Problemy Polityki Społecznej 44(1) · kwartalnik #44 (1)/2019 warszawa 2019 uniwersytet warszawski...

KWARTALNIK

#44 (1)/2019

WARSZAWA 2019

UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKIWYDZIAŁ NAUK POLITYCZNYCH

I STUDIÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCHPATRONAT: KOMITET NAUK O PRACY I POLITYCE SPOŁECZNEJ

POLSKIEJ AKADEMII NAUK

Publikacja finansowana przez Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów MiędzynarodowychUniwersytetu Warszawskiego

RADA PROGRAMOWAAntoni Rajkiewicz (honorowy przewodniczący) (PL),

Zenon Wiśniewski (przewodniczący) (PL), Julian Auleytner (PL), Lutz Bellmann (D),Stanisława Golinowska (PL), Tomasz Inglot (US), Józef Orczyk (PL),

Jeja-Pekka Roos (FI), Piotr Pysz (D)

ZESPÓŁ REDAKCYJNYBarbara Szatur-Jaworska (redaktor naczelna),Maria Theiss (zastępca redaktor naczelnej),

Anna Kurowska (zastępca redaktor naczelnej),Justyna Łukaszewska-Bezulska (sekretarz redakcji),

Piotr Błędowski, Juliusz Gardawski, Ryszard Szarfenberg

Redakcja tekstów w języku polskim i redakcja technicznaEwa Rydlewska

Redakcja tekstów w języku angielskimHelena Marzec

Korektazespół redakcyjny

Redaktor statystycznyAnna Kurowska

Redaktorzy tematyczniteoria polityki społecznej — Ryszard Szarfenberg, metodologia polityki społecznej — Maria Theiss,

problemy pracy — Juliusz Gardawski, lokalna polityka społeczna — Piotr Błędowski,zabezpieczenie społeczne — Gertruda Uścińska, polityka ludnościowa — Cezary Żołędowski,

polityka rodzinna — Anna Kurowska

Copyright byWNPiSM UW

ISSN 1640-1808

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019

Adres redakcji:Nowy Świat 67, pok. 110

00-927 WarszawaTel./fax 0-22 826-66-52

[email protected]

Nakład 130 egz.Wersją referencyjną czasopisma jest wersja papierowa.

Realizacja wydawnicza:Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA ul. Infl ancka 15/198, 00-189 Warszawatel. 22 635 03 01, 22 635 17 85e-mail: [email protected], www.elipsa.pl

Contents

Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

STUDIESWłodzimierz Anioł, Quality of life and public space in the processes of urban

renewal—selected concepts and debate topics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Andrzej Niesporek, Toward postmodern social work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Tomasz Jedynak, The shape of the pension scheme in Poland in the light of the

conventional multi-pillar typologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Ryszard Necel, Marcin Wiśniewski, Prospects for implementation of social impact

bonds in Poland—an example of an intervention on the labour market . . . . . . . . . . 67

FROM RESEARCH WORKSHOPS Marek Bednarski, Social determinants of the shadow economy in the small and

micro-sized enterprise sector from the local perspective. Conclusions of empirical research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Joanna Rutecka-Góra, Supplementary pension schemes: needs, possibilities and problems with evaluation from the perspective of an individual saver. . . . . . . . . . . . 101

FORUM: EVALUATION METHODS IN PENSION POLICYDebate I—Adequacy of the pension system (non-reviewed material in Polish) . . . . . . 119

Editorial

The forty-fourth volume of our quarterly contains six reviewed original scientific articles and a record of the debate that took place during the scientific seminar at the University of Warsaw. The main themes of this volume of Problems in Social Policy are: spatial determinants of the quality of life and social relations, social work, labour market issues and pension policy.

The Studies section opens with an article by Włodzimierz Anioł, entitled Quality of life and public space in the processes of urban renewal—selected concepts and debate topics. The author shows the relationship between the aspiration to improve the quality of life and social relations and projects aimed at the renewal of urban spaces. He discusses selected concepts of urban modernization, analysing their social impact. As a national empirical illustration of a research problem, he discusses a case of urban and social transformations taking place in the last two decades in the Warsaw district of Powiśle. The article discusses the benefits of these, but also the undesirable gentrification processes.

The next article in the volume is entitled Toward postmodern social work. It is devoted to the challenges facing social work in the context of a changing welfare state. Andrzej Niesporek discusses the socio-economic conditions of shaping social work as a component of modernity and its hidden control functions. He analyses the changes in social work in the era of disorganized capitalism and poses a question about its future and links with postmodernity.

Next, we publish Tomasz Jedynak’s study, entitled The shape of the pension scheme in Poland in the light of the conventional multi-pillar typologies. The author puts forward a thesis that as a result of a number of modifications to the universal pension scheme in Poland, the traditional three-pillar way of presenting it does not accurately reflect its essence. He therefore proposes an original concept of describing the structure of the universal pension scheme in Poland.

The Studies section closes with an article by Ryszard Necel and Marcin Wiśniewski, entitled Prospects for implementation of social impact bonds in Poland—an example of an intervention on the labour market. It discusses this social policy instrument in the context of the social investment paradigm. It is an economic, human resources (institutional) and legal instrument. The authors provide its general characteristics, and then analyse the opportunities for the development of social bonds in Poland, taking into account the conditions of the labour market and capital market. They also present a proposal to apply the model of social bonds in professional activation services in our country.

Editorial8

The section From research workshops contains two articles, the authors of which discuss the results of their own research on the labour market and pension policy.

Marek Bednarski’s article is entitled Social determinants of the shadow economy in the small and micro-sized enterprise sector from a local perspective. Conclusi ons from empirical studies. It contains the characteristics of economic and social conditions of the grey area in the Polish economy, with particular emphasis on the social roots of this phenomenon. The author indicates that the shadow economy generates specific social problems, whole also solving some of them.

In her a rticle Supplementary pension schemes: needs, possibilities and problems with evaluation from the perspective of an individual saver, Joanna Rutecka-Góra tackles the informative aspects of pension policy. She analyses the scope of information (quantitative and qualitative) on pension products that is necessary to assess their performance by clients and compares it with the data currently published on the supplementary pension market and the information provided to clients by financial institutions. On this basis, the author points to possible further changes in information policy and limitations resulting from the nature of the products offered and the level of complexity of supplementary pension schemes.

In the Forum section we present the record of the first of the three debates, which were held on 23 March 2018 during a nationwide seminar entitled Evaluati on methods in pension policy. It was organised by the Department of Social Policy Theory and Methodology at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies of the University of Warsaw. The discussion published in this volume concerns the issue of adequacy of the pension system. It was attended by invited speakers representing three academic centers, a moderator representing hosts and conference guests gathered in the conference room. Janina Petelczyc prepared the transcript of the deb ate from the substantive side.

STUDIES

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019.1129

Włodzimierz Anioł

Institute of Social Policy, Faculty of Political Scienceand International Studies, University of Warsaw1

Quality of life and public space in the processes of urban renewal—selected concepts and debate topics

SummaryThe aim of the article is to show the relationship between the aspirations to improve the quality of life and improve social relations and the undertakings serving the renovation of urban spaces. In the first part of the text—after formulating more general remarks about the social significance of space—a few of the concepts of town modernization implemented in the modern history of the developed world (Cerdá, Haussmann, Le Corbusier) are presented, while pointing out their most often ambivalent social results. Attention to the latter has been paid by, among others, critics of modernism and supporters of alternative visions (Jacobs, representatives of the new urbanism, advocates of the ideas of a socially cohesive or fair-shared city, etc.). As the national empirical illustration, the author then characterizes the case of urban and social changes taking place in the last two decades in the Powiśle district of Warsaw. Their effect, regardless of the general benefits of modernization and the desired and long-awaited approximation of the capital to the river, are also controversial, often critically evaluated gentrification processes.

Key words: public space, quality of life, urban policy and renewal, gentrification

1 Instytut Polityki Społecznej, Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych UW, ul. Nowy Świat 67, 00-927 Warszawa; author’s email address: [email protected], ORCID — 0000-0003-0929-292X.

Włodzimierz Anioł12

*

If the space in which people live, work and spend their free time is neglected or inadequately managed, it often generates or exacerbates many significant problems which fall into the domain of social policy. Such problems are not limited to issues related to housing and everyday transport opportunities and include also matters concerning society’s health, distribution and availability of facilities providing social services, and conditions for conducting economic and cultural activities, as well as the impact of the surroundings on personal safety, bringing up children and functioning of families, wider groups and communities. Simply put, chaos and spatial disarray considerably reduce the quality of life and significantly increase its cost. This interdependence is noticeable in the case of ecological damages (e.g. air pollution whose level is dangerous to people’s health) which result from errors made at the stage of planning the settlement network or even from lack of such planning, in unnecessary expenses incurred due to depreciation of infrastructure which has been built at an unnecessarily large scale, or in adverse side effects of imperfect renewal projects implemented in many cities across the world, which are sometimes collectively referred to as gentrification.

Considered from a more general point of view, space, as is well known, constitutes one of the key determinants and reference points for human life, with time being her only equal in this category. Thus, the shape of space affects human thinking and behaviour. For example, a change of the current natural environment can inspire and generate new ideas, and make it easier to create associations between different facts which can be sometimes very distant from one another. There are landscapes that overwhelm and incapacitate people, and landscapes which provide a boost of energy and can function as important stimuli triggering positive emotions or encouraging deeper reflection. Open space often broadens mental horizons and sharpens reflection, whereas enclosed space can have the opposite effect: it seems to induce claustrophobic reactions and moods, and not only in purely psychological and medical sense.

Social significance of spaceDeliberately organised and arranged physical space reflects social relations, but also

shapes them, encouraging people to take certain actions and often provoking specific behaviours. This fact has been known at least since the times of King Arthur when this legendary leader of the Celtic Britons introduced the world to his famous round table—a space designed to eliminate hierarchical differences between the knights, guarantee equal treatment, and enforce equality and partner-like relations between individuals. In more modern and prosaic terms, the presence of benches in contemporary urban spaces shows how seemingly trivial things can affect our everyday lives. Their role is not purely decorative and goes beyond serving as a short-term practical solution for random passers-by who want to rest for a while or use it as site of their leisure activities. The benches serve also a wider social purpose, because they can, for example,

Quality of life and public space in the processes of urban renewal—selected concepts… 13

be a condition determining the mobility or lack thereof of a certain category of residents. If there are no benches in the immediate vicinity, the elderly or sick people who live in a given place may not be able to leave the house. The very design of the bench, its location and lighting can also foster or hinder interpersonal interactions.

Architecture and urban planning are the most important direct tools and methods of creating space. It is worth remembering that the role of architecture does not boil down to forming structures closed by four or more walls. An architectural work is meant to have an impact—to give rise to a new life within a given building, and to affect its surroundings to function in a different way; for example, the area can acquire value which was previously absent and gain certain prestige.2 Each and every existing urban layout or architectural design constitutes a specific image of the world, just like scenography in the theatre; it is an interpretation. The defined shape of the urban space either reflects the current state of society and the condition of the state like a mirror, or constitutes a conscious projection of social reality, i.e. is a deliberate attempt to outline a vision of the future and express the expected or desired state of affairs.

The conviction that architecture and urban planning can positively (or negatively) shape people and their lives, and at the same time our entire world, is not an uncommon one (Montgomery, 2016). Although they are seemingly prosaic objects, buildings are believed to be one of the important means of improving both people and society. In any case, the present and future quality of life of citizens is to be to a large extent dependent on the shape of their surroundings and public space. It is not by accident that attention is drawn to the existence of numerous interdependencies and analogies between relations of politics and spatial order and politics and social order, or in other words, between the physical (material) and social (symbolic) dimension of the public sphere (Anioł, 2016, 2017, 2018).

Anyway, if we were to speak about urban space with greater specificity, then buildings, communication routes, green areas, fences or billboards say a lot not only about their creators and investors, but also about their users or recipients. They testify to the intentions and ambitions of their designers, display aspirations, capabilities and possible agency of city authorities, developers and other decision-making entities, but also express more or less conscious preferences of the local residents. Urban space is an expression of the binding regulations, market mechanisms, interests of various groups, existing social structure and its dominant divisions, and the strength of interpersonal bonds, etc.

Diversity within this scope can be illustrated by taking a closer look at, for example, two different models of ancient city centres. The Greek ideal of polis envisaged the agora as a central place which was accessible to all citizens—the focus point of the entire public sphere of that era. It was the site of gatherings, court hearings, political debates, and, with time, also of trade activities. Administrative buildings and temples were also located in the vicinity of this square. On the other hand, Roman cities and settlements were planned

2 This phenomena can be illustrated with the case of the Centre Georges Pompidou which was completed in 1977 in what was then a much neglected district of Paris, or the famous Guggenheim Museum from 1997, which ennobled and completely changed the Spanish city of Bilbao.


in a different way. They were modelled upon the layout of a military camp (castrum romanum), in the middle of which two roads—cardo (north-south axis) and decumanus maximus (east-west axis, with the line of the road following the sun)—intersected perpendicularly. Let us note, by the way, that the main streets of many European cities are nowadays still mirroring the lines which have been set forth in antiquity. The intersection of these two roads was the place where the Roman Forum was usually located, with the most important public buildings, such as temples, basilicas, baths and amphitheatres, also constructed nearby. Compared with the Athenian agora, the Roman Forum was more orderly-shaped and constituted a space which was a stronger symbol of power of the empire, especially the emperor, and the strength of the entire empire in general.3

Leaving ancient states aside, it is also worth noting that the architectural assumptions of the designs of university campuses are also very deliberate. The European model from its very conception assumed that all of the architecture and urban planning, including buildings, would focus around the main courtyard, where paths of lecturers and students of different faculties would intersect with each other.4 This peculiar academic microcosm was supposed to facilitate contacts and foster conversations and discussions, in much the same way as it happened in medieval monastery schools which had been built on a plan of a square with a garth in the centre. The tradition of stimulating communication and social relations (here with the intention of stimulating an invigorating, interdisciplinary exchange of ideas, also in the following pattern: professor/teacher—student/pupil) with the help of appropriate organization of physical space is therefore very old. It is respected by the overwhelming majority of contemporary planners who agree that common spaces must be designed in such a way as to maximise their role in generating social interactions.

Cerdá, Haussmann, Le Corbusier—pioneers of the modern urban renewal Taking broadly-understood public interest into proper consideration in the design,

arrangement and management of urban space has become an important challenge, especially in recent years. A Spaniard, Ildefonso Cerdá (1815–1876), is considered to be the precursor of modern visions of urban development. This father of urban planning and architectural theoretician was also an engineer, a politician and the person who in the mid-nineteenth century created an innovative design of one of the districts of Barcelona (Eixample). The spatial arrangement consisted in a regular network of wide streets with squares, contrasted with green courtyards isolated from the noise of the city and located in the middle of urban quarters—all in order to provide residents with the best living conditions, hygiene standards, more comfortable relations with neighbours and most convenient layout of transport connections.

3 To read more about the way in which various powers and authorities have used architecture (from ancient emperors to modern dictators) and about buildings as emanations of power and strength in a historical perspective, see Sudjic 2015.

4 The American version of the campus looks a bit different—more like an elegant, friendly park with pavilions which are not coincidentally scattered around it in a more or less thought-out way.


At more or less the same time, France’s capital city became the stage of a modernization project of a much larger scale, but also of more debatable consequences. Operating under the political patronage of Louis Bonaparte, Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1809–1891), then the prefect of the Seine Department, managed to change Paris completely in the first two decades of the second half of the nineteenth century. In a city which until that point had been dominated by chaotic and unimpressive medieval buildings, Haussmann decided to build 140 km of new streets, including wide arteries with boulevards which traversed the city radially, new roundabouts, squares and public buildings, and foremost—the magnificent opera house. He rebuilt the bridges, doubled the number of street lamps and trees, and installed the water and sewage system which was exemplary for that time. In order to build thousands of modern, seven-storey tenement houses, Haussmann ordered demolition of nearly 30,000 existing buildings and hovels, which meant displacement of 350,000 people from lower social classes, i.e. about one-fifth of the inhabitants of Paris.

Therefore, this modernization had its prize—one which was not fully financial, although the original estimated costs of the work were exceeded several times over. Victor Hugo and Charles Baudelaire were among those who protested against the destruction of the old districts of the city, while Haussmann himself finalised his mission among the growing mountain of accusations and was finally forced to leave his post in disgrace. The ambivalent effects of this reconstruction project, and its very Janus-facedness, are emphasised to this day. Its aim was to make the city more modern, worldly, clean and transparent, but the plan assumed that the working class would be pushed out of the centre to the peripheries of the city. As was pointed out in some interpretations—this last goal was also to be reinforced by the political intention to limit the “spatial potential” for grassroots and plebeian social rebellions against the authorities that represented foremost the interests of the elite. One should note, however, that the radical widening of the streets did not prevent building of the barricades during the popular uprising of the Paris Commune in 1871.

A contemporary researcher from Cambridge University, Andy Merrifield, refers to this very historic model of transformation of the Parisian urban fabric, when he labels those of the recent metropolis modernisation projects that privilege the wealthy and bring injury and marginalisation to the poorer groups as examples of “neo-Haussmannization”. These are undertakings that lead to appropriation of public resources by the richest, big business and market entities, for example through the mass sale of urban lands or privatisation of municipal companies. Fencing, commercialisation and privatisation of cities in contemporary world of neoliberal post-industrial capitalism remind Merrifield of the process of gating or appropriation of communal rural lands which took place two hundred years ago, at the early stage of industrial capitalism (Merrifield, 2016).

In the 1920s and 1930s, modernism proposed a certain revolution in designing urban spaces and conceptualising architecture and urban planning in general. It constituted a radical break with traditional models dominating in these areas. As believers in the cult of utopian modernity, the creators and promoters of modernism formulated and promoted a number of noble slogans and postulates which concerned also the process of


shaping, as they put it, “a new space for a new man”. The famous Swiss-French painter, sculptor, architect and urbanist, Le Corbusier, who lived in 1887–1965 (and whose real name was Charles Édouard Jeanneret), is commonly recognised as the founding father of this new way of thinking.

The Athens Charter of 1933—the manifesto of modernism whose development was initiated by Le Corbusier—listed the following three elements as the basic principles of modern architecture: sun, space, and vegetation. The Charter includes statements on the necessity of creating space that will serve people and improve their living conditions; one in which they will be really happy—it was seen as a necessity after a long period of neglecting the housing situation and condemning the vast majority of population to lives spent in shabby homes (in rural huts or in urban shanty towns). These declarations echo some quite clearly leftist-egalitarian beliefs: the city is supposed to be better for everyone, apartments should be cheap, which could be achieved in practice through development of housing co-operatives and public housing, making it easier to obtain land from local governments, offering advantageous state loans, etc.

Le Corbusier argued that glass walls of houses should let sunlight into every corner of flats. Letting light and fresh air into rooms, and ensuring that they have south-facing windows, especially in the case of living rooms, was also justified by health objectives. Good quantity of sunlight and proper ventilation were considered to be remedies for various diseases, including tuberculosis which was still incurable in the interwar period.

Scandinavian modernism, including its leading representative, a Finnish architect, Alvar Aalto (1898–1976), placed the greatest emphasis on maintaining connection with nature and constructing buildings among greenery. Aalto was, for example, the author of the design of the famous sanatorium in Paimio (1933), which was clearly inspired by the principle of “healthy body in a healthy home”, which Aalto both professed and promoted. The artist tightly integrated his buildings with their natural surroundings and used the most natural materials, such as wood or stone, both on the inside and the outside. Thus, Scandinavian architects gave modernism a more human, warm, delicate and nature-loving face.

All modernists believed in certain common ideals: minimalism, moderation, and functionalist simplicity of solutions—rejection of unnecessary forms, decorations and ornaments. Geometric shapes, flat roofs, and façades deprived of ornamentation were the preferred elements of this architectural style. The “less is more” rule was especially strongly promoted by another guru of modernists, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886–1969), who after leaving Germany in 1937 continued his work in the USA, trying to combine the reductionistic logic of Bauhaus with American technology.

The modernist idea of revolution through urbanism, i.e. the concept of reforming social relations through the reconstruction of the material world, also gained good traction in the USA. After all, this motif was noticeable in the States as early as in the nineteenth century in the flourishing development of a literary genre known as the American utopian novel. Similar thoughts could be detected in an even more complete and clear version


in the intellectual life of the United States in the first decades of the twentieth century, especially within the so-called Progressive Movement, which was founded i.a. by Thorstein Veblen, an economist and sociologist, John Dewey, a philosopher, and Charles Beard, a historian, first at the University of Chicago and then at the New School for Social Research in New York which they all co-founded. With some pompousness, Beard wrote the following in 1934: “The next America would be a collectivist democracy—a workers’ republic—one vast park of fields, forests, mountains, lakes, rivers, roads, decentralised communities, farms, ranches, and irrigated deserts (…) a beautiful country—homes beautiful; communities and farms beautiful, stores and workshops beautiful” (quoted in Graham, 2016, pp. 163–164).

Thus, American Progressives shared with the modernists and their visionary leader, Le Corbusier, the same idea of building a new order—both social and spatial—by means of determining the shape of human settlements. In both cases, the desire was for a radical, even revolutionary change of the existing status, for a break with the past and going through the social life with a plough. Both doctrines had in common the belief that the postulated higher quality of life of residents and citizens should be based on both improved aesthetic qualities of the surroundings and greater functionality of the proposed solutions.

Modernism became a very important driver in the development of active urban policy, including multi-faceted and comprehensive renewal projects. Corbusier-like assumptions were also reflected in initiatives carried out in many cities across the world. The top-down and quite brutal interventions in the urban space became a universal tendency, independent of the ideological underpinnings and affiliations of particular members of municipal authorities. Active municipal public policy became the domain of not only left-wing local government officials and activists, but also right-wing activists, politicians and officials. This can be illustrated by the fact that during re-evaluations conducted in the aftermath of the Great Depression, even the Republican Mayor of New York, Fiorello La Guardia (who held this post in 1934–45), decided that it was worth it to, for example, conduct a public takeover and unification of all subway lines of the city.

