Gruzińskie wybory

Między silnyM państweM a deMokracją

Marek Matusiak

29 Marek Matusiak

29

GeorGian dilemmas

Between a strong state and deMocracy

29

NUMBER 29WARSAWJULY 2012

GeorGian dilemmasBEtWEEN A StRoNg StAtE ANd dEMocRAcY

Marek Matusiak

© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

content editorsAdam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota

EditorAnna Łabuszewska

co-operationKatarzyna Kazimierska

translationoSW

co-operationJim todd

graphic design PARA-BUcH

dtP: groupMedia

Photograph on cover used by kind permission of the governing party in georgia, the United National Movement

PUBLiSHERośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka Karpia centre for Eastern Studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, PolandPhone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

iSBN 978-83-62936-12-0

Contents

ExECutivE summary /5

introduCtion /7

I. GEorGia aftEr thE ‘rosE rEvolution’ /11

1. state building /122. Economic reforms /133. Education reforms /15

II. thE politiCal systEm /18

1. the ruling group /182. Governance practice versus democratic standards /193. opposition parties /244. a new political player /265. other public actors /29

III. QuEstions about GEorGia’s futurE /33

1. new legal realities /332. the importance of the elections /353. the future of the president /364. unconstitutional scenarios /385. social and economic problems /39

IV. futurE ChallEnGEs /42

1. Challenges for Georgia /422. Challenges for the West /45

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ExEcutivE summary

• Since the 2003 ‘RoseRevolution’,Georgiahasbeen themostspectacularexampleofasuccessfulexportoftheWesternpo-liticalandeconomicmodeltoapost-SovietcountryotherthantheBalticStates;anexampleofacountry thathasmanagedtodevelopstrongrelationswiththeWest,aswellasefficientandmodernstatestructureswhichdidnotcollapseundertheburdenofthelostwarwithRussia.

• ThestrengthoftheGeorgianstateliesinitsyoung,pro-West-ernanddeterminedelitewhich,thankstothesubstantialaidprovidedbytheUSAandtheEU,hasmanagedtoreformthestatethoroughlywithinashorttimeframe.Atthesametime,however,themergingofthepoliticalelitewiththestate,andthepersonalisationofstateinstitutions,havecreatedaseriesofproblems,underminingdemocracy,weakeningstateinsti-tutionsandwidening thedistancebetweenGeorgiaand theWest. Today, Georgia’s weaknesses mainly manifest them-selvesthroughthedefectsof itsdemocracy.However, inthefuturetheycouldalsounderminethecountry’srelationswiththeWest,itsstability,andthesocialandeconomicbasesoftheGeorgianstate.

• GeorgiawillholdparliamentaryelectionsinOctoberof2012andpresidentialelectionsin2013.Thesetwovoteswillcomeasamultidimensionaltestforthestatethatwasbuiltoverthelastdecade,especiallyitsstability,theconditionoftherulingeliteanditsabilitytoreconciletheparadigmsofastrongstateanddemocracy,aswellasthepoliticalmaturityoftheGeor-gianpublic.

• Reformingthecurrenteconomicmodelwillbeanadditionalchallengeinthecomingyears.Afterthe‘RoseRevolution’,theGeorgianeconomyunderwentthoroughreformsaimedatlib-eralisationandderegulation,thankstowhichGeorgiagained

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dynamic economic growth and international recognition asoneoftheword’stopeconomicreformers.However,structuraleconomicandsocialproblemssuchaspoverty,unemploymentandthebreakdownofagricultureremainedunsolved.Inad-dition,Georgiaisheavilydependentonforeignassistance.Itwillbeadauntingtaskfortherulingelitetodevelopaneco-nomicmodelthatwillallowsustainabledevelopmentwithoutrelyingonforeignaid.

• Georgia is facing its political and economic challenges inacomplicatedinternationalsituation:ithastomaintaincloserelationswiththeEUandtheUSA,andisalsofacingthreatsfromanunstableregionalenvironmentandRussia’spolicy,aswellastheglobaleconomiccrisis.Nevertheless,theoutcomesofitsinternalprocesses,includingthedilemmasrelatedtotheupcomingelectoral tests, dependprimarilyon theGeorgianrulingeliteandpublic.

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introduction

WiththerisetopowerofPresidentMikheilSaakashviliandhiscircleintheaftermathofthe2003‘RoseRevolution’1Georgiaen-tered a path of dynamic reformswhichwereunprecedented intheCIS;thesewereaimedintheinternaldimensionatcreatinganefficientandmodernstate,andintheexternaldimensionatan-choringthecountryinEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticpoliticalandsecuritystructures,withaviewtopermanentlybreakingawayfromtheRussiansphereofinfluence.

Thewiderangeofsuccessfulinternalandforeignpolicydevelop-mentswhichculminatedinthepromiseofafutureNATOmem-bership extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit in April2008wasfirstunderminedbytheinternalpoliticalcrisisintheautumnof 2007 (the suppressionofmassanti-governmentpro-tests),whichadverselyaffectedGeorgia’simageasthe‘beaconofliberty’amongthepost-Sovietstates;andevenmoreimportantly,bythewarwithRussiainAugust2008.

ThewaropenedanewchapterinGeorgia’srecenthistory.Mos-cow’srecognitionofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia’sindependenceandthedeploymentofsignificantmilitaryforcesintheirterrito-ries,combinedwiththedevelopmentofmilitaryinfrastructuresinthearea,hasindefinitelypostponedtheprospectofGeorgiare-storingitsterritorialintegrity.

Intheinternationaldimension,thewardemonstratedtotheWestthatRussiawasdeterminedtodefenditsinterestsintheCISarea.

1 Themasspublicprotestsagainsttheriggedparliamentaryelectionof2No-vember2003,andmorebroadlyagainstthecorruptionandinefficiencyofthestateandGeorgia’seconomicbreakdown,which ledPresidentEduardShevardnadzetostepdownon23November2003.Intheaftermathofthe‘RoseRevolution’,abroad,pro-Westerncoalitionofoppositionforcestookover power, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Bur-janadze.On 4 January 2004,Mikheil Saakashviliwas elected as thenewpresidentofGeorgia,winning96%ofthevotes.

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ItalsounderminedthecredibilityofGeorgia’spoliticalleadershipwhich–inthemoreforgivingvariant–wasaccusedofanimpru-dencethatallowedGeorgiatobedrawnintoaRussianprovoca-tion,and–inthelessfriendlyvariant–wasdeemedresponsiblefortheoutbreakofthearmedconflict.ThesetwofactorsclearlydiminishedtheWesternstates’appetite2 forsignificantpoliticalandmilitaryinvolvementinGeorgia,isolatedTbilisiinternation-allyand,apparently,undidGeorgia’schancesofjoiningNATOformanyyearstocome.Thewaralsotriggeredadramaticdeclineinforeigninvestmentswhich,combinedwiththeonsetoftheglobalcrisis,hit theGeorgianeconomypainfully,and itsperformancehasstillnotreturnedtopre-war levels.At thesametime,how-ever,theconflictwithRussiademonstratedtheresilienceoftheyoungstate,whichdidnotcollapseinthefaceofmilitarydefeat,andthestrongpositionofMikheilSaakashvilihimself,whoheldontoofficeandevenreinforcedhispopularity,contrarytotheex-pectationswhichRussiahadopenlyexpressed.

Inthe lightof thecrisisofGeorgia’sbigpoliticalprojects (tore-storethecountry’sterritorialintegrityandintegratewithNATO,whichhadbeenguidingtheleadership’sinternalandforeignpol-icy),andduetotherelativelylowlikelihoodofanewconflictwithRussia3,theneedforanewwaveofinternalreformshasbecome

2 ThischangeinattitudetowardsGeorgiawasthemostevidentinthecaseofthepatronofGeorgia’sreforms,theUnitedStates.Between2004and2008,PresidentGeorgeW.BushhadmetPresidentMikheilSaakashvilifivetimes:theUSpresidentvisitedTbilisiononeoccasion(May2005),andtheGeor-gianpresidentmettheUSleaderattheWhiteHousethreetimes.Inthepe-riod2009–2012,afterthewarandthechangeofadministrationintheUSA,PresidentBarackObamametSaakashvilithreetimes,butonlyoneofthosemeetings,on31January2012,wasanofficialvisitbytheGeorgianpresidenttotheWhiteHouse(theremainingtwoencounterswerebehind-the-scenesmeetingsontheoccasionof theNATOsummit inLisboninOctober2010,andthefuneralofRichardHolbrookeinWashingtoninJanuary2011).

3 Thelikelihoodofanewwarseemslowbecauseofsuchfactorsasthepres-enceoftheEUMMmonitoringmissionintheconflictregions,Tbilisi’scau-tiouspolicytowardstheseparatistregions,andthecomingwinterOlym-picsinSochiin2014.However,itisdifficulttoestimatehowthesituationconcerningAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiawillbeinfluencedbythedynamics

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evident.Thisconcernsreformsinareaswhichhavehithertore-ceivedlittleattention(fromboththegovernmentandlargesec-tionsofthepublic)inter aliabecauseofthesheerscaleofthechal-lengesrelatedtotheprimaryobjectiveofensuringstatesecurityand thoroughly rebuilding the state institutions, the neglect ofwhichhasformanyyearsexposedtheSaakashvilicamptocriti-cism.Inparticular,thoseareasincludedemocratisingthepoliticalsystemtoensurethatallpoliticalgroupswillvieforvotersupportonalevelplayingfield;thatthestateisfoundedontheruleoflaw,itsinstitutionsareapolitical,anditspubliclife(includingthatofthe business andmedia) transparent. The social and economicsituationalsocallsfordecisivereforms.Despiteitsgoodmacro-economicperformancesincethe‘RoseRevolution’,Georgia’secon-omyhaslaggedbehindonmodernisation4:itischaracterisedbyanarchaicemploymentstructure,highunemployment,aninef-ficientagriculturalsector(whichintheSovietperiodusedtobealeadingsectoroftheeconomy),aheavydependenceonimportsand,mostimportantly,foreignaidandinvestments.

