation of FMFPac with the on-going Marianas campaigns, as well as illness on the staffof Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, Commander, NavalGunfire Support Group, further limited and constrained thepreparations. Heavy ammunition expenditures in the Man-anas reduced ammunition availability for Peleliu.

Surprisingly, during the delivery of U.S. preparatoryfires, there was no Japanese response. This prompted 01-dendorf to report all known targets destroyed, and to can-cel preparatory fires scheduled for D plus 3. Anunintentional benefit of this uncoordinated change in navalgunfire plan may have resulted in there being more shellsavailable for post-landing NGF support. But the costliest

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95115

effect of inadequate NGF was that the flanking positionsnorth and south of the landing beaches were not taken out.The selection of naval gunfire targets could certainly havebeen done with more careful attention. Colonel Lewis B.Puller, the 1st Marines commander, had specifically askedfor the destruction of the positions dominating his land-ing on the division left flanks. Failure to do so was paidfor in blood, courage, and time during the critical battlefor the Point.

Subsequent to D-Day there were numerous instances ofwell-called and -delivered naval gunfire support: night il-lumination during the night of 15-16 September, the des-truction of two major blockhouses earlier reported"destroyed," and effective support of the Ngesebus landingtoward the end of the battle.

to be landed singly and his battalioncommitted piecemeal to the action.On the regiment's right, Honsowetz'2/1 was hotly engaged, but makingprogress toward capture of the westedges of the scrub which looked outonto the airfield area. He was tied onhis right into Boyd's 1/5, which wassimilarly engaged.

In the beachhead's southern sector,the landing of Gormley's 1/7 wasdelayed somewhat by its earlier loss-es in LVTs. That telling effect of ear-ly opposition would be feltthroughout the remainder of the day.Most of Gormley's battalion landedon the correct (Orange 3) beach, but

a few of his troops were driven left-ward by the still enfilading fire fromthe south flank of the beach, andlanded on Orange 2, in the 5th Ma-rines' zone of action. Gormley's bat-talion was brought fully togetherbehind 3/7 however, and as Hurst'sleading 3/7 was able to advance east,Gormley's 1 / 7 attacked southeastand south, against prepared po-sitions.

Hanneken's battle against heavyopposition from both east and southdeveloped approximately as planned.Suddenly, in mid-afternoon, the op-position grew much heavier. Hurst's3/7 ran into a blockhouse, long on

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the Marines' map, which had beenreported destroyed by pre-landingnaval gunfire. As a similar situationlater met on Puller's inland advance,the blockhouse showed little evi-dence of ever having been visited byheavy fire. Preparations to attackand reduce this blockhouse furtherdelayed the 7th Marines' advance,and the commanding general frettedfurther about loss of momentum.

On the enemy's side, LieutenantGeneral Sadae Inoue, a fifth genera-tion warrior of stout military repu-tation, commanding the 14thInfantry Division, fresh from theKwangtung Army in China, met inTokyo in March 1944 with JapanesePremier Hideki Tojo, who was alsoMinister of War. Tojo had conclud-ed that Japan was no longer able tohold the Palaus against growing Al-lied naval dominance in the WesternPacific. Instead, he had decided to sellthe Palaus to the United States at thehighest possible cost to Americans inblood and time. He ordered Inoue totake his division to the Palaus, to takecommand of all Japanese forcesthere, and to defend the Palau Islandsas long as possible, denying its useto the Americans—and killing asmany as possible in the undertaking.

As his division sailed to the Palaus,Inoue flew ahead, reconnoitered hisnew locale by air for two days, andconcluded that Peleliu (with satelliteair strips on Angaur and Ngesebus)was the key to his defenses. EarlierU.S. attention to Peleliu during theTask Force 58 March strikes seemedto confirm that judgment. To defendPeleliu, Inoue immediately settledupon a commander, a mission, anda force level. Peleliu had for sometime been under occupation and ad-ministrative command of a rear ad-miral, who had used his forces'construction resources and capabili-ty to build blockhouses and manyreinforced concrete structures aboveground, while improving existing

D— DAYAfter Rectifying 3/5)

Front LinesRegimental BoundariesPhase LinesMain CounterattackSecondary Counterattacks

or Strong Pressure

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caves and tunnels under Peleliu's richconcealment of overlying jungle,scrub, and vines.

In these underground installations,the admiral's personnel had well sur-vived the Task Force 58 March at-tacks. Above ground, planes andinstallations were demolished. AsTask Force 58 departed, the Japaneseemerged, repaired what they could,but continued to focus upon under-ground installations. Together witha few Korean labor troops, theirnumbers totaled about 7,000, mostof them lacking training and leader-ship for infantry action.

Leadership arrived in the person ofColonel Nakagawa, with his6,500-man 2d Infantry Regiment(Rein forced). They had long battleexperience in China. They werearmed with 24 75mm artillery pieces,some 13-15 light tanks, about 100.50-cal. machine guns, 15 81mmheavy mortars, and about 30 dual-purpose antiaircraft guns. Alreadyon the island were a large number ofvery heavy (141mm) mortars, naval

antiaircraft guns, and rudimentaryrocket launchers for sending up large,unguided naval shells. Most signifi-cant, the regiment had ColonelNakagawa and his battle-disciplinedofficers and noncommissionedofficers. Nakagawa had already beenawarded nine medals for leadershipagainst the Chinese and was viewedas a "comer" within his officer corps.

Immediately upon arrival,Nakagawa reconnoitered hisprospective battle area from theground and from the air. He identi-fied the western beaches, the Ma-rines' White and Orange Beaches, asthe most probable landing sites. Heimmediately ordered his troops to digin and construct beach defenses. Atthis time, a bureaucratic conflictarose. Vice Admiral Seiichi Itou, whowas the senior officer and the seniornaval officer on Peleliu, resented be-ing subordinate to an Army officermuch junior to him.

From Koror, Lieutenant GeneralInoue dispatched Major GeneralKenjiro Murai to Peleliu, to assume

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island command and to maintain"liaison" with Colonel Nakagawa.Murai was young, highly regarded,and, as the personal representative ofLieutenant General Inoue, was con-sidered senior to the admiral. He leftNakagawa's operational missionfirmly in Nakagawa's hands, as In-oue intended. Throughout the cam-paign, Nakagawa exercisedoperational control, and was assist-ed and counseled, but not command-ed, by General Murai.

Nakagawa had a sound apprecia-tion of his mission, of the situation,and of American firepower. Heturned his attention to the fullest useof his principal advantage, the ter-rain. He so deployed and installed hisforces to inflict all possible damageand casualties during the anticipat-ed landing, and then to defend indepth for as long as possible. OnPeleliu, that offered a vertical as wellas a horizontal dimension to thedefense.

He surveyed and registered ar-tillery and mortar weapons over the

"The Beach . . . My First View as I Came Around From theRamp of our LVT We ground to a stop, after a thousand years,on the coarse coral. . . And we ran down the ramp and camearound the end of the LVL splashing ankle-deep up the surf tothe white beach. Suddenly I was completely alone. Each man

Caption by the artist, Tom Leadrew into himself when he ran down that ramp, into thatflame. Those Marines flattened in the sand on that beach weredark and huddled like wet rats in death as I threw my bodydown among them."

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width and depth of the reef off botheastern and western beaches, withplanned heavy concentrations alongthe fringe of the western reef. In thishe anticipated the American need totransfer follow-on waves from land-ing craft to the reef-crossing amphib-ian vehicles. He registered weaponson, and immediately inland from,the water's edge, to subject landingtroops to a hail of fire. Off-shore helaid 500 wire-controlled "mines."

Colonel Nakagawa directed con-struction of beach obstacles, using

rails and logs, and ordered anti-tankditches dug. He emplaced troops inmachine gun and mortar pits along,and inland from, the beaches, aug-mented by all the available barbedwire. On the north and south flanksof the beach, he constructed concreteemplacements to shelter and concealantitank and anti-boat artillery sit-ed to enfilade the expected waves oflanding craft.

Inland, he incorporated thealready-built blockhouse and adja-cent reinforced buildings into mutu-

ally supporting defensive complexes,with interconnecting communicationlines and trenches.

Although believing the westernbeaches to be the most probableroute of attack, he did not leave thesouthern (Scarlet) and eastern (Pur-ple) beaches undefended. He com-mitted one battalion to organizedefenses in each area. The PurpleBeaches were thoroughly organized,with contingent orders to thedefenders to move into central Peleliuif the battle developed from the west,as expected. But the battalion com-mitted to the south, Scarlet Beach,had orders to defend those stronger,more permanent emplacements tothe end. Nakagawa assigned about500 infantry and artillery to defendNgesebus and about 1,000 naval per-sonnel to defend northern Peleliu.Not under his command were the1,500 defenders of Angaur.

The major part of his force and ef-fort was committed to the 500 caves,tunnels, and firing embrasures in thecoral ridges of central Peleliu. Thenaval units' extensive earlier tunnel-ing into the limestone ridges renderedoccupants largely immune to gener-al bombardments. Only lucky hitsinto the mouths of caves, or point-blank direct fire could damage thehidden defenses and their troops.The tunnels were designed for, oradapted to, various purposes: bar-racks, command centers, hospitals,storage and ammunition magazines,cooking areas complete with freshwater springs and seepage basins,and of course firing embrasures withelaborate concealment and protectivedevices, including a few sliding steeldoors. Colonel Nakagawa expectedvery heavy prelanding bombard-ments. He expected his troops to sur-vive them, and then to carry out hismission of delaying and bleeding theAmericans.

On Koror, Lieutenant General In-oue was busy with the bulk of hisforces, preparing for expected attacksagainst Babeithuap. The Allied

Caption by the artist, Tom Lea"The Price Lying there in terror looking longingly up the slope to better cover, Isaw a wounded man near me, staggering in the direction of the LVTs. His face washalf bloody pulp and the mangled shreds of what was left of an arm hung downlike a stick, as he bent over in his stumbling, shock-crazy walk. The half of hisface that was still human had the most terrifying look of abject patience I haveever seen. He fell behind me, in a red puddle on the white sand."

"Stalemate" plan had indeed calledfor invasion of Babeithuap. As theanticipated invasion drew near, Inoueissued a proclamation to his troops,clearly reflecting Tojo's instructionsto delay and bleed. He pointed outthe necessities to anticipate and en-dure the naval bombardment and touse the terrain to inflict casualties onthe attackers. Without actually or-dering troops to die, he included thewords, "we are ready to die honora-bly:' He went on to say that dying,and losing the territory to the enemy,might contribute to the opening of anew phase of the war.

As the 1st Marines battled to se-cure the left flank, and as the 7th Ma-rines fought to isolate and thenreduce the Japanese defenses in thesouthern end of Peleliu, the 5th Ma-rines, Colonel Harold D. Harris com-manding, was charged to drive acrossthe airfield, cut the island in two, andthen re-orient north and drive to se-

cure the eastern half of the island.Shortly after the scheduled H plusone schedule, the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, Major Gordon D. Gaylecommanding, landed over BeachOrange 2, in trace behind 3/5. It

moved directly east, through thedunes and scrub jungle, into and outof the antitank barrier, and to thewest edge of the clearing surround-ing the airfield. Passing through thelines of 3/5, Gayle's battalion at-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95253Engaged in the bitter struggle to establish the Peleliu beach- LVT, while other Marines atop the amphibian tractor fire athead, Marine riflemen get only momentary shelter behind an enemy targets. The name of the LVT was more than prophetic

Embrasures in this well-sited, heavily reinforced position, possibly in the Pocket,indicate the location of Japanese weapons which devastated attacking Marines.

Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 107934

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resistance from dug-outs and bombshelters near the southern end of theairfield, and through the scrub areaslightly farther south. The 3d Battal-ion's mission was to clear that scrub,maintaining contact with 3/7 on itsright, while 2/5 was to drive acrossthe open area to reach the far side ofthe island. Advancing in its centerand right, 2/5 battled completelyacross the island by mid-afternoon,echeloned its left rearward to keepcontact with 1/5, and moved to re-orient its attack northward. The 2dBattalion's right flank tied for a whileinto 3/5 in the woods to the south

of the airfield, but then lost contact.By this time, the antitank ditch

along the center and right of OrangeBeaches 1 and 2 was notable for thenumber of command posts locatedalong its length. Shofner's 3/5 wasthere, as was Harris' 5th Marinescommand post. Then an advance ele-ment of the division command postunder Brigadier General Oliver P.Smith, the assistant division com-mander, landed and moved into theantitank ditch within sight of the air-field clearing area. Simultaneously,important support weapons weremoving ashore.

The 1st Tank Battalion's M-48A1

12

Sherman medium tanks, one-third ofwhich had been left behind at the lastmoment because of inadequate ship-ping, were landed as early as possi-ble, using a novel technique to crossthe reef. This tank landing schemewas developed in anticipation of ear-ly Japanese use of their armor capa-bility.

Movement of this fire and logisti-cal support material onto a beach stillclose to, and under direct observationfrom, the commanding Umurbrogolheights was an inescapable risk man-dated by the Peleliu terrain. So longas the enemy held observation fromUmurbrogol over the airfield andover the beach activity, there was noalternative to driving ahead rapidly,using such fire support as could bemustered and coordinated. Continu-ing casualties at the beaches had tobe accepted to support the rapid ad-vance. The commanding general'sconcern for early momentum ap-peared to be eminently correct. Unitson the left had to assault toward thefoot of Umurbrogol ridges, andquickly get to the commandingcrests. In the center, the 5th Marineshad to make a fast advance to secureother possible routes to outflankUmurbrogol. In the south, the 7thMarines had to destroy immediatelythose now cut-off forces before be-coming freed to join the struggleagainst central Peleliu.