In the immediate post-war period, a great modernist renewal programme was undertaken in New York by Robert Moses, a well-known builder of the city. He wanted to demolish entire quarters of narrow streets, located in Manhattan and other areas (some of which were first planned by the Dutch), in order to create new multi-lane flyovers, high-rise office buildings, parks and municipal housing estates (Zipp, 2010). This plan was consistent with the urban planning philosophy and the dominant tendencies of the post-war modernism which considered segregation—avoidance of combining or mixing different functions of the city—to be one of its central principles. Le Corbusier clearly distinguished between four distinct urban “functional zones”: business (industrial, office), commercial, residential, and recreational. He favoured separating the zones from each other, just as he advocated for rigorous separation of road traffic (motor vehicles) from pedestrian traffic, in order to achieve greater functionality and convenience.


Criticism of modernist visions, New Urbanism and other alternative concepts

It turned out that, in practice, the actual effects of the projects undertaken under the banner of the modernist-style renewal of American cities have often gone wide off the mark when it came to achieving their stated goals. Demolitions significantly reduced housing stock and raised prices of those flats that remained standing, incidentally, in violation of the housing act of 1949, while the highways running through the cities cut off residents of particular districts from others. The too wide streets spelt death to the urban life. Gigantic and impersonal housing estates were often neglected by the authorities and quickly declined, becoming sites marked by high level of crime and unemployment, transforming into infamous symbols of racial segregation. These problems were further exacerbated by a large-scale outflow of more well-off residents to the suburbs, that is, beyond the municipal boundaries, which had a negative impact on the cities’ tax revenues and consequently the scope and quality of public services (education, health care, road, sanitation and energy infrastructure etc.). The 1972 decision to demolish Pruitt-Igoe, public high-rise buildings located in Saint Louis, Missouri, which had been built only 17 years earlier, became an iconic proof that this and similar urban renewal programmes were at least partially a failure. Perhaps it was a good thing that the project proposed by Le Corbusier was not finally realised, considering it was based on the idea of demolishing a large fragment of the centre of Paris to set up a complex of 40-storey blocks of flats.

In 1958, Jane Jacobs wrote an article titled “Downtown is for People” which constituted a full-frontal attack on the post-war modernisation investment projects conducted in the US metropolises, including those proposed by Moses in New York. Later, Jacobs expanded her arguments in the famous book of 1961 Death and Life of America’s Great Cities (Jacobs, 1993), which has since then been repeatedly reprinted all around the world, and which was first published in Poland only in 2014. Jacobs claimed that traffic jams, noise and other adverse social consequences of the afore-mentioned investment projects overshadowed their public benefits. Strongly criticising Le Corbusier’s modernist visions, she argued that the cities created in accordance with the modernist ideals would be, in her words, “stable, symmetrical and orderly. They will be clean, impressive and monumental. They will have all the attributes of a well-kept, dignified cemetery (…) These projects will not revitalize the downtown, they will deaden it” (Jacobs, 2012, pp. 115–116).

Jacobs herself postulated creation of compact settlements with a more human, intimate scale and diverse functions. She believed that they should arise in an organic and spontaneous way, and should not be the result of top-down planning and some sort of gigantomania. She advocated for intertwining and mixing functions of urban life, instead of separating them from each other, which meant that shops, flats, recreation areas and workplaces were to be directly adjacent to each other. She argued that the segregation of residents’ lives into “unconnected atoms” disintegrates the city.

Streets and sidewalks were, according to her, the “most important organs” and binding elements of the city. The streets are primarily the site where city residents come in contact


with shopkeepers, newsagents or other clients in a bakery; everyday life is carried out at a small scale at street level, shaping a sense of trust and security, and giving rise to awareness of having “public identity (…) and public respect”. Therefore, planners should, above all, support “lively and interesting streets”, which should remain the domain of pedestrians, not cars. They are a source of diversity and an opportunity for frequent meetings between people, even strangers.

In the 1960s, critical opinions about modernist urbanism became more common. Its critics claimed that modernism deprives cities of human proportions, destroys their tissue, concentrates too much on buildings, and negates the historical identity of places, as it ignores classical relations and systems developed over centuries in the urban space: streets, squares, and districts. As it turned out and was increasingly often emphasised in public discussions, modern cities age much faster than traditional cities, while the latter adapt much easier to new challenges and changing needs of their residents.

The criticism of modernism in relation to architecture and urban planning became even more radical in 1980s and 1990s, when the entire philosophy was negated globally during the rise of post-modernist tendencies. The end of the 20th century coincided in the United States with the dawn of a new ideological movement and trend in urban planning called New Urbanism. Within the framework of this ideology, many people began to advocate restoring cities to human scale, recommending in essence a return to traditional methods of urban organisation, including more clear definition of boundaries between public and private space (Katz, 1994). The public sphere gained primacy in this doctrine—it was decided that the private sector’s interests and market processes should never override it. The emphasis was placed on the reconstruction of common spaces and social bonds in communities of neighbours (see Świątkowska, 2014). Other widely-popularised theories turned out to have a lot in common with this way of thinking—e.g. the compact city theory, or concepts of a socially cohesive city, fair-shared city, and a smart city (the last one being the newest notion).

Jan Gehl, a famous Danish architect and urban planner, has long been developing and promoting the idea of improving urban space in such a way as to make it more citizen-friendly (Gehl, 2014). In his opinion, urban space should be planned from the perspective of a pedestrian and a cyclist, not a driver or a tenant of a skyscraper, because life necessarily takes place, or even thrives, in spaces between buildings. The vision of a walkable city restores the primacy of walking people and requires overcoming the dominance of vehicular traffic, especially in city centres. Adoption of this vision as an objective leads to such practical actions as: narrowing streets in city centres, introducing bans on entry and parking in specific zones, making walking routes wider, hiding thoroughfares, which painfully divide city quarters or separate them from such elements of the city as a river, in underground tunnels (see, for example, the section of the Warsaw’s thoroughfare, Wisłostrada, which was hidden inside a tunnel in Powiśle district, which will be discussed in greater detail below). It includes also special paths for cyclists, rollers and runners, which in the US are called pleasureways or greenways.


A separate, but at the same time complementary course of action is the emphasis on environmental and landscape protection, introducing “green implants” (biotopes) into the urban space or organisms, not only on streets or squares, but also on roofs and façades of houses. Any environment which is friendly and full of greenery makes people feel more secure, happier, and healthier, and helps them stay active longer. Such a green environment encourages greater mobility—leaving one’s home, engaging in physical movement and establishing relationships with other people. Psychological research shows that people are less stressed in places filled with trees and shrubs.

The above-indicated tendencies are accompanied by the second, i.e. the latest, phase or version of urban renewals (the first was the one associated with the modernist projects) which can be recently observed all over the world, especially in the West, including the USA. The dilapidated centres of large agglomerations, including degraded and impoverished post-industrial districts, are starting to arouse the interest of private investors, municipal authorities and, above all, those who dictate the demand, that is, the members of the middle and upper classes. The latter were previously “led astray”, although not by force, but by its own choice, displacing themselves more or less willingly to distant suburbs as part of processes of suburbanisation and the so-called urban sprawl. Meanwhile, the city centre has recently become an attractive living place for medium and highly qualified specialists, in particular, members of the so-called creative class, i.e. specialists associated with creative industries (term coined by Richard Florida—see Florida, 2008). Members of this class show interest in living in trendy post-industrial lofts, in the close vicinity of respectable and well-visited cultural institutions, valuable monuments, snobbish meeting places, good restaurants, etc.

However, the above-described trend and last-generation renewal projects also have their social costs, which are usually referred to collectively as gentrification. This term refers to a process in which wealthier and dynamic new residents—at first, they are usually freelancers and younger people—begin to flock into a renovated district and start forcing out the poorer, and generally older residents who have lived there longer.5 The older residents who have strong roots in the place start feeling increasingly uncomfortable, even foreign, in the area and are compelled to move out due to economic factors—primarily due to spikes in rents and prices of goods in shops.

This or a very similar pattern of changes, or a sequence of events, repeats itself in all regions which are undergoing gentrification. At the very beginning, we start with a neglected, degraded, under-invested, often post-industrial area (sometimes the area in question was previously closed to the public—used by the military or a railway company), but with great potential and attractive location, e.g. in the very centre of the city or very close to city centres.

This is the stage upon which first outposts of gentrificators arrive. Like paratroopers or commandos, they land on the new, virgin territory, explore it, and begin to gradually

5 To read more about gentrification in Polish literature, see Grzeszczak, 2010; Jakóbczyk-Grysz-kiewicz, 2012.


take it over. By “colonizing” this area step by step, they force out traditional practices and forms of relations. Such pioneers include, for example, aspiring artists who want to rent cheap, but large apartments, because they need them for their studios. Students may form another group of such new arrivals, as their numbers are growing in many larger cities due to the general academic boom, which in consequence leads to the so-called “studentification”. As a result, the area gains first fashionable small bars, alternative pubs, hip café-clubs, and cult meeting places used for recreation or entertainment purposes.

At the next stage, the space becomes more and more prestigious. Reacting to this new situation, private business invests in real estate and land. The market valorises the area. Due to the pressure exerted by the rising prices and the needs of new residents, cheap stores which served the area’s original residents, craft services and bookshops which cannot withstand the rental competition, begin to gradually disappear. In this changing environment, the original residents of the area begin to feel increasingly alienated. Alienated “locals” begin to gradually give way to “urban nomads”, also known as “people of the flows”.

Finally, a much more expensive material infrastructure appears in the area: luxury apartments and office buildings for the “new urban gentry”, shops representing inter-national chains, branches of banks, chain drug stores, delicatessens and pharmacies, and ultimately also cafés, galleries and restaurants addressed to wealthier tourists. The invasion of the latter and the related transformations which take place in the urban public space are sometimes referred to as “touristification”. The final results of the outlined sequence of events are even higher rents which employees of corporations, lawyers or doctors can afford, whereas poorer service providers, consumers, as well as oldest tenants do not and are eventually forced out of the area. The pioneers of the whole process—young members of the creative class and people who work in culture and art and do not earn a lot of money, and students—move out at that point, if they did not manage to buy their apartments in the meantime.

The example of processes which have been changing the image of Warsaw’s Powiśle district in the last two decades will be used here to illustrate the changes in urban planning and social relations which are currently on-going within the framework of the urban renewal projects.

Opening Warsaw to the river and gentrification processes in PowiśleWarsaw’s return to the Vistula river or, in other word, the city’s turn towards its river

(because it is not ultimately clear whether Warsaw and its river have ever been very closely and intimately connected) is one of the most fundamental and spectacular changes, or even revolutionary upheavals, which have taken place in the public space of Warsaw after 2000. Bringing the Vistula back to the Varsovians, i.e. fulfilling the dream of many, e.g. the pre-war president of Warsaw, Stefan Starzyński, has not only been the flagship policy programme of the capital city’s local government authorities and city movements in the last dozen or so years, but also something which the citizens themselves have quite


unequivocally supported. The Vistula River has recently become another informal district of the city with its own special plenipotentiary in the city hall. On the other hand, Powiśle itself, especially the area of the riverside boulevards, has been gradually transforming into an alternative or complementary “lower-level” representative “salon” of Warsaw, which functions in opposition or as a supplement to the “upper-level” salon, located on the escarpment, on the revitalised Krakowskie Przedmieście street.

In the first half of the 20th century, as in previous centuries, Powiśle was still one of the poorest and most forgotten parts of the city—a place full of crime, robberies, whore houses and rubbish dumps.6 After the war, this district, which was as destroyed as other parts of the city and rebuilt in individual spots (in places such as Mariensztat, with great success), remained outside the main interest of the city authorities. Throughout the entire period of the Polish People’s Republic, built-up areas were chaotic, lacking a coherent spatial development plan, and especially any underlying notion of using this district to bind the city more closely with the river.

The first investment which brought the city—and especially Powiśle—significantly closer to the river was the new building of the University of Warsaw Library (BUW) located at Dobra Street, which was opened to the public in 1999. It looks like a monumental temple of books and knowledge and is probably the most outstanding architectural work erected in Warsaw in the 1990s. It was designed by Marek Budzyński, a critical modernist whose artistic inspirations were drawn foremost from Scandinavia, where he spent many years of his life.7 At the first glance, the most striking element of the library building is its rather harsh finish made of polished concrete and green-patinated copper sheets. The building complements the landscape and surroundings of Powiśle, is environmentally friendly and demonstratively pro-ecological, which is additionally emphasised by plants which grow on the library’s façades and the one-hectare garden, with its multiple alleys and benches, located on the building’s roof. Thus, the building of the library seems to supplement, recreate and compensate for the space which has been appropriated from local residents by this investment, and, at the same time, symbolically illustrates the symbiotic connection between nature, culture and humans.

A roofed street hidden inside the building acts as a large lobby and functions at the same time as a quasi-extension of the city. In a sense, it connects the university community with Warsaw residents and tourists. The fact that a certain academic-urban community has thus been formed may be evidenced by the existence of a phenomenon known as

6 In the late nineteenth century, Bolesław Prus wrote a novel titled Lalka [Doll] whose main character, a romantic businessman, Stanisław Wokulski, at one point strolled through the miser-able streets of Powiśle, pondering over ideas and dreams which at that point seemed very utopian: “Warsaw, with all of its enormity, gravitates and slides down towards the Vistula. If the banks were fortified with boulevards, the most beautiful part of the city would be created there: buildings, shops, avenues…”. Perhaps we are living in the times when Wokulski’s visionary dreams and hopes are starting to come true.

7 Scandinavian inspirations are also visible in Budzyński’s other projects—both older ones, such as the Ursynów Północny neighbourhood created in the 1970s, and newer ones, e.g. the Podlasie Opera and Philharmonic—European Centre for the Arts in Białystok which was built in 2012.


“buwing” (which refers to the abbreviated name of the library—BUW), which means visiting, hanging out and spending time in the library for social purposes, especially when it is done by people other than students, researchers or academics. The book collection can be reached by walking from the inner “street” onto a monumental staircase flanked on both sides by colonnades adorned with figures of four great Polish philosophers. Natural light access the building and reaches not only the main reading room, but also many nooks and crannies of the entire three-storey-construction, emphasising its functionality.

The new library was deliberately located in Powiśle by Jan Rutkiewicz, an urban planner and the first mayor of Śródmieście (Warsaw’s central borough which includes Powiśle district), who, after the revival of local government in 1990, offered a city-owned plot of land in Powiśle to the university. Rutkiewicz was also the author of the vision of a new bridge which was to be located near the library—the Świętokrzyski bridge. It was imagined as a low-support, local crossing, cut off from the adjacent busy thoroughfare, Wisłostrada, which runs alongside the river and is hidden inside an almost one-kilometre-long tunnel. Exclusion of the transit function of the bridge, as well as the fact that creation of the tunnel meant that a new plot of city-owned land was created above it, affected the development of this part of Powiśle. New investments were implemented within the area, the quality of life of local residents improved (through e.g. reduction of noise and emissions) and, in more general terms, the city “returned” to the river. It is worth noting that this idea was often criticised and derided during its planning and implementation stage. Many asked why the tunnel should run parallel to the river, not under it. It was also argued that one more bridge could be built for the amount of money that was to be spent on the tunnel (PLN 220 million). However, as it turned out, when the tunnel was opened for use in 2003, it physically reconnected Powiśle with the riverbank, from which it had been practically cut off previously by intense car traffic on Wisłostrada.

The first harbingers of public and recreational activity appeared on the riverbank, at the back of the University of Warsaw Library, immediately after the construction of the tunnel. Containers housing the first club located directly on the riverbank appeared in the summer on the so-called “snow platform” (a platform on which snow used to be dumped from containers)—Cud nad Wisłą [Miracle at the Vistula]. This massively crowded place quickly found its followers—more bars, clubs and concert venues began to appear; some of which were organised on barges moored on the river. It can be said that during the holiday season, the focus of Warsaw social life, especially in the eyes of young people, has begun to move to the river.

The fact that the tunnel made it easier for Warsaw residents and tourists to reach the Vistula was also an important factor for the success of the Copernicus Science Centre, irrespective of the value of its original exhibition and offer. Opened in 2010, it is actually the first large facility in the capital city which is located literally on the bank of the river. The curve created by the two wings of the building envelops a planetarium whose broken, rusty structure resembles an erratic boulder. Its immediate surroundings contain more smaller, natural boulders. It is worth noting the symbiosis between the architecture and the natural environment—it is a marriage of culture and nature. Just as in the case of


BUW, there is a garden on the roof of the Copernicus Centre from which one can observe the river from above. While the older of the gardens is more picturesque, idyllic, and “romantic” in tone, its younger counterpart is more severe and rough, displaying more adequately the brutality of nature. Its surface is riddled with “craters”—glass patios of the lower storeys of the Centre which are filled with wild vegetation or water and let daylight into the building in a very practical way.

The Discovery Park was created around the Centre as an open site hosting experimental sound devices and other exhibits, as well as summer open-air cinema. At the beginning of 2017, the Centre gained a new neighbour—a pavilion of the temporary seat of the Museum of Modern Art, referred to as the Museum on the Vistula.8 In the summer months, the popular breakfast market is organised in front of the museum, which allows people to not only buy vegetables, fruit, dairy products and preserves directly from their producers, but also listen to live music, and take part in workshops and theatre meetings.

The city and the river were brought together even more closely, even directly, by the new Vistula boulevards whose successive sections have been gradually opening to the public since 2015. Their first herald was the Multimedia Fountain Park which was created in Podzamcze area. Since 2011, the fountain park has been staging original shows in which the main roles are played by water (which is sprayed or used in the form of streams coming out of 367 nozzles) and light emitted by lasers and multicolour LED reflectors. Glass pavilions with numerous functions were built on the new boulevards, and similar floating facilities were moored at the quay. A small amphitheatre was established near the Copernicus Centre, and sculptures (fish made of concrete) were placed on the boulevards; there is also a water park and space for children. The area surrounding the Mermaid statue has also undergone a thorough renovation.

Luxury apartment buildings were constructed behind the Copernicus Science Centre, in the second line of buildings (Nowe Powiśle housing estate). The renewal of the old Powiśle power plant is still on-going. It is being done in accordance with the design of architects from the APA Wojciechowski studio commissioned by White Star. Once they are renovated and adapted to the new functions, the over-100-year-old halls (which were stripped down to the skeleton during the construction works, which caused serious worries among the fans of the city’s history) will become the home of shops, restaurants and cafés. Three office buildings, a luxury apartment building, and a hotel created in an old converted building, will be constructed near the power plant. The space between these buildings will be filled with public squares, small streets and glass covered passages. All of these elements are to form together a multifunctional complex of EC Powiśle.

Additionally, it is worth emphasising that the distance between the left-bank Warsaw and the right-bank Warsaw significantly decreased in the area of Powiśle. Five free ferries make it easier for non-motorised people to get across the river, increasing the access, to e.g. the revitalized beaches of Praga: Rusałka, Poniatówka and Saska. The investment

8 This pavilion, which the Museum of Modern Art received free-of-charge for the period of three years from one of the Viennese foundations, was previously the temporary seat of the Berlin Kunsthalle gallery.


plans include also a footbridge from Mariensztat to Praga (on the axis of Karowa and Okrzei Streets), intended for both pedestrians and cyclists. The state-of-the-art National Stadium, built for Euro 2012 on the right bank of the Vistula, clearly shifted the city’s centre of gravity to the east.

All the above-mentioned new investments, both public and private, radically changed Powiśle. The processes which have been taking place in the last two decades in this area seem to be a good illustration of the Janus-faced nature of modernising urban and social changes taking place in many contemporary cities of the developed world, as well as at the wider scale which concerns the entire society.

On the one hand, the renewal of the district positively impacted the whole area, raising its attractiveness and value. In particular, it became much more multi-functional and accessible (especially in the immediate vicinity of the river) for both Varsovians and tourists. On the other hand, such positive changes were accompanied by a process of “capitalising” on the growing fashion for Powiśle and the model-like gentrification of the district, which, as it has been noted earlier, meant increases of prices and rents in trendy locations, emergence of closed neighbourhoods, multiplication of more expensive restaurants and luxury boutiques, and, at the same time, removal of cheaper service companies from such areas and alienating poorer social groups, including the original residents of the district.

Many inexpensive service providers, including places conducting cultural activities, disappeared in the face of the rent surge, falling under the competitive pressure created by purely commercially-oriented tenants. For example, price competition proved too tough for the four clubs whose history began in the first decade of the new century—Jadłodajnia Filozoficzna, Czarny Lew, Diuna and Aurora—which were all located in one of the courtyards at Dobra Street, and because of the street’s name, which in Polish means “good”, were collectively called Zagłębie Dobra [Basin of Good]. The courtyard used to be a site of intimate musical concerts, which in the summer months often lasted until dawn, and various cultural and poetic events, such as one-poem contests. At the end of 2015, the local housing cooperative terminated the lease agreement of a cult bookshop Tarabuk which had to close because it was unable to meet the rocketing price expectations of the cooperative. Shortly thereafter, at the beginning of 2016, the legendary and first in Warsaw café bookshop Czuły Barbarzyńca disappeared from the corner of Dobra and Zajęcza streets for the same reasons after 14 years of operations. The bookshop was widely known for many initiatives and socio-cultural events, such as Sunday family book-oriented meetings. It was a significant event signifying the growing trend towards marketization and, in a sense, a symbolic one, because the lease agreement was in this case terminated by the owner of the tenement house who was infamous for buying reprivatisation claims for various Warsaw real properties.

Thus, Powiśle became an illustration of a more universal dilemma and challenge which can be expressed in the following question: how can a given district become modern, fashionable, and open to new social groups, including the creative middle class, and still remain a relatively cheap, egalitarian space, available to everyone, including less


affluent residents, service providers and consumers? How can valuable relationships and traditional social networks be maintained in the course of modernisation and revitalisation changes? How can we avoid breaking these precious ties unnecessarily?9 Is trying to achieve such a state an attempt to square a circle?

ConclusionsFinally, putting the case of Powiśle aside, it is possible to formulate at least three

general conclusions and postulates in response to the challenges posed by gentrification processes in the revitalised parts of large agglomerations.