Inthissituation,theupcomingelections,toparliamentinOctober2012(thefirstgeneralelectionssincethewar)andthepresidencyin2013,andthequestionsaboutthefutureofPresidentSaakash-vili, thepoliticianwhohas in factbuilt thenewGeorgiaand ispersonallyresponsibleforbothitssuccessesanditsfailuresandshortcomings,will be crucial to the country’s future. The elec-tionswillbeamultidimensionaltestofthestabilityandmaturityoftheGeorgianstateandpoliticalsystem,inwhichthegovern-ment’srealcommitmenttodemocraticideals,publicsupportforGeorgia’scurrentpoliticalcourse,theefficiencyandimpartiality

oftheinternalsituationinRussia.Alsounknownarethepotentialconse-quencesofpossibleviolenteventsinGeorgia’sinternationalenvironment,such as the possible worsening of the Iran situation or a rise in Azeri-ArmeniatensionsoverNagorno-Karabakh.

4 Georgia’smainexportcommoditiesincludeferricalloys(16.7%),re-exportedcars(14.4%)andscrapmetal(6.9%).Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,April26–May4,2011.

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ofstateinstitutionsandmechanisms,theopposition’sreadinesstoparticipateindemocraticprocesses,andthepoliticalmaturityoftheeliteandthepublic,willallbeputtothetest.

Thispaper,whichappearsintherun-uptoallthosechoices,aimsto map out the political and social reality in Georgia today, aswellaspossiblescenariosforfuturedevelopments.Itdeliberatelyleavesout,ormerelysketches,externalfactors–althoughtheseareundoubtedlycrucialtothecountry’sfuture–suchasrelationswithRussia,theUSAandtheEU,regionalstability,theglobaleco-nomicsituation,et al.

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i. GEorGia aftEr thE ‘rosE rEvolution’

Inearly2004, thecampof the ‘RoseRevolution’ tookoverwhatwas effectively a failed state: riddled with corruption, unabletoperformitsbasicfunctions,andhavingnocontroloversomepartsof its territory (Abkhazia,SouthOssetia)oronlynominalcontrolofothers(Adjara,Javakhetia).TheGeorgianpeople’satti-tudetowardstheirstateduringtheruleofEduardShevardnadzewascharacterisedbydistrustandindifference.

The‘RoseRevolution’awakenedtheirhopesforaradicalimprove-mentofthesituation.Thistranslatedintounprecedentedpopu-larsupport for therevolutionarycampandespecially its leaderMikheilSaakashvili,whowonmorethan96%ofthevotesinthepresidential election in January 2004. This strong democraticmandateandtheextensivestrengtheningofpresidentialpowersundertheconstitutiongaveSaakashviliandhisaidesde factofreereintoimplementreforms.RadicalchangewasmadepossiblebysupportfromtheWest,especiallytheUnitedStates,whichbecamenotonlythepoliticalpatronofGeorgia’stransformation,butalsothemainsourceofthenewleadership’sinspirationindefiningthedirectionsandcontentoftheirreforms.BoththeUSAandtheEUprovidedthenewGeorgianleadershipnotonlywithstrongpoliti-calbacking (intensifieddialoguewithNATO, includingGeorgiaintheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy),butalsoconsiderablema-terialassistance(multi-milliongrantsandlow-interestloans)5,aswellasconsultancyandtraining(includingathoroughreformofthearmyunderthepatronageoftheUnitedStates).

5 In theperiod 2004–2009,Georgia received aroundUS$3.137 billion inOf-ficialDevelopmentAssistance(WorldBankdata).Thesefiguresdonotin-cludeallcategoriesofassistance,andtheyexcludealargeproportionofthepost-warassistancepackageworthUS$4.5billion.

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1. State building

Buildingamodern,sovereignstatewasthetoppriorityforthenewleadership, a taskwhich tookupmost of thenew rulers’ energyandmaterialresources.Tothisend,athoroughreorganisationoftheentirestateapparatusatcentralandlocallevelswaslaunched.Characteristically,thechangeswerefocusedontheconsolidationofthestateandissuesofsecurityandpublicorder,whichmanifest-editselfinthetwokeyreforms:theInteriorMinistryandthearmy.

Despite the considerable social costs, stemmingmainly from jobcutsandreshufflesinthepublicsector,thereformsweresuccessfulinmanyrespects.Themostfrequentlycitedachievementsof theSaakashvilicampincluderestoringcontroloverAdjara,ensuringpublicorder,almostcompletelyeliminatingcorruptionfromeve-rydaylife6,upgradingtheinfrastructure,ensuringelectricityandgassupplies,andpunctualpaymentsofsalariesandbenefits.

The stateapparatusofEduardShevardnadze’sGeorgia, and thestateinstitutionsbuiltbythenewleadershipoverjustacoupleofyearswithconsiderabletrainingandmaterialassistancefromtheWest,wereworldsapartintermsofeffectiveness,transparency,thecompetenceofcivilservants,andthematerialandtechnicalbase.Thequalityof services for thepeople also increased radi-callyascorruptionwaseliminated,redtapecutandthestateof-ficescomputerised.

Thereformsboosted thepeople’s respect for thestateand theirconfidence in its institutions.Thepolice and the armyare cur-rentlythemosttrustedinstitutionsinGeorgiaaftertheGeorgianOrthodoxChurch7.Thestateisalsoanattractiveemployer,whose

6 GeorgiamoveduptheTransparencyInternationalrankingfrom133rdplace(2004)to64th(2011),aheadofsuchEUmemberstatesasSlovakia(66th),Italy(69th),Romania(75th),Greece(80th)andBulgaria(86th).

7 Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,April26–May4,2011, InternationalRepubli-canInstitute,BalticSurveysLtd./TheGallupOrganizationTheInstituteof

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appealrestsnotonlyongoodsalariesandtheprospectsfortrain-ing abroadandquickpromotions (at 44, thepresident is oneoftheoldeststateofficials),butalsotheprestigeofthecivilserviceandthestrongethosofagroupofpeoplewhoarebuildingmodernGeorgianstatehoodfromscratch.Inthisway,publicadministra-tionmanagestoattractalargeproportionofthebesteducatedandmostdynamicprofessionalsinGeorgia.

2. Economic reforms

The centralisationofpower and consolidationof the state after2003coincidedwithoppositeprogressincertainspheres:aten-dencytowardsliberalisation,deregulationandeventhecompletewithdrawalof the state fromcertaindomains.Thenew leader-shipadoptedastrictlyliberaleconomicpolicyaimedatcreatinganeconomicclimatethatwouldbeasinvestment-friendlyaspos-sible8, andavoidingpractices that could ‘distortmarketmecha-nisms’9. Inpractice, thismeant that thestate’s role in theecon-omywasreducedconsiderably, red tapewascut,all taxeswerelowered and simplified, custom duties were almost completelyabolished,mostsupervisoryandregulatorybodiesweredisman-tled,andthelabourlawwasradicallyliberalised10.TheGeorgian

PollingAndMarketing,p.54.http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20June%2028%20Survey%20of%20Georgian%20Public%20Opinion,%20April%2026-May%204,%202011%281%29.pdf(lastaccessed14.11.2011).

8 In theWorldBank’sDoingBusinessreport,Georgiaranked12th in2011 intermsofeaseofdoingbusiness (up from112th in2005). In thesamerank-ing,Polandwas70thandRussia123rd.Cf.http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB11-FullReport.pdf(lastaccessed16November2011).

9 Forexample,thepolicystatementbyPMLadoGurgenidzeofOctober2008ontheGeorgianeconomicmodelhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BM-SjuRckqw(lastaccessed16November2011).

10 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has criticised the Georgianlabourlawsforyears.Inits2010report,theILOexpressedconcernaboutGeorgia’sfailuretoimplementconventionsontherighttoorganiseandtherighttocollectivebargaining,amongotherprovisions.

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leadershipalsostoppedpursuinganysectoraleconomicpolicies.Thestatealsowithdrewfromthewelfaresphere,andundertookalarge-scaleprivatisationofstateproperty.

Table 1.Georgia’smacroeconomicindexesin2003–2010

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

GDP(US$billion) 3.99 5.12 6.41 7.74 10.17 12.79 10.76 11.67

GDPper capita PPP(US$thousand)

2.9 3.2 3.6 4 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.1

GDPgrowthrate 11.1% 5.9% 9.6% 9.4% 12.3% 2.3% -3.8% 6.4%

Foreigndirectinvestments(US$billion)

0.33 0.49 0.45 1.17

1.75(Geo-stat:2.01)

1.56 0.65 0.81

Taxrevenue(GELbillion) 1 1.53 1.98 2.64 3.67 4.72 4.39 4.87

Unemployment - 12.5% 13.8% 13.6% 13.3% 16.5% 16.9% 16.3%

source:WB,IMF,Geostat

Thanks to this policy, combinedwith an effective fight againstcorruptionandthegreyeconomy,Georgiaexperienceddynamiceconomic growth, very good macroeconomic performance andrecognition abroad for several years after the revolution. TheGDP and foreign direct investments were growing rapidly (seeTable).However,thewarwithRussiaandthefinancialcrisishittheGeorgianeconomybadly: foreign investmentsdroppeddra-matically,theeconomycontractedbynearly4%in2009,andun-employment increased.Apost-warpackageof international aidworthUS$4.5billionallowedthecountrytoavoidadeeperslumpandrestoregrowth,albeitatamuchslowerratethanbeforethe

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war.Anumberofstructuralsocialandeconomicproblemshavealsoremainedunsolved(seebelow).

3. Education reforms

The reconstruction of the state after 2003was accompanied byamajorefforttopromotesocialmodernisation,withspecialfocuson education. Education spending increased substantially afterthe‘RoseRevolution’11,andaneducationreformprogrammewaslaunchedwithaviewtobringingtheorganisationoftheeducationsystemclosertoWesternstandards(includingthroughagradualimplementationoftheBolognasystem),increasingtransparency(unifiedcentralentranceexamsforuniversities,exchangeofex-ecutivecadresinalluniversities)andimprovingtheinfrastruc-turalbase.Muchemphasiswasplacedonpromotingtheknowl-edgeofEnglishamongpupilsandstudents,attheexpenseoftheteachingofRussian12.Thecapitalcity’sIliaUniversity,whichwasestablishedaccording to ‘Anglo-Saxon’principlesof liberaledu-cation,iscurrentlythebestuniversityintheentireregion,andasymbolofthosechanges.