The movement of the 5th Marinesacross the airfield and to the westernedge of the lagoon separating the air-field area from the eastern peninsu-la (Beach Purple), created a line ofattacking Marines completely acrossthat part of the island oriented botheast and north, toward what was be-lieved to be the major center ofJapanese strength. The 7th Marines,pushing east and south, completedsplitting the enemy forces. ColonelHanneken's troops, fully engaged,were generally concealed against ob-servation from the enemy still northof the airfield and from the heightsof Umurbrogol. There was a gap be-

PURPLE

tacked west against scattered

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tween the 5th's right and the 7th's left,but it did not appear to be in a criti-cal sector.

Nevertheless, it was by now appar-ent that the D-Day phase-line objec-tives were not going to be met ineither the south or the north.Alarmed at the loss of the desiredmomentum, General Rupertus begancommitting his reserve. First, he or-dered the division reconnaissancecompany ashore, then, pressing com-manders already on the island, heordered his one remaining uncom-mitted infantry battalion, LieutenantColonel Spencer S. Berger's 2/7, toland. No commander ashore felt aneed for 2/7, but Colonel Hannekensaid he could find an assembly area

where it would not be in the way.General Rupertus ordered it to land,remarking to his staff that he hadnow "shot his bolt!" Ashore, it wasapparent that what was needed onthis hectic beachhead was not moretroops, but more room in which tomaneuver and more artillery.

General Rupertus began to makeplans to land himself and the mainelements of his command group. Ad-vice from the ADC ashore, and hischief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden,convinced Rupertus to stay on theflagship. He compromised that deci-sion by ordering Colonel Seldenashore. By now, the shortage of LVTswas frustrating the timely landing offollowing waves. In consequence,

13

neither Selden's small CP group, norBerger's 2/7, could get past the trans-fer line in their landing craft, and hadto return to their ships despite theirorders to land.

Into this division posture, at about1650, Colonel Nakagawa launchedhis planned tank-infantry counterat-tack. All Marine commanders hadbeen alerted to the Japanese capabil-ity to make an armored attack on D-Day, and were well prepared. The at-tack emerged from the area north ofthe airfield and headed south, gener-ally across the front of the 1st Ma-rines' lines on the eastern edge of theairfield clearing. The attack moveddirectly into the 5th Marines' sectorwhere Boyd's 1/5 was set in, andstretched across the southern area ofthe airfield. Marines in 2/1 and 1/5took the attackers under fire, infan-try and tanks alike. A bazooka gun-ner in 2/i's front hit two of the tanks.The commanding officer of 1/5 hadhis tanks in defilade, just behind hisfront lines. They opened up on theJapanese armor, which ran throughthe front lines and virtually into hisforward command group. Boyd'slines held fast, taking the attackers,infantry and tanks alike, under firewith all available weapons.

Major John H. Gustafson, in 2/S'sforward command post mid-wayacross the airfield, had his tank pla-toon close at hand. Although theenemy had not yet come into his zoneof action, he launched the platoon oftanks into the melee. Accounts varyas to just who shot what, but in avery few minutes it was all over. Theattacking tanks were all destroyed,and the Japanese infantry literallyblown away.

Colonel Nakagawa's attack wascourageous, but proved to be a totalfailure. Even where the tanks brokethrough the Marine lines, they in-duced no Marine retreat. Instead, theJapanese armor became the focus ofantitank fire of every sort and caliber.The light Japanese tanks were liter-ally blown apart. More than 100

Deparmen of Defense Photo (USMC) 96745Cpl Peter P Zacharko stands by a captured Japanese 141mm mortar, which rainedshells down on the landing beaches and on the Marines as they proceeded inland.

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PELELIUSECOND OPERATIONAL

PHASE (D+I—D+8)

were reported destroyed. That figure,of course, reflected the amount of firedirected their way; each Marinegrenadier, antitank gunner, andtanker thought he had killed the tankat which he shot, and so reported.

With the counterattack over andthe Japanese in apparent disarray, 2/5immediately resumed its attack,moving north along the eastern halfof the airfield. The battalion ad-vanced halfway up the length of theairfield clearing before it stopped toorganize for the night. It was the

maximum advance of the day, overthe most favorable terrain in the di-vision front. It provided neededspace for artillery and logisticdeployment to support the continu-ation of the attack the next day.

However, that relatively advancedposition had an open right, south,flank which corresponded to a holein the regimental command struc-ture. At that stage, 3/5 was supposedto maintain the contact betweennorth-facing 2/5 and south-oriented3/7. But 3/5's battalion command

14

and control had been completelyknocked out by 1700. The battalionexecutive officer, Major Robert M.Ash, had been killed earlier in theday by a direct hit upon his landingLVT. About the time of the Japanesetank attack, a mortar barrage hit the3/5 CF in the antitank ditch near thebeach, killing several staff andprompting the evacuation of the bat-talion commander. As of 1700, thethree companies of 3/5 were not incontact with each other, nor with the

(Continued on page 16)

A Horrible Place

A mong the few civilian news correspondents whochose to share the fate of the Marines on shoreon Peleliu was Robert Tepper" Martin, of Time,

who furnished the following description of what it was likethere:

Peleliu is a horrible place. The heat is stifling andrain falls intermittently — the muggy rain that bringsno relief, only greater misery. The coral rocks soakup the heat during the day and it is only slightly cool-er at night. Marines are in the finest possible physi-cal condition, but they wilted on Pelellu. By the fourthday there were as many casualties from heat prostra-tion as from wounds .

Peleliu is incomparably worse than Guam in itsbloodiness, terror, climate and the incomprehensibletenacity of the Japs. For sheer brutality and fatigue,I think it surpasses anything yet seen in the Pacific,certainly from the standpoint of numbers of troopsinvolved and the time taken to make the island secure.

On the second day, the temperature reached 105 degreesin the shade and there was very little shade in most placeswhere the fighting was going on, and arguably no breezeat all anywhere. It lingered around that level of heat as thedays dragged by (temperatures as high as 115 were record-ed). Water supply presented a serious problem from theoutset. This had been anticipated and in actual fact the so-lution proved less difficult than expected; the engineers soon

discovered that productive wells could be drilled almostanywhere on the comparatively low ground, and person-nel semi-permanently stationed near the beach found thateven shallow holes dug in the sand would yield an onlymildly repulsive liquid which could be purified for drink-ing with halizone tablets. But it continued necessary to sup-ply the assault troops by means of scoured-out oil drumsand five-gallon field cans. Unfortunately, steaming out theoil drums did not remove all the oil, with the result thatmany or most of the troops drinking water from the drumswere sickened. When the captains of the ships in the trans-port area learned of this and of the shortage of water, theyrushed cases of fruit and fruit drinks to the beaches to easethe problem somewhat.

The water situation presented a problem even in the caseof troops operating on comparatively level and openground. Once the fighting entered the ridges, terraindifficult merely to traverse without having to fight, the de-bility rate shot upward so alarmingly that an emergencycall was sent to all the ships off-shore to requisition everyavailable salt tablet for issue to the 1st Marines.

The statement that heat prostrations equalled woundcasualties is apt to be misleading. Most of those evacuatedwere returned to duty after a day or two of rest and re-habilitation; hence, their absence from the frontlines didnot permanently impair the combat efficiency of their units.But such numerous cases did strain the already overbur-dened Medical Corps elements.

The antitank ditch dug by the Japanese along the center and the 5th Marines' and 3/5's CPs were located there, as was theright of Orange Beaches 1 and 2 soon after the landing be- 7th Marines shown here. BGen Oliver P Smith with the ad-came the locations of command posts of various units, Both vance element of the division CP set up in the ditch also.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94939

15

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(Continued from page 14)battalions to their right and left.

The 5th Marines commandingofficer ordered his executive officer,Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt,to take command of 3/5 and toredeploy so as to close the gap be-tween 5th and 7th Marines. MajorGayle moved 2/S's reserve companyto his right flank and to provide a tie-in position. Walt located and tied inhis 3/5 companies to build a morecontinuous regimental line. By 2230,he had effected the tie-in, just in time.Beginning then, the salient which the5th Marines had carved betweenPeleliu's central and southerndefenders came under a series ofsharp counterattacks that continuedthroughout the night. The attackscame from both north and south.None of them enjoyed any notable

success, but they were persistentenough to require resupply of ammu-nition to forward companies. Dawnrevealed scores of Japanese bodiesnorth of the Marine lines.

Elsewhere across the 1st Division'sfront there were more potentiallythreatening night counterattacks.None of them succeeded in drivingMarines back or in penetrating thelines in significant strength. The mostserious attack came against the Com-pany K, 3/1, position on the Point,at the 1st Marines' left.

In the south, the 7th Marines ex-perienced significant night attacksfrom the Japanese battalion oppos-ing it. But the Marines there were incomfortable strength, had communi-cations to bring in fire support, in-cluding naval gunfire illumination.They turned back all attacks without

16

a crisis developing.At the end of the first 12 hours

ashore, the 1st Marine Division heldits beachhead across the intendedfront. Only in the center did thedepth approximate that which hadbeen planned. The position wasstrong everywhere except on the ex-treme left flank. General Smith, fromhis forward command post was incommunication with all three regi-mental commanders. The report hereceived from Colonel Puller, on theleft, did not afford an adequate per-ception of 1st Marines' tenuous holdon the Point. That reflected ColonelPuller's own limited information.The other two regimental reportsreflected the situations adequately.

In addition to the three infantryregiments, the 1st Division hadalmost three battalions of light ar-

Special Reef-crossing Techniquesnasmuch as Peleliu's fringing reef would not permitlanding craft within 700 yards of the beach, suchcraft deposited tanks at the reef's edge. There the

depths permitted tanks to operate in most areas, withoutbeing submerged, but not in all. A plan was devised to formtanks into small columns, each to be led by an LVT So longas the LVT was grounded on the reef, the tanks could fol-low in trace. But when the LVT encountered a depth whichfloated it, tanks halted while the LVT literally "felt" out asuitable shallow path. Then the tanks followed, still insmall columns, and so arrived at the shore at the earliestpossible hour. The technique was one of the keys to time-ly employment of armor ashore before D-Day was over.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95624.

Two other reef-crossing innovations were used on D-Day.A large number of amphibious trailers were incorporatedinto the logistic plan, to be towed behind landing craft, andlater, at reef's edge they would be taken in tow by amphib-ian tractors. Ashore, trucks took them into tow, enablingcritical supplies to be moved well forward to supply pointsjust in rear of the fighting. Newly available crawler craneswere emplaced on barges near the reef's edge. They couldlift nets full of ammunition and other vital supplies fromboats to tractors at the transfer line. Other such crawlercranes were landed early and positioned by the shore partyto lift net-loads from L'VTs to trucks for expeditious deliv-ery forward.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95354.

9

I

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Marines were battling to retain theposition.

Colonel Nakagawa, on the otherhand, had reported that the landingattempt by the Marines had been"put to route." Inconsistently, he hadalso reported that his brave counter-attack force had thrown the enemyinto the sea.

Caption by the artist, Tom Lea"This is Sad Sack Calling Charlie Blue We found the battalion commander [LtColEdward H. Hurst, CO, 3/7] sitting on a smashed wet log in the mud, marking posi-tions on his map. By him sat his radioman, trying to make contact with companycommands on the portable set propped up in the mud. There was an infinitely tiredand plaintive patience in the radioman's voice as he called code names, repeating timeand again, 'This is Sad Sack calling Charlie Blue. This is Sad Sack calling Charlie

tillery ashore and emplaced. All 30tanks were ashore. The shore partywas functioning on the beach, albeitunder full daylight observation bythe enemy and under intermittentenemy fire. The division necessarilyhad to continue at full press on Dplus 1. The objective was to capturethe commanding crests on the left, togain maneuver opportunities in thecenter, and to finish off the isolateddefenders in the south.

At least two colonels on Peleliuended their work day with firm mis-conceptions of their situations, andwith correspondingly inaccuratereports to their superiors. At day'send, when General Smith finally gota telephone wire into the 1st Marines'CP, he was told that the regiment hada firm hold on its beachhead, andwas approximately on the 0-1 objec-tive line. He was not told about, andColonel Puller was not fully awareof, the gaps in his lines, nor of thegravity of the Company K, 3/1,struggle on the Point, where only 38

With the dawn of a new day, thetwo opposing commanders at Peleliuawoke from whatever sleep they mayhave gotten to face immediate grimprospects.

General Rupertus, having beenfrustrated by his earlier effort to landhis division reserve into the southernsector of his beachhead, was nowaware that his northern sector stoodmost in need of help, specifically onthe extreme left flank. Rupertus or-dered 2/7 into Puller's sector for em-ployment there.

At division headquarters afloat,

Wary riflemen of the 5th Marines advance through a devastated Japanese bivouacarea to the northeast of the Peleliu airfield. The concealed enemy troops took full ad-vantage of the rocky terrain, forcing the Marines to clear out each nook and cranny.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96763

17

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more had been learned about the ex-tent of Marine D-Day casualties:1,111, of whom 209 were killed in ac-tion (KIA). While this was not ahefty percentage of the total rein-forced divisional strength, the num-ber was grim in terms of cutting-edgestrength. Most of those 1,111 casual-ties had been suffered in eight of thedivision's nine infantry battalions.Except in the center, Rupertus wasnot yet on the 0-1 line, the first ofeight planned phase lines.

Having received less than a com-prehensive view of the 1st Marines'situation, Rupertus was more deter-mined than ever to move ashorequickly, to see what he could, and todo whatever he could to re-ignite thelost momentum. That he would haveto operate with a gimpy leg from asandy trench within a beach area stillunder light but frequent fire, seemedless a consideration to him than hisneed to see and to know (GeneralRupertus had broken his ankle in apreassault training exercise, and hisfoot was in a cast for the entireoperation.).

Over on Colonel Nakagawa's side,despite the incredible reports beingsent out from his headquarters, hecould see from his high ground aquite different situation. The landingforce had not been "put to route."Ashore, and under his view, was adivision of American Marinesdeployed across two miles of beach-head. They had been punished on D-

Day, but were preparing to renew thefight. Predictably, their attack wouldbe launched behind a hail of navalgunfire, artillery, and aerial attacks.They would be supported by U.S.tanks which had so readily dis-patched the Japanese armor onD-Day.