First of all, it should be acknowledged that spatial order and a specific “culture of space” remain one of the most important features of the desired and expected quality of life in cities, as well as in other, non-urban areas of residence. Public spaces have a particularly important role to play in this context, as their scale and shape determine whether the city can be considered to be, to put it shortly, a “friendly” one for its residents. Counteracting spatial chaos, reinforcing the importance of spatial development planning and fostering its more frequent use are objectives which are constantly repeated in speeches, postulates and recommendations formulated in recent years by international organizations (e.g. UN, European Union), governments or politicians seeking public offices, which was noticeable even during the recent local election campaign which was conducted in Poland before the October 2018 local government elections.

Secondly, when it comes to development processes, it is not worth leaving everything to the free market. We should actively influence the changes taking place in the urban space, consciously shaping the way it functions. When managing modernisation projects, the municipal authorities should reduce the negative effects of gentrification, and mitigate the strong pressure of the market and the private, especially speculative capital. The authorities can use for this purpose such municipal policy instruments as, for example, protecting city-owned flats and supporting social housing development in the districts which are subject to renewal processes. A deliberate rent policy can also help prevent the creation of social ghettos, both the enclaves of poverty and underdevelopment, and the oases of wealth and modernity, and foster development of various urban functions. For example, in Kreuzberg, a district of Berlin, when someone wants to open a new café, the city council sets the rental price on the basis of assessment of the situation and checks, among other things, how many similar places are operating already on a given street, how much coffee is to cost in this new place, and how the planned prices compare to the average earnings in the district, etc.

Thirdly, it is very important to involve residents and civic urban movements in the agglomeration renewal processes. Local government authorities should support the

9 For example, an elderly, ailing resident of a renovated tenement house can be moved from a revitalised district to a nicer and more comfortable flat in another part of the city, but what if a neighbour who supports her on a daily basis moves to a completely different place and the old lady has to be therefore provided with some form of external, institutional social care?


involvement of local communities in changes, as part of the empowerment formula, through creation of multi-sectoral public-social partnerships, if necessary, also with participation of private-market entities.10 Tenant associations or environmental protection organizations also have independent roles to play. As significant pressure groups critical of city authorities, they can exert pressure on their decisions and promote various alternative solutions.

Intellectual foundations for the development of the so-called new urban movements were laid down by Henri Lefebvre, a leftist philosopher and French sociologist, in his famous essay entitled Le droit à la ville, which was published for the first time in 1967 in 6th issue of “L’Homme et la société”11. In this essay, Lefebvre presented revolutionary proposals of the analytical science of the city, combining urban planning with the general theory of urban space-time continuum. He proposed to establish a reformed, grassroots urban policy, based on the achievements of science and art, and seeking new, pro-citizen solutions in relation to, on the one hand, inefficiency of many functions of traditional public policy, and, on the other hand, with increasing expansion of market forces, such as large corporations, financiers, bankers or developers, in urban spaces.

When it comes to more recent times, Lefebvre’s ideas are referenced and reinterpreted in a probably even more radical way by David Harvey in his 2012 book entitled Rebel Cities. From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (Harvey, 2012).12 Its author presents the city and its inhabitants as a new space of social rebellion (previously, the same function was played by factories and workers’ associations) and writes about the transformation of the concept of the right to the city into an urban revolution.13

ReferencesAnioł, W. (2016). Kształtowanie przestrzeni miejskiej jako mikrokosmos polityki publicz-

nej. Przypadek Warszawy. Studia z Polityki Publicznej, no. 2 (10).Anioł, W. (2017). Między starym i nowym. O sposobach modernizowania przestrzeni

publicznych. Studia z Polityki Publicznej, no. 2 (14).Anioł, W. (2018). Metamorfozy domeny publicznej i ich janusowe oblicze społeczne. Stu-

dia z Polityki Publicznej, no. 1 (17).

10 In Poland, real opportunities to get citizens involved in urban renewal processes, e.g. by consulting relevant programmes, are created the Act on Revitalization of 9 October 2015 (entered into force in January 2016).

11 Polish translation of this text: Lefebvre, 2012. To read a more in-depth discussion of this thinker’s ideas, see Butler, 2012.

12 The well-known and widely quoted earlier publications of this author include book titled Social Justice and the City (Oxford 1973) and a pamphlet A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Polish edition: Warsaw 2008).

13 To find out more on the political role of cities and reclaiming of urban space by movements that contest the neoliberal model of capitalism, see also works written by the following Polish authors: Urbański, 2005; Nawratek, 2008.


Butler, Ch. (2012). Henri Lefebvre: Spatial Politics, Everyday Life, and the Right to the City. New York–London: Routledge.

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Harvey, D. (2012). Bunt miast. Prawo do miasta i miejska rewolucja. Warszawa: Fundacja Bęc Zmiana.

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Jakóbczyk-Gryszkiewicz, J. (ed.) (2012). Procesy gentryfikacji w mieście. Vol. I. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

Katz, P. (ed.) (1994). The New Urbanism: Toward an Architecture of Community. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lefebvre, H. (2012). Prawo do miasta. Praktyka Teoretyczna, no. 5.Merrifield, A. (2016). Nowa kwestia miejska. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.Montgomery, Ch. (2016). Miasto szczęśliwe. Jak zmienić nasze życie, zmieniając nasze mia-

sta. Kraków: Wysoki Zamek.Nawratek, K. (2008). Miasto jako idea polityczna. Kraków: Korporacja Ha!art.Sudjic, D. (2015). Kompleks gmachu. Architektura władzy. Warszawa: Fundacja Centrum

Architektury.Świątkowska, B. (ed.) (2014). My i oni. Przestrzenie wspólne/projektowanie dla wspólnoty.

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York. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Jakość życia i przestrzeń publiczna w procesach miejskiej odnowy — wybrane koncepcje i wątki debaty

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest pokazanie związków między dążeniami do podniesienia jakości życia i poprawy stosunków społecznych a przedsięwzięciami służącymi odnowie przestrzeni miejskich. W pierwszej części tekstu—po sformułowaniu ogólniejszych uwag na temat społecznego znaczenia przestrzeni—wskazano kilka realizowanych w najnowszej historii rozwiniętego świata koncepcji unowocześniania miast (Cerdà, Haussmann, Le Corbusier), akcentując ich najczęściej ambiwalentne skutki społeczne. Na te ostatnie zwracają uwagę m.in. krytycy modernizmu i zwolennicy wizji wobec niego alternatywnych (Jacobs, przedstawiciele tzw. nowego urbanizmu, promotorzy idei miasta spójnego społecznie, „sprawiedliwie dzielonego” itp.). Tytułem krajowej ilustracji empirycznej, autor scharakteryzował następnie przypadek przemian urbanistycznych i społecznych, jakie zachodzą w ostatnich dwóch dekadach w warszawskiej dzielnicy Powiśle. Ich efektem, niezależnie od generalnych korzyści modernizacyjnych oraz pożądanego i długo oczekiwanego zbliżenia stolicy do rzeki, są także kontrowersyjne, często krytycznie oceniane procesy gentryfikacyjne.

Słowa kluczowe: przestrzeń publiczna, jakość życia, polityka miejska, rewitalizacja, gentryfikacja

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019.3145

Andrzej Niesporek

Institute of Sociology, University of Silesia in Katowice1

Toward postmodern social work

SummaryThis scientific article is based on the analysis of socio-economic conditions of the formation of social work as a constituent element of modernity and its hidden controlling functions. Publication shows social work changes in the epoch of disorganized capitalism, and raises a question of the future of social work and its relations with postmodernity.

Key words: social work, capitalism, modernity, postmodern, Foucault

Modernity and its dimensionsSince the Enlightenment, modernity is perhaps the most common subject for reflection

in social sciences (Delanty, 1999). The idea of modernity is deeply rooted in the German social philosophy and sociology from the turn of the 19th and 20th century, including among others the thoughts of Georg W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx and Max Weber, as well as Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel. Modernity is contrasted with tradition. Most importantly, modernity signifies the rejection of mythological and magical thinking, and also the decreasing role of religion. Striving for secularisation and rationalisation of all areas of human life is the essence of modernity. It is a process called by Max Weber the

1 Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach, Instytut Socjologii, ul. Bankowa 11, 40-007 Katowice; author’s email address: [email protected], ORCID — 000-0001-7514-8163.

32 Andrzej Niesporek

“disenchantment of the world” (Weber, 1989). It is marked by the growing dominance of scientific understanding, which becomes instrumentalised under the increasing influence of the technological requirements. The cognitive rationality finds its continuation in social, legal and aesthetic rationality. The principles characteristic for modernist mentality have universalistic nature, and their emergence is related to the belief in civilisational progress. Social life is subjected to a change, bonds with community are replaced with associations bonds, which are based on state organisation together with a network of institutions. Because of the increasing complexity of social relationships, an effective administration becomes essential, which leads to a bureaucratisation of social life (Niesporek, 2007, p. 20). These processes include also an emerging and increasingly professionalised social work.

Modernity and capitalismWith all the complexity and ambiguity of modernity as a conceptual category, it

is ultimately related to the concept of capitalism (Jameson, 2002; Prendergast, 2003). Peter Wagner proposed four possible ways of conceptualising the relationship between capitalism and modernity. First, defining capitalism as a dominant or primary aspect of modern society. This thought is present in the classical Marxist tradition expressed in the dependence of the “social formation” (of modern society) on the “mode of production” (capitalism). Second, treating capitalism, or strictly speaking market economy, as a development function of modern society. Modernity creates conditions for development of freedom, which fosters the development of market economy. Third, the development of capitalism and modernity can be analysed as intertwined to an extent that is impossible to untangle. This approach is characteristic for the classics of the Frankfurt School, who emphasised the totalising dimension of social life. Fourth, capitalism and modernity are perceived as co-existing and can be analytically distinguished. At the same time, capitalism is more or less understood as related to economic phenomena, and modernity as related to political and cultural phenomena (Wagner, 2001). Equating capitalism with modernity is more typical for those thinkers who are positively biased towards capitalism. Its critic, regarding capitalism as the most important factor shaping modernity, define the latter in broader terms, assuming that modernity can exist, and even achieve its highest level of maturity, only in its post-capitalist stage (Arnason, 2001, pp. 100–101).

An important feature of capitalism is not only the differentiation of economic relations, but also their reification by commodification, i.e. meaning that these relations no longer serve the purpose of creating a usable value or satisfying needs. The effect of monetary economy, which is typical for modern capitalist society and linked to the processes of commodification, is the process of reification of society. Therefore, commodification and mechanisms of monetary economy constitute the actual grounds for the manifestation of society and culture as objective wholes (Simmel, 1997; Niesporek, 2007, chapter 2). In modern capitalist society, market functions as an “impersonal order”, regulated by its own rules. Social world is no longer perceived as completely dependent on interactions

33Toward postmodern social work

between people and controlled by people. The autonomization of economic activities, and furthermore a separation of other social subsystems (politics, law, science, art), entails not only a diversification of social activities, but also a disintegration of the normative system, which finds support in a religiously- and metaphysically-based substantial reason and which is the foundation of traditional society (Habermas, 1987).

Organised capitalism and welfare stateCapitalism has been subjected to significant changes. Crucial for its contemporary form

was the constitution of a capitalism subjected to state regulation, i.e. so called “organised capitalism”.2 Its beginnings are rooted in the 1870s, whereas a spectacular growth of this form of capitalism could be observed from the 1930s and 1940s. The essence of “organised capitalism” is most often characterised by referring to a few of its crucial features. First, the ability of the state to ensure a social contract between capital and labour, and, therefore, to maintain the stability of capitalist production relationships within the state. It is enabled by a change in the state’s policy and the way the state bureaucracy functions, and which is no longer occupied in “maintaining order”, but becomes focused on solving problems and addressing the interests of various social groups. On the other hand, it is possible thanks to the emergence of national organisational structures of trade unions and employers’ organisations, and professional organisations of other kind. Second, the state’s interventionism and regulatory function in the area of economic activity. This includes, among others, undertaking key economic initiatives, absorption of surplus labour, income redistribution and satisfying needs by public expenditure, etc. Third, the state’s control function in international economic exchange, also by participating in international economic institutions. Fourth, the concentration and centralisation of industrial, banking and trade capital. The concertation of capitalist economic relationships on several key economic sectors in the area of a part of major countries, and the development of large industrial cities on their territories. The development of industry employing a relatively large number of employees and the dominating role of economy of scale and Taylor’s organisation of production (Lash, Urry, 1993, pp. 3–4; Castells, 1993, pp. 21–24; Harvey, 1990, pp. 175–176; Niesporek, 2007, p. 100).

The embodiment of the age of organised capitalism is the welfare state, which emerged in the post-war Western Europe. Notwithstanding the complex history, its variations and theoretical justifications for its existence, the welfare state became an answer to the strengthening of capitalism and the force of market. At the time of the increasing power and importance of the working class, it fulfilled particular socio-political functions, and also led to the decommodification of a part of socio-occupational activity of individuals (Esping-Andersen, 2010). The state became a complement to family, neighbourhood and local communities in coping with the social consequences of crises generated by capitalism.

2 The notion of “organised capitalism” was first proposed by R. Hilferding in his paper The Organised Economy, in T. Bottomore, P. Goode (eds), Readings in Marxist Sociology, Oxford 1978.


On the one hand, the state became an essential subject of wealth redistribution, while on the second hand, of control, which was exerted within the welfare state also via social work (Parton, 1994, p. 19).

Modernity and social workSocial work at its beginnings—as many other increasingly professionalised forms of

social activity—was connected to the process of shaping new social bonds, characteristic for capitalism in the stage of development, and related to the above-mentioned process of commodification and reification of social relations and the formation of objective basis for differentiation of society as a whole (Simmel, 1997; Niesporek, 2007). It concerns, first of all, the formation of mechanisms of social bond different from those typical for pre-capitalist society.

Social work, as a component of modernity, in both theoretical and practical aspect, i.e. embedded in social theory and expressed in methodology, performed mostly disciplinary function—in the meaning used by M. Foucault (Parton, 1994, p. 14 et seq.). According to Foucault, power should be understood in terms of multiplicity of relations, as a “play”, “network” or “complex strategic situation”. “In thinking of the mechanisms of power”, wrote Foucault, “I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into the action and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1988, p. 309). Power manifests itself in a complex network of power relations. It is an immanent feature of this network and has a “strictly relational character”. The power that interests Foucault is internalised with regard to those different relations. It can be said that it is constitutive to them, that the forms of domination are rooted in the very understanding of joint action, or search of wealth, or anything that forms the nature of such a micro-relation (Taylor, 1998, p. 87). What Foucault has in mind is a certain kind of “microphysics of power”, a description of multiple, local forms of manifestations of power, technologies of governing, which form in connection with many, often random, relationships and associations. Power is dispersed, ubiquitous and surrounds people like a net. Power exists in those people and through them, is supported on them, it even imposes the framework for protest against the power. As Foucault says, power “blocks” them (Foucault, 1998, p. 28). The nature of power is not solely repressive, power not only orders or prohibits, but also creates. It is productive. Power determines the boundary conditions for other social practices, including the cognitive and communicative processes that are characteristic and relevant to them. Through a complex play of coincidences, power as a network of relationships, together with its inherent technologies, constitutes the subject, which is at the same time an object of power and its actor. It creates a complex and, how was proved in Foucault’s analyses, a historically ordered whole of cognitive and material practices, in which “the individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him” is constituted. The elementary works of Foucault undertake the issue of genealogy of power that shapes historical forms of structured discursive and non-discursive practices


generating the subjectivity of an individual (the mentally ill, the criminal, the human as an object of humanistic reflection). Foucault presented the situation in a particularly incisive manner, analysing the changes in the ways of treating persons with mental disorders—madmen. The madman is a representative of a broader, larger and more general family of individuals who are an impediment in economic and social organisation of capitalism (Foucault, 2000, p. 95). The new economic norms, characteristic for emerging capitalism, brought a change to the way the persons that could not be subjected to any labour standards were treated. The madman is here only an example. It was reflected by the evolution in social measures. They evolved first from support to confinement, and, later, to empowerment. The confinement played an important role in the time of shaping the beginnings of capitalist economy. The purpose of confinement is not only “hiding away the unemployed, but now also of giving them work. (…) The cycle was clear: in times of high wages and full employment, they provided a low-cost workforce, while in a slump they absorbed the unemployed, and protected society from unrest and riots” (Foucault, 1987, p. 72). A classical example of such measures is the history of establishment and development of the English workhouses (Crowther, 1981; Fowler, 2007). The idea of empowerment, however, expresses a change of attitude to a rapidly arising social problems of the era of the development of capitalism and urbanisation that followed. It is related to the 19th century development of social sciences and so called “scientific charity”.

Social work seen from such a perspective is a part of the process of establishing and maintaining a new type of social order. It incorporates a vision of this order, the place and role of family and an individual within it, and, most importantly, subjects its practice to the mechanism of social and individual disciplining. Modern social work provided knowledge and a set of practices, which enabled the individuals experiencing problems to be included into society in line with moralising, normalising and guardianship. According to Parton, the space occupied by social work, what is “social”, emerges halfway between an individual action and the potentially omnipresent state. Modern social work is rooted in the possibilities of mental recognition of community and turning it into the purpose of political activity (Parton, 1994, p. 100). The perspective of looking at the whole society and the mechanisms of its functioning—functional dependencies constituting the basis for social cohesion, or social order—which was characteristic for the emerging social sciences, was also a theoretical perspective of social work. Whereas social work practice played a disciplinary role, subordinating the activities of individuals and families to functional social norms. It did not happen with the view of sovereign power, but knowledge, or “power/knowledge” as understood by Foucault (Niesporek, Trembaczowski, Warczok, 2013, p. 60).

Power, according to Foucault, is dispersed, exists in circulating social relations. Power is exercised by everyone, so to say, it circulates through social relations, and it is inscribed in them. Power creates a discourse within which the image of reality is articulated. Since knowledge is a tool for creating such a discourse, it is simultaneously a tool for exercising power. Knowledge is a medium that allows to distribute the binding rules of


the discourse in the structure of social relations and, what Foucault emphasises, plays an essential role in creating human subjectivity. The latter is then co-created by the practice of exercising power. The discourses of power/knowledge are not imposed by a centre of power, but created upstream. By abiding by the rules of a discourse, people sustain it, and, at the same time, are its co-authors. As stressed by Barry Smart, Foucault’s concept draws attention to the fact of the existence of power relations at the threshold of social order, while what differentiates it is the identification of power relations with society itself (Smart, 1983, p. 87). Analysing Foucault’s views, Sławomir Magala used in very the title of his interesting essay a significant expression: power in blood and aerosol, which very well characterises those views. “In aerosol” signifies that power is not a local phenomenon, but it is dispersed, penetrating all ties and bonds of a social being, slipping into the tiniest crevices of social life, as drops of aerosol do. “In blood” means that the domination and power in the contemporary times is, first and foremost, the domination and power over life, over the completely normal reproduction of life—biological, social, cultural—and over the tiniest reflexes of an individual, constantly trained in the ways of reacting and conduct (Magala, 1985).

Social work plays a significant role in clearing this bloodstream. It activates indirect methods of social regulation. Using its own strategies, and preserving the ideas of autonomous and free individuals, it simultaneously subordinates them to generalised rules. It is achieved not by repressions, but—in the name of norms, standards, health—by promoting subjectivity, shaping individual way of life, or the dependency of individual life projects on the acceptance of social order (Parton, 1994, p. 19). It concerns, for example, a significant for social work practice notion of empowerment. This notion has both emancipatory and regulative potential. The discourse using the term empowerment, on one hand, expresses so characteristic for modernity emancipatory and personal approach. It signifies being a master of oneself and of one’s own life. On the other hand, this discourse is appropriated by professionals. They are the ones who set standards for autonomous life, compliant with the norms. Ultimately, “empowerment is taken out of the hands of those who are being empowered” (Parker, Fook, Pease, 1999, p. 150).

Social work and social sciencesThe rejection of non-social, supernatural and enigmatic foundations for the existence

of social order was typical for the social sciences emerging in the times of modernity. On one hand, they searched for rational foundations of social order, of the modern, industrial society that was emerging; on the other hand—because of the impossibility of anchoring it in the non-social world—they created visions of a new, more rational order. This type of society, as Bauman wrote, retrospectively described as “modern”, emerged from the discovery that the human order has its weaknesses, is conditional and devoid of solid grounds. That was a shocking discovery. A response was a dream and an attempt to make this order more solid, binding and based of firm grounds (Bauman, 1992, p. XI). Nevertheless, the issue of social order became the main subject of sociological reflection.


The idea of social order, however, can be understood in two ways. Social order can be defined in terms of fixed, regular, predictable forms of conduct. It can be also understood as a system of mutually responsive, matching activities. Accordingly, an absence of social order may signify a lack of predictability, or a lack of social cooperation (Elster, 1994). The idea of social order implies a tension caused by the relationship between the idea of instrumental rationality and the regulatory concept of social norms. Between the concept of spontaneous forming of social order, and admitting the necessity of its pre-existing cultural and normative grounds. It reflects the tension that accompanies the formation of a new social order, based on commodity production. The tension between market, subjected to instrumental rationality and governed by its internal rules, and social life, which has been freed from the burden of transcendence and tradition.

Therefore, the issue of the bases for social order became, to a great extent, the issue of norms and mechanisms of social regulation that were established by the developing social and medical sciences. As stressed by Foucault, it became an issue of normalisation, disciplining and supervising, based on rational premises and legitimised by the developing sciences—especially psychiatry and psychology (“psy-complex”). Gradually, modern societies regulate collective behaviours through the use of knowledge and practices developed by new human sciences—notably medicine, psychiatry, psychology, criminology and social work. So called “psy-complex” refers, in this context, to the network of ideas related to the nature of human individuals, their perfection, reasons for their behaviour and the ways in which they can be classified, differentiated and controlled. It aims to guide and improve individuals by manipulating their qualities and attributes, and is dependent on scientific knowledge, professional intervention and expertise (Parton, 1996, p. 7).