Educationhasbeenoneof themost importantareas forexperi-mentationandunconventionalprojectsfortheGeorgiangovern-ment.In2010,aprogrammecalledTeachandLearnWithGeorgiawaslaunched13,withtheobjectiveofinvitingtenthousandforeign

11 From2.1%oftheGDPin2003to3.2%oftheGDPin2009,whiletheGDPitselfwasgrowingrapidly.Forcomparison,theEU-27countriesspentaround5%onaverageoftheirGDPoneducationin2008.

12 As ameasure of the effectiveness of the government’s efforts to promoteEnglish, during the 2010 high-school leaving exams 70% of pupils choseEnglishas the foreign language,compared to20%whochoseRussian.Cf.InterviewwiththeGeorgianministerforeducation,DmitryShashkin,onEkho Moskvy radio on 9 July 2011, http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/790284-echo/(lastaccessed16.11.2011).

13 Cf.http://tlg.gov.ge/.AccordingtotheMinistryofEducation,around1500teachersareexpectedtoarriveundertheTLGprogrammeduringtheschoolyear2011–2012.

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teachersofEnglishtoGeorgiaby2014,whowouldteachthelan-guageinschoolsalloverthecountryforlodgingsandpocketmon-ey. Inanother initiative, thegovernmentdecidedtogivemobileeducationalcomputers toallfirst-graders (60,000suchcomput-ersaretobedistributedtopupilsthroughoutGeorgiaduringtheschoolyear2011-12)14.

Thesetwoprogrammesarecharacteristicofhowthenewleader-shipand thepresidentpersonallyprefer tooperate.On theonehand,theydemonstratethenewleaders’energyandcreativityinmodernisingGeorgia,andontheotherthe‘revolutionary’faith,typical of the Saakashvili camp, that the country’s structuralproblemsanditscivilisationalbackwardnesscanquicklybeover-comethankstodeterminationandgoodideas.

ThereformsimplementedbytheSaakashvilicamphavecreatedaunique, statist-liberal statemodel inGeorgia,which isunlikethemodelsfoundintheotherformerSovietrepublicorthoseintheEuropeanUnion.Inasituationwherethepost-Sovietsocietywaspassive,theprivatesectorunderdevelopedandthecivilso-cietyinstitutionsweak,thenewGeorgianstate–ledbyagroupofpeoplewithaclearsenseofdirectionandconsiderableforeignassistance–hasbecomethemostimportantvehicleformodernis-ingthecountry,inbothmaterialandsocialdimensions.

HarassmentfromMoscowputtheresilienceofthe‘Georgianex-periment’toatestintheyearsthatfollowedthe‘RoseRevolution’.Georgia has largelymanaged to end its dependence on naturalgas and electricity supplies fromRussia15,which the latter had

14 ThecomputerswereassembledinGeorgia,atanewly-openedfactorybuiltinco-operationwithIntel.Inthefuture,thefactoryisexpectedtoassembleuptoonemillioncomputersayearforexport.Cf.http://www.mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=2543&lang=eng(lastaccessed16November2011).

15 In2005,Georgiaimported100%ofitsgasfromRussia;currentlyitimports80% fromAzerbaijan and 19% from Russia (partly as payment of transitcharges for gas sent by Russia to Armenia). Georgia also used to importelectricityfromRussia,butcurrentlyitexportselectricitytoallfourneigh-

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previouslybeenusedasinstrumentsofpoliticalpressure.Despitesignificantlosses,GeorgiaalsosurvivedtheRussianembargoonitsexportsofwineandmineralwater16.ThefinaltestcamewiththewarofAugust2008,inwhichGeorgiawasdefeatednotonlymilitarily, but alsopolitically, and consequently the fundamen-talassumptionsofTbilisi’spost-revolutionarypolicywerecalledinto question. Thewar considerably reduced Georgia’s chancesofreintegratingAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia,andofcloserinte-grationwithNATO;exposedthelimitationsofthealliancewiththeUnitedStates,leadingtoalooseningofmutualties(inwhichthechangeofadministrationintheUSwasalsoafactor);under-minedMikheilSaakashvili’sreliabilityintheeyesofhisWesternpartners;andfinally,dentedtheprestigeofthearmy,therecon-structionofwhichhadbeenoneofthesymbolsofthepost-2003reforms.Yetinspiteofallthis,Georgianeithercollapsednorwentintoapoliticalcrisis.Asoneauthorandcriticofthegovernmenthasadmitted,intheaftermathofthewar“Georgiahaslostsometerritoryandgainedsomerefugees.Otherthanthat,nothingofsignificancehaschanged”17.

bouringcountries.Source:GeorgianEconomyOverview,April2011.16 In 2005, Georgianwine exportswereworthUS$81.3million. In 2011, the

valueofexportsfelltoUS$54.1millioneventhoughthequalityofwinehadimprovedandGeorgiahaddiversifieditsexportmarkets.Source:Geostat.

17 “Czekającnamesjasza”, interviewwithZazaBurchuladze,Rzeczpospolita,9 September 2011. http://www.rp.pl/artykul/714696.html (last accessed19November2011).

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ii. thE political systEm

1. The ruling group

The‘RoseRevolution’openedupanewchapterinGeorgia’shis-tory,andlaunchedawaveofprofoundchangesinnearlyallar-easofsociallife.Thegroupofreformersbroughttopowerbytherevolution,especially its leaderandsymbol,PresidentMikheilSaakashvili,havehadacrucialsayindeterminingtheshapeandcontentofthosechangesforovereightyears.Sincehetookof-ficeinJanuary2004,Saakashvilihashadadecisiveinfluenceontheformationofthethestateapparatus,thepoliticalsystem,thebusinessenvironment, themedia landscape, andmore.As themain architect of and the executive forcebehind the reforms,thepresidenthasdominatedpublic life inGeorgia,bothinthepersonaldimension(mostpublicinstitutionsandthemedia,aswell as large sectionsof the economyandbusiness are staffedwiththepresident’scurrentorformeraides)andatthelevelofideas (setting the agenda, defining the directions of develop-ment).Asaresult,fullpowerinGeorgia,formalandinformal,hasbeenconcentratedinthehandsofPresidentSaakashvilianda narrow circle of his closest aides,whichhas remained rela-tivelystabledespiteanumberofspectaculardefections.Despitethelongdurationofhistenure,thedifficulteconomicsituation,the successive internal crises (the oppositionprotests of 2007,2009and2011)and,mostimportantly,thelostwarwithRussia,PresidentSaakashvilistillholdsastrongpopularmandate.Ac-cording to public opinion polls commissioned by theNationalDemocraticInstituteandpublishedinOctober2011,theheadofstateenjoysanapprovalrateof64%18.

18 Cf.http://pik.tv/ru/news/story/21405-reyting-ndi-partiy-gruzii(lastacces-sed19October2011).ThepollwasmostprobablyconductedbeforeBidzinaIvanishvilideclaredthathewasstartinghispoliticalactivity(seebelow).

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This predominance of the presidential campover all aspects ofpubliclifeinGeorgiahasledtothedevelopmentofanarbitrarymodelofstatemanagement.Keydecisionsaretakenbythepresi-dent’sinnercircle,oftenwithoutinvolvingtheformalstructuresand mechanisms of the state (and nearly always without con-sultingthepublic),andwithvisibledisregardfortheopposition,whichtherulinggroupperceivesaseitherincompetentorcollab-oratingwithRussia.Withtheexceptionofahandfulofministers,theprimeministerandthegovernmentinfactstayonthemar-ginsof thedecision-makingprocess19. Likewise theparliament,dominatedbythepresident’sUnitedNationalMovement,hasnosignificant say,and itsvotesanddebatesonly serve to formallyendorsedecisionsthathavealreadybeentaken.

2. Governance practice versus democratic standards

Thepresident and the political camp of his supporters came topowerpledgingtorepairthestate,restoreitsterritorialintegrityanddemocratisethepoliticalsystem.Despitethereformsimple-mented since 2004 to expand democratic freedoms, the formertwoobjectiveshaveclearlybeenthepriorityforthenewleader-shipsincethestart20.Theweaknessofthesystemofchecksandbalances (the opposition, independentmedia, civil society), thefocusonstatebuilding,stabilityandsecurity,andconsequentlythe considerable centralisation of power, have all led firstly toaslowdownofpoliticalreform,andthentotheriseofphenomenawhichclearlydepartfromthestandardsofademocraticstateandtheruleoflaw.

19 Betweenthe‘RoseRevolution’andthebeginningof2012,Georgiahadfiveprimeministers,sixforeignministers,sixfinanceministersandsevende-fenceministers.

20 ThoseaspirationsfoundtheirsymbolicexpressioninMikheilSaakashvili’soathatthetombofkingDavidtheBuilder,whosereigninitiatedtheperiodoftheGeorgianstate’sgreatestpowerbetweenthe11thandthe13thcenturies.Intheoath,takenontheeveoftheinaugurationofSaakashvili’sfirsttermaspresident, thenewheadofstatepromisedtobuildastrongandunitedGeorgiaandrestoreitsterritorialintegrity.

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Themostimportantofthosephenomenainclude:

a)Noclearseparationbetweentherulinggroupandthestateap-paratus

Since 2004, President Saakashvili’s camp has had a free reinin deciding how the state apparatus should be organised, andwhoshouldbeappointedtopostsatalllevelsoftheadministra-tion.Manyinstitutionswerebuiltfromscratchafterthe ‘RoseRevolution’,andareinextricablyconnectedwiththepeoplewhowere inchargeof theirreform.Moreover,manycivilservantsarealsomembersoftherulingparty.Thisblurstheboundariesbetweenpoliticalstructuresandthestate,createstheriskofthestatebeingappropriatedbyonepoliticalgroup,and leaves thestateprone to exploitation forpolitical ends.During the Janu-ary2008presidentialelections,thescaleofirregularities(con-sistinginactiveuseofthestateapparatusduringthecampaignandthevotingitself)wassuchthat it ledtocriticismfromin-ternational institutionsandallegationsofelectoral fraudfromtheopposition(whosemembersaccusedthepresidentofhavingaddedseveralpercentofvotestohisshowinginordertoavoidasecondroundofvoting).ThelocalelectionsinMay2010gen-erallyreceivedpositiveassessmentsfrominternationalobserv-ers, althoughnumerous irregularitieswerealso reporteddur-ingthatballot.AccordingtoareportbytheGeorgianbranchofTransparency International, large numbers of public officials,whowere formallyon leaveat that time,were involved in thecampaignandusedtheiroffices,officephonesandcarsforcam-paignpurposes.21

21 Cf.TransparencyInternationalGeorgia.The Use of Administrative Resourc-es for Election Campaign 2010. Local Self-Government Elections Final Report. http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/Final%20Re-port%20on%20AAR_ENG_0.pdf(lastaccessed13October2011).