In his own D-Day counterattack,Nakagawa had lost roughly one of

At about 1650 on D-Day, Col Nakagawa launched his tank-infantry attack from the north of the airfield and headed southacross the front of the 1st Marines' lines. The 1st Marine Di-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95921

vision had been prepared for such an eventuality, and the at-tack was a total failure. More than 100 enemy tanks and theircovering troops were reported as being literally blown apart.

Apparently covered by a returning 1st Marine Division veteran's graffiti,this Japanese light tank remains on the northwest corner of the Peleliu airfield. Itsturret blown off, it is the only one left from the failed enemy attack of 1944.

Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr

18

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his five infantry battalions. Elsewherehe had lost hundreds of his beachdefenders in fighting across the frontthroughout D-Day, and in his uni-formly unsuccessful night attacksagainst the beachhead. Nevertheless,he still had several thousand deter-mined warriors, trained and armed.They were deployed throughoutstrong and well-protected defensivecomplexes and fortifications, withample underground support facili-ties. All were armed with the dis-cipline and determination to killmany Americans.

As he had known from the start,Nakagawa's advantage lay in the ter-rain, and in his occupation and or-ganization of that terrain. For thepresent, and until that time when hewould be driven from the Umur-brogol crests which commanded theairfield clearing, he held a dominat-ing position. He had impressive ob-servation over his attackers, and

hidden fire to strike with dangerouseffect. His forces were largely invisi-ble to the Americans, and relativelyimpervious to their fire superiority.His prospects for continuing to holdkey terrain components seemedgood.

The Marines were attacking forti-fied positions, against which carefuland precise fire preparations wereneeded. They were, especially on theleft, under extreme pressure to assaultrapidly, with more emphasis uponspeed than upon careful preparation.With enemy observation andweapons dominating the entire Ma-rine position, staying in place was toinvite being picked off at the hiddenenemy's leisure. General Rupertus'concern for momentum remainedvalid.

This placed the burden of rapidadvance primarily upon the 1st Ma-rines on the left, and secondarilyupon the 5th in the airfield area. In

19

the south, the 7th Marines alreadyheld its edge of the airfield's terrain.The scrub jungle largely screened theregiment from observation and it wasopposed by defenses oriented towardthe sea, away from the airfield.

Puller's 1st Marines, which had al-ready suffered the most casualties onD-Day, still faced the toughest terrainand positions. It had to attack,relieve Company K, 3/1, on thePoint, and assault the ridges ofUmurbrogol, south to north. Sup-porting that assault, Honsowetz hadto swing his east-facing 2/1 leftward,and to capture and clear the built-uparea between the airfield and theridges. This his battalion did on Dplus 1 and 2, with the 5th Marinesassisting in its zone on the right. Butthen he was at the foot of the com-manding ridges, and joined in thedeadly claw-scratch-and-scramble at-tack of Davis' 1/1 against theJapanese on and in the ridges.

As Colonel Puller was able to closethe gaps on his left, and swing his en-tire regiment toward the north, hepivoted on Sabol's 3/1 on the left.Sabol, aided by Company B, 1/1, es-tablished contact with and reinforcedCompany K on the Point. Then heheaded north, with his left on thebeach and his right near the WestRoad along the foot of the western-most features of the Umurbrogolcomplex. In Sabol's sector, the terrainpermitted tank support, and offeredmore chances for maneuver thanwere afforded in the ridges further tothe right. Hard fighting was in-volved, but after D-Day, Sabol's bat-talion was able to move north fasterthan the units on his right. His ad-vance against the enemy was limit-ed by the necessity to keep contactwith Davis' 1/1 on his right.

The relative rates of movementalong the boundary between Sabol'sflatter and more open zone and Da-vis' very rough zone of action,brought the first pressing need forreserves. Tactically, there was clearnecessity to press east into and over

Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr."Sick Bay in a Shelihole: The Padre Read, 'I am the Resurrection and the Light'About thirty paces back of the lap trench a sick bay had been established in a bigshell crater made by one of our battleship guns . . . In the center of the craterat the bottom a doctor was working on the worst of the stretcher cases. Corps-men, four to a stretcher, came in continually with their bloody loads . . . . Thepadre stood by with two canteens and a Bible, helping. He was deeply and visiblymoved by the patient suffering and death. He looked very lonely, very close toGod, as he bent over the shattered men so far from home."

A Paucity of Reserves

P lanning for the seizure of the southern Palaus(Angaur and Peleliu-Ngesebus) had been theresponsibility of III Amphibious Corps (Major

General Roy S. Geiger). But General Geiger and his staffhad been fully occupied during the critical planning weeks,up to and including the capture of Guam, from 21 July to10 August. The Guam operation ended more than a monthlater than originally contemplated. Meanwhile, someoneelse had to fill the corps planning function for the Palauundertaking. A temporary headquarters, X-Ray Corps, un-der Major General Julian C. Smith was established. Thetwo major tactical tasks of the southern Palau operationwere assigned to the Army 81st Infantry Division (Angaur)and 1st Marine Division (Peleliu-Ngesebus). The 81st Di-vision was also tasked to set aside one RCT as corps reserve.

This partition of division level-planning effort was con-venient, but it slipped into a gross imbalance in force allo-cation which was neither recognized nor corrected as plans

progressed toward operations. The 1st Marine Division hadnine infantry battalions with which to attack more than10,000 defending Japanese on Peleliu. Major General PaulJ. Mueller's 81st Infantry Division had six infantry battal-ions with which to attack 1,500 (earlier reported as 2,500)Japanese defenders on Angaur. Terrain and circumstanceson the two objective islands were similarly imbalanced.Peleliu was considerably larger and had far more complexterrain. Its defensive fortifications were obviously far moredeveloped, and it offered fewer predictable landing beachesthan Angaur. Only the subsequent rapid shifting of plansand higher-level responsibilities can account for such forceallocation imbalance not having been corrected at Corpsor Expeditionary Troops level. The effect of all these im-balances was still further magnified between 13 and 17 Sep-

tember. Higher level changes in plans and naval decisionsstripped Ill Corps of all its reserves.

the rough terrain, and systematical-ly reduce the complex defenses. Thatjob Davis' 1/1, Honsowetz's 2/1, andBerger's 2/7 did. But more troopsthan Sabol had also were needed toadvance north through the open ter-rain to begin encirclement of therough Umurbrogol area, and to findavenues into the puzzle of thatrugged landscape. By 17 September,reserves were badly needed along the1st Division's left (west) axis of ad-vance. But on 17 September, neitherthe division nor III AmphibiousCorps had reserves.

As Sabol's 3/1 fought up the easi-er terrain on the 1st Marines' left, Da-vis' 1/1 drove into the center with hisleft on the break between coral ridgecountry and Sabol's more open flatzone. Among his early surprises, ashe approached the foot of the ridgearea, was another of the blockhousesAdmiral Oldendorf had reportedlydestroyed with pre-D-Day gunfire.Although it had been on the plan-ning map for weeks, those who firstencountered it, reported the emplace-ment as "not having a mark on it!"

The blockhouse was part of an im-pressive defense complex. It was con-nected to and supported by a web ofpillboxes and emplacements, which

it in turn supported. The walls werefour-feet thick, of reinforced con-crete. Happily, Davis was given anaval gunfire support team whichcalled in the fires of the the USS Mis-sissippi. Between them, they madefairly short work of the entire com-plex, and 1/1 could advance until itran into the far more insolubleJapanese ridge defense systems.

Major Davis, who was to earn aMedal of Honor in the Korean Warin 1950, said of the attack into andalong or across those ridges, "It wasthe most difficult assignment I haveever seen."

During the 1st Marines' action inthe first four days of the campaign,all three of its battalions battledalongside, and up onto Umurbrogol'sterrible, cave-filled, coral ridges.Berger's 2/7, initially in divisionreserve, but assigned to the 1st Ma-rines on D plus 1, was immediatelythrown into the struggle. Puller fedtwo separate companies of the bat-talion into the fight piecemeal. Short-ly thereafter, 2/7 was given a centralzone of action between ColonelPuller's 1st and 2d Battalions. The 1stMarines continued attacking on afour-battalion front about a 1,000yards wide, against stubborn and

20

able defenders in underground cavesand fortifications within an incredi-ble jumble of ridges and cliffs. Everyadvance opened the advancing Ma-rines to new fire from heretofore hid-den positions on flanks, in rear, incaves above or below newly wonground.

Nothing better illustrated the tac-tical dilemmas posed by Umurbrogolthan did the 19 September seizure of,then withdrawal from, Hill 100, aridge bordering the so-called Horse-shoe Valley at the eastern limit of thePocket. It lay in the sector of Lieu-tenant Colonel Honsowetz' 2d Bat-talion, 1st Marines, to whichCompany B of Major Ray Davis' 1stBattalion was attached. Company B,1/1, having landed with 242 men,had 90 men left when its commander,Captain Everett P. Pope, receivedHonsowetz' order to take what theMarines were then calling Hill 100.The Japanese called it Higashiyama(East Mountain).

Initially supported by tanks, Pope'scompany lost that support when thetwo leading tanks slipped off an ap-proach causeway. Continuing withonly mortar support, and into theface of heavy defending mortar andmachine-gun fire, Pope's Marines

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reached the summit near twilight,only to discover that the ridge'snortheast extension led to still higherground, from which its defenderswere pouring fire upon the contest-ed Hill 100. Equally threatening wasfire from the enemy caves inside theparallel ridge to the west, called FiveBrothers. In the settling darknessPope's men, liberally supported by2/i's heavy mortars, were able tohang on. Throughout the night, therewas a series of enemy probes andcounterattacks onto the ridge top.They were beaten off by the support-

ing mortars and by hand-to-handbrawls involving not only rifles butalso knives, and even rocks, thrownintermittently with grenades, as sup-plies of them ran low. Pope's menwere still clinging to the ridge topwhen dawn broke; but the numberof unwounded Marines was by nowdown to eight. Pope was ordered towithdraw and was able to take hiswounded out. But the dead he hadto leave on the ridge, not to be reco-vered until 3 October, when the ridgewas finally recaptured for good. Thisaction was illustrative and prophet-

ic of the Japanese defenders' skillfuluse of mutually supporting positionsthroughout Umurbrogol.

By D plus 4, the 1st Marines wasa regiment in name only, havingsuffered 1,500 casualties. This fact ledto a serious disagreement betweenGeneral Rupertus, who kept urgingPuller onward, and the general's su-perior, Major General Roy S. Geiger,III Amphibious Corps commander.Based on his own experiences in com-manding major ground operations atBougainville and Guam, Geiger wasvery aware of the lowered combat ef-ficiency such losses impose upon acommitted combat unit.

On 21 September, after visitingColonel Puller in his forward CP andobserving his exhausted condition,and that of his troops, Geiger con-ferred in the 1st Division CP withRupertus and some of his staff.Rupertus was still not willing to ad-mit that his division needed rein-forcement, but Geiger overruled him.He ordered the newly available 321stRegiment Combat Team (RCT), 81stInfantry Division, then on Angaur,to be attached to the Marine division.Geiger further ordered Rupertus tostand down the 1st Marines, and tosend them back to Pavuvu, the divi-sion's rear area base in the RussellIslands.

On 21 September (D plus 5),Rupertus had ordered his 7th Ma-rines to relieve what was left of the1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Ma-rines. By then, the 1st Marines wasreporting 1,749 casualties. It report-ed killing an estimated. 3,942Japanese, the capture of 10 defend-ed coral ridges, the destruction ofthree blockhouses, 22 pillboxes, 13antitank guns, and 144 defendedcaves.

In that fighting the assault battal-ions had captured much of the crestrequired to deny the enemy observa-tion and effective fire on the airfieldand logistic areas. Light aircraft hadbegun operating on D plus 5 fromPeleliu's scarred, and still-under-

Near the edge of a clearing, a Marine rifleman fires a rifle grenade with good effectinto an enemy position up ahead into the northern, difficult portion of Peleliu.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96106

21

repair airfield. With Purple Beach inAmerican control, the division'slogistical life-line was assured.Although the Japanese still had someobservation over the now operatingairfield and rear areas, their reducedcapability was to harass rather thanto threaten.

Furthermore, the Marine frontlines in the Umurbrogol had by nowreached close to what proved to bethe final Japanese defensive posi-tions. Intelligence then availabledidn't tell that, but the terrain and sit-uation suggested that the assault re-quirements had been met, and thatin the Umurbrogol it was time forsiege tactics. The Japanese defenders

also learned that when aerial observ-ers were overhead, they were nolonger free to run their weapons outof their caves and fire barragestoward the beach or toward the air-field. When they tried to get off morethan a round or two, they couldcount on quick counter-battery, or amuch-dreaded aerial attack fromcarrier-based planes, or — after 24September—from Marine attackplanes operating from the field onPeleliu.

On D plus 1, when the 1st Marineshad launched their costly Umur-

22

brogol assault, the 5th Marines on itsright also faced an assault situation,but one of substantially less opposi-tion and easier terrain. LieutenantColonel Boyd's 1/5 had to fightacross the airfield, from southwest tonortheast, and through the built-uparea similar to that which faced Hon-sowetz's 2/1. The battalion was sub-jected to observed fire from theUmurbrogol and to small arms firefrom Japanese defenders in therubble-filled built-up area. Boyd'scoordinated tank-infantry attackquickly carried the day. He soon hadcontrol of that area, and the east-west, cross-island road, which couldlead the 5th toward its next objective,the eastern peninsula of Peleliu.