The emergence of those new forms of social control or regulation of human behaviour, as has been emphasised, is an inseparable element of modernity. Modernity entails a realisation that human order is neither natural nor given by God (as in traditional and premodern society), but is inherently weak and unstable. However, through the development of science and application of its findings, it can be subjected to human control (Parton, 1996, p. 7). It means, among others, that the increase of knowledge in the area of social sciences, including especially the development of so called “psy-complex”, signifies an emergence of professions having a significant influence on the development of an individual and social welfare, and, as a result, operationalising more and more sophisticated mechanisms of social regulation (Parton, 1996, p. 8). They include also social work, which is even considered as the most general among all “therapeutic professions”. Hance the nature of social work should include “representation, control and protection” (Epstein, 1999, p. 6). The discourse characteristic for modern social work is, therefore, related to the discourse of other sciences, and its function is similar to the function of other sciences. Therefore, the emergence and substantial ambiguity of modern social work were strictly related to the development of new forms of regulation accompanying the increasing sophistication and complexity of modern society (Parton, 1996, p. 6).


Disorganised capitalism and the crisis of welfare state

From the 1980s, we can observe the process of restructuration of capitalism, as a result of both economic crisis of the 1970s, and the development of information technologies at the same time (Castells, 1993, pp. 22–23; Castells, 2000, pp. 53–54). The information revolution created new technological conditions for the development of capitalism, as well as a new capitalist and information economy. “In the last two decades of the 20th century, new economy has emerged around the world. It is certainly capitalist. Indeed, for the first time in history, the whole planet is either capitalist or highly dependent on capitalist economy processes. But it is a new brand of capitalism, characterised by three fundamental features” (Castells, 2001, p. 52). First, it is based on generating, processing and transmitting information. Second, it is global, because a substantial part of production, consumption and trade is carried out on a global scale. It concerns also the circulation of capital, workforce, information transfer, technology, methods of production or development of global market. Third, it is based on the development of networks, where, also on a global scale, production and competition operate (Castells, 2001, p. 52).

The changes in the functioning of the globalising capitalism of the end of the 20th century included both the process of expanding its influence, and the changes in the ways of capital accumulation, i.e. the development of commodification process and organisational conditions for accumulation (Scholte, 2005, chapter 5). Capitalism becomes ‘hypercapitalism’ or ‘turbocapitalism’, where expanding its areas of influence, i.e. “spatial globalisation”, becomes a way to accelerate and intensify profit maximisation. “For the first time in the history of mankind, everything can be produced and sold everywhere in the world. In capitalists economy, it means that each component is made and each activity is conducted in such a place on the globe where it can be done in the cheapest way possible, and that the resulting products or services are sold where the prices and profits can be the highest. Profit maximisation, which is the core of capitalism, means minimising costs and maximising income” (Thurow, 1999, p. 157). It entails the process of commodification of new areas of human activity. “Capitalism gradually penetrates deeper into the areas of the social relations which before were not subjected to commodity and monetary regulations. Recent moves related to including information and knowledge in the market area as commodities, and increasing commodification of activities that before pertained to a more general domain, are a part of an unprecedent division of labour” (May, 2002, p. 41). With the development of technical and information capacities of shaping the global market, global actors (international corporations) and deterritorialization of economic activity, emerges also a pressure to deregulate and shape new institutionalised and organisational conditions of the accumulation process, in which functions “a private enterprise free from governmental regulations, not controlled by trade unions, unrestricted by a sentimental care for the fate of employees or local communities, not limited by tariff barriers or investment restrictions, and not bothered with taxes as much as possible” (Luttwak, 2000, p. 42).


The change in the way of accumulation, characteristic for capitalism under transformation, is described in various categories, such as: flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1999, chapter 9), reflexive accumulation (Lash, Urry, 2002, chapter 4 and 5) or post-Fordism (Amin, 2000). The change process that capitalism is subjected to is defined also as a transformation of organised capitalism into its “disorganised” from. The basic characteristics of disorganised capitalism that are pointed out most often include:• the expansion of capitalist principles of production to new sectors of economy (com-

modification);• the development of global market;• the deterritorialization of economic activity;• the development of service sector (service economy);• the use of new information technologies, “digitalisation” of economy;• flexibility of work (changing positions, part-time work, working from home, flexible

working time, undefined rank in a corporation’s hierarchy, income dependent on per-formed duties, etc.);

• the development of the network (“networking”);• the crisis of welfare state;• the increase of individual and social risk;• the increase of cultural pluralism; (Lash, Urry, 1993, pp. 5–7; Castells, 1993, pp. 28–32;

Rifkin, 2003, chapter 7; Niesporek, 2007, pp. 104–105).

Postmodernity versus postmodernismIn relation to modernism, postmodernism is defined either as a category used for

periodisation, describing in terms of time that what follows the period of modernism, or, separately from the process of periodisation, as only a definition of certain attitude, the way of thinking and perceiving the world, as an intellectual attempt of defining contemporary times (Dziamski, 1993). While discussing postmodernism, on one hand, scholars differentiate a group of civilisational phenomena, defined as “postmodernity”. It is juxtaposed with a civilisational and cultural component of modernity, which represents the processes of industrialisation, applying the human knowledge to the quest of developing technology, great discoveries of natural science leading to relativisation of the concept of time and space, urbanisation, the development of mass communication and bureaucracy. On the other hand, they differentiate a domain of cultural and intellectual phenomena, defined as “postmodernism”. It is juxtaposed with a cultural and ideological component of modernism, characterised mostly by an artistic avant-garde (Przybysz, 1993; Szkudlarek, 1993). Anthony Giddens states it directly that “the term ‘postmodernism’, if it means anything, is best kept to refer to tyles or movements in literature, painting and plastic arts, and architecture. It concerns aspects of aesthetic reflection upon the nature of modernity. (…) Post-modernity refers to something different, at least as I shall define the notion. If we are moving into the phase of post-modernity, it means that the trajectory of social development is taking us away from the institutions of modernity towards a new


and distinct type of social order. Post-modernism, if it exists in cogent form, might express an awareness of such a transition” (Giddens, 2008, pp. 32–33).

Postmodernity signifies changes in the socio-economic reality, expressed by the dimensions of the transformation of capitalism, discussed above. Whereas, postmodernism encompasses the cultural changes related to undermining the foundations on which the programme (project) of Enlightenment was built. It is related to the collapse of the three fundamental ideas of modern thought: the faith in progress, the sense of history and the opposition subject/object (Lyotard, 1997). A particularly important role in the postmodernist thought was played by the process of deligitimisation of scientific cognition based on the criticism of fundamentalist epistemology, the criticism of the ability of science to legitimise other linguistic plays, and also the inability of science to legitimise itself.

Postmodern social workThe analysis of the challenges faced by contemporary social work, and the changes to

which it is subjected, or will be subjected to in future, prepares the ground for discussion over its postmodern nature. The internally diverse discussion concerns, on one hand, an evaluation of the value of applying the postmodern perspective in theory and practice to social work. The definitive rejection of postmodern perspective (Atherton, Bolland, 2002), as a nihilist alternative to the Enlightenment origins of social work, competes with the conviction that modern social work has to be inevitably replaced by postmodern social work (Noble, 2004, p. 292).

However, the supporters of the idea that both theory and practice of social work should open to changes draw attention to the fact that there are different conditions for this process. A considerable challenge that social work will have to face—related to the transformation of capitalism discussed above—is the crisis of the welfare state. From this perspective, as an expert puts it, “the world in which social work operates today is a very different world from that in which most of us took their social work training” (Lorenz, 2005, p. 93). Those changes, according to Lorenz, are profound. Their main indicator is the criticism of the welfare state, which is typical for the neoliberal perspective. As Nigel Parton states, “the attack on modern social work can be treated as a special case of neoliberal criticism, which dominated the government in the recent years: the antagonism towards the public spending in favour of the state’s social care, an increasing pressure on individual self-help and family support, a deepening commodification of social relations, as well as a general failure of the consensus which is the basis for «welfarism»” (Parton, 1994, p. 24). Neoliberal vision assumes the existence of particular relationships between what belongs to economy and what is social. Where market plays the key regulatory role in the economy, family is the most important institution for the social sphere. Such perspective, according to Parton, does not mean a complete disappearance of the state’s responsibility, but a reorganisation of this responsibility. New boundary conditions for services and forms of resources allocation, increasingly constitute the key elements of social work (Parton, 1994, p. 24; Niesporek, 2008, p. 29).


The new approach described above gives room for the formation of what is called the “welfare pluralism”, i.e. a diversification of the sources and forms of social care, including a visible weakening of public sector in favour of non-governmental organisations and private sector. What follows is a decentralisation and a shift of the burden of social support to local communities. Finally, an increase in the importance of different forms of contracting, in both cooperation between sectors and institutions and with their clients (Parton, 1994, p. 25). The extent of the changes causes the emergence of quasi-market rules in the functioning of public care sector (welfare sector), which includes social work, the development of new forms of managerialism and mixed economy, the development of the contract culture, as well as different forms of part-time and flexible employment. It leads to a devaluation of traditional role of social work and social workers employed in the public sector. To social workers it practically means high levels of stress, a career crisis, low morale and an attitude that assumes personal survival as the only vital prize for social work practitioners (Noble, 2004, pp. 294–295; Niesporek, 2008, pp. 29–30).

Therefore, the changes of socio-economic environment call for changes within the field of social work itself. The shaping of the new postmodern socio-economic reality, as discussed above, leads to changes in social policy, the shaping of “post-welfare state”, or “workfare state” (Jessop, 2000). Therefore, postmodern social work, or “post-welfare social work”, require a preparation for other forms of practical action (Hugman, 2001). The practice of postmodern social work gradually loses its therapeutic nature. It stops working on particular cases, but becomes rather a form of organisation, management and coordination. The main skills and activities are estimating, planning, support management, negotiation, coordination, the use of information technology and implementation of legal procedures. It is not surprising, taking into account that more time is devoted to administration: to meetings, preparing reports, establishing contacts, than to a direct work with clients or, as they are called now, users or consumers. It is not to suggest, as Parton writes, that we are dealing with new forms of social work activities and skills, it is simply that they constitute the main professional activity of a social worker. In practice, social workers become family life managers of some part of society (Parton, 1994, p. 26). Such a form of professional activity fits the idea of “workfare-state”, a state that creates conditions allowing an individual to shape one’s own future in the world of “disorganised capitalism” and “post-Fordism”. However, it does not provide a full and absolute, including material, support. It is no longer a welfare state.

Social work practice has to deal with a life in the world that is devoid of safety, assurance and order, the world of unpredictable circumstances and ambivalence. In its most pragmatic dimension, a question that emerges is: how are social workers, within their basic professional role, supposed to formulate opinions on their clients’ situation in the absence of rules? (Walker, 2001, p. 31). How can they support them in shaping their own future in the world without universal standards? Hence the situation of social workers is doubly difficult. In the postmodern reality of “disorganised capitalism” and in the world of relative values and cognitive perspectives, it becomes impossible to indicate approved methods, based on a widely-accepted knowledge and


universal values. Social works does not perform anymore its function of maintaining social order.

Postmodern social work, opening itself to above-mentioned new dimensions of practical acting, is seeking, at the same time, new theoretical grounds. The rejection of the modern striving for universal standards of truth, beauty and justice deeply unsettled the intellectual and practical foundations of social work. Culturally-transcendent notions of progress and order, which facilitated the shaping of the initial social work discourse are now questioned. Such questioning has a nuanced effect on this discourse (Howe, 1994, p. 523). It leads, as Howe emphasises, to the development of new grounds for the social work discourse, based on pluralism, participation, authority and performing (acting). In the world without a universal truth, the idea of common theoretical grounds of social work has to be abandoned. There is not such a theory that could be applied to all life experiences of all clients. The focus is on the differences, not on the similarities. However, since there are no universal truths, the difference cannot be something merely tolerated, as in the classical social work. It should rather become the core of postmodern social work, an answer to polymorphic, non-uniform, and non-consensual nature of significant areas of social life (Howe, 1994, p. 524). Social work practice should then be based on a full participation of clients in taking all important decisions. This is necessary in the absence of a privileged cognitive perspective and universally accepted authorities. Only full participation can ensure an unoppressive character of social work. The assumption is that the foundation for this practice is a dialog, not privileged expert knowledge. It means that experts who “define both the problem and its solutions” lose their power (Howe, 1994, p. 526). The position of social workers is no longer defined by an external to the client, professional diagnosis and the ability to propose preventive actions. It becomes more an issue of the ability to look for “common conceptual grounds”, and of common language that would create a reality shared by both the social worker and the client. The latter stops being a “case”, but rather becomes a consumer or a counterparty. Therefore, the focus of social work practice is shifted from the subject, the performer of an action, to the action itself. It departs from the essential approach to a particular case. It is not anymore about subjecting to an action (treatment), but about supervision, and the collection and evaluation of facts. It moves from profound explaining to superficial acting (Howe, 1994, p. 529). Social work practice is less and less focused on the questions ‘how’, and more on ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘how often’. It departs from the typical for modern social work inclination towards rehabilitation and corrective actions, in favour of the identification of potential risks, protection and prevention.

ConclusionAs a result of economic and social changes, social work faces the necessity of

reformulating its values and principles, which were established at its origins. It raises a question about the scope of necessary changes and the capability of social work to survive as a profession. The alternative is a division of social work into many separate


professions, each with its own expertise and practical skills (Howe, 1994, p. 530). The changes observed and anticipated in the field of social work are, or should be, an answer to the gradual changes in the functioning of capitalism, and the changes in the area of politics, as well as to the end of “great narratives” and fading of cognitive and axiological confidence. The transformation of social work, as a part of these changes, triggers the reformulation of the traditional boundaries and mutual connections of its theory and practice. It is a quest to place social work in postmodern reality and postmodern culture.

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Ku ponowoczesnej pracy socjalnej

Streszczenie

W artykule są omawiane społeczno-ekonomiczne uwarunkowania kształtowania się pracy socjalnej jako składowej nowoczesności oraz jej ukryte funkcje kontrolne. Analizie są poddawane zmiany, jakim podlega praca socjalna w epoce zdezorganizowanego kapitalizmu. Stawiane jest pytanie o przyszłość pracy socjalnej i jej związki z ponowoczesnością.

Słowa kluczowe: praca socjalna, kapitalizm, nowoczesność, ponowoczesny, Foucault

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019.4765

Tomasz Jedynak

Department of Risk Management and InsuranceCracow University of Economics1

The shape of the pension scheme in Poland in the light of the conventional multi-pillar typologies

SummaryIn recent years, a number of modifications that have a significant impact on the shape of the pension system in Poland are introduced and discussed (e.g. OFE [Open Pension Funds] reform, implementation of the PPK [Employee Capital Plans], introduction of civil pensions, etc.). The result of these changes is that the traditional, three-pillar way of presenting the shape of this system does not reflect its essence any more. On the basis of the typologies of multi-pillar pension systems proposed in the literature, the study propose a new concept for presenting the shape of the general pension system in Poland. It consists of four levels of pension security, distinguished by the criterion of the initiating subject. These levels together form the base and the supplementary part of the pension system.

Key words: universal pension system, pension system reform, multi-pillar pension systems

1 Katedra Zarządzania Ryzykiem i Ubezpieczeń, Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie, ul. Rakowicka 27, 31-510 Kraków; author’s email address: [email protected], ORCID — 0000-0003-4141-6654.

48 Tomasz Jedynak

Introduction

In the approach presented since the 1999 pension reform, the universal retirement system in Poland is consistently demonstrated as a three-pillar one (Bezpieczeństwo dzięki różnorodności [Security Through Diversity], 1997). In this concept, referring to the World Bank proposal (World Bank, 1994), the first pillar is the mandatory part of the system, administered by the public institution (the Social Insurance Institution, SII; Polish: ZUS), financed by the repartition method (pay-as-you-go, PAYG). Also compulsory, the second pillar is fully funded system, and the key role therein is played by the privately owned financial institutions (General Pension Societies, Polish: PTE). The third pillar, in turn, is a voluntary, yet state-promoted capital scheme in which various financial institutions offer pension products.

However, over the last decade and more, various modifications have been introduced to the universal pension system, which, directly or indirectly, caused a change in its architecture. Moreover, subsequent reforms are currently implemented, resulting in a further erosion of the three-pillar concept of a pension scheme. The modifications that explicitly influence the shape of the pension scheme include the changes in the functioning of the open pension funds and introducing the sub-accounts in the Social Insurance Institution, as well as implementing the employee capital pension schemes planned for 2019. The quotes from key politicians demonstrate that in the near future, we can also expect the open pension funds to be completely eliminated. Changes that result in the increasing number of persons to draw the minimal pension (lowering the retirement age and the length of service entitling to a minimal pension, introducing additional concessions in paying social security contributions for entrepreneurs) (Jajko-Siwek, 2017) have, in turn, an intermediate influence on the functioning and the shape of the pension scheme. The effect of these changes is the progressive switch from the key assumption of the 1999 reform, that is, linking the pension amount to the amount of the contributions paid, which causes more and more numerous calls for introducing the so-called civic pension (Gwiazdowski, 2012).

The observed evolution of the Polish pension scheme is therefore raising a question whether the three-pillar approach, presented since the 1999 reform, is still valid and accurately reflects the concept of how the universal pensions scheme operates in Poland. A potentially negative answer to that question, in turn, produces a dilemma on the means of presenting the shape of the pension scheme that would reflect its nature accurately. The above questions express the research problem tackled in this paper, and the main purposes of the work that aims at solving it are: 1) to review the pension scheme typologies, with particular attention to the multi-pillar concepts; 2) to include a brief presentation of the general pension scheme’s evolution in the years 1999–2018; 3) to establish the key dilemmas stemming from the traditional three-pillar approach; 4) to attempt to formulate a new concept to present the architecture of the Polish pension scheme.

To achieve the particular objectives of this paper, research methods based on inductive reasoning have been used. In the first place, a theoretical and compiling analysis was

49The shape of the pension scheme in Poland...

performed on the basis of literature review. Then, criticism of selected concepts was attempted on the basis of the conclusions of these analyses, along with synthesising the compiled material and formulating own proposals on the new concept of presenting the shape of the Polish pension scheme.

Pension scheme typologyFrom a legal and formal point of view, the pension scheme (the pension protection

system) are institutional solutions aimed at enabling the system participants with non-earned assets of subsistence for the old age by establishing the rules of 1) accumulating retirement savings, and 2) by making retirement benefit payments (Szumlicz, 2005). Thus understood, the pension scheme constitutes a factually clearly distinguished subsystem within a widely understood social security scheme. At the same time, the scope of the pension security scheme entails a specific type of social risk which is the risk of old age, and its main task is to enable a certain level of financial security in the period after ceding the professional activity (Szumlicz, 2004).

In economics, the pension scheme is generally defined by demonstrating two perspectives of its perception. In the macroeconomic approach, the pension scheme is defined as the tool of dividing the current GDP between the working and the retired generations. From an individual’s point of view, in turn, the retirement system is treated as the tool of allocation income within the life cycle (Góra, 2003).

The primary objective of pension schemes’ existence is to enable their participants with income after they cease their professional activity (Góra, 2003). More widely, it can be thus said that the objectives of the contemporary pension schemes is to equalise the level of consumption in the life cycle and to satisfy the vital needs of the elderly. The objectives presented to pension schemes also include helping the poor and income redistribution, as well as additional social and economic aims, such as, for example, stimulating the economic growth (Barr, Diamond, 2014).

Taking into account the rules for the organisation and functioning of the contemporary pension schemes, the state-of-the-art tends to classify them according to the various basic criteria (cf. Table 1).

The basic pension scheme classification criteria demonstrated in the table are subjects of in-depth analyses in the robust state-of-the-art (Góra, 2003; Żukowski, 2006; Chybalski, 2012). Thus, it is not my purpose to describe them here in detail. However, it must be observed that the designated criteria enable a synthetic characterisation of the rules for the functioning of the various pension schemes. They also enable a consistent presentation of the multi-pillar systems currently functioning in many countries, where multiple pension “subsystems” (plans) operate in parallel.2 A particular feature of these multi-pillar system is that within their framework, various combinations of funding schemes and benefit

2 Here, after Szumlicz (2004), it has to be stressed that the various muti-pillar typologies mainly aim at presenting the scheme, and not particular formal or legislative solutions.

50 Tomasz Jedynak

calculation, the type of managing entities and the coercion to participate are used. In the case of such schemes, the basic classification criteria in Table 1 enable the characteristics of their particular components, yet they do not allow for a comprehensive presentation of the complex nature of the entire multi-pillar scheme. For that reason, the state-of-the-art gives many suggestions as to the multi-pillar scheme typology.

Table 1. Selected pension scheme classification criteria

Criterion Pension scheme types

nature of benefit insurance schemes (Bismarck type) and basic pensions (Beveridge type)

creation method repartition and capital schemes

financing method financial and non-financial systems

benefit calculation method defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) systems

nature of managing entity publicly and privately governed schemes

coercion to participate compulsory and voluntary schemes

type of resource allocation individual or group

means of generating a rate of return real economy, financial markets, increasing the share of GDP ending with the retired

Source: own work, based on Chybalski, 2012, pp. 28–31; Góra, 2003, pp. 129–135.

One of the first concepts of the multi-pillar system was the one proposed by Beveridge, of the three pillars of retirement security. It assumed that the first pillar was supposed to ensure a minimum pension, fully guaranteed by the state and funded by the supply method. The objective of the second pillar was to complement the minimum basic benefits with an insurance pension, depending on the salary and years in the workforce. The third pillar, in turn, was meant to be an entirely voluntary scheme based on the offer of private insurance institutions (Golinowska, 1993).

The three-pillar perspective, nowadays deemed traditional, underlines the substantial criterion of division. On the basis of defining the three entities with whose initiative the particular components of the pension scheme are associated (the state, the employer, the household), the three components, the pillars, are distinguished. Moreover, this perspective also applies the income criterion, which serves for establish which level of security (benefits) should be provided by the particular components (pillars) of the system (Szumlicz, 2004).

In the 1990s, a three-pillar concept was proposed on the basis of the experience of three countries: Switzerland, Chile and Singapore (hence its name, Swiss Chilanpore). According to that proposal, the first pillar was supposed to be based on the Swiss baseline


scheme model, the second pillar—on the Chilean system of individual capital accounts governed by private entities, and the third pillar—on voluntary (individual or company) savings accumulated by the Singaporean model (Vittas, 1993; Wiktorow, 1996).