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b)Informalgovernmentswayoverthemedia

FreedomofspeechisassuredinGeorgia:thereareindependentnewspapers,radiostationsandonlinemedia.However,asintheotherformerSovietcountries,televisionremainsthemainsourceofinformationfortheGeorgianpublic.Theprivatetelevisionsta-tions Rustavi 2 and Imedi, the only TV channelswith nationalreach apart from the public TV Channel 1, are themost popu-lar, and they takea clearlypro-government line22.Even thoughbothRustavi2andImediareformallyindependentofthestate,inpractice theownershipofboth televisions isunclear (Rusta-vi2isownedbytwocompaniesregisteredintheVirginIslandsandtheMarshallIslands).This,combinedwiththeirclearlypro-governmentcharacter,hasledtospeculationthatthesechannelsare covertly controlled by the ruling camp (Imedi’s CEOGiorgiArveladzehasformerlyservedastheministerforeconomyandhasworkedasapresidentialaide)23.Criticsoftherulinggroupareallowedverylimitedaccesstothosemediaoutlets.

c)‘Elite’corruption

One of the greatest achievements of the ‘Rose Revolution’ hasbeen toeradicatecorruptionalmostcompletely fromtheevery-daylivesofcitizens.InMay2011,97%ofrespondentsreplied‘no’tothequestion“Didyouhavetopayabribetoobtainanadmin-istrativedecisionorserviceduringthelast12months?”24.Atthe

22 InanopinionpollcarriedoutinApril2011,thenewsservicesofthedifferenttelevisionstationsweredeemedclearlypro-governmentby53%(Rustavi2),43%(Imedi)and48%(Channel1)ofrespondentsrespectively.Cf.TheCaucasusRe-searchResourceCenters,‘GeorgianModelasseenbyGeorgians’,May2011.

23 Transparency InternationalGeorgia, ‘Television inGeorgia–Ownership,ControlandRegulation’,20November2009;http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/Media%20Ownership%20November%202009%20Eng.pdf(lastaccessed20November2011).

24 Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,26April-4May2011,InternationalRepublicanInstitute, Baltic Surveys Ltd. / TheGallupOrganization, The Institute ofPollingAndMarketing,p.9.

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same time, however, there is much speculation about corruptpracticeswithinthepowerelite.Suchpracticesallegedlyincludeclose linksbetweentherulinggroupandbigbusiness25,aswellasundisclosedcontrolbymembersof therulingeliteof impor-tantGeorgian enterprises.Theopaqueownership structures ofmanyimportantenterprises inGeorgia,whichareoftenownedbycompaniesregisteredintaxheavens,favoursuchspeculation.AccordingtoamemberoftheGeorgianbranchofTransparencyInternational, quoted in a report by the Carnegie Endowment,“Onceyougetaboveacertainlevel,youalwaysseemtoendupinCyprusoraP.O.boxintheBahamas”26.

d)Lackofafullyindependentjudiciary

Eventhoughanumberofregulatorychangeshavebeenenactedto buttress the independence of the judiciary (judges are nownominatedforlife,attemptstopressurethejuryarepenalised,andjudges’salarieshaveincreasedseveral-fold),theindepend-ence of judges inGeorgia remains problematic. Large sectionsof the public (43% of citizens, according to a May 2011 poll27)perceivethecourtsasmoreorless‘politicallyavailable’.Ontheonehand, this perception stems from the existence of instru-mentswithwhich the government is able to discipline judges(aftertheirnomination, judgeshavetoservea three-yearpro-bationperiod,andmaybepermanentlymovedfromtheircur-rentposttoanycourtinGeorgia,withoutbeingconsultedaboutitandwithouthavingtogiveconsent28);andontheother,from

25 Cf.forexample‘PoliticalParty.FinanceReport’,TransparencyInternation-al–Georgia,Tbilisi2011.http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_at-tachments/TI-G-PartyFinance-ENG.pdf(lastaccessed20November2011).

26 Quotedafter:ThomasdeWaal,Georgia’schoices.Chartingafutureinun-certaintimes,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace2011.http://car-negieendowment.org/files/georgias_choices.pdf(lastaccessed20.11.2011).

27 Cf.TheCaucasusResearchResourceCenters, ‘GeorgianModelas seenbyGeorgians’,May2011.

28 Cf.“JusticeinGeorgia”,GeorgiaYoungLawyers’Association,Tbilisi2010.

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thejudges’“tendencytoguessthegovernment’swishes”29,espe-ciallyincaseswithapoliticalcontext.

e)Excessiveroleofthesecuritystructures

Thenewsecurity structuresestablishedafter the ‘RoseRevo-lution’havefromthebeginningbeenamongthemosteffectivestatebodies,andhavebeenthemostdevotedtothecauseofre-buildingGeorgia.Atthesametime,theyhavealwaysprovideddirectbackingtotherulingcamp,andasaresultofthenationalinterestbeingconflatedwith the interestof the rulinggroup,theyhavealsobeenusedforpoliticalends.TheroleoftheIn-teriorMinistry’sstructures intakingcontrolovertheopposi-tionTVchannelImediintheautumnof2007mayserveasanexample.

Anotherproblemconcernsthelackofdemocraticoversightovertheactivitiesofthesecuritystructures,andthelackofpoliticalresponsibilityforthis.Inthiscontext,theJanuary2006murderof a 28-year-old banker Sandro Girgvliani by off-duty InteriorMinistryofficers,inwhich,accordingtospeculation,topMinis-tryofficialsmayalsohavebeenimplicated,isasymboliccase.TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshasruledthattheinvestigationintothatcase‘manifestlylackedtherequisiteindependence,im-partiality,objectivityandthoroughness’30.

Thesignificantroleplayedbythesecuritystructuresinthecoun-try’ssocialandpoliticallife,thelackofanyoversightoftheiractivi-ties,theeasewithwhichtheauthoritiesresorttoforcefulmethods

29 Interviewwithamemberof the internationalanalystcommunityduringastudyvisittoGeorgiainMay2011.

30 EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,CaseofEnukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia,applicationno.25091/07,Judgment,Strasbourg26April2011,http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&sessionid=79655442&skin=hudoc-en(lastaccessed25November2011).

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toresolveinternalcrises,aswellastherestrictiveregulations31andthewillingnessoftheenforcementbodiesandcourtstousethem32,allaffecttheatmosphereofpubliclife,andhavegivenrisetoallega-tionsthatGeorgiaisturningintoa‘policestate’.

3. Opposition parties

In Georgia there are a number of opposition political groupswhosetraditionsdatebacktothe1990s,oreventheperiodbeforethebreak-upof theSovietUnion.However, thebulkof today’soppositionemergedasaresultofschismsthatoccurredwithinthe campof the ‘RoseRevolution’ since 2003, andmanyof themostrecognisableoppositionpoliticianswereMikheilSaakash-vili’s close aides in thepast (NinoBurjanadze, IrakliAlasaniaandothers).

Havingcontestedtheresultsofthe2008parliamentaryelectionsduetoallegedfraud,theoppositioninGeorgianowfunctionsout-sideparliament.Formallyaparliamentaryoppositiongroup,theChristianDemocraticMovementiscommonlyregardedasa‘sys-temic’oppositionwhichdoesnotquestionthepresidentialcamp’smonopolyonpower33.Morethanadozenmoreorlessactiveop-positionpartiesaredispersedoutsidetheparliament.Whattheyhaveincommonislimitedfinancialandhumanresources,poorlydevelopedstructuresoutsidethecapital,andnoaccesstothema-jormedia.Thisputstheminapositionwhichisclearlyinferiorto

31 TheGeorgianCodeofAdministrativeMisdemeanourprovidesforthepos-sibilityofadministrativedetentionofupto90days,amongothermeasures.Cf.‘AdministrativeError.Georgia’sflawedsystemofadministrativedeten-tion’, Human Rights Watch 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/georgia0112ForUpload.pdf(lastaccessed29January2012).

32 Georgiahasoneoftheworld’shighestprisonpopulationsper100,000in-habitants.Cf.forexampleWorldPrisonPopulationList8thedition,http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf(lastaccessed10December2011).

33 Cf.forexample‘LeakedCable:CDMMayoralCandidateEncouragedbyGov’ttoRun’,http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23898(lastaccessed10December2011).

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thatoftherulingelite,withitsextensiveadministrative,humanandfinancialresourcesandaccesstothemedia.Personalconflictsdividetheopposition,makingthesituationevenmoredifficult.

The opposition principally emphasises the authoritarian traitsoftheSaakashvilicamp’sruleandthepooreconomicsituationofthegeneralpublic.Ithascriticisedtherepressivebehaviourofthesecurityapparatus,thearroganceofpoweranditsdisconnectionfrom the realities ofGeorgian life (thisparticularlypertains tothepresidentpersonally),andtherandomandsuperficialnatureofmanyactions34.However, theoppositionhasnotbeenable toformulateapositivealternativevision.Asaresult,criticismstendtobepersonal, and focusoncalls forMikheilSaakashvili toberemovedfrompower.

Sinceideologicalissuesareoflittleimportance,themaincriteriabywhichtheoppositiongroupsdifferentiatethemselvesconcerntheirchoiceofmethodsforpoliticalstruggleandtheirattitudestowardsRussia.PoliticianssuchasNinoBurjanadze(theformerparliamentary speaker), are ready formore or less open co-op-erationwithMoscow, and advocate removing Saakashvili frompowerthroughmassstreetprotests.GovernmentpropagandahasconsistentlyaccusedthissectionoftheoppositionoflinkstoRus-sian secret services, including through Georgian oligarchs liv-inginRussiaandWesternEurope,andmembersofthecriminalunderground35.Mostoftheotheroppositionparties(suchasOurGeorgia/FreeDemocrats,runbyGeorgia’sformerambassadortotheUNIrakliAlasania,ortheRepublicanParty)seektoremoveSaakashvili’sgroupfrompowerthroughelections,andadvocate

34 TheprojecttoenhanceGeorgia’sagriculturalstandardsbyinvitingwhitefarmersfromSouthAfricatosettleinthecountryisaclassicexampleoftheauthorities’highcreativity,whichneverthelesshasproducedlittleconcreteeffect.Cf.http://www.boers.ge/(lastaccessed12December11).