On the 5th Marines' right, 2/5 hada more difficult time. Its progress wasstubbornly opposed by infantry fromthe woods on its right, and by ar-tillery from Umurbrogol, which tooka particular interest in the tanks 2/5was using to support its attack alongthe edge of the woods. Whether theJapanese infantry in those woods hadbeen posted to defend that position,or whether they were just survivingJapanese infantry from the D-Daycounterattack, was never established.The fight took all day and inflictedheavier casualties on Gayle's battal-ion than had D-Day. By dusk, 2/5had battled beyond the north end ofthe airfield, and halted for the nightnear the woods concealing the ap-proaches to the eastern peninsula.

As the two-battalion attack of the5th Marines (D plus 1) was heavilyengaged on its front and right, theregimental headquarters near thebeach was hit by an artillery barragewhich, coupled with D-Day's loss of3/5's commanding officer and execu-tive officer, engendered a significantrearrangement in command assign-ments. The early D plus 1 barrage hitthe regimental C took out numbersof the staff, and buried the regimen-tal commander in the crumblingJapanese antitank trench in which theCF was "sheltered." Fortunately, the

Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 95661At a conference held in the 1st Marine Division command post, Col Harold D."Bucky" Harris, 5th Marines commander, center, explains to MajGen Roy S. Geiger,Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, left, and MajGen William H. Ruper-tus, commander of the division, his plan of operations in northern Peleliu.

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The 7th Marines'Complete Destruction of

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burial was temporary, and ColonelHarris emerged with a twisted andbattered leg, but still able to hobble.Two of his principal staff officerswere casualties, and his sergeantmajor killed. Harris elected not to beevacuated, but he needed help in theregimental CP. Ordering LieutenantColonel Walt back from the 3d Bat-talion to the regimental CP, Harrisdirected the commanding officer of2/5 to send his executive officer,Major John H. Gustafson, to takecommand of 3/5. Then Harris direct-ed Boyd to send his 1/5 operationsofficer, Major Hierome Opie, to join3/5 as Gustaf son's executive officer.

Fortunately, 3/5 was having a rela-tively quiet day, unlike its hair-raisingregrouping on the night of D-Day.After daylight, as 2/5 attacked north,3/5 stretched along the east edge ofthe mangrove lagoon which separat-ed Peleliu from the eastern peninsu-la. In that position, 3/5 also tied into3/7 as that battalion attacked south.Thus 3/5 protected each regiment'sflank against any Japanese move-ment across the intervening water,and into the rear of the attacking bat-talions. No such threat developed,and as the afternoon grew on, thereemerged a more pressing employ-ment for 3/5.

As Walt returned to his post besidethe now only semi-mobile Harris,Major Gustaf son was told to get 3/5into position to bolster and thenrelieve 1/5, as it closed in on its 0-2objectives.

Throughout the next day (D plus2), the 5th Marines kept tied in withthe 1st Marines on its left and cap-tured some control of the foot of theEast Road. On the right, 2/5 hackedand combed its way through the jun-gle and mangrove north of the air-field, alongside the road leadingtoward the eastern peninsula. Thethick scrub, nearly impenetrable,reduced progress to a crawl. It com-pensated by concealing most of theadvancing Marines from enemy ob-servation from high ground to 2/5'snorth and northwest.

That 5th Marines' forward posi-tion generally coincided with thenortheast sector of the airfield earli-er mentioned. Possession of thatvisual boundary meant that in mostplaces on the regimental right, front-line Marines were spared the hostileobservation and directed fire fromUmurbrogol. As with the 7th Ma-rines, largely hidden in the jungle ofthe south, this lessened the need forheadlong assault. There would nowbe freedom to maneuver moredeliberately and to coordinate sup-porting fire more carefully.

In the south, from D plus 1 throughD plus 3, the 7th Marines was invigorous assault against extensivefortifications in the rear of the ScarletBeaches. These were defended by afull battalion, the elite 2d Battalion,15th Regiment. Although isolatedand surrounded by the Marines, thisbattalion demonstrated its skill andits understanding of ColonelNakagawa's orders and mission: tosell Peleliu at the highest possibleprice. The 7th Marines attacked with3/7 on the left and 1/7 on the right.They enjoyed the advantage of at-tacking the extensive and well-prepared defenses from the rear, andthey had both heavy fire support andthe terrain for limited maneuver intheir favor. Both sides fought bitter-ly, but by 1530 on 18 September (Dplus 3), the battle was substantiallyover. The Marines had destroyed anelite Japanese reinforced infantry bat-talion well positioned in a heavilyfortified stronghold. Colonel Han-neken reported to General Rupertusthat the 7th Marines' objectives hehad set for D-Day were all in hand.The naval gunfire preparation hadbeen significantly less than planned.The difference had been made up bytime, and by the courage, skill, andadditional casualties of the infantrycompanies of 1/7 and 3/7.

23

Now the 7th Marines, whose 2dBattalion was already in the thick ofthe fight for Umurbrogol, was aboutto move out of its own successful bat-tle area and into a costly assaultwhich, by this time, might have beenmore economically conducted as asiege.

As the 7th Marines moved to itsmission, the 5th Marines was againsuccessfully opening up opportuni-ties on Peleliu's eastern, "lobster claw"peninsula. Most of those opportuni-ties, unfortunately were never ex-ploited.

By the end of D plus 2, the 5thMarines stood at the approach to theeastern peninsula, and astride theEast Road just east of the 1st Marines'terrible struggle in Umurbrogol. Ithad fought somewhat clear of thegalling fires from Umurbrogol, andplanned an assault on the easternpeninsula across a narrow causeway,which the Japanese should certainlydefend. Then a D plus 3 reconnais-sance of the causeway revealed thatthe causeway was not defended. The2d Battalion hastened to seize the op-portunity and moved across instrength. The attack was hit by itsown supporting fires. The forwardbattalion CP group was strafed byNavy planes and then hit by artilleryairburst, causing the loss of 18 bat-talion headquarters personnel to"friendly fire:'

Nevertheless, a bridgehead acrossthe causeway was well established onD plus 3, and the 5th Marines'Colonel Harris moved to exploit it.During the afternoon, he thinned hisforces holding the East Road sector,gave the former 3/5 mission to Com-pany L, 3/5, and gave the remainderof 3/5 a new mission. He orderedGustaf son into a position within thebridgehead established by 2/5, andfurther ordered both battalions thento capture and clear the easternpeninsula. Earlier he had expected

elsewhere on the other islands, andnear Ngardololok, there appeared tobe many opportunities to attack byfire against the cave-infested north-south ridges of central and northernPeleliu. Such positioning of heavyweapons would be very difficult, butrelative to the intense infantry bat-tles underway in Umurbrogol, suchdifficulties seemed acceptable. Manyof the prospective targets could havebeen vulnerable to direct, flat trajec-tory fire across the front of U.S. unitsadvancing north in central Peleliu.Corps artillery units had conductedsuch direct fire training before em-barking for the Peleliu campaign.Such tactical advantages and oppor-tunities from the eastern peninsulawere advocated but never exploited.Only later, in the fighting for north-ern Peleliu was the 5th Marines ableto secure point-blank, heavy, single-gun fire support.

such an attack to be against thestrong defending forces originallyreported on the eastern peninsula.However, the apparent reduction ofdefending forces now appeared tooffer an opportunity to seize PurpleBeach quickly, a logistic prize ofsome significance. Harris knew thatthe division would need to shift itslogistical axis to Purple Beach, awayfrom the fire from Umurbrogol,andaway from the threat of westerlystorms.

Before dark, Gustaf son moved twoof his 3/5 companies across thecauseway, and moved his own CPgroup in with the 2/5 CP, where thetwo commanders jointly planned thenext day's advance. Hoping for lit-tle resistance, they directed rapidmovement, but armed their pointunits with war dog sections to guardagainst ambush. Their lead compa-nies moved out just after dawn. Inthe 3 / 5 sector, there was an ambush,

but the war dogs warned of, and ef-fectively thwarted, the attemptedsurprise.

By the end of D plus 4, the twobattalions had cleared the main bodyof the eastern peninsula and hadreached Purple Beach from the rear.The defenses were most impressive,but many were unmanned. Thoseenemy troops encountered seemedmore interested in hiding than infighting, leading to speculation thatNakagawa's trained infantry hadbeen moved west to the fight on D-Day and/or D plus 1. By D plus 5,Purple Beach was cleared, as werethe long peninsulas southwest andnortheast of Purple Beach. On Dplus 6, 2/5 seized the two islands im-mediately north of the northeastpeninsula, and the next day occupiedthe small unnamed islet just 1,000yards east of the northern ridges ofPeleliu.

From that position, and positions

24

With southern and eastern Peleliucaptured, there now began an encir-clement of the Japanese defenders incentral Peleliu, and an attack againstthe Japanese defending northernPeleliu and nearby Ngesebus andKongauru. This was the obvious nexttactical phase for combat on Peleliu.However, securing it was less neces-sary for the basic Peleliu tactical andstrategic goals than for the mopping-up of the island. As the 1st MarineDivision's Assistant Commander,Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith,later phrased it, "by the end of thefirst week, the Division had controlof everything on the island that itthen needed, or later used'

The airfield had been seized, wasunder repair and improvement, andin use. It was no longer any threat,if it had ever been, to MacArthur'slong-heralded return to the Philip-pines. Peleliu's best logistical beach(Purple) had been secured, providinga secure logistic axis to the main bat-tle areas. The Japanese defenders in

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96936A Marine war dog handler reads a note just delivered by canine messenger, a Dober-man Pinscher, one of the breeds used in the Pacific This Marine has a pump shotgun.

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their caves, and in northern Peleliuand on Ngesebus, retained somecapability to harass American rear in-stallations, but that was sharply cur-tailed by the Marines' counterfire.

Only two significant Japanesecapabilities remained: they could bit-terly resist from their cave positionsand they had a limited capability toreinforce Peleliu from Babeithuap.Such reinforcement could only be bysmall-unit infiltration, which facedU.S. naval screening operations in thearea. Likewise, American encircle-ment of the stubborn UmurbrogolPocket faced two obstacles. First wasthe lack of additional maneuver regi-ments from III Amphibious Corps'reserve. General Geiger in fact hadno corps reserve pending the releaseof some units from the forces in-volved in the seizure of Angaur. Thatlanding by the 81st Infantry Division(less the 323d RCT) had beenlaunched on 17 September, afterwhich there was no corps reserve.

The operation on Angaur, theplanning which attended it and thedecision on its timing, impactedheavily upon the Peleliu operation.The naval planners early on pro-posed landing on Angaur beforePeleliu. Only when Major GeneralJulian C. Smith, commanding Ex-peditionary Troops/X-Ray PlanningGroup, explained that such timingwould invite the numerous Japanesein northern Palau to reinforce Peleliuwas it agreed that Angaur be assault-ed only after the Peleliu landing wasassured of success. However, the An-gaur landing was initiated before thePeleliu landing had been clearlyresolved. The commanding generalof the 81st Division wanted to landas soon as possible, and he was sup-ported in his view by his naval taskunit commander, Rear Admiral Wil-liam H. P. Blandy. Opposing the 17September date for the Angaur land-ing was Marine Major General JulianSmith. Smith argued that committingthe element of III Corps Reserve be-fore the Peleliu operation was more

fully developed would be premature.His advice was ignored by Vice Ad-miral Theodore S. Wilkinson.

A related decision on 17 Septem-ber committed the III Corps' finalreserve to the Ulithi landing. The taskwas assigned to the Western AttackForce, which was ordered to seizeUlithi with "available resources:' OverGeneral Smith's advice, Wilkinsonchose to commit the entire 323d RCT,the 81st Division's other maneuverelement. The 321st subsequently andsuccessfully occupied an undefend-ed Ulithi while reserves were sorelyneeded at Peleliu.

By 20 September, the 81st Divisionhad defeated or cornered all sur-vivors of Angaur's 1,400 defenders.The Slst's commander declared An-gaur secure. He tasked his 322d RCTto complete the mop-up, and report-ed to General Geiger that the 321stRCT was available for further oper-ations. The lack of enough troops tobegin encircling Umurbrogol was nolonger an obstacle.

The other obstacle to reinforcingthe division on Peleliu and encirclingthe Pocket lay in the thinking of

General Rupertus, who clung to a be-lief that his Marines could do itwithout help from the Army. The IIICorps plan tasked the 81st Divisionto reinforce the Marines in seizingPeleliu and then to relieve the 1st Ma-rine Division for the mop up, but thegeneral continued to exhort his com-manders to "hurry up."

Earlier, General Rupertus andColonel Puller had shrugged off asuggestion from the 5th Marines'"Bucky" Harris that they take a lookat the Umurbrogol Pocket from thenewly available light planes of Ma-rine Observation Squadron 3. Har-ris' own aerial reconnaissance, madeimmediately after those planes ar-rived on 19 September, had alteredhis view of the Umurbrogol fromsober to grave. It convinced him thatattacking the Pocket from the northwould be less costly than the origi-nally planned and ordered attemptsfrom south to north. Both Puller andRupertus responded to Harris thatthey had their maps.

The prelanding scheme of maneu-ver was built on the tactical conceptthat, after capturing the airfield, the

Once the troops entered the Umurbogol Mountain, they found sinkholes anddifficult terrain much as pictured here. Japanese soldiers in the caves and heightsabove could fire at will at the Marines, who were like so many "fish in a barrel."

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 108432

25

En circleinen t of Urnurbrogolcnd Seizure of

Northern Peleliu

1st Marine Division would pushnorth along a line across the widthof the main or western part of the is-land. Once abreast of the southernedge of Umurbrogol, that conceptand maneuver scheme were reflect-ed in a series of four west-to-eastphase lines, indicating an expectedlinear advance, south to north.Clearly, it was expected that the ad-vance along the flatter zones westand east of I.Jmurbrogol would be atapproximately the same pace as thatalong the high-central ground ofPeleliu. Such thinking may have beenconsistent with Rupertus' predictionof a three-day assault. Developmentsin Sabol's sector to the west, and inthe 5th Marines' sector to the east,apparently did not change division-level thinking. Until additional forcesbecame available, such a linear ad-vance may have seemed all that waspossible.