Currently, the most famous typologies of the multi-pillar schemes include: the three--pillar World Bank concept, the three-pillar Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concept and the four-pillar International Labour Organisation (ILO) concept.

The three-pillar World Bank concept (World Bank, 1994) assumes that retirement benefits can be financed from taxes (contributions) or savings, and the particular components of the pension scheme may be administered by public or private institutions. Moreover, participation in the particular pillars can be mandatory or voluntary. On that basis, the World Bank recommended that the pension scheme be based on three pillars. The first pillar was supposed to be a mandatory part of the scheme, based on the publicly governed pay-as-you-go model. It was meant to be small in size and ensure a minimum level of benefits. The second pillar, also compulsory, was supposed to be governed via private institutions and be based on capital financing. That pillar was supposed to adopt the form of group Occupational Pension Schemes or individual savings. Just as the second pillar, also the third one could be formed from occupational or individual pension schemes. However, it was supposed to be entirely voluntary and aimed at increasing the level of future benefits.

The classic three-pillar scheme sustained a modification in 2005, when the World Bank made a proposal of a five-pillar pension scheme (Holzman, Hinz, 2005). The new concept was meant to take into account the different nature of various target groups participating in the pension scheme: the poor, the gray market and the formal sector. Taking the two first groups into account in particular, a non-contribution zero pillar guaranteeing a minimal benefit, directed to the general public and the 4th pillar including all forms of accumulating pension capital (both financial and non-financial) and the family’s support within the natural system3 were added in this approach.

OECD (1998) proposed an alternative to the World Bank’s classification of multi-pillar schemes. It assumes that the pension scheme is composed of three tiers that achieve different objectives of pension security. Tier 1 is meant to protect from the risk of poverty caused by the old age. It is created with a compulsory, non-financial pension scheme governed by the state. Tier 2 is meant to protect from the risk of retirement benefit inadequacy. It is composed both from financial and non-financial compulsory retirement plans with defined contributions or defined benefit. Tier 3 is composed of voluntary pension savings that enable raising the individual replacement rate.

In a slightly modified version, the OECD taxonomy, focusing on the aims of particular pillars, is also used in the European Union publications (Lannoo et al., 2014). The only difference between the two classifications tackles capital occupational plans. If such plans embrace less than 60% of the population, OECD classifies them as a part of level 3

3 At the same time, this has to be.

52 Tomasz Jedynak

(voluntary savings). Union publications, in turn, consider such plans a part of the second pillar, assuming that the third pillar is composed exclusively of fully voluntary plans (Lannoo et al., 2014, p. 17).

In the International Labour Organisation concept (Gillion, 1999), the pension scheme is composed of four tiers: 1) a universal or discretionary minimum universal pension, enabling protection against poverty (the so-called tier zero); 2) a compulsory pension scheme with defined benefit, publicly governed and financed from non-financial contributions (pay-as-you-go), enabling a fair replacement rate; 3) a generally compulsory, privately governed, individual or occupational financial pension plan with a defined contribution, enabling a raise of the replacement rate to the desired level; 4) a fully voluntary financial pension plan with a defined contribution, enabling individual income allocation in the life cycle.

The national state-of-the-art contains many references to the above mentioned pension scheme typologies. Żukowski (1997) determined three layers of pension protection: 1) a social (basal) pension security, public, compulsory and universal, constituting an element of social security; 2) an occupational or professional pension security organised by the employer for the benefit of the employees, voluntary or compulsory; 3) individually pension security or the security stemming from the citizens’ foresight, generally voluntary. Similarly, with the initiating entity criterion, Handschke, Łyskawa and Ratajczak (2005) distinguished the baseline, occupational and individual retirement protection. While comparing the Polish pension scheme to the World Bank’s five-pillar one, Chybalski (2012, p. 36), in turn, claimed that all pillars were present in Poland, while the zero pillar’s role is played by social assistance and the minimum retirement pension guarantee, pillars one, two and three are the relevant universal pension schemes, and pillar four comprises all other forms of accumulating capital and the family’s support.

As rightfully observed by F. Chybalski (2012), as well as M. Dybał (2013), although they differ in the assets of defining the particular levels (pillars), the presented concepts indicate the main direction of changes in the contemporary pension schemes, i.e. the diversification of the retired persons’ sources of income. When referring to the presented multi-pillar pension scheme typologies, it is also worth noting that the OECD concept, which takes into account the type of risk it secures against as the classification criterion of the pension scheme levels, appears to be the most intuitive. However, it is also the least precise in the description of various pension schemes. The four-pillar ILO classification is more detailed, differing from the 1994 World Bank concept by detailing the part of the system aimed at protecting the poorest part of the society (Level 1). The modified five-pillar World Bank proposal seems to be the most complete, and therefore the most useful to describe the contemporary pension scheme, taking into account both the zero pillar and the informal pension products (pillar four), which gain importance in today’s pension systems.

While at the typology of pension schemes, the ongoing discussion on terminological correctness should be mentioned. Since the World Bank proposal (1994), many authors


use the term “pillar” to describe the particular components (elements) of the pension scheme. However, some researchers observe that this descriptor is not always fully adequate (Żukowski, 1997; Szumlicz, 2004). M. Żukowski supports this notion with the following arguments: 1) the scope of particular components of the retirement system is varied, thus, the “pillars” are strongly uneven, and 2) ties between particular pillars usually exist, causing them to overlap. This author also argues that the “pillar” terminology has an ideological hue, suggesting that each of the pillars is indispensable for the orderly functioning of the scheme. In this context, Żukowski proposes “layers” or “degrees” as more adequate descriptors of the particular pension scheme components.

Evolution of the universal pension scheme, 1999–2018The construction of the new pension scheme in Poland began in the mid-1990s,

when the bases of the structural reform4 of the entire social security scheme have been established (Bezpieczeństwo dzięki różnorodności… [Security through Diversity…], 1997). The reform entered into force in 1999, and with regards to the pension scheme, the move from the defined benefit system to a defined contribution one was, without a doubt, one of its key elements. Moreover, one of the important assumptions of the new system was to diversify the sources of pension payout, aimed at increasing the security of the entire scheme. Thanks to this, with regard to the World Bank guidelines of the day (World Bank, 1994), the architecture of the system was based on a three-pillar construction with capital elements, in which, nevertheless, the pillar differentiation criterion has been modified. Taking into consideration the specific nature of the transformed scheme, the creators of the reform proposed three pillars financed by the employee and the employer.5 The mandatory first pillar was supposed to be governed by the Social Insurance Institution and function on the basis of the pay-as-you-go system; the second one, also mandatory, was supposed to be based on a funded scheme, governed by privately managed Pension Funds Societies, the Open Pension Funds; the third pillar, in turn, was a voluntary mechanism of group savings accumulation, promoted by the state, but organised by the employers.

A visual representation of the shape of the new pension scheme introduced in 1999 is shown in Table 2. It references the representation of the reformed system’s architecture in the works from the period of its implementation

4 In contrast to the parametric reforms, which mainly aim at ensuring a financial balance or income adequacy of the pension scheme, the structural reforms have a considerable impact on the change in the concepts and rules (paradigms) of the pension schemes’ operation (Kalina--Prasznic, 2011).

5 Whereby many explanations exist for pension funds that are privately governed and financed from the mandatory contribution. For instance, Orenstein (2008) claims it was an effect of pressure from international financial institutions. According to Müller (2003), pivotal role was played by the pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the example of the Chilean report.

54 Tomasz Jedynak

Table 2. The shape of the universal pension scheme in Poland post-1999 reform

Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3

FormThe insured person’s account in the Social Insurance Institution

Open Pension Funds Employee Pension Programmes (EPP)

Governing institution

Social Insurance Institution

Pension Funds Societies

Financial market institutions on the basis of an agreement

with employer

Nature of participation mandatory mandatory voluntary

Contribution amount 12.22% 7.3% limited amount

Financing and benefit calculation pay-as-you-go, NDC* fully funded, DC** fully funded, DC

* NDC—nonfinancial defined contribution, ** DC—defined contributionSource: Jedynak, 2014.

However, in the years that followed the reform’s implementation, a correction of certain solutions proposed in 1999 has proven necessary. In the first turn, particular attention had to be directed towards the third pillar, which, contrary to the expectations, has not stirred interest among the future retired persons (Rutecka, 2014; Kawalec, Błażuk, Kurek, 2015; Jedynak, 2016a). Privatisation of pensions within the second pillar and the functioning of the Open Pension Funds has also proven debatable (Orenstein, 2008; Góra, Oręziak, Żukowski, 2011). Other important issues included the principles of establishing the retirement age (Muszalski, 2009; Szczepański, 2016; Jedynak, 2016b), the rules for granting minimum pensions and pension privileges for selected occupational groups (Grodzicki, 2012; Walczak, 2017). In response to these problems, a series of actions have been taken in the years 1999–2017, to mention, among others: 1. Adopting the amended act on Employee Pension Programmes and introduction of

Individual Pension Accounts (2004).2. Changes in the functioning of the second pillar (2011)—the so-called small Open

Pension Funds reform. 3. Raising and aligning the universal retirement ages for men and women (2012).4. Changes in the scope of operation of the Open Pension Funds and transferring a part

of OPF funds to the Social Insurance Institution (2014)—the so-called large Open Pension Funds reform.

5. Return to the pre-2012 principles of establishing the retirement age (2017).6. Introducing the Employee Capital Plans (2019).

In the context of changes to the pension scheme, it is also worth mentioning that, according to the information published by the Ministry of Development (2016) and public declarations of the government representatives, the final liquidation of the Open Pension Funds seems to have been decided.


Not leaving room for detailed analysis on the course of particular stages of building the pension scheme, it is worth noting that the consecutive modifications have strongly influenced its shape, thus leading to progressive blurring of its initial shape (cf. Table 3).

Table 3. The shape of the universal pension scheme in Poland (2018)

Pillar 1 “Pillar 2” Pillar 3

Form

the insured person’s account

in the Social Insurance Institution

sub-account in the Social

Insurance Institution

Open Pension

Fund (OPF)

Employee Pension

Programmes (EPP)

Individual Pension Account

(IPA)

Individual Pension Security Account (IPSA)

Governing institution Social Insurance Institution

Pension Funds

Societiesfinancial market institutions

Nature ofparticipation mandatory mandatory possibility

to resign voluntary

Contribution amount 12.22%

7.30%

limited amount7.30% 0.00%

or (per the insured person’s choice):

4.38% 2.92%

Financing and benefit calculation

pay-as-you-go, NDC

pay-as-you-go, NDC

fully funded,

DCfully funded, DC

Source: own work.

Over the past 20 years, momentous changes occurred in the functioning of the second pillar. They led to a number of uncertainties so as to the status of the open pension funds, partly voluntary since 2014, and the means to classify the sub-account in the Social Insurance Institution and the pension paid from the Social Insurance Fund, also including the assets previously accumulated in the OPFs. According to the primary assumptions, the second pillar was described as a compulsory capital component of the pension scheme, formed by the competing OPFs governed by the private Universal Retirement Societies. They were supposed to invest the contributions passed to them (7.30% of the basis of assessment) in various financial market instruments. As a result of the aforementioned small and large reforms of the Open Pension Funds, the above definition of the second pillar ceased to be valid. From a theoretical point of view, after the 2014 changes, the concept of the second pillar may be considered twofold: 1. From the perspective of a part of the pension insurance contribution attributable to

the original second pillar. In this perspective, the second pillar is formed by a sub-

56 Tomasz Jedynak

account in the Social Insurance Institution, to which, according to the insured person’s decision, 7.30% or 4.38% of the basis of assessment for the contribution is trans-ferred, and the Open Pension Funds, to which 2.92% of the basis of assessment for the contribution can be transferred. This perspective generally overlaps with the way of presenting the shape of the pension scheme, conveyed at the occasion of the 2014 reform, and most of the later publications describing the shape of the pension scheme (the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2013).

2. From the perspective of the principles of financing the future retirement benefits. According to this approach, the second pillar is constituted exclusively by the Open Pension Fund scheme, in which the capital method is used. The Social Insurance Insti-tution sub-account, as a part of the pay-as-you-go scheme, should then be classified as a part of the first pillar.6 Such an understanding of the second pillar also overlaps with the substantial understanding, according to which the institution responsible for the operation of the first pillar is the Social Insurance Institution, whereas the construction of the second pillar is based on the publicly supervised private financial institutions (the OPF).In respect to these suggestions, in my view, the post-2014 second pillar should be

treated in accordance to the second of the presented viewpoints. Contrary to the first option, this approach thus reflects the fundamental differences in the functioning of the first and second pillars and guarantees a relative transparency of the make-up of the entire scheme. Taking into account the widely announced and presumably already agreed OPFs liquidation, the above remarks on defining the second pillar will probably become obsolete. The question will remain, however, how to re-define the second pillar of the Polish pension scheme after the OPF liquidation. Very slight differences between the account and the sub-account in the SII, coming down to different valorisation rules and the limited possibility to inherit funds are, in my opinion, not strong enough an argument to highlight two separate pillars within the public “SII” scheme.

Initially, enriching the third pillar with two form to accumulate savings (first the IPA [Polish: IKE], then the IPSA [Polish: IKZE]) only led to a slight redefinition of this part of the scheme: the initial concept of an additional pension savings accumulation scheme, initiated by the employer, has been replaced with a wider concept of an additional pension scheme (Jedynak, 2016a). The issue of the third pillar definition has been, nevertheless, complicated by the introduction of the Employee Capital Plans (ECP, Polish: PPK) from January 2019.

From a formal point of view, the ECP are a legally regulated and state-supported mechanism of group accumulation of long-term savings for pension purposes, functioning within the capital part of the pension scheme. At first glance then, the ECP are a form of pension savings accumulation, close to the OPS, thus, they should naturally be treated as another instrument comprised within the third pillar. It is also the way the ECP are

6 It is worth noting that the authors of the OPF reform have demonstrated that the argument for considering the sub-account in the SII as a part of the fully funded system is allowing for a partial inheritance of the funds evidenced therein.


presented in the government documents (Ministry of Finance, 2018b) and the press and promotional releases based on them. However, taking into consideration the specific features of the ECPs, it appears that in relation to the initial shape of the 1999 pension scheme, they should be positioned somewhere at the boundary between the second and the third pillar (Balcerowski and Prusik, 2018).

On one hand, similarly to the Open Pension Funds, the ECPs are, after all, directed at the entire working population, and the legislator imposes an obligation to create them on all employees and assumes universal participation. Moreover, the ECPs foresee the capital method of financing the benefits, based on the obligation to pay at least the minimum contribution calculated as a percentage of the remuneration and are governed by private financial institutions. On the other hand, the ECPs also leave a margin of freedom within the shape of the contribution, allow the so-called auto-enrolment and auto-re-enrolment with an opt-out option and foresee tax incentives aiming at encouraging the public to accumulate pension savings. In this context, Balcerowski and Prusik (2018) claim that the formal participation in the ECP system is mandatory in nature, whereas only the so-called material participation (continuous contribution payment) is voluntary.

A more discreet changes, yet no less important in the consequences, are brought by a considerable growth in the number of the assigned minimum pensions (Jajko-Siwek, 2017). On one hand, this phenomenon stems from a drastic decline of the replacement rate, one of the consequences of the move to the defined contribution scheme (Góra and Rutecka, 2013; European Comission, 2015; OECD, 2015). On the other hand, it is reinforced by the moves such as lowering the retirement age and diminishing the number of years of work required to obtain the minimal pension, or exempting business owners from the obligation to pay parts of the contributions (see the so-called 2018 Konstytucja Biznesu [Business Constitution]). In the context of the growing number of minimum pensions assigned, the announcement of granting these benefits to the selected social groups, even without meting the years of work criterion (e.g. the proposal, recently formulated by the government, to grant minimum pension to mothers that raised at least four children) are also important.

The forecast growth of the number of persons receiving the minimal benefit causes the suggestions to introduce the so-called civic retirement benefit, a benefit paid to all citizens in the identical amount, regardless of the number of years worked and the amount of contributions paid, to appear (BCC, 2010; Gwiazdowski, 2012). The argument raised by the partisans of this solution is based on the claim that since in the future, most of the retirement pensions will nevertheless be the minimum benefits subsidised by the state, then the complex contribution system can be replaced with a less expensive and simpler solution. Not entering here into a discussion on the rationale and validity of introducing civic retirement pensions, due to the aforementioned tendencies, it has to be noted that this concept is entering the Polish pension system “by the back-door”. Basing on the sited retirement pension prognoses, one should expect that the Social Insurance Institution benefits (today’s first and second pillars) will continue to lower, thus leading to the rising number of the granted minimum pensions which, in the future, will start playing the role

58 Tomasz Jedynak

of the particular quasi-civic pension. A similar situation, after all, is already in place in the strongly budget-subsidised (over 90% of the income) agricultural system, in which the distribution of the values of the benefits paid is strongly concentrated around the average, amounting to PLN 1094 (KRUS, 2018).

Taking the shape of the universal pension scheme in Poland into account, it must nevertheless be noted here that the concept of civic pension does not inscribe into the traditional three-pillar concept in any way. The civic retirement pension in its clear shape, nor in the form of a benefit paid from the Social Insurance Institution contribution system, low and relatively equal for all, does not fit into it either. This solution can be more likely inscribed in the concept of tier 1 in the OECD classification (protection against the risk of poverty), the zero tier according to the ILO (a minimum retirement pension enabling protection against poverty), or, to a lesser extent, in the zero pillar in the World Bank 2005 classification. Moving beyond other challenges and problems relating to the introduction (official or “back-door”) of a solution of this type in Poland, it must be noted that it will require a thorough redefinition of the concept of presenting the entire pension system.

A new concept of presenting the Polish pension schemeThe already formulated remarks on the shape of the universal pension scheme in

Poland call to pose a question already signalled in the introduction, on the new model of presenting this shape. Adopting the most basic approach, a proposal can be made similar to those by Góra and Rutecka (2013), separating a basal and additional part of the pension scheme.7 Adopting the Polish conditions, the basal part covers the entire “Social Insurance Institution” part of the scheme, where the mandatory retirement pension insurance contribution goes. It is thus created by the first and second pillar to date, including the OPFs (regardless of their future fate). The additional part is, on the other hand, formed by all the savings accumulated in the instruments of the third pillar to date (Individual Pension Account, Individual Pension Security Account, Employee Pension Programmes) and the savings accumulated for pension purposes outside the state-supported forms. Starting January 2019, the Employee Capital Plans also constitute a solution that is an integral element of the additional part of the scheme. An advantage of this approach is its simplicity and the unambiguous classification criterion (the mandatory participation). This division may, and even should thus be promoted within the educational policy aiming at reinforcing the citizens’ pension awareness and stimulating the growth of individual pension savings.

However, it must be observed that this simple classification does not reflect the diversity of the particular pension system components and may thus have limited applicability to more advanced analyses, including the academic ones. Therefore, I would proposed that within this new concept of presenting the Polish pension system, the division between the basal and additional part be completed with the criterion of the entity initiating the

7 A similar division is presented by Golinowska (1993) and Szumlicz (1997).


particular components of the scheme. This criterion references the traditional three-pillar approach and the concept of the three layers of pension security by Żukowski (1997). It must be strongly underlined that the proposed criterion is based on initiating and not financing the particular components of the scheme. It stems from the fact that the solutions such as co-financing the mandatory contributions to pension insurance from the employee and the employer, covering the EPP and ECP contributions by the employee and the employers with the ongoing incentives in the form of direct subsidies financed by the state budget, as well as subsidies to the minimum pensions financed by the state budget make it basically impossible to identify separate parts of the Polish system financed by the state, the employer and the employee. In addition, it also appears that a complex look at the pension system also requires the growing importance of the informal forms of retirement plans to be included.

Taking the above remarks into consideration, I stipulate that four “layers” of the pension system be identified within the new concept of presenting the Polish pension system (cf. Table 4).

Table 4. The stipulated way to present the shape of the Polish pension scheme

BASAL PART ADDITIONAL PART

Layer 1 Layer 1aa Layer 2 Layer 3 Layer 4

Form SII (account and sub-account) OPF EPP, ECP IPA, IPSA

other investments,

natural system

Administration /governing public private private private private

Initiating entity the State employerc employee/

saving person employee/

saving person

Nature of participation mandatory opt-out

option quasi-mandatory voluntary voluntary

Contribution amount 19.52%

discretionary (with maximum/

minimum)

discretionary (with

maximum) discretionary

Allocation of funds group group individual individual

Benefit financing

pay-as-you-go, NDC

State subsidiesb

fully funded,

DCfully funded, DC fully funded,

DCfully funded or informal

a The transitional form; b pertains to the subsidies to the minimal pensions; c with State support (incentives).Source: own work.

60 Tomasz Jedynak

In the terminological aspect, the stipulated proposal references the conclusions of the discussion on naming the particular components of pension security (see the section entitled Pension scheme typology). It should be especially stressed that the particular “layers” are not equal and may be interlinked, which results in them “permeating” (Żukowski, 1997). The necessity to differentiate the new proposal from the concept of “pillars”, already established in Poland, also works in favour of the term “layers”.

In the stipulated proposal, Layer 1 is identical to its basal part. It covers the part of the system stipulated by the State and financed within the mandatory contribution to the pension insurance, i.e. the account and the sub-account in the SII. The OPFs also operate within Layer 18, whereas to underline the capital financing and administration by private institutions, they could operate as Layer 1a. Retirement benefits paid out within Level 1 are the baseline retirement pensions, which, by assumption, ensure relatively low substitution levels, protecting the system members from poverty, yet not enabling optimal income allocation within the life cycle. The pension scheme participants should thus also make use of its additional part, consisting of layers 2, 3 and 4.

Layer 2 consists of the two programmes initiated by employers for the employees’ benefit: the already existing, yet unpopular EPPs and the implemented, yet presumably much more universal thanks to the auto-enrolment mechanism: the ECPs. Both programmes are forms of group saving for retirement, state-promoted via an extensive incentive scheme, within which the assets are governed by private financial institutions. As previously mentioned, the contributions to the EPPs and the ECPs are financed from the employer and employee’s assets in different parts. The pay-out of funds from Layer 2, as a rule, should have a form of an annuity, or possibly, a programme pay-out.9

Layers 3 and 4 are composed of fully voluntary forms of individual retirement plans, financed with the own assets of the future retired persons. Members of all socio-occupational groups (employees, entrepreneurs, farmers, uniformed services, etc.), as well as non-employed persons may participate in Levels 3 and 4. The difference between Layers 3 and 4 generally comes down to the scope of the State interference, as well as to the means of accumulating the savings. Within Layer3, there are instruments of accumulating voluntary savings (the IPAs and IPSAs) that are formalised (e.g. within the pay-out possibilities) and State-promoted with tax incentives. Layer 4, in turn, is formed with all, including non-financial and non-formalised forms of individual retirement plans.