35 Cf. for example ‘Robert Coalson, Burjanadze’s husband, becomes focus ofGeorgiapoliticalintrigue’,RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,26March2009,http://www.rferl.org/content/Burjanadzes_Husband_Becomes_Focus_Of_Georgian_Political_Intrigue/1563251.html(lastaccessed13December2011).

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acontinuationofthepro-Westerncourse.Nevertheless,therul-inggrouphasinfactmonopolisedtherhetoricofmodernisationandintegrationwiththeWest,whichmakesitevenmoredifficultfortheoppositiongroupstoreachandbenoticedbytheelectorateoutsidethebigcities.

Becauseofitsfragmentationandreactiveapproachtothegovern-ment’smoves,theoppositionenjoysonlylimitedpublicsupport.Even though the potential for discontent is significant (mainlybecauseofsocialissuessuchasunemployment,poverty,growingsocialinequalitiesetc.),thepublic,fatiguedbythefutilityofanti-government streetprotests inpreviousyears,perceives theop-positionasunconstructive,bereftofideasofhowtocarryonthepoliticalstruggle,andessentiallyunpreparedtotakeoverpowerinGeorgia.

4. A new political player

AnewplayerontheGeorgianpoliticalsceneisBidzinaIvanish-vili,therichestmaninGeorgia,withassetsworthanestimatedUS$6.4billion(correspondingtomorethanhalfofGeorgia’san-nualGDP),whounexpectedlyannouncedhisentryintopoliticsinOctober2011.Unliketheoppositionparties,hehasthepotentialtochallengetherulinggroup’smonopolisticposition36.Hisambi-

36 As intheotherformerSovietcountries, theactive involvementoftheso-called oligarchs in politics is not a new phenomenon in Georgia. Badri(Arkadi)Patarkatsishvili,aGeorgianbillionairewhooperatedinRussiainthe1990s,isafigurewhoresemblesBidzinaIvanishviliinmanyrespects.BecauseofhiscloselinkstotheRussianoligarchBorisBerezovsky,whowasinconflictwithVladimirPutin,PatarkatsishvilireturnedtoGeorgiain2001whereheusedhisimmensewealth(estimatedatUS$12billion)todeveloplarge-scalebusinessandcharitableactivities.Dissatisfiedwiththereformsimplemented after the ‘RoseRevolution’,whichunderminedhis businessinterests,PatarkatsishvilimovedovertotheoppositionagainstSaakash-vili;hefinancedtheanti-governmentprotestsinautumn2007,amongotherventures,andharshlycriticisedtherulinggroupinhismedia(mainlyIme-ditelevision).HealsochallengedMikheilSaakashviliasapresidentialcan-didateintheelectionsofJanuary2008.Thankstohishugewealth,personalinfluence,linkstotheRussiangovernmentandbusiness,andthefactthat

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tionistodefeatthepresident’sUnitedNationalMovementintheupcomingparliamentaryelectionsandformanewgovernment.Ivanishvili intends the newly founded Georgian Dream publicmovementandtheGeorgianDream–DemocraticGeorgiaopposi-tionpartytobehispoliticalvehicles.

IvanishviliearnedhismoneyintheopaquebusinessenvironmentofRussiainthe1990s.BeforereturningtoGeorgia,hecarriedoutlarge-scaleactivitiesinthebanking,metallurgicandothersectorsinRussia.After the ‘RoseRevolution’hewasawardedGeorgiancitizenshipbyPresidentSaakashviliandresettledinGeorgia,al-thoughhekeptsomeofhisRussianassets.Accordingtouncon-firmedreports,IvanishvilisupportedtheauthoritiesfinanciallyformanyyearsafterreturningtoGeorgia,which,iftrue,wouldmakehimfitthepatternwherebythenewGeorgiangovernment‘amnestied’Georgianoligarchsinreturnfortheirfinancialsup-port. The billionaire has gained recognition and popularity inGeorgiathankstohislarge-scalecharitableactivitiesandhissup-portfortheGeorgianOrthodoxChurch,eventhoughIvanishvilihas consistently avoided themediaormakinganypublic state-ments,andhasbeensurroundedbyanatmosphereofsecrecy.HeisbelievedformanyyearstohavefinancedgrantsformembersoftheGeorgianintelligentsiawhowereimpoverishedasaresultofthetransformation.Accordingtounconfirmedreports,hehasalsofinancedtheconstructionoftheHolyTrinityCathedral,thelargestreligiousbuildingintheSouthernCaucasus,whichrisesaboveTbilisi.

WhenIvanishvilideclaredthathewasenteringpolitics,opposi-tion groups started to seek his favour and opportunities to co-operatewith him. The authorities also responded immediately:IvanishviliwasstrippedofhisGeorgiancitizenship,asaresultof

hepossessedhisownmedia,PatarkatsishviliposedthegreatestchallengetotheSaakashviligroupsincethe‘RoseRevolution’.InFebruary2008,heunexpectedlydiedofaheartattackinLondon.

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whichhecannotlegallyengageinpoliticsorfinanceparties37,andtheNationalBankofGeorgiaopenedaninvestigationintoallegedmoneylaunderingbyhisCartuBank.Meanwhile,membersoftherulinggrouphavestartedtopubliclyaccusethebillionaireofact-ingonordersfrom,andintheinterestof,Russia.

Little is known about Ivanishvili’s views. His statements sug-gest thathesupportsbothapro-Westernorientation, includingGeorgia’sfutureaccessiontoNATO,andcloserrelationswithRus-sia.However,hispolicydeclarationshavebeenverygeneralandpopulistinnature.Thepoliticalpartieshehaschosenashismainpartners,theRepublicanPartyandAlasania’sOurGeorgia/FreeDemocrats, represent thepro-Westernoptionandare recognis-ableandreliablepotentialpartnersfortheWest.However,Ivan-ishvili’scirclealsoincludessomemembersoftheoldregime,fromtheperiodofEduardShevardnadze’srule.Moreover,thefactthatIvanishvilihaslongbeendoingbusinessinRussia,andthescaleofhisbusinessactivities,engenderspeculationsthathemightbeimplicated inmurky business and political relations in Russia.Thus,thenewpoliticalforcethatthebillionaireisbuildingupisinmanywaysnon-transparentandunpredictable,bothwithre-gardtoitspolicyissuesandthequestionofwhowillultimatelyhavethedecisivesayinit.

It’sdifficulttosaywhyIvanishvilihasmadethissuddenturn.Hisactions so far demonstrate a lack of political experience or anyclearstrategyofaction.Nevertheless,hisemergenceonthepoliti-calsceneposesaseriouschallengetotherulinggroup.AnumberoffactorspredisposeIvanishvilitoplayamajorroleinGeorgianpolitics, either personally if he regains his citizenship, or indi-rectly ifnot.These factors includehishugefinancialresources,

37 Ivanishviliwasstrippedofhiscitizenshipunderthepretextthat,alreadyacitizenofGeorgiaandRussia,hehadrecentlyadoptedathird,Frenchciti-zenship,asheannouncedinoneofhisstatements.Accordingtothe legalinterpretationpresentedbytheauthorities,thisautomaticallyentailedtheexpiryofhisGeorgiancitizenship.

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apositivepublicimageandgoodrelationswiththeGeorgianOr-thodoxChurch.Knowledgeabout the relationsandconnectionswithintherulingeliteisalsoanimportantassetinIvanishvili’spoliticalcapital,whichheisusingbysendingsignalstokeymem-bersof therulinggroupthathecouldofferasafealternativetoMikheil Saakashvili. The billionaire also benefits from the ex-pectationsoftheEUandtheUnitedStatesthatthecampaignandvotinginthenextparliamentaryelectionsshouldpresentmajorprogressintermsofdemocraticstandards,whichlimitsthecur-rentGeorgianleadership’sroomformanoeuvre.

5. Other public actors

a)TheOrthodoxChurch

TheGeorgianOrthodoxChurch,andespeciallyPatriarchIliaIIwhohasbeenleadingtheChurchsince1977,areveryimportantactorsinGeorgia’spoliticallife,eveniftheyseldomtakethelimelight.Or-thodoxChristianityisaconstitutiveelementofGeorgiannationalidentity,andtheimportanceofreligioninsociallifehasbeengrow-ingsteadilysinceGeorgiaregainedindependencein1991.

The Orthodox Church and the Patriarch are the most trustedpublic institutionsandenjoygreatauthority.AsthePapalNun-cioClaudioGugerotti allegedlysaid, „If thepeopleare forced tochoose,theywillchoosethechurchoverthegovernment”38.ThespecialstatusoftheOrthodoxChurchisregulatedbyanaccordconcludedin2002betweenthestateandtheChurch(commonlyreferredtoasthe‘concordat’).

Thechurchisostensiblyconservativeonmoralissues,openaboutitsaversiontootherconfessions,anddistrustfuloftheWest39.Be-

38 Georgia: impossible togovernwithoutGodandBible,http://www.wikile-aks.org/cable/2008/12/08TBILISI2269.html(lastaccessed14.12.2011).

39 Cf. for example the patriarch’s call to refrain from sending children to

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causeof the growing importanceof the church inGeorgia’s so-ciallifeinrecentyears,manyobserversclaimthattheeffectivemodernisationof the stateafter 2003hasbeenaccompaniedbya traditionalistbacklash in social lifeandpublicmorals.At thesame time, churchorganisations (suchas charities) remain themostimportantplatformofsocialactivityfortheGeorgianpublic.

The great authority enjoyedby the church is visible in the factthatduringthecountry’smajorpoliticalcrises(suchasthemassoppositionprotests in 2007and2009), thegovernment, theop-positionandamajorityofthepublicturnedtothePatriarchformediationandassistanceinresolvingthetensions.