Even so, there was no apparentreexamination of the planned south-to-north linear advance, and for daysafter the Pocket was sealed off at itsnorthernmost extremity, the divisioncommander kept ordering attacksfrom south to north, generally fol-lowing the initial landing plan. Ashad been revealed to "Bucky" Harrisin his early aerial reconnaissance ofthe Umurbrogol Pocket, such attackswould offer little but casualties.Troops, heavily supported, could ad-vance into "the Horseshoe" and into"Death Valley," but the positions theyreached then proved untenable andwithdrawal was usual at day's end.

Some part of this thinking mayhave well come from the inadequa-cies of the map in use. The 5th Ma-rines in early October produced anew and more representative sketchmap. It located and identified the de-tails within Umurbrogol sufficientlyto facilitate maneuver and fire coor-dination.

That mapping effort, incidentally,led to the misnaming of Honsowetz'Hill 100, where Captain Everett P.Pope earned his Medal of Honor.

The 5th's mapping team, launchedafter Harris' regiment was commit-ted against the Pocket, encounteredLieutenant Colonel Walt, theregimental executive officer, on Hill100 during their sketching, and sonamed the hill.

Even after General Geiger had or-dered General Rupertus on 21 Sep-tember to stand down Puller'sshattered 1st Marines, GeneralRupertus expressed the belief that hisMarines, alone, would shortly clearthe entire island. After taking a closerlook at the situation on the ground.Geiger ordered RCT 321 from An-gaur and attached it to the Marinedivision. Encirclement of the Umur-brogol Pocket now became tactical-ly feasible.

Capture of northern Peleliu andNgesebus became more pressing withthe discovery on 23 September thatsome part of the enemy's substantialtroop strength in the northern Palauswas being infiltrated by barge fromKoror and Babeithuap into northernPeleliu.

Although the naval patrol set toprotect against just that reinforcingaction had discovered and destroyedsome of the Japanese barges, mostenemy troops seemed to have wad-

26

ed ashore on the early morning of 23September. Colonel Nakagawa sud-denly had reinforcements in the formof a partially mauled infantry battal-ion in northern Peleliu.

A plan to encircle the Pocket, anddeny reinforcement to northernPeleliu was immediately formulated.General Rupertus' staff was closelyattended by selected III Corps staffofficers, and General Geiger also waspresent.

The plan called for two regimentsto move up the West Road, the Army321st Infantry leading in the attack,and the 5th Marines following. TheMarines were to pass through theArmy unit after it had gone beyondthe Pocket on its right, and the 5thwould continue then to take north-ern Peleliu and Ngesebus.

The 321st RCT, by now battle test-ed, was tasked to push up the WestRoad, alongside and just atop thewestern edge of coral uplift whichmarked the topographical boundarybetween the flat western plain, andthe uplifted coral "plateau." Thatplateau, about 300 yards west to east,

constituted the western shoulder ofthe Pocket. The plateau rose some30-80 feet above the West Road. Itswestern edge, or "cliff 7 was a jumbleof knobs and small ridges whichdominated the West Road, andwould have to be seized and clearedto permit unharrassed use of theroad.

Once the 321st RCT was past thisup-lift, and the Pocket which itbounded, it was to probe east insearch of any routes east through the600 yards necessary to reach theeastern edge of that portion ofPeleliu. Any opportunities in thatdirection were to be exploited to en-circle the Pocket on the north.

Behind the 321st RCT, the 5th Ma-rines followed, pressed through, andattacked into northern Peleliu. Han-neken's 7th Marines relieved the 1st,which was standing down to theeastern peninsula, also relieving the5th Marines of their then-passivesecurity role. The 5th was thentasked to capture northern Peleliu,and to seize Ngesebus-Kongauru.

This maneuver would involve theuse of the West Road, first as a tac-tical route north, then as the line ofcommunications for continued oper-ations to the north. The road wascomparatively "open" for a distanceabout halfway, 400 yards, to thenorthern limit of the Pocket, andparalleled by the ragged "cliff" whichconstituted the western shoulder ofthe up-lifted "plateau." That featurewas no level plateau, but a veritablemoonscape of coral knobs, karst, andsinkholes. It had no defined ridges orpattern. The sinkholes varied fromroom-size to house-size, 10 to 30 feetin depth, and jungle- and vine-covered. The "plateau" was general-ly 30 to 100 feet above the plain ofthe road. Some 200-300 yards furtherto the east, it dropped precipitious-ly off into a sheer cliff, called the Chi-na Wall by those Marines wholooked up to it from the southern andeastern approaches to the Pocket. Tothem, that wall was the western edge

of the Pocket and the coral "plateau"was a virtually impassable shoulderof the Pocket.

The plateau was totally impenetra-ble by vehicles. The coral sinkholesand uplifted knobs forced any infan-try moving through to crawl, climb,or clamber down into successivesmall terrain compartments of roughand jagged surfaces. Evacuating anycasualties would involve unavoida-ble rough handling of stretchers andtheir wounded passengers. The areawas occupied and defended by scat-

27

tered small units and individuals whodid not sally forth, and who bitterlyresisted movement into their moon-scape. When Americans moved alongthe West Road, these Japanese ig-nored individuals, took under fireonly groups or individuals which ap-peared to them to be rich targets.

The only tactical option along theWest Road was to seize and hold thecoral spires and cliffs commandingthe road, and to defend such posi-tions against infiltrators. Once thoseheights were seized, troop units and

ISOLATION OF UMURBROGOL26,27 SEPT

Umurbrogol Front, 26 Sept— Route of Task Force

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trucks could move along West Road.Until seized, the "cliff" offered con-cealment and some cover to occupy-ing Japanese. Until those cliffpositions were seized and held, theJapanese therein could be only tem-porarily silenced by heavy firepower.Until they were driven from theircommanding positions, the roadcould not be treated as truly open.

Those terrain conditions existedfor three-quarters of a mile along theWest Road. There, abreast the northend of the Pocket, the plateau ofcoral sinkholes merged into a moresystematic group of limestone ridges.These ridges trended slightly north-east, broadening the coastal strip toan east-west width of 200 to 400yards.

Into that milieu, the 321st RCTwas launched on 23 September, be-hind an hour-long intensive navalgunfire and artillery preparationagainst the high ground command-ing the West Road. The initial Armyreconnaissance patrols moved gener-ally west of the road, somewhatscreened from any Japanese still onthe "cliff" just east of the road byvegetation and small terrain features.These tactics worked until largerunits of the 2d Battalion, 321st,moved out astride the West Road.Then they experienced galling firefrom the heights above the road.

The 321st's 2d Battalion hadrelieved 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,along an east-west line across theroad, and up onto the heights justabove the road. Near that point, the1st Marines had been tied into theforward left flank of 3d Battalion,7th Marines. The orders for the ad-vance called for 3/7 to follow behindthe elements of 2/321, along the highground as the soldiers seized the suc-ceeding west edge of the cliff and ad-vanced northward. However, theadvanced elements along the ridgewere immediately out-paced by theother 2/321 elements in the flat totheir west. Instead of fighting northto seize the ridge, units responsible

for that cliff abandoned it, side-stepping down to the road. They thenadvanced along the road, and soonreported that 3/7 was not keepingcontact along the high ground.

On orders from Colonel Han-neken, the 7th Marines' command-ing officer, 3/7 then captured thehigh ground which 2/321 had aban-doned, but at a cost which did littlefor inter-service relations. Thereafter,3/7 was gradually further committedalong the ridge within the 321st zoneof action. This of course stretched3/7, which still had to maintain con-tact on its right in the 7th Marines'zone, generally facing the southernshoulders of the Umurbrogol Pock-et. Further north, as the 321st pressedon, it was able to regain some of theheights above its axis of advance, andthereafter held onto them.

Abreast the northern end ofUmurbrogol Pocket, where the sink-hole terrain blended into more regu-

28

lar ridgelines, the 321st capturedparts of a key feature, Hill 100.Together with an adjacent hill justeast of East Road, and designatedHill B, that position constituted thenorthern cap of the UmurbrogolPocket. Seizing Hill B, and con-solidating the partial hold on Hill 100would occupy the 321st for the nextthree days.

As the regiment probed thiseastern path across the north end ofUmurbrogol, it also pushed patrolsnorth up the West Road. In the vi-cinity of the buildings designated"Radio Station," it reached a promis-ing road junction. It was in fact thejunction of West and East Roads.Colonel Robert F. Dark, command-ing officer of RCT 321, determinedto exploit that route, back south, toadd a new direction to his attackupon Hill 100/Hill B. He organizeda mobile task force heavy in armorand flamethrowers, designated Task

Caption and photo by Phillip 0. OrrDiscovered during a trip to Peleliu in 1994 was this 1,000-man cave, littered withempty sake bottles, deep in the tunnels in the Amiangal Mountain in north Peleliu.

Force Neal, named for Captain Ge-orge C. Neal. He sent it circlingsoutheast and south to join 2/321'sefforts at the Hill 100/Hill B scene.Below that battle, the 7th Marinescontinued pressure on the south andeast fronts of the Pocket, but still at-tacking south to north.

As those efforts were underway,the 5th Marines was ordered into thedeveloping campaign for northernPeleliu. Now relieved by the 1st Ma-rines of its passive security missionon the eastern peninsula and its near-by three small islands, the 5th movedover the West Road to side-step the321st action and seize northernPeleliu. Having received the divisionorder at 1100, the 5th motored,marched, and waded (off the north-eastern islets) to and along the WestRoad. By 1300, its 1st Battalion waspassing through the 321st lines atGarekoru, moving to attack the ra-dio station installations discoveredby 321st patrols the previous after-noon.

In this area, the 5th Marines foundflat ground, some open and some co-vered with palm trees. The groundwas broken by the familiar limestoneridges, but with the critical tacticaldifference that most of the ridgesstood alone. Attackers were not al-ways exposed to flanking fires frommutually supporting defenses in ad-jacent and/or parallel ridges, as in theUmurbrogol. The Japanese had pre-pared the northern ridges for defenseas thoroughly as they had done inthe Umurbrogol, with extensive tun-nels and concealed gun positions.However, the positions could be at-tacked individually with deliberatetank, flamethrower, and demolitiontactics. Further, it developed that thedefenders were not all trained infan-trymen; many were from naval con-struction units.

On the U.S. side of the fight, aweighty command factor shaped thecampaign into northern Peleliu.Colonel Harold D. "Bucky" Harriswas determined to develop all avail-

able firepower fully before sendinghis infantry into assault. His aerialreconnaissance earlier had acquaint-ed him with an understanding of theterrain. This knowledge strengthenedhis resolve to continue using all avail-able firepower and employingdeliberate tactics as he pursued hisregiment's assigned missions.

On the afternoon of 25 September,1/5 seized the Radio Station com-plex, and the near portion of a hillcommanding it. When 3/5 arrived,it was directed to seize the next highground to the east of 1/S's position.Then when 2/5 closed, it tied in tothe right of 3/5's position, and ex-tended the regimental line back to thebeach. This effectively broke contactwith the 321st operations to thesouth, but fulfilled Colonel Harris'plans to advance north as rapidly aspossible, without over-extending hislines. By suddenly establishing thisregimental "beachhead' the 5th Ma-rines had surprised the defenders

29

with strong forces challenging thecave defenses, and in position to en-gage them fully on the next day.

The following day, 26 September,as the 321st launched its three-pronged attack against Hill 100/HillB (northern cap of the UmurbrogolPocket) and the 5th Marines attackedfour hills running east to west acrossPeleliu, dubbed Hills 1, 2, 3, and Ra-dar Hill in Hill Row. The row wasperpendicular to and south of the lastnorthern ridge, Amiangal Mountain.These hills and the ridge weredefended by some 1,500 infantry, ar-tillerymen, naval engineers, and theshot-up reinforcing infantry battal-ion which landed the night of 23 Sep-tember, in caves and interconnectedtunnels within the ridge and the hills.As the fight for Hill Row developed,Colonel Harris had his 2d Battalionside-step west of Hill Row and beginan attack on the Amiangal ridge tothe north. Before dark, the 2d Bat-talion had taken the southern end

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95375Marines using rifle grenades, hand grenades, and "Molotov Note the torch in the foreground which was used to ignite thecocktails" battle Japanese holed up in caves in northern Peleliu. "cocktails" and the flaming bottle of gas ready to be thrown.

and crest of the ridge, but was un- During the night of 27 September, one of the weapons from the 8th 155mm Gun Bat-der severe fire from cave positions in talion was moved into position in 2/5's sector about 180 yards from Amiangal Ridge.the central and northwestern slopes Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95941

of the ridge.

What was not yet appreciated wasthat the Marines were confrontingthe most comprehensive set of cavesand tunnels on Peleliu. They weretrying to invade the home (anddefensive position) of a long-established naval construction unitmost of whose members were betterminers than infantrymen. As darkfell, the 2d Battalion cut itself loosefrom the units to its south, andformed a small battalion beachheadfor the night.

The next morning, as the 2d Bat-talion, 5th Marines, tried to movealong the route leading to the north-ern nose of Amiangal Ridge, it raninto a wide and deep antitank ditchwhich denied the attacking infantrythe close tank support they had sosuccessfully used earlier. At thispoint, the 5th Marines command

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asked, again, for point-blank ar-tillery.