The stipulated concept did not include a zero layer corresponding to the zero pillar in the World Bank proposal and tier 1 from the ILO classification. To my mind, it should be equated only with a classical civic pension (minimal benefit), fully sponsored with the

8 It is presumably only temporary, up to the time of their stipulated liquidation.9 It should be stated here that the draft act on the ECP foresees a programme pay-out of

120 monthly instalments (10 years) as a basic pay-out form. In the context of an instrument to accumulate additional retirement savings, such solution must be assessed negatively. See a wider presentation of the topic in Jedynak (2018).


State budget assets. In the meantime, the minimum pensions in Poland are linked to the obligations of earlier contribution payment and the minimal years of work requirement. They are also, as a rule, sponsored within the insurance system, and not the provision system. Therefore, even when faced with the drastically increasing number of the minimum pensions paid out, I do not currently find the justification to treat such benefits different from any other pensions paid out from the Social Insurance Institution, the difference being them partially sponsored with the State budget.

ConclusionThe referred phenomena and tendencies on the evolution of the Polish pension system

lead to a conclusion that the existing way of presenting its shape has become obsolete. Basing on the reflections herein, it can be concluded with all certainty that the classic three-pillar concept has already ceased to adequately reflect the factual state of the system. Moreover, the already implemented (ECPs), planned (OPFs) and “back-door” (civic pension) changes in the pension scheme cause that in the very near future, in no way will this concept reflect its factual shape. Therefore, a justified need emerges to drastically redefine a concept of presenting the Polish pension system.

The proposed new concept of presenting the universal pension scheme in Poland stipulates distinguishing four layers of the old-age security. Layer 1 is identical to the basal part of the system. It is the mandatory part of the scheme, publicly governed (the SII), financed in the PAYG system. Ultimately, this layer will be composed of the account and sub-account in the Social Insurance Institution. The additional part of the system is formed with layers 2, 3, and 4. Layer 2 are fully funded programmes organised by the employers on a quasi-mandatory basis (ECPs and EPPs), Layer 3—the State-supported individual forms of pension saving (IPA, IPSA), while Layer 4 are all other form of accumulating pension capital.

An undoubted advantage of the stipulated proposal is its legibility and transparency, even to an audience without thorough knowledge of the pension scheme theories (a clear initiating entity criterion). Also importantly, within its framework, there is a possibility to underline one of the key challenges in the Polish pension scheme: the problem of benefit adequacy. The proposed concept clearly demonstrates what is the basal and the additional part of the scheme and who is responsible for the amount of benefits from particular levels. An appropriately directed educational policy, making the future retired aware of the prospective Layer 1 benefits amount should thus strongly stimulate participation in the various additional forms of saving. In addition, in case of possibly introducing a guaranteed minimal benefit (the civic pension), the proposed way of presenting the shape of the pension scheme can easily be completed with adding a zero level.

62 Tomasz Jedynak

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Kształt powszechnego systemu emerytalnego w Polsce w świetle klasycznych typologii wielofilarowych

Streszczenie

W ostatnich latach jest wprowadzanych i dyskutowanych szereg modyfikacji, które mają istotny wpływ na kształt powszechnego systemu emerytalnego w Polsce (m.in. reforma OFE, wdrożenie PPK, wprowadzenie emerytur obywatelskich itp.). Zmiany te powodują, że tradycyjny, trzyfilarowy sposób prezentacji kształtu tego systemu nie oddaje trafnie jego istoty. W opracowaniu, opierając się na proponowanych w piśmiennictwie typologiach wielofilarowych systemów emerytalnych, proponuje się nową koncepcję pre-zentacji kształtu powszechnego systemu emerytalnego w Polsce. Składają się na nią cztery, wyodrębnione przy użyciu kryterium podmiotu, inicjującego, poziomy zabezpieczenia emerytalnego, które tworzą razem część bazową oraz dodatkową systemu emerytalnego.

Słowa kluczowe: powszechny system emerytalny, reforma systemu emerytalnego, wielo-filarowe systemy emerytalne

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019.6783

Ryszard Necel

Institute of Sociology, Department of Applied Sociology and Social WorkAdam Mickiewicz University in Poznań1

Marcin Wiśniewski

Faculty of Economics, Department of Monetary Policy and Financial MarketsPoznań University of Economics and Business2

Prospects for implementation of social impact bonds in Poland—

an example of an intervention on the labour market

SummaryThe aim of this article is to describe social impact bonds as an innovative instrument for financing social services. The first part presents the nature of this solution in its economic, institutional and legal aspects. Then we analyse the chances of social impact bond development taking into account the labour market and the financial market. In the next part, the authors present a proposal to use the model of social impact bonds in

1 Instytut Socjologii UAM, Zakład Badania Problemów Społecznych i Pracy Socjal-nej, ul. Szamarzewskiego 89C, 60-568 Poznań; author’s email address: [email protected], ORCID — 0000-0001-6709-0862.

2 Wydział Ekonomii UEP, Katedra Polityki Pieniężnej i Rynków Finansowych, al. Nie-podległości 10, 61-875 Poznań; author’s email address: [email protected], ORCID — 0000-0003-4609-6143.

68 Ryszard Necel, Marcin Wiśniewski

employment support services. The summary is a critical analysis of the model, presenting its weaknesses and relevant remedial strategies.

Key words: social impact bonds, labour market, employment support services

IntroductionDiscussions concerning directions of development of the contemporary social policy

are becoming increasingly less focused on the validity of social investments and more interested in ensuring that implementation of said investments is done with the help of most optimal strategies. Social impact bonds are an example of the investment-based social policy paradigm. This instrument is meant to meet social needs more effectively than any existing solutions, while at the same time maintaining the economic viability of the applied public intervention. It is worth considering this solution for several fundamental reasons. First of all, it is an example of a social innovation which changes the logic of financing of public tasks, as it implements the idea of paying for results. Secondly, it constitutes a good practice in the area of building social programmes based on a reliable assessment of the implemented interventions (The Australian Government the Treasury, 2017, p. 7). It requires an in-depth diagnosis of a given social problem, an empirical determination of expectations of the entities which are involved in the project, and identification of reliable intervention indicators. Thirdly, this solution can be treated as a testing ground for a multi-sectoral social policy, because public, private and non-governmental entities all participate in this mechanism. Moreover, considering the fact that this issue is rarely described in the Polish academic discourse (Marchewka-Bartkowiak, Wiśniewski, 2015), there is a gap in the literature that is worth filling, and the aim of this article is to contribute to this very goal.

The first section of this article will describe the nature of the social impact bond mechanism, broken down into different tasks implemented by different entities, with information on relevant Polish legal and financial conditions. The article will also identify the determinants of development of the social impact bond model in the context of the labour and securities markets in Poland. In addition, the aim of this work is to develop proposals concerning implementation of the social impact bond model on the labour market and employment support services, because, on the one hand, it represents active forms of unemployment prevention, and on the other hand, it is an innovation that goes off the beaten path of traditional employment support methods. This section of the article will contain direct references to the effects of the work conducted within the framework of a project co-financed by the European Union, under the European Social Fund, entitled “The mechanism of implementation of social impact bonds on the labour market” and carried out by DGA S.A. in partnership with Wielkopolska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości Sp. z o.o. within Axis IV Operational Programme Knowledge

69Prospects for implementation of social impact bonds in Poland…

Education Development “Social Innovation and Transnational Cooperation”, measure 4.1 Social innovations.

The nature of the social impact bond modelThe nature of the social impact bond mechanism can be best described by treating it

as an economic, legal and human resources instrument of social policy (Supińska, 2009, pp. 85–89; Supińska, 2014, pp. 217–240).3 Moreover, it is assumed that it is a mechanism defined in a general framework, which is, nevertheless, flexible and open to changes, depending on the chosen area of intervention (Pasi, 2014, p. 145).

According to Supińska (2009, p. 88), the human resources dimension of social policy consists primarily of people who make decisions concerning social policy directions at various levels of hierarchy and people who provide professional services. When describing the social impact bond model, it is more justified to refer to institutions in which members of staff perform their tasks rather than individual employees. Therefore, in the institutional dimension, social impact bonds constitute a network of cooperation for implementation of a socially significant objective. Said objective is formulated by a central or local public institution which under the law is tasked with implementing public tasks. The public entity is the contracting party specifying the type and scope of the commissioned intervention and the expected outcomes of its implementation in respect to a specific target group within the set time limit. The intermediary is the one who accepts the order and receives remuneration from the contracting party if a relevant social outcome is achieved. Another entity operating within the social impact bond mechanism is the investor that deposits capital by purchasing bonds for the implementation of the project specified by the contracting party. If the project proves to be a success, the investor is guaranteed to receive the return of their capital with interests. Within the framework of the investor-intermediary relation, the intermediary is first of all responsible for receiving the payment of the capital and paying out any capital gain. The key role in the presented model is played by the contractor that performs specific interventions commissioned by the intermediary. The contractor performs social services whose type, scope and performance indicators are determined in agreements concluded between the intermediary and the contracting party. The contractor may be a non-governmental organisation active in the public benefit area in accordance with Article 3(2) of the Act on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work (Journal of Laws of 2016 item 239, as amended) or an enterprise that guarantees implementation of the task, e.g. through employment, if the employment effect is the expected social outcome. The last element of the mechanism is the recipient—the direct beneficiary of the support. The basic scheme of the institutional structure of the social impact bond mechanism is presented in Scheme 1.

3 According to Jolanta Supińska, the set of social policy instruments includes: economic, social, legal, information, human resources, space shaping and time management instruments. In order to make the description of the social impact bond mechanism more clear, only part of this proposed catalogue of instruments was included in this article.


Scheme 1. The basic social impact bond mechanism

7. payment for outcomes

5. achieving the outcomes

Outcome payers(public institutions – central or local

government institutions)

Evaluator(evaluation companies, consulting

companies, academics)

Investors(lenders of capital)

Intermediary(private entities specialising in financingorganisation of public-private ventures)

2. investment

Contractor(social service providers – NGOs

and private entities)

3. planning, coordination,risk management

Beneficiaries(people at risk of social exclusion, e.g.

the long-term unemployed, the homeless,seniors who require care, etc.)

4. provision of services

8. return of the capital and interests

1. commissioning of an intervention and commitment to payment for the outcomes

6. evaluation

Source: own work, based on: Galitopoulou, Noya, 2016, pp. 4–6.

The institutional support architecture operating within the social impact bond mechanism is presented above. However, to explain the nature of the model it is necessary to describe it also as an economic instrument. In this context, the function of social impact bonds is to create opportunities to achieve social policy objectives by using market instruments, which is to reduce the amount of public expenditure (Schinckus, 2015, p. 105). Investors, i.e. bondholders, can represent many different types of entities. Considering the investor types, we can talk about philanthropic, public sector and commercial social impact bonds (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, Bo’sher, 2011, pp. 8–9). In the case of philanthropic social impact bonds, the funds allocated to the project come from organisations or individuals that do not seek profit and are motivated by the desire to offer selfless help. As a rule, entities acting for philanthropic reasons do not expect to gain any profit from the invested funds and accept a higher risk of failure than commercial entities, which means that this model allows for implementation of innovative activities. The public sector social impact bonds represent the second type of bonds. Their investors are local authorities that lend funds on the existing market in the form of, for example, credit, and then receive remuneration from the central administration, if specific results are achieved. This solution is relatively easy to implement. It does not involve many entities and has relatively low transaction costs. The commercial social impact bond model replaces the role of philanthropist investors and local authorities with commercial enterprises. A new financial instrument is thus created in which banks, insurance companies and other organisations


can invest. This commercial approach will be possible to implement when social impact bonds prove their effectiveness and profitability.

When considering social impact bonds as financial instruments, it should be emphasised that this mechanism changes the allocation of financial risk by including investors in financing social services, which is one of its key features (Cooper, Graham, Himick, 2016, p. 64). This reveals the fundamental difference between social impact bonds and their traditional counterparts: “social impact bonds are associated with a higher level of risk than standard bonds because, as a rule, their structure includes an additional outcome-linked condition for repayment of the principal and interests” (Marchewka-Bartkowiak, Wiśniewski, 2015, p. 212). As Pasi rightly emphasises, the risk in social impact bonds should be perceived both in its object-related aspect—i.e. in relation to potential difficulties in implementation of a given service—and in the subject-related aspect in which the entity implementing specific actions is responsible for the level of risk (Pasi, 2014, p. 146).

Social impact bonds are based on the idea of “pay for results”, which is well-described in the literature on the subject, so there is no need for including a detailed description of this paradigm. It should only be emphasised that said idea has its apologists proving the effectiveness and innovativeness of social programmes which are based on this model (Fox, Albertson, 2011, p. 397). The effectiveness of this type of solutions is proven e.g. by research conducted in the field of experimental economics, although it is in so far imperfect that they lack control over risk factors (Wong, Ortmann, Motta, Zhang, 2016, p. 74). The opposite opinions which treat “pay for results” as a manifestation of neo-liberal rationality, which aims to express the often immeasurable social effects of interventions as indicators, are equally commonplace (Cooper, Graham, Himick, 2016, p. 65). In relation to social impact bonds, the intervention is to be carried out thanks to the funds provided by private investors, and any payments made from public funds are triggered only when the endeavour becomes a measurable success.

The social impact bond model should also be contextualised within the Polish legal provisions, which would make it applicable in the country. The solutions which have been so far implemented around the world indicate that, despite their names, social impact bonds are most often not actually bonds in the meaning of legislation regulating the issue and trading of securities (which include bonds). Most often, they are in fact civil law agreements which contain the rights and obligations of the parties to the above-described mechanisms. In other words, in practice, social impact bonds are not securities which, after their issuance, could be traded on the market—private or public.

Therefore, accurate representation of the nature of social impact bonds requires also considering them in the light of changing social policy paradigms. Putting aside the discussion on the desired employment support models, which is not the main aim of this article, it is enough to emphasise that the social impact bond model requires a new look at social policy. First, in the axionormative dimension, the model refers to the primacy of the promotion/development function over the compensation/protection function (Kaźmierczak, 2014, p. 94). Social impact bonds also promote the idea of deinstitutionalization of the state which does not renounce its responsibility for social problems, which Krzysztof


Frysztacki presents as follows: “Contemporary state power undergoes rationalisation, institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, which is meant to facilitate the search for additional solutions for matters for which the state is responsible, but with which it is not necessarily able to cope” (Frysztacki, 2015, p. 57). Secondly, as a consequence of adoption of the employment supporting approach, the way of management of social policy must also change, including the labour market policy in which we are particularly interested. It will be necessary to implement new-public-management-style public policies for the development of social impact bonds. The aim of the article is not to present the full complexity of this paradigm, it is enough to emphasise the need to implement the principle of empowering the recipients of services (Brye, Preston-Shoot, 1995), especially through the practice of co-production of services (Pestoff, 2008, p. 280), and on-going monitoring of effects of the undertaken actions, referring to quantifiable intervention indicators, i.e. elements of the so-called evidence-based policy (Davies, Nutley, Smith, 2000).

Chances of using social impact bonds on the labour market This article has so far focused on presentation of the general assumptions of the

social impact bond model without indicating a specific area of intervention. In the further part of the article, the proposed solution will be considered in reference to the labour market, where the objective is to help the unemployed find jobs by creating appropriate connections between the needs of the demand and supply sides of the labour market. First of all, it is worth considering the conditions that must be met in order for the bonds to have a chance to exist in the social policy system not as a one-off initiative, but as a solution that can become a permanent component of a wide range of social policy instruments. In this context, it is first necessary to answer the question whether the relevant markets for this solution, that is, the capital and labour markets, provide opportunities for the development of such initiatives.

When considering the labour market, one should begin with its potential in the area of financing active forms of support, as all interventions using social impact bonds should be included in this category. The classification of “activities” (interventions) implemented by the state and its institutions within the framework of labour market policy is made a bit difficult due to the fact that their definitions adopted in law, reporting and statistics—both domestic and international—are not consistent. The definition used by Eurostat was adopted at the outset for this article, because its further sections will reference the Eurostat statistical data (Eurostat, 2013). Eurostat names 9 types of “labour market policy interventions”, divided into three categories, as shown in Table 1. It should be noted that in this classification interventions no. 1–7 can be considered to be active labour market instruments, while interventions no. 8–9 are treated as passive instruments.

Analysing the potential of individual employment support instruments from the point of view of public finances, it is worth pointing out the amount of expenses incurred by the state for the above-mentioned interventions. The figure below presents the expenditure on labour market policy in Poland in 2005–2015 in accordance with the classification adopted in Table 1.


Table 1. Classification of interventions of labour market policy according to Eurostat

LMP services

1. labour market services

LMP measures

2. trainings

3. job rotation and job sharing (not used any more—included in category 4)

4. employment incentives—programmes that facilitate the recruitment of unemployed persons or help to maintain jobs which would be liquidated without proper support

5. sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation

6. direct job creation

7. start-up incentives

LPM support

8. out-of-work income maintenance and support

9. early retirement

Source: own work, based on: Eurostat, 2013, pp. 13–23; Wiśniewski, Zawadzki, 2010, p. 29.

Figure 1. Expenditures on the labour market policy in Poland, by type of intervention (in PLN million)

0

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

16 000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 20142012

Labour market services Trainings

Employment incentives Sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation

Direct job creation Start-up incentives

Out-of-work income maintenance and support Early retirement

2015

Source: own work, based on the Eurostat data.


The above-presented figure shows that even a decade ago pre-retirement benefits and unemployment benefits constituted the prevailing share of all interventions financed from public funds. In the last decade, these proportions have changed—these forms of support are still financed from the public funds, but there has been a noticeable increase in the share of expenditures spent on employment support, rehabilitation of people with disabilities or employment incentives. Additionally, Figure 2 presents the same expenses broken down into active forms of labour market policy (including services) and their passive counterparts, and also the share of expenditures spent on labour market policy in relation to GDP.

Figure 2. Expenditures spent on active and passive forms of labour market policy in Poland in 2005–2015 (in PLN million) against GDP (in %)

0.0

[in

PLN

mill

ion]

[in

%]

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Passive forms

Active forms

Expenditures on the labour market policy as a percentage of GDP (right axis)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 20142012 20150

2 000

4 000

6 000

8 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

16 000


There is a noticeable trend of reducing spending on passive forms of interventions and increasing spending on active forms. However, despite this increase, the relative value of overall expenditures spent on the labour market policy has been successively reduced in the last ten years, from over 1.2% of GDP in 2005 to just 0.7% in 2015. It is estimated that between 1990 and 2015 nearly PLN 200 billion were spent on the labour market policy, with expenditure on passive instruments dominating in the initial part of this period. In the recent years, there has been an evolution in the approach to implementation of the labour market policy which caused a gradual shift from protective measures to strengthening the employment support instruments for the unemployed (Cicha-Nazarczuk, 2015, p. 157).

The above-presented analysis of the existing data reveals one fundamental observation—the share of expenditures allocated to active forms of employment support in Poland has been increasing in recent years. The proposed intervention in the scope of financing activities carried out on the labour market with funds from social impact bonds


is part of this trend, as it is aimed at creating new jobs, and not at mitigating negative effects of unemployment with the help of passive instruments.

The debt instruments market is also a source of opportunities for development of social impact bonds in Poland. According to the Eurostat data, the value of debt securities issued in Poland by Polish residents (including the State Treasury and other state and local government institutions) has increased fivefold in the last 15 years (Figure 1). Currently, this value exceeds the level of EUR 250 billion, which at the current exchange rate translates into over PLN 1 billion.

Figure 3. The value of debt securities issued in Poland (in EUR million)

0

50 000

100 000

150 000

200 000

250 000

300 000

2005 2006 2007 2008 20092005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 20142012 2015


However, it should be emphasised that public debt dominates in this category, and the value of securities whose issuers are non-financial enterprises, that is, the entities which are the most important from the point of view of the conducted analysis, amounted to about EUR 24 billion, or about PLN 100 billion. Detailed data concerning this aspect can be found in the reports of the National Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski—NBP). Table 2 presents basic data concerning the capital market in Poland in 2012–2015. It is easy to notice that, in Poland, the capital market instruments outnumber slightly the equity instruments, including those listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (Giełda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie—GPW). The securities issued by the State Treasury are the most dominant category among all debt securities, as was already indicated above.

To sum up, the securities market in Poland is developing dynamically, but involvement of non-financial enterprises in issuing debt instruments is rather limited, and public and local government institutions dominate. Thus, any issuer of social impact bonds as a non-public entity, a special purpose vehicle, would enter a market which is relatively small, hence, any proposed instruments would have to be attractive to potential investors (in terms of their profitability or opportunities to achieve other types of profits, e.g. social or prestigious ones).


Table 2. The size of individual segments of the domestic capital market in Poland (in PLN billion)

Specification 2012 2013 2014 2015

Debt securities 613.8 670.8 605.0 649.9

Marketable State Treasury bonds 520.0 565.7 482.9 513.4

BGK bonds for the NRF* 25.6 25.4 19.6 19.4

Long-term corporate debt securities 32.3 37.8 54.2 65.2

Municipal bonds 15.6 18.6 19.1 20.0

Long-term bank debt securities 17.2 20.0 25.1 26.5

Covered bonds 3.1 3.3 4.1 5.4

Equity instruments 745.1 851.8 1262.1 1091.6

WSE Main Market 734.0 840.8 1253.0 1082.9

NewConnect 11.1 11.0 9.1 8.7

* National Road Fund (Polish: Krajowy Fundusz Drogowy).Source: NBP, 2016, p. 241.