Whilethechurchisnotdirectlyinvolvedinpolitics,ithassofartakenthesideofthestatus quo duringcrises,ineffectthesideofthegovernment.However,thechurchhaspreservedastrongandindependentpositiontowardstherulinggroup,andhasvocallyexpressed its discontentwhenever it sawfit. The church is theonlysocialinstitutionwhoseopinionthegovernmenthastotakeintoaccount,andwhosefavoursitactivelyneedstoseek–becausethesecannotbetakenforgranted,asdemonstratedbythePatri-arch’sappealforBidzinaIvanishvili’scitizenshiptoberestored.

Becauseof its traditionally close relationswith theRussianOr-thodoxChurch,criticsoftenconsidertheGeorgianchurch(oratleastaconsiderableproportionofitshighclergy)tohavelinkstoRussiaoreventorepresentRussianinterests.Atthesametime,however,thechurch,andIliaIIpersonally,haveclearlydistancedthemselves fromRussianpolicyandadoptedastanceon the is-sueofreintegratingSouthOssetiaandAbkhaziawhichisclosertothatoftheGeorgiangovernment40.

schoolsabroadbecause,being immature, theycouldbe influencedby thewrongrolemodels.Patriarch:‘RefrainfromSendingKidsAbroadforEdu-cation,03October10,http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22722(lastaccessed14.12.2011).

40 For example, the joint visit inAugust 2006 by the President and the Pa-

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ThefactthatIliaII’sstancetowardsGeorgia’sEuropeanandEuro-Atlanticaspirationsismoderatelyfavourable–despitehisandhischurch’sdistrustofWesterncultureandvalues–isavaluableas-setfortherulinggroup.Thereforethequestionofwhowillsuc-ceedIliaII(whoisnow79yearsold)asleaderofthechurchwillbeveryimportantforthecountry’sfuture.Ifananti-Westernandpro-Russian cleric becomes the next patriarch then, even if hedoesnotenjoyasmuchauthorityasIliaII,itwillbemoredifficultfortheGeorgianleadershiptocontinueitspro-Westerncourse.

b)The‘thirdsector’

UnderEduardShevardnadze,Georgiahadanextensiveandac-tive ‘thirdsector’whichplayedamajorrole in the ‘RoseRevo-lution’.WhenMikheilSaakashvilicametopower,non-govern-mentalorganisationsbecameahumanresourcepoolforthenewauthorities,andmanyprominentmembersoftherulinggroupenteredtheworldofpoliticsfromtheNGOsector.TheoutflowofqualifiedindividualsfromNGOstothestateadministration,and the decrease in funding available to them (many donorstransferredtheirfundstogovernmentalprogrammesaftertherevolution)haveconsiderablyweakenedtheeffectivenessoftheNGOsectorinGeorgia.AlthoughNGOsinGeorgiaarenumerousandenjoymuchbetterconditionsthaninanyotherneighbour-hoodpost-Sovietcountry,infacttheyoperateonamuchsmallerscale and aremarkedly less active than before the revolution.GiventheweaknessandfragmentationoftheGeorgianopposi-tion,theweaknessoftheNGOsectorposesanadditionalprob-lemforGeorgiandemocracy41.

triarch to thevillageofChkhalta in theKodoriGorge;untilAugust2008thiswasapartofAbkhaziacontrolledbyTbilisi,andtheseatoftheloyalistgovernmentoftheAutonomousRepublicofAbkhazia,analternativetotheseparatistauthoritiesinSukhumi.

41 AnextensivereportonthecurrentconditionofGeorgia’sNGOsectorcanbe found here: http://www.cipdd.org/files/40_631_536365_Civicus-Geor-giaACR-eng.pdf(lastaccessed14December2011).

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c)Informalgroups

It remainsanopenquestionhowmuchpowerand influence isinthehandsofinformalgroups,especiallytheoligarchswhomSaakashvili forced into emigration, leaders of the organisedcriminalunderground,andformerhigh-rankingstateofficials,including secret service officerswhom the governmenthas re-peatedly accused of trying to destabilise Georgia. Attempts bysuchgroupstoinfluencethesituationinGeorgiahavebeende-scribedby theGermannewspaperFrankfurter Rundschau inanarticle which quoted a confidential report from the Austriancriminalpolice.ThisdocumentshowsthatGeorgiancriminalor-ganisationsoperatinginWesternEuropeareco-operatingwithIgorGiorgadze,theformersecurityministerofGeorgia(1993-5)whonowlivesinMoscow,todestabilisetheinternalsituationinGeorgiawithaviewtotopplingthecurrentleadership.Georgiancriminalorganisationsallegedlysupportedtheoppositionstreetprotests in the spring and summer of 2009, and bribed high-rankingstateofficials42.

42 Andreas Förster, ‘Georgiens Mafia plante Umsturz’, Frankfurter Rundschau,22 June 2011, http://www.fr-online.de/politik/wiener-ermittler-georgiens-mafia-plante-umsturz,1472596,4481758.html(lastaccessed14December2011).

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iii. QuEstions about GEorGia’s futurE

Thenextparliamentaryelectionswillbeheld inGeorgia inOc-tober2012.Theballotwillbethefirstnationalelectionssincethewarwith Russia. Itwill offer the voters an opportunity to callthegovernmenttoaccountforthe2008conflictandforthefour-yearpost-warperiod.TheywillalsoendthestagnationwhichhasprevailedinGeorgia’spoliticalscenesincethewar,andwillstartaperiodofintensepoliticalstrugglethatwillonlyendwiththepresidential elections in 2013 andMikheil Saakashvili’s depar-turefromoffice.

1. New legal realities

Theelectionswilltakeplaceinanewlegalreality:underanewelectoralcode,andwiththeprospectofaconstitutionalamend-mentcoming into force thatwillalter therelationshipbetweenthedifferentbranchesofgovernment(itwillbecomeeffectivein2013, after Saakashvili leaves office and during the newparlia-mentaryterm).

Both legislative changes have been enacted as part of the ‘newwave of democratisation’ announced by the President after thewar, and are being presented by the government asmilestonesintheprocessofbringingGeorgiaclosertoWesterndemocraticstandards.

The new electoral code implements a number of recommenda-tionspresentedbyinternationalinstitutions,andmeetssomeofthedemandsvoicedbytheopposition.TheOSCEOfficeforDemo-cratic Institutions&HumanRightsandtheVeniceCommissionoftheCouncilofEurope,whichhaveexpressedopinionsonthedraft,havestatedthatitisconducivetodemocraticelections,andincludesmanypositiveelements.However,theyhavealsocriti-cisedGeorgia for failing toenact theanticipatedchanges to thedefinitionofsingle-mandateelectoraldistricts,whichaccountfor

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almosthalfoftheseatsintheparliament.Thegeographyofthosedistricts, whose size varies from several thousand to little lessthanonehundredthousandvoters insomecases,clearlyworksinfavourofthestillverypopularrulingparty,whichwonin71ofthe75single-mandatedistrictsinthe2008elections.

With the constitutional amendment of October 2010 (adoptedpartlyinresponsetocallsfromtheinternationalcommunitytolimit thepresident’spowersand strengthen theprerogativesoftheparliament43),Georgiawillmovefromapresidentialsystemof government towards a parliamentary-cabinet arrangement.When the reform comes into force, the president will remainthe head of state, but many of the presidential powers will betransferredtothegovernment,whichwillbecomethesupremeexecutive authority for both internal and foreign policy.Undertheamendedconstitution,thepresidentwillnolongerhavethepowertoarbitrarilydesignatecandidatesforprimeminister(thecandidatewillbedesignatedbythepartywinningtheelection),approvethenominationsofministers,dismiss thegovernment,appointthedefenceandinteriorministers,orsuspendandrepealthegovernment’sdecisions.Theprimeministerwillhaveexclu-siveinfluenceoverthenominationsofgovernorsandthepowerto countersign presidential nominations of army commandersand ambassadors, and presidential decrees. Overturning thepresident’s veto will require an absolute majority of votes, in-steadofthequalifiedthree-fifthsmajorityrequiredcurrently.Asanuance,theamendedconstitutionwillprovideforanunusuallycomplexandlongprocedureforavoteofnoconfidence,inwhichthepresident,ratherthantheparliament,willinfactplayakeyrole44.Thissuggests that theprojectedchangestothesystemof

43 Strengtheningtheparliament’spowerswasrecommendedintheEU-Geor-giaActionPlanadoptedin2006,amongothers.

44 Cf.FinalopiniononthedraftconstitutionallawonamendmentsandchangestotheconstitutionofGeorgia,adoptedbytheVeniceCommissionatits84thPlenary Session (Venice, 15-16 October 2010), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD%282010%29028-e.pdf(lastaccessed16December2011).

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governmentwillmainly shiftpowersbetween thedifferentex-ecutive authorities, while preserving the executive’s privilegedpositionregardingthelegislature.

2. The importance of the elections

Theupcomingparliamentary andpresidential electionswill beatestofthestabilityandmaturityoftheGeorgianstateandpo-litical system,whichwill probe the government’s commitmenttodemocratic ideals, the impartialityof state institutions,pub-licsupportforGeorgia’scurrentpoliticalcourse,theopposition’sreadinesstoparticipateindemocraticprocesses,andthepoliticalmaturityofthegeneralpublic.

BeforetheoligarchBidzinaIvanishvilimadehispoliticaldebut,the outcome of the parliamentary elections in October seemedtohavebeenalreadydecided;theoppositionwasweakanddis-persed, and lacked popularity despite the significant potentialforpublicdiscontent,whereastherulinggroupwasconsolidated,possessedsignificantresourcesandwasperceivedashavingnoalternative to it, despite thegrowing fatiguewith theSaakash-vilicamp.Theonlyunknownwaswhethertheleadershipwouldreallyoptfora‘qualitativebreakthrough’,intermsofabidingbydemocraticstandardsduringthecampaignandduringtheballot.ThechallengeIvanishvilihasposedhasradicallychangedthesit-uation;anewplayerhasappearedonthestagewithconsiderableassets, including impressive wealth, considerable social capitalbuiltupthroughhischarityactivities,andanextensivenetworkofcontactsinGeorgia,RussiaandtheWest–andwithwhomthecurrentleadershiphastoreckon.Thus,theoutcomeoftheelec-tionsisnolongeraforegoneconclusion.