This time, division headquartersresponded favorably. During thenight of 27 September Major GeorgeV. Hanna's 8th 155mm Gun Battal-ion moved one of its pieces into po-sition in 2/5's sector. The gun wasabout 180 yards from the face ofAmiangal Ridge. The sight of thatthreat at dawn elicited enemymachine-gun fire which inflictedsome casualties upon the artillery-men. This fire was quickly sup-pressed by Marine infantry fire, andthen by the 155mm gun itself.Throughout the morning, the heavy155mm fire played across the face ofAmiangal Ridge, destroying or clos-ing all identified caves on the westface, except for one. That latter wasa tunnel mouth, down at ground lev-el and on the northwestern base ofthe hill. It was too close to friendlylines to permit the gun to take it un-der fire. But by then, tanks had neu-tralized the tunnel mouth, and a tankbulldozer filled in a portion of theanti-tank ditch. This allowed 2/S'stank-infantry teams to close on thetunnel mouth, to blast and bulldozeit closed, and to press on around thenorthern nose of Amiangal. Simul-taneously, Marines swept over theslopes above the tunnel and "seized"the crest of the small mountain.

The term seizure is qualified, foralthough 2/5 held the outside of thehill, the stubborn Japanese defendersstill held the inside. A maze of inter-connected tunnels extended through-out the length and breadth of theAmiangal Ridge. From time to timethe Japanese inside the mountainwould blast open a previously closedcave or tunnel mouth, and sortie tochallenge the Marines. Notwith-standing their surprise effect, thesecounterattacks provided a rare andwelcome opportunity for the Ma-rines actually to see their enemy indaylight. Such tactics were inconsis-tent with the general Japanese strate-gy for Peleliu, and somewhat

shortened the fight for the northernend of the island.

As that fighting progressed, the5th Marines assembled its 3d Battal-ion, supporting tanks, amphibiantractors, and the entire panoply ofnaval gunfire, and air support tolaunch a shore-to-shore operation toseize Ngesebus and Kongauru, 600yards north of Peleliu, on 28 Sep-tember.

There followed an operationwhich was "made to look easy" butwhich in fact involved a single, rein-forced (but depleted) battalionagainst some 500 prepared and en-

31

trenched Japanese infantry. For some35 hours, the battalion conducted themost cost-effective single battalionoperation of the entire Peleliucampaign.

Much of the credit for such effec-tiveness was due to supporting avi-ation. VMF-114, under Major RobertF. "Cowboy" Stout, had landed onPeleliu's air strip just three days pri-or to this landing, and immediatelyundertook its primary service mis-sion: supporting Marine groundoperations. The Ngesebus landingwas the first in the Pacific War forwhich the entire air support of a

V

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95931

The crews of amphibian tractors board a severely damaged patrols when it carried troops attempting to infiltrate north-Japanese landing craft which was intercepted by U.S. naval em Peleliu and reinforce Ngesebus Island off northwest Peleliu.

A western-looking aerial view of the northern end of Peleliu Island is in the upper right. Veterans of Peleliu will be amazedshowing Peleliu village and the Amiangal Mountain. Ngesebus to note how fully the island has been recaptured by vegetation.

Caption and Photo by Phillip D. Orr

32

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landing was provided by Marine avi-ation. As the LVTs entered the waterfrom Peleliu's shore, the naval gun-fire prematurely lifted to the alarmof the assault troops. Stout's pilotsimmediately recognized the situation,resumed their strafing of Ngesebusuntil the LVTs were within 30 yardsof the beach. They flew so low thatthe watching Marines "expected someof them to shoot each other down bytheir ricochets." This action so keptthe Japanese defenders down that theMarines in the leading waves wereupon them before they recoveredfrom the shock of the strafing planes.

The 3d Battalion got ashore withno casualties. Thus enabled to knockout all the Japanese in beach defensesimmediately, it turned its attentionto the cave positions in the ridges andblockhouses. The ridges here, as withthose on northern Peleliu, stood in-dividually, not as part of complexridge systems. This denied theirdefenders opportunities for a mutu-al defense between cave positions.The attacking companies of 3/5could use supporting tanks and con-centrate all fire means upon eachdefensive system, without beingtaken under fire from their flanksand rear. By nightfall on 28 Septem-ber, 3/5 had overrun most of the op-position. On 29 September, there wasa day of mopping up before Ngese-bus was declared secure at 1500. Asplanned, the island was turned overto 2/321, and 3/5 was moved to di-vision reserve in the Ngardololokarea.

Seizure of Ngesebus by one deplet-ed infantry battalion gave a dramaticillustration of an enduring principleof war: the effective concentration ofmeans. To support that battalion,General Rupertus concentrated thebulk of all his available firepower: abattleship; two cruisers; most of thedivisional and corps artillery; virtu-ally all of the division's remaining ar-mor; armored amphibian tractors; alltroop-carrying amphibian tractors;and all Marine aviation on Peleliu.

Such concentated support enabledthe heavily depleted 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, to quickly seize Ngesebus,destroying 463 of Colonel Nakaga-wa's battle-hardened and well-emplaced warriors in 36 hours, at acost of 48 American casualties.

Other maneuver elements onPeleliu also were attacking duringthose 36 hours, but at an intensityadjusted to the limited support con-sequent upon General Rupertus' all-out support of the day's primary ob-jective.

33

As 3/5 was clearing Ngesebus, therest of the 5th Marines was fightingthe Japanese still in northeast Peleliu.After capturing Akarakoro Point be-yond Amiangal Mountain, 2/5turned south. It swept through thedefenses east of that mountain withdemolitions and flamethrowers, thenmoved south toward Radar Hill, theeastern stronghold of Hill Row. Thatfeature was under attack from thesouth and west by 1/5. After twodays, the two battalions were in com-mand of the scene, at least on the

Caption and photo by Phillip D. OrrPossibly one of the best preserved specimens of its kind in the Pacific this Model10 120mm dual-purpose antiaircraft and coastal defense gun is on the western shoreof Ngesebus. The gun rests on its skid plate and was sited in a natural position.

O fl63

topside of the hills. Inside there stillremained stubborn Japanesedefenders who continued to resist thecontest for Radar Hill, as did thedefenders within Amiangal Moun-tain's extensive tunnels. All could besilenced when the cave or tunnelmouths were blasted closed.

As these operations were inprogress, the 321st at the north endof Umurbrogol completed seizingHills 100 and Hill B, then cleared outthe ridge (Kamilianlul Mountain)and road north from there to the areaof 5th Marines operations. On 30September the 321st relieved the 1stand 2d Battalions of the 5th Marinesin northern Peleliu. That regimentreassembled in the Ngardololok area,before it became once more necessary

to commit it to the UmurbrogolPocket.

In a very real sense, the Umur-brogol Pocket typified the worst fea-tures of the post D-Day campaign forPeleliu. It provided the scene of someof Peleliu's worst and most costlyfighting, and of some of the camp-aign's best and worst tactical judg-ments. Its terrain was the mostdifficult and challenging on the is-land. Prelanding planning did notperceive the Pocket for what it was,a complex cave and ridge fortresssuitable to a fanatic and suicidaldefense. Plans for the seizure of thearea treated the Pocket's complex ter-

34

rain as oversimplified, time-phasedlinear objectives to be seized concur-rently with the flat terrain abuttingit to the east and west.

The southern slopes (generallycalled Bloody Nose) dominated thelanding beaches and airfield, overwhich the Pocket had to be ap-proached. After those heights wereconquered by the heroic and costlyassaults of Puller's 1st Marines (withBerger's 2/7 attached), and after thedivision had set in artillery whichwas controlled by aerial observersoverhead, the situation changed rad-ically. The Pocket's defenders there-after retained only the capability toharass and delay the Americans, toannoy them with intermittent attacksby fire and with night-time raids. But

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after D plus 4, Umurbrogol's de-fenders could no longer seriouslythreaten the division's mission.

Nevertheless, after the critical ene-my observation sites were seized,General Rupertus kept urging"momentum," as though the seizureof the Pocket were as urgent as hadbeen seizure of the commandingheights guarding it from the south.The stubborn character of the ter-rain, and its determined defenders,became entwined with the deter-mined character of the general com-manding the 1st Marine Division.This admixture was sorted out onlyby time and by the reluctant inter-cession of General Geiger. Most of

the offensive effort into the Pocketbetween 21 and 29 September wasdirected from south to north, into themouths or up onto the ridges of thetwin box canyons which defined thePocket. Infantry supported by tanks,air, and flame-throwing LVTs couldpenetrate the low ground, but gener-ally then found themselves surround-ed on three sides. Japanese positionsinside the ridges of the canyons, hid-den from observation and protectedin their caves, were quite capable ofmaking the "captured" low grounduntenable. Other attacks, aimed atseizing the heights of the easternridges, while initially successful, inthat small infantry units could

35

scramble up onto the bare ridge tops,thereafter came under fire from fac-ing parallel ridges and caves. Theywere subject to strong night counter-attacks from Japanese who left theircaves under cover of darkness.

During 20 September, D plus 5,the 7th Marines had relieved the 1stMarines along the south and south-west fronts of the Pocket, and on the21st the 3d and 1st Battalions re-sumed the attack into the Pocket,from southwest and south. These at-tacks achieved limited initial success-es behind heavy fire support andsmoke, but succeeded only in ad-vancing to positions which grew un-tenable after the supporting fire andsmoke was lifted. Assault troops hadto be withdrawn under renewed firesupport to approximately their jump-off positions. There was little to showfor the day's valiant efforts.

Attacks the next day (22 Septem-ber) against the west shoulder of thePocket, from the West Road, up thewestern box canyon (Wildcat Bowl)and toward Higashiyama (Hill 140),all liberally supported with firepow-er, again produced early advances,most of which had to be surrenderedat day's end, as all three attackinggroups came under increasing firefrom the Japanese hidden in mutu-ally supporting cave positions. The7th Marines had, unbeknown to it,reached within about 100 yards ofColonel Nakagawa's final commandcave position. However, many sup-porting ridges, and hilltops, wouldhave to be reduced before a direct at-tack upon that cave could have anyhope of success.

The fight for Umurbrogol Pockethad devolved into a siege situation,to be reduced only by siege tactics.But the 1st Marine Division's com-mander continued to cling to his be-lief that there would be a "break-thru"against the enemy's opposition. Heinsisted that continued battalion andregimental assaults would bring vic-tory "very shortly:'

When the 321st's probes eastward

This sketch shows the floor plan of the largest and most elaborate tunnel system dis-covered by Marines on Peleliu. It was prepared by Japanese naval construction troopsand was so elaborate the Americans thought it might be a phosphate mine.

near the northern end of the Pocketbrought them within grasp of seal-ing off that Pocket from the north,they deployed two battalions (2d and3d) facing eastward to complete theencirclement.

This attack against Hill B, the stop-per at the northern end of the Pock-et absorbed the 321st Infantry's fullattention through 26 September, asthe 5th Marines was fighting innorthern Peleliu. The 7th Marinescontinued pressuring the Pocket fromthe south, and guarding it on thewest. With the 321st victory on the26th, that unit's mission was expand-ed to press into the Pocket from thenorth. This it did, while simultane-ously clearing out the sporadicallydefended Kamilianlul Ridge to itsnorth. Its attack south from Hill Band adjacent ridges made very limit-ed progress, but permitted some con-solidation of the American holdalong the north side of the Pocket,now 400 yards wide in that zone. On29 September, the 7th Marines wasordered to relieve the Army unit inthat northern sector.

To relieve 2/7 and 3/7 of their nowlargely static guard positions along

the west and southwest sectors of thePocket, the division stripped hun-dreds of non-infantry from combatsupport units (artillery, engineer, pi-oneer), and formed them into twocomposite "infantillery" units. Under11th Marines' Lieutenant ColonelRichard B. Evans and 5th Marines'Major Harold T. A. Richmond, theywere assigned to maintain the statichold in the sectors earlier held by 2/7and 3/7. They faced the karst plateaubetween the West Road and thePocket.

The 7th Marines' flexibility re-stored by this relief, its 1st and 3dBattalions relieved the 321st units on29 September, along the north edgeof the Pocket. Then on the 30th, theypushed south, securing improvedcontrol of Boyd Ridge and itssouthern extension, variously calledHill 100, Pope's Ridge, or Walt Ridge.The latter dominated the East Road,but Japanese defenders remained incaves on the west side. The 7th Ma-rines' partial hold on Pope Ridge gavelimited control of East Road, andthereby stabilized the east side of thePocket. But the U.S. hold over thearea needed improvement.

36

On 3 October, reinforced by theattached 3/5 (back from Ngesebus),the 7th Regiment organized a four-battalion attack. The plan called for1/7 and 3/7 to attack from the north,against Boyd Ridge and the smallerridges to its west, while 2/7 wouldattack Pope (Walt) Ridge from thesouth. The attached 3/5 was orderedto make a diversionary attack fromthe south into the Horseshoe canyonand its guardian Five Sisters on itswest. This regimental attack againstthe Pocket committed four infantry"battalions," all now closer to com-pany than battalion strength, againstthe heights near the southern end ofthe Pocket (Five Sisters), and theridges at the eastern shoulder of thePocket (Pope and Boyd Ridges). Af-ter heavy casualties, the attack suc-ceeded, but the Five Sisters (four ofwhich 3/5 scaled) were untenable,and had to be abandoned after theirseizure.

The next day, 4 October, the 7thMarines with 3/5 still attached madeone more general attack—in thesouth, again to seize, then give up,positions on the Five Sisters; in thenorth, to try to advance and consoli-date the positions there earlier seized.

In that 4 October action, the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines' push led toan unexpectedly rapid advance whichit pressed to get up onto Hill 120. Itwas hoped that this would providea good jump-off for the next day'soperation against the next ridge tothe west. However, Hill 120, as withso many others in the Umurbrogol,was then under enemy crossfirewhich made it completely untenable.The attacking company was with-drawn with heavy casualties Amongthese casualties was Captain JamesV. "Jamo" Shanley, commandingCompany L. His company was at-tacking Ridge/Hill 120 when sever-al of his men fell, wounded. Shanleydashed forward under heavy fire,rescued two of the men and broughtthem to safety behind a tank. Hethen rushed back to help a third,

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 98260Many of the participants in the battle with a literary turn of mind best comparedthe ridge areas of Peleliu with the description of Dante's "Inferno." Here a flamethrower-mounted amphibian tractor spews its deadly stream of napalm into a cave.

when a mortar round landed im-mediately behind him, mortallywounding him. His executive officer,Lieutenant Harold J. Collins ran outto rescue him, only to fall by his sideinstantly killed by a Japanese anti-tank round.