The development of social impact bonds in Poland is determined not only by the condition and structure of the capital market, or the level of development of active forms of counteracting unemployment, but also, in equally significant way, by the state policy creating incentives for development of such initiatives. First of all, the state’s activity should focus on creating business environment institutions that stimulate the development of enterprises and local governments, inter alia, through repayable instruments. The already operating Polish Development Fund (Polski Fundusz Rozwoju—PFR), or the planned regional banks are good examples of such initiatives.4 Secondly, the key development factor for any innovative initiatives, including the social impact bond model, is the creation of financing programmes for projects with a high innovation potential, i.e., ones which have not been tested in Poland, and a high risk of failure in the implementation phase. In 2016, the Ministry of Development decided to face this challenge and announced a competition for the pilot social impact bond programme as a new form of financing social services in Poland. The competition was a part of the Ministry’s Operational Programme Knowledge Education Development (OP KED; Program Operacyjny Wiedza Edukacja Rozwój—PO WER) which is financed from the EU’s Cohesion Fund.

4 More information on this subject can be found in an interview which Deputy Minis-ter Jerzy Kwieciński gave to the daily newspaper, Rzeczpospolita. Available at: http://www.rp.pl/Banki/308129989-Regionalne-fundusze-rozwoju-moga-dac-poczatek-bankom.html#ap-1 [access date: 08.09.2017].


To sum up, the opportunities which are created for the social impact bond model on the labour market are the development of active employment support services and the possibility of raising capital from financial markets. However, in order to make use of these opportunities, public administration has to take an active role in creating appropriate climate for such investments in both the institutional and financial dimension. Finally, it is worth emphasising that the country’s dominant directions of social policy development also play a significant role in this process. Indeed, social impact bonds have a chance to enter the ranks of most common support activities if the social security of citizens is achieved not by increased spending on passive support instruments, but through development of activities aimed at strengthening the social capital.

Social impact bonds in the employment support practice According to the data published on the www.instiglio.pl website, 77 programmes based

on the social impact bond mechanism are currently on-going across the world (as of April 2017).5 They cover a wide range of activities concerning many issues—from social rehabilitation, through counteracting homelessness, and unemployment, to education of the youngest citizens. As indicated earlier, Poland has also seen its first attempts to implement the idea of social impact bonds within the support service framework. The Ministry of Development initiated those ventures by launching competitions co-financed from the European Union funds. The following model of social impact bond implementation was created as part of one of the above-mentioned projects.6

The proposed model of social impact bonds concerns interventions within the labour market; to be precise—the employment support for the unemployed. To avoid any doubts, this instrument will be described below from the perspectives of the roles of individual entities, which is illustrated by the following scheme.

In the proposed model, the District Labour Office (DLO; Powiatowy Urząd Pracy—PUP) is the contracting party, which, in accordance with Article 34 of the Act on employment promotion and labour market institutions, provides job search assistance for registered unemployed persons, and if it is not possible to provide them with appropriate work, initiates and co-finances the creation of additional jobs. An external entity is commissioned to perform this service, which is to be done with the help of the bond instrument. The role of DLO is limited to defining the expected outcomes of intervention by specifying

5 Available at: http://www.instiglio.org/en/sibs-worldwide/ [access date: 15.09.2017].6 The model of using social impact bonds to provide support on the labour market has

been previously described in other works of the authors of this article and in the work of Baha Kalinowska-Sufinowicz, Ph.D., PUEB Associate Professor, within the framework of a project co-financed by the European Union, under the European Social Fund, entitled “The mechanism of implementation of social impact bonds on the labour market”, carried out by DGA S.A., in partner-ship with Wielkopolska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości Sp. z o.o. within Axis IV Operational Programme Knowledge Education Development “Social Innovation and Transnational Coopera-tion”, measure 4.1 Social innovations.


a minimum percentage of the unemployed who became employed for a given time due to the intervention, e.g. a minimum of 80% of people subject to intervention within a 2-year period. The DLO makes the payment after implementation of the intervention and achievement of the previously determined performance indicator. The payment is made to the intermediary; an entity that also functions as an issuer of the bonds in relation to the investors. The intermediary is also responsible for selecting the entity performing tasks in the field of job search assistance. It may be a non-governmental organisation or a non-public employment agency that will recruit unemployed persons whose profiles are defined by the employer (in terms of knowledge, competences and skills). Employment support services can also rely on social coaching or trainings, support of a job coach, etc. depending on the deficits of individual unemployed persons and the needs of the employer in question.

Scheme 2. The social impact bond model on the labour market in Poland

7. payment of a specific remuneration when the employment outcome is achieved

5. assessment of results of the intervention on the labour market

Outcome payers(District Labour Office)

Evaluator(evaluation companies, consulting

companies, academics)

Investors(entrepreneurs seeking employees)

Intermediary(private entities specialisingin financing organisation of

public-private ventures)

2. payment of capital (purchase of social impact bonds)

Contractor performing the social task(entity carrying out employment support services)

3. commissioning activities aimed at providing employment support for the unemployed and paying for said activities

Beneficiaries(unemployed people registeredin the District Labour Office)

4. recruitment and training of employees in accordance with the needs reported by the investor-entrepreneur

8. return of capital and payment of the specified capital gain if the employment outcome is achieved

1. determination of social outcomes, i.e. the expected number of unemployed people who become employed for a given time

6. information on whether the goal was achieved

Source: own work, based on: Galitopoulou, Noya, 2016, pp. 4–6.

It is worth recalling that the bond model is based on the “pay for results” principle, so it requires figuring out how to obtain financing for implementation of the intervention. The investors, that is, the employers who buy bonds play the key role in this context. The funds invested must guarantee the provision of employment support services from job search assistance to training. If the anticipated outcome of the intervention is achieved, the investor receives their capital back with the appropriate added gain (e.g. the


interests which are higher than the market-level interests). However, in the event of failure, the invested capital is lost, either in part or in entirety. In the presented model, the entrepreneur-investor bears the full risk associated with a potential failure of the undertaking, which would be a failure to achieve the assumed employment indicators. The benefits for the investor should be therefore emphasised. They are revealed in two basic contexts. Firstly, in the economic dimension, the entrepreneur saves on the costs of training and recruitment of the employee and is guaranteed that the new employee would be obliged to work for the employer during the intervention period, which is an important issue in the context of increasing demand for employees. Secondly, the purchase of social impact bonds can be treated as an example of pro-social activity, which demonstrates that the enterprise is involved in the local community, as it actively participates in its development projects.

The funds provided by investors do not only cover the costs of employment support, but their significant part is provided to the unemployed in the form of loans-donations. The so-obtained capital would be used to set up the previously unemployed people’s own businesses; it would be spent on fixed assets, equipment, and machinery, including resources necessary to provide work for the benefit of the entrepreneur. An unemployed person can receive money for starting a business only if one agrees to provide services to a specific investor-entrepreneur. Because of this, the self-employed would receive revenues which could be used to repay the loan, on predefined dates and at very low interest rates. Therefore, the purpose of the developed model is to bring the unemployed person together with an entrepreneur seeking a new employee. It is worth emphasising that employment support services implemented on the basis of the social impact bond mechanism should be addressed to a selected, relatively narrow category of the unemployed people. To use the nomenclature of public employment services—it would be the person with the first or possibly the second assistance profile, so only slightly removed from the labour market and ready to enter it with the support of loan-subsidies and a properly designed training and coaching offer.

Conclusions: a critical analysis of social impact bondsas an instrument of social policy

Having outlined the social impact bond mechanism and identified conditions for their development, it is worth to assess the proposed model more critically. The following comments, presented in the form of a list of doubts/objections, should in no way be used as fuel to contest the very idea of social impact bonds, but should be treated as a starting point in the discussion on the model of their implementation. The social impact bond model, despite its weaknesses, should be treated as one of the new forms of sustainable development of the social policy system in the context of low public expenditures and increasing social needs (Pasi, 2014, p. 148). What is more, some mitigating strategies have been formulated in response to the presented arguments which eliminate the problems and show possible ways of improving the model.


First, social impact bonds support an effectiveness-oriented approach to social policy. Due to the fact that social impact bonds are based on the idea of pay for results, only those social goals that are possible to quantify (can be expressed in numbers) count in the final evaluation of activities. The performance indicator of social objectives based on specific measurement parameters can be treated by investors as an attractive investment product (Pasi, 2014, p. 146), that is, investor may make their interest in a given investment conditional on whether a given target performance indicator is achievable. In the case of the labour market, there might be a certain “fetishisation” of employment rates—reaching the target rate might be treated as the ultimate measure of success of the initiative, whereas the soft outcomes of employment support measures might go unnoticed. Proposed evaluations of outcomes should also include so-called soft results, i.e. increased confidence in one’s own strength, greater motivation for engaging in professional and social activity, or an increased sense of responsibility.

Secondly, the proposed model is by design based only on the commodified gainful work, and the income obtained through said work is supposed to be an argument supporting the legitimacy of this type of intervention on the macroeconomic scale—that is, an unemployed person who becomes employed will no longer be associated with public expenses related to the payment of unemployment benefits. In addition, the newly-employed person will receive remuneration for their work, which will in turn contribute to the state and local government unit’s budgets, e.g. as payments of income tax. On the labour market, the social impact bond model does not take into consideration any alternative forms of activities which can also be treated as work, albeit non-profit kind of work, e.g. volunteering, reproductive labour of women, involvement in the local community, etc. Thus, the social impact bond model could apply to the above-mentioned work areas, but it would require a change of the entity acting as the contracting party—it could not be the district labour office.

Thirdly, because the proposed mechanism focuses on employment rates and the employer’s needs, it may be easy to reduce the unemployed people to resources which are to be profiled in accordance with the needs of the investor, i.e. the employer. Social impact bonds should focus more on the co-production of services (Pestof, 2012; Sześciło, 2015), treating the beneficiary of the support as a partner in the implemented support activities. In practice, this could mean developing resourcefulness in job search activities and shaping entrepreneurial attitudes through social coaching conducted as part of job search assistance services.

Fourthly, when it comes to services responding to the problem of unemployment, the proposed model of social impact bonds can hardly be considered to be a social innovation. It refers to well-known, even conservative, tools and forms of support—job search assistance, trainings, loans, and subsidies. However, the innovative potential is located in the context of the proposed model of cooperation in which public institutions are to cooperate with the private and/or local government sectors on the basis of the pay for results principle. The proposed new cooperation model can therefore be seen as an innovation, which is also a belief of Zbigniew Woźniak who wrote the following:


“creating and implementing new ideas that enable people to organise interpersonal activities and social interactions to achieve one or more common goals—innovations through participation allow to do more for less” (Woźniak, 2016, p. 213).

Fifth, the potential weakness of the proposed bond model may consist in limiting the support to a small group of beneficiaries who are resourceful and entrepreneurial enough to quickly and effectively enter into the role of an employee, which will allow for achievement of effective employment outcomes. Therefore, it may lead to emergence of a relatively well-known phenomenon of the so-called “creaming”—that is, provision of support to those who have already been beneficiaries of projects or have not spent too much time off the market and thus show potential for achieving the employment success. Taking these types of risks into consideration, it is possible to limit the area of intervention to the unemployed with the second or third assistance profiles.7

In conclusion, the proposed form of intervention works well in the context of a specific agenda of problems, in favourable socio-economic conditions and with a high level of trust between the public institution and its co-operators. Therefore, the social impact bond model cannot be treated as an alternative to a functioning system of employment support services, but only as another instrument in a wide range of possible forms of employment support and assistance.

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aktywnej polityki rynku pracy w Polsce. Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne, no. 4 (76), pp. 153–168.

Cooper, Ch., Graham, C., Himick, D. (2016). Social impact bonds: The securitization of the homeless. Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 55, p. 63–82. DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2016.10.003.

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Woźniak, Z. (2016). Praca socjalna a innowacje społeczne – między rutyną a zmianą. Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, no. 3, pp. 205–230.

Ustawa z dnia 24 kwietnia 2003 r. o działalności pożytku publicznego i o wolontariacie, Journal of Laws [Dziennik Ustaw] of 2003 No. 96 item 873 with subsequent amend-ments.

Ustawa z dnia 20 kwietnia 2004 r. o promocji zatrudnienia i instytucjach rynku pracy, Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1065 with subsequent amendments.


Ustawa z dnia 15 stycznia 2015 r. o obligacjach, Journal of Laws of 2015, item 238, Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1089 with subsequent amendments.

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http://psz.praca.gov.pl/-/69796-profilowanie-pomocy [access date: 18.09.2017]

Perspektywy wdrażania obligacji społecznych w Polsce—przykład interwencji na rynku pracy

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest opisanie obligacji społecznych jako innowacyjnego instrumentu finansowania usług społecznych. W pierwszej części przedstawiona jest istota tego rozwiązania w wymiarze ekonomicznym, instytucjonalnym oraz prawnym. Następnie dokonana jest analiza szans rozwoju obligacji społecznych w Polsce, biorąc pod uwagę uwarunkowania rynku pracy i rynku kapitałowego. W dalszej części autorzy przedstawiają propozycję zastosowania modelu obligacji społecznych w usługach aktywizacji zawodowej. Podsumowaniem jest krytyczna analiza modelu ukazująca potencjalnie słabe strony interwencji z zastosowanym mechanizmem wraz z propozycjami przeciwdziałania.

Słowa kluczowe: obligacje społeczne, rynek pracy, usługi aktywizacji zawodowej

FROM RESEARCH WORKSHOPS

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019.87100

Marek Bednarski

Faculty of Economic Sciences, Chair of Political EconomyUniversity of Warsaw1

Social determinants of the shadow economy in the small and micro-sized enterprise sector

from the local perspective. Conclusions of empirical research

SummaryThis paper presents economic and sociological determinants of the shadow economy in the small and micro-sized enterprise sector in Poland, based on empirical research. Special attention is paid to social embeddedness of this phenomenon. It is indicated that the shadow economy generates specific social problems, whole also solving some of them. The article concludes with some socio-economics policy suggestions.

Key words: shadow economy, small and micro-sized enterprise sector, social problems

1 Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych UW, Katedra Ekonomii Politycznej, ul. Długa 44/50, 00-241 Warszawa; author’s email address: [email protected], ORCID — 0000-0002-5018-2151.

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IntroductionSocial problems in every country, constituting a scope of interest for social policy both

as a science and an area of practical actions, remain in close relation to the economic processes happening therein. Solving problems present in the areas most important for social policy, that is, the widely understood employment, health protection, protection in case of illness and in the old age, functioning of the family, migration, poverty or pathology (Firlit-Fesnak, Szylko-Skoczny, 2007) is linked to what is the essence of economy—allocating limited resources. It also must be borne in mind that through their shape, economic processes create social problems themselves. At the same time, with its interventions, both created because of effectiveness and justice, social policy influences economy. The nature of relationships between economic and social policy is recognised in science, which is reflected in relevant literature (Golinowska, 1994; Barr, 2016).

However, the analyses of this type mostly focus on the social policy—official economy relations, thus monitored and regulated by the state. On the other hand, important social issues are created, and sometimes to some extent, solved by the so-called shadow economic area. Moreover, its functioning is conditioned by the social environment and social rootedness, as per its definition, the shadow economy is not subject to the State regulations. The necessary institutional governance must ensure the social capital resources here. At the same time, the shape of the shadow economy, to a large extent, but not only, remains the result of the implemented economic and social policy.

This article is an attempt to analyse the relationships outlined on the basis of empirical research conducted in Poland, both original (published and new) and described in literature. My thesis here is that the informal economy in the small and micro enterprises (MSE’s, Polish: MMP) sector, as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on the one hand creates social problems, but on the other hand, although in a limited way, is conducive to solving them. This may include marginalised labour resources, economically weaker companies and poorer consumers. The second thesis concerns the strong social rooting of the shadow economy in Poland, which is conducive to its expansion (when other conditions are favourable) or at least stabilisation, and makes it difficult for the State to limit it. This article attempts to justify these theses.

The shadow economy: the concept and the scale of the phenomenonThe problem of management outside the state regulation and registration became

a subject of reflection within the framework of social sciences, and economic sciences in particular, in the 1980s (Feige, 1982; Tanzi, 1983). This was probably related to the accumulation of economic expansion of the state in that period (Rutkowski, 2009, pp. 89–99), which triggered a specific defensive reaction of economic entities that tried to avoid state monitoring and influence. This area of economic activity was noticed by science, which attempted to explain the rules of its functioning. This has been supported by governments seeking to reduce the phenomenon, harmful from their point of view.

89Social determinants of the shadow economy in the small and micro-sized enterprise sector…

The task has proven difficult already at the level of a simple description and definition, which is illustrated by the multitude of names given to this phenomenon. One can find here such terms as hidden economy, black economy, informal economy, “in the moonlight”, “under the table”, “in the wild”, in the shade, in the second circuit, grey economy, unobservable (this term is used by the Central Statistical Office—CSO; Polish: GUS). The variety of names was an expression of the diverse understanding of this phenomenon by different authors.

In the light of the conventions applied by the CSO, the unobservable economy consists mainly of three areas: illegal, hidden and informal activities (Fundowicz, Łapiński, Wyżnikiewicz, 2018). Illegal activities are the production and distribution of goods prohibited by law (e.g. drugs) or legal goods by unauthorised entities (medical treatment without a diploma). Hidden activities take place in registered companies in order to avoid taxation or state regulations. Informal activities are, in turn, carried out by entities unregistered at all, usually on a small scale. They may be clearly separated from households or form part of households. It should be stressed that the unobservable economy understood in this way is treated as creating added value, and therefore included in the gross domestic product (GDP) account. However, the category of unobservable economy does not include activities where one of the parties is not a voluntary participant (for example, theft).

Within such a defined space, individual authors or institutions, in accordance with their research needs or theoretical concepts, create their own categories of economy apart from monitoring and state regulations, taking out fragments of their interest from such a broadly defined area (Slemrod, 2007; Schneider, 2011; Packard, Koettl, Montenegro, 2012).

An attempt to estimate the unobservable sector is most often made by defining its share in the GDP. According to the CSO (GUS, 2015), in 2014, it accounted for 13.3% of GDP and was relatively stable in the current decade. However, estimates from other authors (Schneider, 2011, pp. 34–35) using a different methodology indicate that the percentage of the GDP is around 26%. As a comparison, according to this author, the figure in Switzerland was 8.1%. In Germany, it amounted to 15.3%, and in Greece, to 26.5%. Everywhere, thus, it is a significant number.

For the purposes of this article, which focuses on the study of social problems related to informal economy in the MSE’s sector, I propose to call the phenomenon analysed the “shadow economy”. I will understand it, according to the definition proposed by the OECD, as the production of goods and services that are legal, but not declared to public authorities, according to the regulations in force in each country (OECD, 2002). It is therefore a scope similar to the total area of hidden and informal activity, but without illegal economy, according to the nomenclature of the Central Statistical Office. The subject of the study are, as mentioned above, micro- and small companies, i.e. companies with less than 50 employees per year on average in full-time equivalents. This is where the shadow economy, understood in accordance with the OECD definition, is the most common. Larger entities tend to apply tax ‘optimisation’ or operate through small companies.

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The basis for the theses presented in the article and their justification are the published results of empirical research on the shadow economy in Poland by various authors and also foreign publications of more general value, all referenced herein.

At the same time, only partly published results of own empirical research of a qualitative nature, in the form of in-depth structured interviews (in-depth interview IDI), conducted since 2013 at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Warsaw and the Institute of Labour and Social Affairs, have been used. In total, eleven interviews were conducted, four of which were conducted with high-level officials from institutions in contact with the shadow economy (tax, customs, commercial and statistical control services) and seven with owners of enterprises of micro and small size (if there is unofficial employment, it is difficult to obtain an unambiguous qualification). The surveyed units were scattered all over Poland and located mainly in small towns of the Mazowieckie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Lubelskie and Opolskie Voivodeships. They included sectors typical of the shadow economy (construction and installation, transport, trade, transport, financial intermediation). The aim was to achieve a broad territorial and sectoral cross-section.

It should be stressed that the respondents were not asked about their own activity (due to the informal nature of the shadow economy), but about their knowledge on the subject, which allows to extend conclusions to the entire MSE’s sector. Of course, such analyses do not have the value of representativeness. However, they allow us to penetrate into the nature of the phenomenon under study and obtain a full picture of the processes taking place there. The hypotheses formulated on this basis can then be verified by means of quantitative analyses giving representative results.

As it was mentioned earlier, own research is, however, only one of the sources of the presented analysis, which is based on an attempt to synthesise a number of published studies. This allows the conclusions to be extended to larger populations and enhances the credibility of the results.

The conditions of shadow economy operation in PolandThe functioning of the shadow economy is generally conditioned by two factors. On

the one hand, there must be motivation for informal activities on the part of potential participants, mainly entrepreneurs and employees. On the other hand, mechanisms must exist in place to ensure elementary institutional governance in this area, which the state here, as an entity that is deliberately bypassed, cannot ensure. And a market that regulates the shadow economy requires such order. Both factors are strongly conditioned not only economically, but also socially.

The issue of motivation is quite thoroughly described in the state of the art, both Polish and international (Kudła, 2004; Bednarski, Kryńska, Pater, Walewski, 2008; Schneider, 2011; Szulc, 2013; Kryńska, 2015). The motives are, on the one hand, to avoid tributes to the state, such as various taxes and compulsory contributions, and, on the other hand, to avoid legal regulations that create costs and require going through a bureaucratic ordeal.


The process of avoiding taxes is sometimes described in literature as a particular game between taxpayers and fiscal authorities. The variables in this game are the probability that the tax deduction will be detected by the tax office, the amount of the penalty imposed in case of fraud and the benefits of avoiding paying the tax.

Over-regulation of the economy is burdensome and encouraging to locate in the shadow economy, especially from the perspective of small entrepreneurs. Here, one can indicate a surplus of concessions, permits and other regulations. Clarity of the law, transparency of relevant forms and declarations are also important for the entrepreneur.