If the political movement created by Ivanishvili takes part intheelections,itwill likelyposeaseriouschallengetothePresi-dent’sUnitedNationalMovement,withgoodchancesofsuccess-fullymobilisingandwinningoverthosesectionsoftheelectorate

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whichdonotsupportthegovernment.However,sincetherulinggroupstillenjoyswidepopularity,andIvanishviliclearlyhasnopolitical experienceorvision, the likelihood thathewilldefeatthepresidentialcampseemslow.Itseemsthatthemosttheop-position could achievewould be to deprive the ruling party ofits absolutemajority in theparliamentwhich, in the contextoftheconstitutionalamendments,wouldforceittoseekacoalitionpartner–thatis,tosharepower.

3. The future of the President

Saakashvili’sdecisionastowhatrolehewillassumeafterleavingofficein2013willbeofdecisiveimportanceforGeorgia’sfuture.Thesolutionsenvisagedintheconstitutionalamendment,andthefactthattheywillonlycomeintoforceaftertheendofhissecondterm,havebeenfuellingspeculations thathemaybe intendingtofollowVladimirPutin’sfootstepsandbecometheheadofgov-ernment,thuseffectivelymanipulatingtheprincipaldemocraticmechanisms.

The President himself has admitted that thiswas theoreticallypossible,buthasrefusedtodeclarehisintentionsclearly,claim-ingthatifheannouncedhiswithdrawalfrompoliticstwoyearsaheadoftheendofhisterm,thiswouldunderminehispositionandposeathreattotheplannedreforms45.Saakashvili’sage(hewillturn46in2013),hispopularity,andtheabsenceofanypoliti-cianwithenoughleadershipandcharismatoreplacehim,mightconvincehimtostayinpower.Somemembersoftheelitealsoar-gue thatmaintaining the currentpolitical course foras longaspossibleshouldbetheprioritywhiletheRussianthreatremainsimminent.

45 Cf.forexampleinterviewsforEuronewsandtheUkrainian1+1channel.http://www.euronews.net/2011/05/31/saakashvili-the-west-is-only-option/ (last ac-cessed16December2011)andhttp://tkachenko.ua/video/vypuski/?media_id=383432334(lastaccessed16December2011).

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However,suchastepwouldleaveGeorgiafacingaknotofprob-lems typical of authoritarian countries: the declining popularlegitimacy of the ruling group, international isolation, and en-trenchmentofthepathologiesofpower.Saakashvili’sdecisiontostayinpowerwouldalsothreatentoescalatetensionswithintheelitebecause,accordingtounconfirmedreports,anumberofkeymembersoftherulinggroupopposethisstep.

An alternative scenario could be for the President to cease ac-tiveinvolvementinpolitics,whilekeepingthepositionofamen-torandinformalarbiter.SincetherulingpartyislikelytoretainitsdominantpositionontheGeorgianpoliticalsceneafter2012,suchadecisionwouldopenthewaytoseniorstateofficesforothermembersof theelite.Forexample, thepopularmayorofTbilisiGigiUgulava(whoenjoysgoodrelationswiththechurch),orthecurrent parliament speaker David Bakaradze have been men-tionedaspotentialcandidatesforpresident.ThisscenariowouldalsostrengthenthepositionoftheinteriorministerIvaneMera-bishvili,whoisalreadycommonlyregardedasbeinginchargeoftheday-to-dayrunningofthestate.

A third possible scenario, which is currently being speculatedupon in Tbilisi, envisages the President assuming a prominentpublicpostotherthanthatofprimeminister,suchasthespeak-erofparliament,ortheheadofgovernmentintheAutonomousRepublicofAdjara.Intheshortterm,suchamovewouldenableSaakashvilitoretainconsiderableformalinfluenceonGeorgia’spolitics, and would probably cause less controversy than if hebecame primeminister. In the long term, however, thiswouldalmost inevitably leadto tensionswith the futureprimeminis-terandpresident,andineffecttopoliticalcrisesandevensplitswithintherulingcamp.Additionallythepresidentwouldsurelyface internationaland internalaccusationsofmanipulating thedemocraticmechanisms.

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4. Unconstitutional scenarios

ConsideringthecomplexityofGeorgia’sinternalandexternalsit-uation,unconstitutionalscenarioscannotberuledout.

MassprotestsarethestaplemethodofpoliticalstruggleinGeor-gia.Atthemomentthepublicappearstobetiredofthiskindofstreetpolitics,althoughintheeventofadeteriorationofeconomicconditionsortheappearanceofpost-electioncontroversies,anewwaveofprotestsisentirelyconceivable.Eventhoughthegovern-mentisexperiencedindealingwithmassprotests,suchcrisesareasaruleunpredictable,andpotentiallydangerousforthecoun-try’sstability.

A separate issue concerns the influence of Georgia’s northernneighbour on the country’s internal situation.Moscow has boththenecessary instrumentsanda longtrackrecordof interferingwithGeorgia’sinternalaffairs.Moreover,itisinRussia’sstrategicinteresttostrengthenitspositionintheSouthCaucasus(includingbysubordinatingGeorgia),becauseofitsneedtocontrolthetransitroutesforCaspianenergyresources,amongotherobjectives.

MoscowandTbilisihavehadnodiplomaticrelationssince2008,andformallyremaininastateofwar46.TheRussiangovernmentdoesnotrecognisethecurrentGeorgianleadershipasrepresent-ativeofthecountry,andbothofficiallyand,presumably,unoffi-ciallyhasbeensupportingitsopponents47.

TheGeorgianauthoritiesandthemediaassociatedwiththemhaveregularlywarnedaboutthepossibilityofaRussian-inspiredter-rorattackorcoup.Overthelasttwoyears,mysteriousexplosions

46 Russiaiscurrentlyoccupyingaround20%ofthecountry’sinternationallyrecognisedterritory(Abkhazia,SouthOssetia).Theonlyformaldocumentendingthe2008waristheMedvedev-Sarkozyceasefireagreement.

47 Cf.‘Путин готов говорить с ‘конструктивными силами’ в Грузии’,http://www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=20746(lastaccessed15December2011).

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havebeenreportedinvariouspartsofGeorgia,includinginthevicinityoftheUSembassyinTbilisi.Thesecuritystructureshavealsorepeatedlyreportedfoiledattemptsatbombattacksoractsofsabotage48. InMay2009,amutinytookplaceat thetankbat-talionstationedintheMukhrovanibasenearTbilisiwhilemassoppositionprotestswerebeingheldinTbilisi,whichtheauthori-tiesdescribedas anattemptedcoup.According to theGeorgiangovernment,allthoseincidentswereorganisedbyRussiansecretservices, operating primarily from the territories of AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia49.

WhileRussian interference inGeorgia’s internal affairs is likely,andmayincludesupportfortheoppositionaswellasactsofsabo-tage,itshouldalsobenotedthattheGeorgianleadershiphasbeenexploitingtheRussianmenaceinordertomobilisepublicsupportanddiscredit theopposition.ATVprogrammeairedbyImedi inMarch2010,whichdepictedanewRussianinvasion,theestablish-mentofapro-RussiangovernmentandthedeathofSaakashviliinabroadcaststylisedaslivecoverage,mayserveasanexamplehere.Airedwithnowarningsthatitwasafictionalprogramme,thepro-grammegaverisetopanicinGeorgia,andledtoharshcriticismofthegovernmentbothdomesticallyandabroad.

5. Social and economic problems

The condition of the economy will affect how the situation inGeorgia,includingthepoliticalsituation,develops.Georgia’sgood

48 Cf. for example http://police.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=2304, http://po-lice.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=3101(lastaccessed20.02.2012).

49 Tbilisi’s version is corroborated by a series of articles in theWashington TimesofJuly2011,accordingtowhichthequestionoftheexplosioninthevicinityoftheUSembassywastwiceraisedduringmeetingsbetweentheUSsecretaryofstateUSAHillaryClintonandtheRussian foreignminis-terSergeiLavrovinthecourseof2011.Cf.EliLake,‘ClintonraisedissueofaRussianlinktobombinginGeorgia’,Washington Post,28July2011;http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/clinton-raised-issue-of-a-russian-link-to-bombing-/?page=all(lastaccessed16December2011).

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macroeconomicperformanceafter 2003has scarcely translatedintobetterstandardsoflivingforthepeople.Foryears,massun-employmenthasremainedthemostimportantproblemforGeor-giansociety50(theofficialunemploymentrateis16.3%,butunoffi-ciallyitismuchhigher).Nosignificantprogresshasbeenreportedinthefightagainstpoverty,whichaffects27.8%ofthepeopleinGeorgiaaccordingtoEUfigures51.Shouldtheeconomicsituationdeteriorate, standardsof livingwoulddominate thecomingpo-liticalseasonandcouldbringpeopleintothestreets.

These problems expose the limitations of the liberal economicmodelwhichuntil nowhadbeen implemented as economic or-thodoxy, and require corrections to it. The foreign investmentswhich theauthoritieshopedwouldbringdynamicdevelopmenttoGeorgiaareoftendestinedfortherealestateandthefinancialsectors(15%and16%respectivelyofGeorgia’sFDIin2010)anddonotgeneratemanyjobs,or,inthecaseofinvestmentsintransportand communication (35%), consist of large, one-off infrastruc-tural projects financed with funds coming from internationalaid,amongothersources.ThepresenceoftheVirginIslands,theUnitedArabEmiratesandCyprusamongthetop-teninvestorsinGeorgiasuggeststhataconsiderableproportionofFDIconsistsinspeculativecapital,orGeorgiancapitalreinvestedinGeorgiaviataxhavens.

After2003Georgiastoppedpursuinganysectoraleconomicpoli-cies,exacerbatingthebreakdownoftheagriculturalsector,whichhadbeenindeclinesince1991.Currently,agriculturenominallyaccountsfortheemploymentofover50%ofthoseactiveinthela-bourmarket,yetgeneratesonlyslightlyover8%ofGDP52.Georgia

50 Cf.GeorgianNationalStudy,26April–4May2011.51 2009figures.Source:‘ImplementationoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPol-

icy in2009:ProgressReportGeorgia’,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_518_en.pdf

52 Cf.http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=428&lang=eng

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importsanestimated80–90%of its food.Tocompare, inSoviettimesagricultureprovided25%ofalljobsandgenerated32%oftherepublic’snationalincome53.