For his heroism Captain Shanleywas awarded a Gold Star (second) forthe Navy Cross he had earned atCape Gloucester, New Britain.There, his company was in the leadin seizing Hill 660, a key terrain fea-ture in the Borgen Bay area.

The 7th Marines had now been inthe terrible Umurbrogol struggle fortwo weeks. General Rupertus decidedto relieve it, a course General Geiger

also suggested. Still determined to se-cure the Pocket with Marines, Gener-al Rupertus turned to his onlyremaining Marine regiment, the 5th.

Colonel Harris brought two firmconcepts to this final effort for his 5thMarines. First, the attack would befrom the north, an approach whichoffered the greatest opportunity tochip off one terrain compartment orone ridge at a time. His 1st Battal-ion positions along the east side ofthe Pocket Would be held statically,perhaps incrementally adjusted orimproved. No attacks would belaunched from the south, where the3d Battalion was positioned inreserve.

Colonel Harris' aerial reconnais-

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sance during the first week on Peleliuhad convinced him that siege tacticswould be required to clear the mul-titude of mutually defended posi-tions within Umurbrogol. As he hadearlier expressed himself in thepresence of the corps and divisioncommanders visiting his regimentalCP, Harris continued with his poli-cy to "be lavish with ammunition andstingy with . . . men's lives' He wasin a strong command position to pre-pare support thoroughly before or-dering advances.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,relieved 3d Battalion, 7th Marines inposition on 5 October, but did noth-ing but reconnoiter positions where

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37

heavier firepower could come intoplay. Engineer dozers were broughtup to prepare paths into the northends of the box canyons, along whichLVT flame throwers and tanks couldlater operate. A light artillery batterywas emplaced along the West Roadto fire point-blank into the west-facing cliffs at the north end of thePocket, as were weapons carriers andtanks later. Troublesome sections ofcertain cliffs were literallydemolished by direct fire, and therubble dozed into a ramp for tanksto climb toward better firing posi-tions. Light mortars were used exten-sively to strip vegetation from areasin which firing caves were suspect-ed, and planes loaded with napalm-filled belly tanks were used to bomb

suspected targets just south of the keyHill 140, which 2/5 had selected asits key objective.

As 2 / 5 picked off successive firingpositions in the north, 3/5 on 7 Oc-

tober sent a tank sortie into theHorseshoe. This time, the missionwas not to seize and hold, but to des-troy by fire all identifiable targets onthe faces of the Five Sisters, and on

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 97433

Marine riflemen accompanied by tanks push forward to the enemy water supply and rid it of Japanese troops once and for

inner recesses of Horseshoe Ridge in an effort to cut off the all. The going got no easier as the Americans pushed forward.

Marines who fought on Pope Ridge would not recognize it in this photograph ofthe southern end of the ridge looking north showing how the vegetation took over.

Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr

38

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the western (lower) face of Hill 100(Pope Ridge). When all ammunitionwas expended, the tanks withdrew torearm then returned, accompaniedby LVT flame-throwing tanks andguarded by small infantry fire-teams.Considerably more destruction waseffected, a large number of Japanesewere killed in caves, and many of theJapanese heavy weapons in thosecaves were silenced. Previous to thistime, some single artillery pieces fir-ing from within the Horseshoe hadoccasionally harassed the airfield. Nosuch nuisance attacks occurred afterthe 7 October tank sorties.

For the next six days, the 5th Ma-rines headquarters afforded all avail-able support to small, incremental

advances by 2/5 from the north.Light mortars were repeatedly usedto clear all vegetation from small ob-jectives and routes of advance. Bothtanks and artillery were used atpoint-blank ranges to fire into all sus-pected caves or rough coral areas.Aerial bombardment with napalmwas used to clear vegetation and,hopefully, drive some defenders fur-ther back into their caves. All ad-vances were very limited, aimedsimply at seizing new firing posi-tions. Advances were made bysquads or small platoons.

The last position seized, Hill 140,just north of the Five Brothers, af-forded a firing site to which a 75mmpack howitzer was wrestled in disas-

sembled mode, reassembled, sand-bagged, and then effectively firedfrom its then-commanding position.It could fire into the mouth of a verylarge cave at the base of the nextridge, from which serious fire hadbeen received for days.

Sandbagging this piece into posi-tion posed special problems, since theonly available loose sand or dirt hadto be carried from the beach, or oc-casional debris slides. Nevertheless,the use of sandbags in forward infan-try positions began to be used in-creasingly, and the technique waslater improved and widely used when81st Infantry Division soldiers tookover further reduction of the Pocket.

By this mode of careful advance,

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a number of small knobs and ridgesat the head of the two murderous boxcanyons were seized. Direct fire couldbe laid into the west face of Walt andBoyd Ridges, whose tops were oc-cupied by 1/5, but those cave-filledwestern slopes were protected byother caves on the opposite, parallelridge known as Five Brothers.

A week of such siege-like activitypushed the northern boundary of thePocket another 500 yards south. On12 October, the 3d Battalion, 5thMarines was called in to relieve 2dBattalion, 5th Marines. The reliefwas seriously marred, primarily be-cause the forward positions beingrelieved were so close to the oppos-ing enemy. The incoming troops, in-cluding a company commander, werepicked off by snipers during this ex-change, and a small group of enemyreoccupied a position earlier subduedby frequent interdiction fires. Despitethese losses and interruptions, therelief was completed on schedule,and on 13 October, 3/5 continuedthe slow and deliberate wedgingforward.

Directly south of Hill 140, thereseemed no feasible axis for advance,so 3/S's axis was shifted southwest,approximately paralleling the WestRoad, and into the coral badlands infront of the containing lines mannedby the composite groups guardingWest Road. While the compositegroups held in place, 3/5 operatedacross their front, north to south. Bythis means the coral badlands werecleared out for an average (east-west)depth of 75-150 yards, along some500 yards of the north-south front.This terrain, earlier judged unsuit-able for any but the costliest andmost difficult advance, was nowtraversed with the aid of preparato-ry fire-scouring by napalm bombs.Major "Cowboy" Stout's VMF-114 pi-lots' bombs fell breathtakingly closeto both the advancing 3/5 front andto the stationary composite unitsholding just east of West Road.

A similar effort was then launchedfrom the south by what was left ofLieutenant Colonel John Gormley's1/7. Together, these two advancesseized and emptied about one-half of

40

the depth of the coral badlands, be-tween West road and the China Wall.This clearing action allowed the com-posite "infantillery" unit to advanceits lines eastward and then hold, asfar as the infantry had cleared,toward the back of China Wall.

Overall, the actions of the 5th and7th Marines in October had reducedthe Pocket to an oval some 800 yards,north to south, and 400-500 yards,east to west. According to ColonelNakagawa's contemporaneous radioreport back to Koror, he still hadsome 700 defenders within the Pock-et, of which only 80 percent were ef-fective. In early October, some waghad suggested that the Pocket situa-tion be clarified by enclosing it withbarbed wire and designating it as aprisoner of war enclosure. Spoken inbitter jest, the concept did recognizethat the Pocket no longer counted inthe strategic balance, nor in complet-ing the effective seizure of Peleliu.

But it still weighed significantly inthe mind of Major General Rupertus,who wanted to subdue the Pocket be-fore turning over to Major GeneralMueller the 81st Division's previouslyspecified mopping-up task. In pointof fact, Rupertus' successful seizureof Ngesebus and northern Peleliu hadterminated the enemy's capability toreinforce the now-isolated Japaneseon Peleliu. Creation of that tacticalsituation had effectively securedPeleliu.

Without pressing for a declarationthat Peleliu had been effectively se-cured, which would have formalizedthe completion of the 1st Marine Di-vision's mission, General Geiger hadfor some days suggested that in con-tinuing his attacks into the Pocket,Rupertus relieve first the 5th, then the7th Marines with his largest andfreshest infantry regiment, the 321stRCT, still attached to 1st Marine Di-vision. To all such suggestions,General Rupertus replied that hisMarines would "very shortly" subduethe Pocket.

Two events now overtook Gener-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 97878Maj Gordon D. Gayle, commander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, outlines in thesand proposed enemy targets in the north for LtCol Joslyn R. Bailey, Marine Air-craft Group 11. Looking on are Col Harold D Harris, 5th Marines commander,center, and LtCol Lewis W. Walt, behind Gayle, 5th Marines executive officer.

RD 7163

al Rupertus' confidence. First, the81st Division was made whole by thereturn of its 323d RCT, fresh from itscritically important seizure of Ulithi.Second, the perception that Peleliuwas effectively secured was validat-ed by a message which so stated fromAdmiral Chester W. Nimitz, Com-mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Com-mander in Chief, Pacific OceanAreas. Major General Geiger wasdirected to turn over command toMajor General Mueller, whose 81stDivision was now directed to relievethe 1st Marine Division, to mop up,and to garrison Peleliu, as longplanned. Rear Admiral George E.Fort, Rear Admiral Theodore S.Wilkinson's successor as commanderof operations in the Palaus, was

directed to turn over that responsi-bility to Vice Admiral John H.Hoover, a sub-area commander.When relieved by the 81st Division,the 1st Marine Division would em-bark for return to Pavuvu.

During the movement and turn-over, tactical operations ashorenecessarily remained under 1st Ma-rine Division control until the 81stDivision could move its commandpost from Angaur. General Muellerestablished his CP near Peleliu's Pur-ple Beach on 20 October. The Wild-cat Division thereupon acquired"custody" of the Pocket, and respon-sibility for final reduction of its de-termined, able, battered defenders.

Meanwhile, the relief of the 5thMarines by the 321st RCT took place

41

DRIVE FROM THE NORTH

•..... Positions 6—8 Oct

LL Attock 9 Oct

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Positions 2/bNigtitIIOct

on 15 and 16 October. While thatrelief was in progress, LieutenantColonel Gormley's 1/7 was still en-gaged in the earlier-described coralbadlands action, to make possible theeastward movement of the contain-ing lines protecting West Road. Therelief of 1 / 7 was accordingly delayeduntil the next day. On 17 October,a full-strength Company B, 1/323,newly arrived from Ulithi, relievedGormley's surviving battalion, ap-proximately man for man.

When on 20 October MajorGeneral Mueller became responsiblefor mopping up on Peleliu, he ad-

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dressed the tactical problem as a siegesituation, and directed his troops toproceed accordingly. Over a periodof nearly six weeks, his two regi-ments, the 322d amd 323d Infantry,plus 2/321, did just that. They usedsandbags as an assault device, carry-ing sand up from the beaches andinching the filled sandbags forwardto press ever nearer to positions fromwhich to attack by fire the Japanesecaves and dug-in strong points. Theymade liberal use of tanks andflamethrowers, even improving uponthe vehicle-mounted flamethrower.They thrust a gasoline pipeline for-ward from a roadbound gasolinetruck, thereby enabling them, withbooster pumps, to throw napalmhundreds of feet ahead into Japanesedefensive areas. Noting the effective-

ness of the 75mm pack howitzerwhich the Marines had wrestled upto Hill 140, they sought and foundother sites to which they moved packhowitzers, and from which they firedpoint-blank intQ defending caves. Tosupport their growing need for sand-bags on ridge-top "foxholes;' their en-gineers strung highlines to transportsand (and ammo and rations) up tosuch peaks and ridgetops.

Notwithstanding these deliberatesiege tactics, the 81st troops still faceddeath and maiming as they grounddown the bitter and stubbornJapanese defenses. The siege of theUmurbrogol Pocket consumed thefull efforts of 81st Division's 322dRCT and 323d RCT, as well as 2/321,until 27 November 1944 (D plus 73).

This prolonged siege operation

42

was carried on within 25 miles of amuch larger force of some 25,000Japanese soldiers in the northernPalaus. Minor infiltrations aside,those Japanese were isolated by U.S.Navy patrols, and by regular bomb-ing from Marine Aircraft Group 11,operating from Peleliu.

Difficult and costly as the Ameri-can advances were, the Japanesedefenders in their undergroundpositions had a similarly demandingand even more discouraging situa-tion. Water was low. Sanitation wascrude to nonexistent. Rations wereshort, and ammunition was evenscarcer. As time wore on, some of theJapanese, when afforded opportuni-ty, chose to leave their defenses andundertake futile, usually suicidalnight attacks. A very few succeeded

Department of Defense Photo (USMC 98401

As a result of Maj Gayle's targetting of enemy positions in the iu's airfield, and returned to the field to be rearmed, in perhapsUniurbrogol, napalm-laden Marine Corsairs lifted from Pelel- the shortest wheels-down bombing run of the Pacific War.

in being captured.Toward late November, even

Major General Murai apparentlycame to this point of view. Still notin command, he nevertheless pro-posed, in a radio message to Lieu-tenant General Inoue on Koror, abanzai finale for their prolongeddefense. But General Inoue turneddown the proposal. By this time,Nakagawa's only exterior communi-cations were by radio to Koror. Ashe had anticipated, all local wirecommunications had been destroyed.He had issued mission orders to car-ry his units through the final, phaseof defense.

As the tanks and infantry careful-ly pressed their relentless advances,

the 81st Division's engineers pressedforward and improved the roads andramps leading into or toward theheart of the Japanese final position.This facilitated the tank andflamethrower attacks to systematical-ly reduce each cave and position asthe infantry pushed its sandbag "fox-holes" forward.

On 24 November, Colonel Nakag-awa sent his final message to his su-perior on Koror. He advised that hehad burned the colors of the 2d In-fan try Regiment. He said that the fi-nal 56 men had been split into 17infiltration parties, to slip through theAmerican positions and to "attack theenemy everywhere" During the nightof 24-25 November, 25 Japanese, in-

cluding two officers, were killed.Another soldier was captured the fol-lowing morning. His interrogation,together with postwar records and in-terviews, led to his conclusion thatColonel Nakagawa and Major Gen-eral Murai died in the CP, in ritualsuicide.

The final two-day advance of the81st Division's soldiers was truly andliterally a mopping-up operation. Itwas carefully conducted to search outany holed-up opposition. By mid-day on 27 November, the north-moving units, guarded on the east byother Army units, met face-to-facewith the battalion moving south,near the Japanese CP later located.The 323d's commander, Colonel Ar-

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thur P. Watson, reported to GeneralMueller that the operation was over.

Not quite. Marine air on Peleliucontinued to attack the Japanese po-sitions in Koror and Babeithuap,joining the patrolling Navy units indestroying or bottling up any re-maining Japanese forces in the north-ern Palaus. A late casualty in thataction was the indomitable MajorRobert F. "Cowboy" Stout, whoseVMF-114 had delivered so much ef-fective air support to the groundcombat on Peleliu.

The stubborn determination of the

Japanese to carry out their emperor'swar aims was starkly symbolized bythe last 33 prisoners captured onPeleliu. In March 1947, a small Ma-rine guard attached to a small navalgarrison on the island encounteredunmistakable signs of a Japanesemilitary presence in a cave in theUmurbrogol. Patrolling and ambush-es produced a straggler, a Japaneseseaman who told of 33 remainingJapanese under the military com-mand of Lieutenant TadamichiYamaguchi. Although the stragglerreported some dissension within theranks of that varied group, it seemed

44

that a final banzai attack was underconsideration.

The Navy garrison commandermoved all Navy personnel, and some35 dependents, to a secure area andsent to Guam for reinforcements anda Japanese war crimes witness, RearAdmiral Michio Sumikawa. The ad-miral flew in and travelled by jeepalong the roads near the suspectedcave positions. Through a loudspeak-er he recited the then-existing situa-tion. No response. Finally, theJapanese seaman who had originallysurrendered went back to the cavearmed with letters from Japanese fa-

On 27 September 1944, the U.S. flag was raised over Peleliu,symbolizing that the island was secured. The honor guard was

comprised of 1st Marine Division Band members. The generaleditor of this pamphlet, Benis M. Frank, is eighth from the left.

milies and former officers from thePalaus, advising the hold-outs of theend of the war. On 21 April 1947, theholdouts formally surrendered. Lieu-tenant Yamaguchi led 26 soldiers toa position in front of 80 battle-dressed Marines. He bowed andhanded his sword to the Americannaval commander on the scene.

What advantages to the UnitedStates' war effort grew from the con-quest of Peleliu? It assured absolutedomination of all of the Palaus,thereby adding, marginally, to thesecurity of MacArthur's right flankas he continued westward, thennorthward from New Guinea into hisPhilippines campaign. Within the

Palaus group, it destroyed facilitieswhich survived Admiral Marc A.Mitscher's devastating strike ofMarch 1944. It insured total denialof support to the enemy from Koror'ssubmarine basing facilities, in-crementally decreasing the alreadywaning Japanese submarine capabil-ity east of the Philippines. The Unit-ed States position on Peleliucompleted the neutralization of thesome 25,000 Japanese troops innorthern Palau. The landing onPeleliu did not contribute to theRegimental Landing Team (RLT) 323unopposed seizure of Ulithi. AdmiralWilliam F. Halsey had earlier be-lieved that his forces could seizeUlithi without first seizing Peleliu.

The most visible benefit of a sub-dued Peleliu lay in its use as a linkin the flight path and line of commu-

nications from Hawaii, and from theMarianas, to the Philippines. Theholding was a convenience, but nota necessity.

Such judgment could be disputed,however, by the survivors of the In-dianapolis' 29 July 1945 sinking.Having delivered atomic bomb partsto Tinian shortly before, the ship washeaded for the Philippines, when itwas suddenly torpedoed at night.The ship went down in 12 minutes,and no report of the contact or thesinking was received. The fourth dayafter the sinking, its 316 survivors(from a crew of 1,196) were sightedby a Navy patrol bomber workingout of Peleliu. The sighting led direct-ly to their rescue, and most certain-ly would not have occurred, but forAmerican occupation of Peleliu.

(Continued on page 48)

With the senior officers present, division chaplains dedicatea new cemetery created at Orange Beach 2. The 1st Divisioncommander, MajGen Rupertus, with a cane, is near the centerand to his right is Col Puller (1st Marines). Grouped on the

extreme right are: BGen Smith, assistant division commander;Col Harrison (11th Marines), and, Col Harris (5th Marines).Not present at this time was the 7th Marines' commander, ColHanneken, whose regiment was still engaged with the enemy.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96989

45

Tom Lea's Paintings

T om Lea, the artist of the paintings which illustratethis pamphlet, wrote of his experiences on Peleliuin Battle Stations, published in 1988 by Still Point

Press in Dallas. Some of the sketches from this book werereproduced with commentary in Volume 14. Number 2 ofDiscovery, a journal published by the University of Texasat Austin. In this issue, James Jones, author of From Hereto Eternity, wrote: "Lea was one of the artists put in thefield by Life . Various of his works appeared in themagazine, and up until the time he went into Peleliu, mostof them could be pretty well classified as excellently donebut high-grade propaganda. There was very little Ameri-can blood, very little tension, very little horror. Mostly,it was what could be called the Bravo America! and Thisis Your Boy type of war art. His almost photographic styleeasily lent itself to that type of work .

"But something apparently happened to Lea after goinginto Peleliu. The pictures painted out of his Peleliu ex-perience show a new approach. There is the tension of ter-ror in the bodies here, the distorted facial expressions ofthe men under fire show it, too .

"One of the most famous, of course, is the Two-Thousand-Yard Stare portrait of a young marine who hashad all, or more than, he can take. The staring eyes, theslack lips, the sleepwalker's stance. I've seen men with thatlook on their faces. I've had it on my own face. It feels stiff,and the muscles don't want to work right when you try

46

to smile, or show expression, or talk. Mercifully, you're outof it for a while; unmertifully, down in the center of thatnumbness, though, you know you will have to come backeventually:'

Reprinted by permission of Discovery, the University of Texas atAustin. Tom Lea's artwork in this pamphlet is reproduced withthe permission of the artist. The captions under each of the Leapaintings are the artist's own words. Benis M. Frank

ABOVE RIGHT "Artillery Support" At the southern end on our side ofthe field opposite the hill our artillerymen had dug holes and carried75-rum field howitzers to the sites. As we came down to them these bat-teries were firing continuously, throwing shells into the lap hangars andbuildings at the foot of the hill, and at caves in the bill where lap mortarand artillery and machine-gun fire was dealing out misery to marines,

BELOW RIGHT "The Blockhouse" Looking up at the head of the trailI could see the big lap blockhouse that commanded the height. The thingwas now a great jagged lump of concrete, smoking. I saw our lead manmeet a front line detail posted by the blockhouse while the other troopsadvanced down the hill with the three tanks and the flumethrowers. Iso-lated lap snipers were at work on our slope, small groups of marinesfanned out on both sides of the trail to clean them out, while we climbedtoward the blockhouse.

Life Magazine artist Torn Lea accompanied Marines on Peleliu.

BELOW "Counterattack" The phone rang. A battalion CO reported thelaps' infiltration and the beginning of the counterattack. He asked whatreserves were available and was told there were none. Small arms fireahead of us became a continuous rattle. Abruptly three star shells burstin the sky. As soon as they died floating down, others flared to take theirplace. Then the howitzers just behind us opened up, hurling their chargesover our heads, shaking the ground with their blasts.

47

For Extraordinary Heroism

T he Secretary of the Navy awarded the Presidenlial Unit Citation to the1st Marine Division, and its reinforcing organizations, for"extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at

Peleliu and Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944." In addition, MarineAircraft Group 11 and the 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion were awarded theNavy Unit Commendation. On an individual basis, 69 participants in thebattle for Peleliu were decorated with the Navy Cross, the second seniormostcombat award in the Naval service.

The nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor, was presented to eightMarines in the fight for Peleliu; five were decorated posthumously, as indi-cated by ('): *CorporaI Lewis K. Bausell., USMC, 1/5; Private First Class Ar-thur J. Jackson, USMC, 3.7; 'Private First Class Richard E. Kraus, USMCR,8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; * Private First Class John D. New. USMC,2. 7; *Private First Class Wesley Phelps, USMCR, 3/7; Captain Everett P. Pope,USMC, ill.: 'Private First Class Charles H. Roan, USMCR. 2/7: and FirstLieutenant Canton R. Rouh, USMCR, 1/5.

(Continued from page 45)What did the seizure of Peleliu

cost? Marine casualties numbered6,526, including Navy corpsmen anddoctors, of whom 1,252 were killed.The 81st Division totalled 3,089casualties, of whom 404 were killedin action. Total U.S. troop casualtieswas 9,615 for Peleliu, Angaur andNgesebus, with 1,656 dead.

By inflicting that many casualties,the Japanese were successful in im-plementing their longstanding "delayand bleed" strategy. The actions costthem an estimated 10,900 casualties,all but a tiny fraction killed. Just 202prisoners of war were captured, only19 of whom were Japanese military(seven Army, 12 Navy). The otherswere laborers, largely Korean.Among the Japanese militarydefenders, less than two per thou-sand were captured.

The costs at Peleliu held warningsaplenty for the remaining Alliedoperations to be conducted across thePacific to Japan. Even with total 10-cal air and naval superiority, withlavish naval gunfire and bombs, withthe dreaded napalm weaponry, andwith a 4:1 troop superiority, the sei-zure of Peleiju consumed one Ameri-can casualty and 1,589 rounds ofheavy and light troop ammunitionfor each single Japanese defenderkilled or driven from his preparedposition. A few months later, the at-tacks on Iwo Jima and Okinawawould confirm this grim calculus ofwar against determined Japanesedefenders, ably led, in prepareddefenses.

The question of whether thePeleliu operation was necessary re-mains moot, even today, some 52years after the 1 September 1944landing. The heroism and exemplaryconduct of the 1st Marine Division,its Marines and Navy corpsmen, andthe soldiers of the 81st Infantry Di-vision on that miserable island iswritten in the record. But there is anenduring question of whether thecapture of Peleliu was essential, es-pecially in view of Admiral William

F. Halsey's recommendation throughAdmiral Nimitz to the Joint Chiefsof Staff on 13 September 1944, twodays before D-Day, that the landing

be cancelled. By that time, it was toolate. And Peleliu was added to thelong list of battles in which Marinesfought and suffered, and prevailed.

48* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 440—649/40002

The basic source work for this pamph-let is the Marine Corps' official mono-graph, The Assault on Peleliu, by MajFrank 0. Hough, published by the Govern-ment Printing Office in 1950, while LtColGordon D. Gayle was serving as deputydirector of Marine Corps history and edi-tor of the monograph series. Other booksused in this narrative were: George W.Garand and Truman R. Strobridge,Western Pacific Operations, vol IV, Historyof U.S. Marine Corps Operations in WorldWar II (Washington: Historical Division,HQMC, 1971); George P. Hunt, CoralComes High (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1946); E. B. Sledge, With the OldBreed at Peleliu and Okinawa (PresidioPress, 1981); Edward S. Miller, War PlanOrange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991);Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth(New York: Vantage Books & RandomHouse, 1989); Bill D. Ross, Peleliu: TragicTriumph, The Untold Story of the PacificWar's Forgotten Battle (New York: RandomHouse, 1992); James H. Hallas, The Devil'sAnvil: The Assault on Peleliu (Westport,Connecticut: Praeger, 1944); Harry A.Gailey, Peleliu 1944 (Annapolis,Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publish-ing Inc., 1983); Masataka Chihaya, FadingVictory: The Diary of Admiral MatomeUgaki, 1941-45 (University of PittsburgPress, 1962); Larry L. Woodward, Beforethe First Wave: The 3rd Armored Amphib-ian Tractor Battalion — Peleliu and Okina-wa (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower Univ.Press, 1944); Burke Davis Marine: The Lifeof Lieutenant General Lewis B. (Chesty)Puller, USMC (Ret) (Boston: Little, BrownCompany, 1962).

The Oral History and Personal PapersCollections in the Marine Corps Histori-cal Center, Washington Navy Yard,Washington, D.C., hold a number of in-terviews and diaries of participants in thePeleliu operation. These documents fromthe following were particularly useful:LtGen Oliver P. Smith; BGen Harold D.Harris; BGen Harold 0. Deakin; andLtGen Lewis J. Fields, along with numer-ous personal interviews with campaignveterans — officers and enlisted men.

The author wishes to thank the ArmyCenter of Military History for the loan ofthe photographs of Tom Lea's artwork ap-pearing in this pamphlet. He also wishesto thank Phillip D. Orr for permitting useof the interesting photographs of Peleliu asit appeared in 1994.

B rigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC(Ret), graduated from the U.S. Naval Acade-

my in June 1939 and was commissioned a Ma-rifle second lieutenant. After completing BasicSchool in Philadelphia in 1940, he was assignedto the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division withwhich he served in three Pacific campaigns:Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. Forhis extraordinary heroism while commanding the2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on Peleliu, he wasawarded the Navy Cross.

He returned to 1st Marine Division in the Korean war to serve first as the execu-tive officer of the 7th Marines, then as G-3 on the division staff. He is a graduateof the Army's Command and General Staff College. In 1963-65, he chaired the LongRange Study Panel at Quantico, developing concepts for the Corps' operational,organizational, logistical and R&D needs for the 1985 period. He was promotedto brigadier general in 1964. Retiring in 1968, he joined Georgetown University'sCenter for Strategic and International Studies.

945 aWORLD WAR II

THIS PAMPHLET HIS1DRY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part bya grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation and a bequest fromthe estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband, Thomas M.Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple Heart.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information

Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1996PCN 190 003137 00