AnotherproblemconcernsGeorgia’sdependenceoninternationalassistance.Afterthe‘RoseRevolution’,alargestreamofloansandgrantsstartedflowingintoGeorgiafrominternationalaidorgan-isations: the InternationalMonetaryFund, theWorldBank, theEuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,etc.,aswellastheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanCommission.AccordingtoWorldBankestimates,between2004and2009GeorgiareceivedaroundUS$3.137billionofODA(OfficialDevelopmentAssistance).Thosefigurescertainlydonotincludeallcategoriesofaid(suchasmilitaryaid),andexcludeamajorpartof thepost-warassis-tancepackageworthUS$4.5billion.TheinfluxofforeignaidhascontributedconsiderablytoGeorgia’srapidtransformation,butatthesametimehasmadeTbilisideeplydependentonapermanentstream of external financing. Official figures demonstrate thatin2010over20%ofbudgetspendingwascoveredbyaidfunding–grants, lowinterest loans,etc54.Accordingtounconfirmedin-formation,Georgiawillreceiveanotherlargepaymentofinterna-tionalaidin2012as‘recompense’forwithdrawingitsobjectionsto Russia’s accession to theWTO. Nevertheless, aid to Georgiawillprobablystartshrinkinginthecomingyears,posingamajorchallengebecauseofGeorgia’slackofeconomicself-sufficiency.

53 GlennE.Curtis,ed.Georgia: A Country Study.Washington:GPOfortheLi-brary ofCongress, 1994. http://countrystudies.us/georgia/43.htm (last ac-cessed20January2012).

54 Cf.GeorgianEconomyOverview,April2011.

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iv. futurE challEnGEs

1. Challenges for Georgia

Sincethe‘RoseRevolution’,Georgiahasbeenamostspectacularpoliticalexperiment,whichhasinspiredenthusiasmintheWestforyearsandhasbeenadmiredbythepro-WesternelementsofsocietiesintheotherCIScountries.

Yet despite the unquestionable achievements of PresidentSaakashvili’steam,thewarwithRussiahasexposedthesystemicweaknessesandlimitationsoftheGeorgianmodel,aswellastheneedforthoroughreformswhicharenecessarynotonlytokeepmodernising the country, but also to maintain what has beenachievedso far.Preserving the status quo, inpoliticsand in theeconomy,willnotonlymake it impossible toeliminate thesys-tem’sinherentfaults,butwillalsoleadtoariseinauthoritarianpracticesandsocialandeconomicproblems.

Changesarealsonecessaryinviewoftheinternationalsituation,whichisunfavourableforTbilisi.Becauseoftheseriouseconomicproblems in the euro zone and theUnited States, the changingbalancesofpowerbothgloballyandwithinEurope,aswellasthedynamism,depthanduncertainoutcomesoftheupheavalsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica, interest inGeorgiawillprobablywaneoverthecomingyears,especiallyifthereformsanticipatedbytheWestdonotmaterialise,andmostcertainlyifdemocraticstandardsdeteriorate.

In this situation, Georgia’s most important and most difficultchallengeistotrulydemocratisethecountry,whichwillrequirethedepoliticisationofthestateapparatus,thedevelopmentoffreemedia,anindependentjudiciary,transparencyinpubliclifeandtheruleoflaw;ensuringthelattermaywellprovetobethemostdifficult task.The followingstatementbyPresidentSaakashviliisnoteworthy,ashehasadmitted,“We’vebecomeamodernstate

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basedlessoninstitutionsandmoreonpersonalities;nowweshouldmakeamodernsocietybasedonruleoflawandinstitutions”55.IfGeorgiaistocontinuedeveloping,itwillneedtoabandonthe‘rev-olutionary’model of statemanagement based on improvisationandarbitrarydecisionsbyanarrowcircle.Itwillhavetobuildupinstitutionsanddevelopproceduresthatcanoperatesmoothlyir-respectiveofthepersonalitiesinpower,andbeyondtheeventualchangeofleadershipthroughelections.

Continued developmentwill also require a clear answer to thequestionaboutGeorgia’sidentityandaspirations.DuringGeorgeW.Bush’spresidency,Georgia clearly tended to followand imi-tateAmericanmodelsinsuchdomainsastheorganisationofthestate, economy and culture.After thewarwithRussia and thechange in US administration, when Tbilisi’s relationswith theUnitedstatescooledoff,integrationwiththeEUbecamethepre-eminentaim.However,seekingrapprochementwiththeEUhadlongbeenmoreofanexpressionofTbilisi’sgeneralaspirationstobepartof theWest in thecivilisationalandcultural sense,andlessofarealcommitmenttoadoptthespecificpoliticalandeco-nomicmodel.Georgia’sliberally-mindedpoliticaleliteshavebeenobjectingtotheprospectofhavingtoimplementthecomplicatedEUregulations.ThefollowingstatementbyPresidentSaakashviliillustratesthispointwell:

ItisdifficulttoworkwiththeEuropeans.Thisisahugebureau-cracy, and they donot alwaysunderstand.Wehave eliminated90%ofallthosesanitaryandfireprotectioninspectors,thephy-tosanitaryservices,etc.and90%ofall the licencesandpermitsthatexistedbefore.Oursystemisverysimple.ButwhenyoutalkwiththeEuropeans,theyalwaysaskifwehaveanofficialdealingwiththegivenissue,likeinEurope.Andwedonothavethem,towhichtheEUpeopleimmediatelysaythatwewillhavetocreate

55 Saakashvilionhisrolemodel,CivilGeorgia,31December2008,http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20221(lastaccessed17December2011).

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suchoffices.Andthenwereplythatwhenwehadallthoseoffi-cials,theyextortedmoneyandsuckedpeople’sblood,andwedonotmissthem56.

Yet despite Georgians’ scepticism and long-held reluctance toadoptEUregulations,Georgiaundertookanumberofreformsin2011whichledtotheofficialinaugurationinJanuary2012ofnego-tiationsconcerningtheestablishmentofaDeepandComprehen-siveFreeTradeArea(DCFTA)betweenGeorgiaandtheEU.TheDCFTAisthekeyelementofafutureAssociationAgreement(AA).Itprovidesfortheabolitionoftariffsandquotasinmutualtradeofgoodsandservices,aswellastheeliminationofnon-tariffbar-riers,andwillenableGeorgiatointegratewiththeEUmarket.

Eventhoughthenegotiationswillprobablytakeseveralyearstobeconcluded,theveryfactthattheyhavebeenopenedisasuc-cess. The launch of negotiations had long hung in the balance,bothbecausetheEUhadsetverystrictpreconditions(concerningsanitaryandphytosanitarystandards,competitionpolicy, tech-nicalbarriers to trade, intellectualpropertyprotection, and la-bourlaw57),andbecauseofreluctanceonTbilisi’spart.

Commentingonthestartofthenegotiations,PresidentSaakashvilisaidthattheyear2011hadbeenaturningpointinTbilisi’srelationswithBrussels,andthatithadbroughtGeorgiaclosertomember-ship in theEU.Allowing for thePresident’s typical tendency to-wardshyperbole,itseemsthatGeorgia’sattitudetowardstheAs-sociationAgreementnegotiations indeedunderwent real changeduring2011,andthecountryisnowmorecommittedtotheprocessandmorewilling to implement European regulations. However,

56 http://tkachenko.ua/video/vypuski/?media_id=383432338(lastaccessed13Octo-ber2011).

57 Cf.‘AnAppraisaloftheEU’sTradePolicytowardsitsEasternNeighbours:The Case of Georgia’, Brussels 2011 http://www.ceps.eu/book/appraisal-eu%E2%80%99s-trade-policy-towards-its-eastern-neighbours-case-geor-gia(lastaccessed13October2011).

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thischangewascertainlymotivatedmainlybythedisappointmentwiththedowngradeofUS/Georgiarelationsafter2008.

2. Challenges for the West

Georgia’s pro-Western transformation after the ‘Rose Revolu-tion’hasbeenoneoftheWest’sgreatest internationalsuccessesofthelastdecade.Theroadfromafailedstatetoafullyfunctionalstate,whichGeorgiatraversedinjustafewyears,notonlydem-onstrates thebenefitsof theWesternpoliticalandcivilisationaloffer,butalso,moreimportantly,provesthatWesternstandardscantakerootalsobeyondCentralandEasternEurope,whichwashistoricallyboundmorecloselytotheWest.

BysupportingthetransformationinGeorgia,theWesthasdem-onstrateditsabilitytoinfluencepoliticalrealitiesinareaswhereit has vital interests. Post-revolutionaryGeorgia is inmany re-spectsasymboloftheWest’sambition,determinationandcapa-bilityintheinternationalarena.

ShouldtheGeorgianprojectstagnate,orworse,becomederailedasaresultofrisingauthoritariantendencies,aneconomicbreak-downoranewwar,thiswouldbeapainfuldefeatfortheWest,andwould expose its inability to influence developments in itsclose neighbourhood and to retain its ‘holdings’. This, in turn,couldunderminetheachievementsofmanyyearsofWesternin-volvementnotonlyinGeorgia,butthroughouttheCIS.

Areal ‘qualitativebreakthrough’inthefunctioningofGeorgiandemocracy,whichwouldcomewithfreeandfair,pluralisticpar-liamentary and presidential elections, and a possible change ofgovernmentbyelectoralmeans,wouldbeanunquestionablesuc-cess for theWest, since fair elections remaina rareandexcep-tionaloccurrenceintheformerSovietarea.

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It therefore appears that, despite the immensity of other chal-lengesandtheapparent‘Georgiafatigue’,theWestshouldbevi-tallyinterestedinthecontinuationofthecountry’spro-Westerntransformation.Inordertosucceed,however,itneedstopresentanattractiveoffertoTbilisibyprovidingpolitical,economicandexpertsupport, inordertodemonstratethatGeorgia’s future islinkedwiththatoftheWest,whileatthesametimestrictlyabid-ingbytheprincipleofconditionality,underwhichanyassistanceshoulddependonthegenuineprogressofinternalreforms.

marEk matusiakText completed April 2012