The hypotheses formulated above on the basis of literature are confirmed by own research. A respondent says: “I think the most important reason is, above all, the excessive tax burden and the Social Insurance Institution (SII; Polish: ZUS). In addition, this entails bureaucracy. And employees decide to work in the grey economy mainly because of the possibility of receiving a higher salary. An employer like me, who employs five people, prefers to pay the symbolic zloty more to an employee and not play around with the SII fees and taxes, while an employee prefers the proverbial zloty an hour more.” Another respondent explains the logic of employers’ acting here: “In a market economy, money is the basic value and profit is the measure of the effectiveness of a company’s operations. By employing in the shadow economy, employers reduce labour costs, which allows them to achieve a higher profit. Lower labour costs often make the employer more competitive on the market than companies employing legally.” Therefore, employment in the shadow economy is fast additional income today but also an element of building the image of a company as a cheap contractor in the long run. Therefore, only economic criteria count, although the respondent is aware of the social dimension of activities in the shadow economy, because he adds: “this human nature makes employers often forget about social and humanitarian issues, forget about them and risk a hypothetical conflict with the law”. And this risk of conflict with the law is actually hypothetical, because, as stated by another respondent: “an employer who employs in the shadow economy does not risk much. Possible controls will not do him any great harm and he will easily pay a possible fine for the profit he has when he hires employees in the shadow economy”. Another respondent adds: “We all do that in our country.”

From the employee’s perspective, the economic mechanism encouraging participation in the grey economy is connected with the fact that the level of labour costs acceptable for employers in relation to specific qualifications (a specific “gross” salary) is determined by local labour markets and it is largely up to the employee to divide them into the received “net salary” and taxes and contributions. A respondent says: “Employees are usually well aware of how much their employer can spend on wages. So they know that if they get something «under the table», they won’t have to share it with the state, whether it’s with the SII or the tax office.” On the other hand, many social benefits are only granted below certain income thresholds and employees try to maximise their income from the State. A respondent notices: “We’ve got 500+ [a benefit for families with children—translator’s note] now and the employees are trying to get a grant for all the kids here. They’re just telling me to do something so they don’t lose the 500+.

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I also know from others that employees or more like, their families apply for various subsidies from social welfare centres and here too, they want to have the lowest income shown.” Control mechanisms also fail in relation to employees. A respondent is of the opinion that: “Employees are not afraid of inspections of various services, because in reality, these inspections are aimed at repressive actions against employers and not employees.”

The shadow economy, as understood in this article, is regulated by the market mechanism. Here, in registered and non-registered entities, the streams of supply of non-declared goods and services are created, which have to meet streams of demand from other companies or households. However, the functioning of every market, including the shadow economy, requires a specific institutional order protecting the entities operating here from opportunistic behaviour of partners resulting, above all, from information asymmetries. It is therefore necessary to ensure that appropriate institutions are in place to guarantee, in particular, the credibility of commitments and the possibility of cross-reviewing their implementation. In the shadow economy, by its very nature, formal institutions created by the State, usually in the form of legal regulations and mechanisms of their execution, are not present. Therefore, they must be replaced by informal institutions, i.e. informal rules of the social game (North, 2002), because in this area, there are transactions of exchange of goods or lease of labour force on a mass scale, impossible without an elementary institutional order.

In my opinion, it could be argued that informal institutions regulating the shadow economy are created in its social environment, in local networks, where MSE’s are firmly embedded. It should be stressed that the motives behind their actions are explained by both the homo oeconomicus model and the homo sociologicus model (Chmielewski, 2011). On the one hand, as mentioned above, individuals, both as employers and employees, try to maximise their income and keep a specific cost-benefit account. On the other hand, as the research shows, they carry out their roles imposed by the local environment, which takes place, to a large extent, through social networks.

At the same time, networks are understood here as a social infrastructure that serves to coordinate the activities of functioning entities, provide information, exert influence. Hence the division into advisory, trust and communication networks (Koniuszy, 2014, pp. 24–45). Thus, if the networks are functioning properly, they meet the signalled needs for mutual control of entities and the guarantee of the credibility of their commitments. Of course, the functioning of the network may fail due to differences in goals, conflicts of interest, cultural differences, spatial distance or short-term nature of relationships. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the network is supported by the IT infrastructure (the Internet), which makes it possible to quickly reveal the opportunistic activities of entities.

The effectiveness of the network from an analysed perspective can be explained by the concept of “social rooting” of the economy (Granovetter, 1985). This author points out that economic decisions are the result of the impact of both economic and non-economic institutions, because the binding norms and rules are important for individuals. Above all,


close (“strong”) relations with other people, which make the information cheap, in-depth and reliable, are important here, as it is based on the experience of external observers (Grzesiuk, 2015).

A slightly different perspective for the performed analysis is given by the use of the category of social capital understood, among others, as a resource of benefits from functioning in the network. It is also referred to as a mechanism fostering cooperation. Despite differences between them, all these approaches stress the role of trust arising as a result of the formation of permanent bonds between individuals (Woźniak-Jęchorek, 2016, pp. 30–32). And trust creates the prerequisites for guaranteeing the credibility of commitments without the State control.

In general, the theoretical concepts mentioned above emphasise the complementary role of interpersonal relations in relation to market mechanisms in shaping economic processes. These relations are described by categories of social rootedness or social capital, embedded in networks and building informal institutions. For the shadow economy, deprived of protection by formal institutions, they should be of key importance.

Empirical research shows that this is indeed the case. Respondents are aware of both market and non-economic pressures. One of them says: “Because this market pressure is certainly important here, but one cannot escape such informal issues either. It seems to me that these two factors intertwine.” Another one adds, though: “but I think this market pressure is becoming more and more dominant.” In the light of the research, the size of the locality is important here, which is connected with the creation and effectiveness of the social network impact. A respondent notices: “It’s different when you know everybody, and different in a big city.”

Within the network, the category of trust is crucial. One respondent emphasizes: “Mutual trust between employers and employees as well as between employers and customers is important.” Trust is built, on the one hand, by the circulation of information in the local network. A respondent says: “I know if someone didn’t pay me for a job, everyone would know.” The Internet plays an important role here. Respondents indicate that “it’s very dangerous for employers, because employees can write bad things about the company at any time, mainly by creating a so-called PR on the company Facebook pages.” On the other hand, different types of ties are important. Here, the respondents indicate: “family ties, social ties between the sides of these contracts. Practically everyone knows each other here, so it’s common to keep these agreements.” Religious ties may be important. One respondent emphasizes: “Here, we meet in the church. Nobody’s gonna cheat on anyone here.”

It is interesting that by building links between communities, local networks can use them against outsiders from the network, building specific monopolistic structures. The functioning of the social network creates mutual loyalty and disciplines its members, preventing competition. The respondent talks about strawberry growers: “Until recently, there was an unwritten rule that on Sundays, you don’t do anything with these strawberries. A few years ago, that rule was broken. Sunday is now the same working day as Monday or Tuesday.” Another one adds: “There are very strong ties there—of such a solidarity

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among farmers that salaries for seasonal workers are at the same level. So they do not compete for these workers, they all have the same rates. And no one breaks out.”

It is also worth noting that loyalty to the State does not cause respondents to reflect either.

The research confirms the thesis that the order formed within the framework of informal institutions embedded in social networks is, next to the market, the leading regulator of the grey economy. This makes it possible to realise the benefits of avoiding restrictions and levies imposed by the State.

The shadow economy as a place of social problemsFrom a macroeconomic perspective, by limiting the revenues of the state budget, the

shadow economy hinders the achievement of its social objectives. However, from the microeconomic perspective considered in the article, the social consequences of the grey economy on the labour market and in the sphere of employment are of key importance. It can be argued that the SME sector is, to a large extent, the space of the second, worse segment in the light of the dual labour market concept. And the shadow economy is its bottom sector. It is therefore characterised by low wages, poor working conditions, lack of opportunities for professional advancement and insecurity of employment. Empirical research indicates (Bednarski, 2017) that this is largely the case. The shadow economy is home to poor quality jobs and, in this sense, to social problems.

Respondents stress that wages are indeed often low. One of them states: “Surely most of those working in the shadow economy are people who accept any conditions just to have a job and get by.” This, of course, will create a problem of poverty, which may become even worse in the case of illness (lack of health insurance) and old age (lack of pension insurance). One respondent is judging: “In my opinion, the majority of workers are certainly aware of all the risks arising from undeclared work, lack of insurance in the event of sickness, low pension or no pension at all.” These problems may be limited by partial registration of employment or unemployment status, yet they are not eliminated. Those working in the shadow economy are therefore potential or already actual clients of social welfare.

At the same time, which is typical for the worse segment of the labour market, the level of occupational health and safety (OHS; Polish: bezpieczeństwo i higiena pracy, BHP) is low. One respondent even says that: “for money, an employee risks his own health and often his life.” And later, he adds: “The employer doesn’t feel bound by any labour law regulations. The workplace for such an employee is also cheaper.” Work there is therefore legally unprotected and dangerous, which allows employers to reduce the cost of employment at the expense of the quality of the workplace.

Employment in the shadow economy is also a way of hiding incomes by persons prosecuted by a bailiff. These may be bank debtors or people who do not pay their maintenance. A respondent is outraged: “There’s a large group of men who don’t really want to pay the adjudged alimony for their children. They try to show the lowest possible


income. And this is also very tragic, because what kind of a person you have to be to evade providing for your own children?” Maintenance debts do indeed create a major social problem and the informal economy actually makes it possible to avoid maintenance obligations.

It should also be noted that the shadow economy may not only create a segment of worse employment, especially low wages, but also affect all employment in the local labour markets. In the opinion of respondents, such phenomena may occur. In particular, those working in the informal sector can push those who are employed officially out of their jobs. A respondent says: “Yes, unfortunately, that’s what happens. And why? Because such workers are simply cheaper, we do not have to pay their benefits, taxes, insurance, and so on. And you don’t have to play with bureaucracy.” The impact on wages in the official sector is also signalled. A respondent notices: “Surely, the shadow economy contributes to the fact that the wages of legally employed workers do not increase or do not increase at the same rate as the income of a given employer. This is where a mechanism works that both sides are well aware that there is an alternative in the form of the employment of new workers within the grey economy.” At the same time, the signalled phenomena of the transfer of employment to the grey economy or the reduction of wages in the official sector do not necessarily mean that one person leaves work and is replaced by another. A respondent indicates that “employers more and more often use the solution that they employ a part-time employee. Such an employee actually works full-time and, depending on the results of his or her work, gets a bonus.” Therefore, it is not the employee, but his or her working time that is shifted to the shadow economy. At the same time, it should be noted that high qualifications protect against being pushed into a worse segment of employment. A respondent notices: “I know a case of one restaurant where a chef works on a contract of employment and earns PLN 6000, and everyone else is employed on a contract of mandate and they earn PLN 50 a day. But without the chef, this restaurant would have simply stopped working.” It is possible to guess that the crew locates additional working time in the shadow economy and there, they obtain extra income. The key specialist for the company can operate completely legally, in a better employment segment.

Thus, the shadow economy creates social problems, including in its environment. It is a worse segment of the labour market, which offers low wages and does not sufficiently satisfy other, non-wage needs of employees. However, it is important to consider whether it is not also a way of solving them.

Does the shadow economy help solve selected social problems?Previous considerations have shown that various social problems are present in

the grey economy. To understand their nature, however, it is important to answer the question to what extent the shadow economy is their source and to what extent only the place where they appear. In the latter case, entering the shadow economy may at least mitigate existing social problems and limiting their impact. From this point of

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view, the prerequisites for entering the shadow economy, to what extent it is voluntary and to what extent it is compulsory, are important. If the entry is voluntary, the grey economy can be seen as a source of social problems and if forced, it can be seen as a specific shelter for the maladjusted. From this perspective, it is worth to look at three basic entities operating here: employees, small companies and households (Bednarski et al., 2008).

From the social point of view, the situation of those employed in the informal economy is crucial, because, as it has been shown, they bear the most important consequences of informal work. In the light of the research, it can be concluded that there are two groups of employees here. Some people are looking for short-term financial benefits at the expense of social security in the long term. Others work in the shadow economy because they cannot find employment elsewhere, at all or for enough money to support their families. It may also involve recklessness, inability to think in long term. However, in recent years, with the improvement of the situation on the labour market, the former group seems to dominate. One respondent is judging: “In the vast majority of cases, it is a voluntary choice of employees, but only a few years ago it was a little different. But now the market situation is such that if someone doesn’t want to work illegally, they will find a legal job. It is the workers themselves who are not currently willing to sign contracts.” But another respondent, representing a different region and industry, says: “I think that undeclared work is more of an alternative than a voluntary choice.” And continues: “Usually, these are workers with low education and also workers aged 50+, from small towns and villages, mentally, a little bit intimidated, unable to cope with the current reality.” Respondents also emphasise the peculiar mentality of some employees of the shadow economy: “They don’t think of the future in the perspective of 3–5 years. They are thinking a year ahead maximum, and most often, it’s thinking in the perspective of the upcoming Christmas.” It is therefore a trap for voluntary undeclared workers, a source of social problems. For others, however, it is an opportunity for a kind of employment after all, a relatively stable income and minimal stability. In a way far from perfect, the shadow economy still solves their problem.

Similar reasoning can be applied to entrepreneurs operating in the SME sector. Some of them are stable on the market. If they enter the shadow economy, it is for extraordinary profits. A respondent says: “Here, some employers, I think not so many, want to maximise their profit by saving on social security contributions. For them, undeclared workers are simply cheaper than those with employment contracts.” And another one adds: “If you hire an employee on the black market, even adding a thousand zlotys to their pay, the owner’s profit will almost double.” Therefore, the temptation is strong.

Sometimes, things are different, though. Micro and small businesses are often opened not by choice, but by force, because their owners cannot find paid employment. They are usually characterised by low business skills, high level of fear of failure, limited ambitions. When confronted with difficult environmental conditions, such as strong competition or ailing state burdens, their companies rarely reach maturity and often fail. As a respondent notices: “There is also a certain group of companies, mainly small, family-owned


companies, which defend themselves against market exit in this way (shadow economy share).” Another one adds: “If I had hired employees with full insurance, I wouldn’t have earned anything as an employer.” And continues: “There are ups and downs, and there is not always work, and sometimes it’s easier to part ways with an employee without an official contract. It’s also time-consuming and cost-intensive to keep all this documentation. I couldn’t do anything then, I’d just sit in the paperwork. There wouldn’t be anyone to supervise the work. I would’ve lost my clients in two months!” And a collapse of a micro and small business is also a social problem. The owners lose their livelihood, his employees lose their jobs. Hence, the shadow economy, which creates a survival space for weak companies with little added value, plays, to some extent, a positive role. Although this space rather perpetuates their marginal status without creating a perspective for strengthening and expansion, which has consequences for the quality of companies in the entire economy.

The same applies to households using goods and services produced in the shadow economy. They are exposed to a lower quality of products in the absence, often, of formal qualifications and authorisations of craftsmen, guarantees, approvals and similar official safeguards. But many take the risk of buying, in view of the expectation of a significantly lower price (Bednarski et al., 2008). However, there is no unanimity among respondents on this issue. One respondent claims: “If there were no undeclared work, these products and services would be more expensive. So it’s a positive thing for customers, because they can pay less for a hairdresser or have lunch at a bar more cheaply.” But another one says: “In the end, lower labour costs do not have a significant impact on the price of the product for the consumer. In general, profits remain with employers or intermediaries.” It is reasonable to believe that the differences outlined are due to the different levels of competition in the markets observed by the respondents. Nevertheless, at least in many cases, sometimes prices in the shadow economy are lower. Some households take advantage of these opportunities for short-term benefits, but for poorer ones, cheaper goods and services from the shadow economy are the only chance to take advantage of them. This can be seen as a form of solving a social problem such as limited access to certain types of consumer goods.

In conclusion, it is possible to defend the thesis that to some extent, the shadow economy solves particular social problems. However, society pays the price of lower tax revenues, and those interested in functioning in marginal markets are subject to discrimination, which over time becomes durable. This promotes the creation of a layer of the permanently excluded—the precariat.

ConclusionThe outlined characteristics of the social conditions of the shadow economy may lead

to suggestions to the state policy towards this area. Above all, however, it must be realised that the strong rooting of this phenomenon in local networks and the use of social capital resources here means that it will remain a permanent element of the local economy.

98 Marek Bednarski

Therefore, in the policy towards the shadow economy, it is worth distinguishing between situations of voluntary and forced entry into this area.

In the case of informal operation, activities with a higher and low level of social harm should still be isolated on a voluntary basis. The latter case will include actions on a small scale of units or small groups of persons having social insurance from other sources, not carrying the risk for manufacturers or consumers, performed on the borderline of natural activity of households. Such activity should be “whitewashed”, allowing unregistered operation. This will not change the scale of the phenomenon, because such production embedded in social networks has always taken place, but will create comfort of legality for the participants of the transaction. It also gives the possibility of state arbitration in case of disputes.

However, when it comes to exploitation, gross violations of labour law, threats to workers or consumers, violations of the principles of fair competition in relation to, for example, the non-registration of part of production in registered companies, or an escape from creditors, criminal repression becomes necessary. At the same time, it is important that the threat is perceived as real and the penalty adequate to the possible benefits.

We should behave differently in the face of informal actions of individuals or companies that do not cope with the official markets. In this case, as has been said, the shadow economy does not create a social problem, but only reveals it and, to some extent, even solves it. It is not enough to agree to informal activities here, but help is needed. It seems that such an opportunity can be created by the so-called “social entrepreneurship.” Here, economic entities can operate outside the rules imposed on everyone by the state and the market. However, it is not easy. On the one hand, we need a reliable selection of those who expect the rules of management to be relaxed, because many people will certainly be willing profit from it. On the other hand, there will be the reluctance of some candidates who are accustomed to working outside the rules of law and who do not think in terms of the future. Such measures should therefore be seen in terms of social policy rather than economic policy.

In general, research indicates that there is a need for a strong differentiation in the activities in relation to the shadow economy in view of its hybrid character.

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100 Marek Bednarski

Społeczne uwarunkowania funkcjonowania szarej strefyw sektorze mikroprzedsiębiorstw i małych przedsiębiorstw

z perspektywy lokalnej. Wnioski z badań empirycznych

Streszczenie

Artykuł prezentuje ekonomiczne i socjologiczne uwarunkowania funkcjonowania szarej strefy w sektorze mikro- i małych przedsiębiorstw w Polsce na podstawie badań empirycznych. Podkreślone jest tu społeczne zakorzenienie tego fenomenu. Wskazuje się, że szara strefa tworzy określone problemy społeczne, ale niektóre również rozwiązuje. Artykuł kończą sugestie pod adresem polityki społeczno-ekonomicznej.

Słowa kluczowe: szara strefa, sektor mikro- i małych przedsiębiorstw, problemy społeczne

https://doi.org/10.31971/16401808.44.1.2019.101115

Joanna Rutecka-Góra

Institute of Statistics and DemographyWarsaw School of Economics1

Supplementary pension schemes: needs, possibilities and problems

with evaluation from the perspective of an individual saver2

SummaryThe purpose of this article is to identify the scope of information (both qualitative and quantitative) relating to pension products, necessary to evaluate their operation by individual saver and subsequently to compare this scope with the information provided to customers by financial institutions. The research relies on an analysis of available literature, documents and reports of pension institutions as well as the legal acts which govern the pension scheme and the financial market. The analysis of the situation in Poland led to the identification, in the final part of the report, of possible future changes in the information policies and of restraints, which follow from the nature of the products offered and the level of complexity of the supplementary schemes.

1 Instytut Statystyki i Demografii, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, ul. Madalińskiego 6/8 pok. 221, 02-513 Warszawa; adres elektroniczny autorki: [email protected], ORCID — 0000-0002-2509-8599.

2 The research was financed from research grant number UMO-2016/21/D/HS5/03905 from the National Science Centre in Poland.

102 Joanna Rutecka-Góra

Key words: pension scheme, supplementary old-age security, occupational pension schemes, individual retirement accounts, individual retirement savings accounts

IntroductionSupplementary pension schemes are a necessary element of the social security

system in view of increasingly lower replacement rates from mandatory schemes, which have been subjected to in-depth, systemic and parametric reforms over recent decades. Consequently, a pension gap arises, which reflects the difference between the desired income and the income received from base pension system, which may be supplemented with an additional, either collective or individual, pension scheme. It is assumed (Góra, Rutecka, 2013; Rutecka, 2014) that a supplementary pension system should be universal, transparent (both in terms of the product structure and the structure of the entire system), effective and cheap. It should also feature stability, flexibility and should yield additional savings of long-term nature and support the economic growth and increased social welfare.

The said qualities are sometimes difficult to reconcile, especially when it comes to simultaneous universality, adaptation to individual needs of each potential participant, flexibility and transparency. Consequently, even developed markets offering supplementary pension schemes, which operate in Western Europe, are characterised by high complexity and multi-dimensional lack of transparency (Allgayer et al., 2016), which makes it difficult to move around them for an individual customer.

The level of complexity of supplementary pension products may be analysed using several dimensions (Turner, 2013; Rutecka, 2014; Chłoń-Domińczak, Góra, Rutecka, 2016a):• the complexity of the architecture of an additional pension system due to the avail-

ability of a number of institutional forms (employee and individual schemes, solutions addressed to various groups of recipients);

• the complexity of the product structure, which occurs where various products are offered by different financial institutions;

• the complexity of financial mechanisms used in pension products;• the complexity of the agreement, which consists in the inclusion of numerous additio-

nal documents affecting its provisions; • the complexity of the system of fees associated with the pension products;• complexity resulting from the characteristics and/or size of the tax incentives used.

The multi-dimensional complexity of supplementary pension systems is a direct consequence of offering a broad range of financial products (pension funds, cash pension schemes, unit-linked life insurance, investment funds, bank accounts or securities

103Supplementary pension schemes: needs, possibilities and problems with evaluation…

accounts). All of them are offered on the financial market, which is the most complex and the least transparent of all goods and services markets (Rajnes, 2003).

At this point, it should be emphasised that the majority of the supplementary insurance markets are characterised by a complex architecture due to a voluntary nature of this element of the pension system, which is a consequence of the need to adapt the supplementary pension products to individual needs of the savers. The third pillar should supplement the base pension system, making it more flexible (Żukowski, 1997; Góra, Rutecka, 2013). The required flexibility of a product means that there are no uniform, fully standardised solutions and various financial mechanisms can be offered, with the State regulations in this respect being minimal. Therefore, the market features quite considerable freedom to word the contractual provisions. The legal regulations usually indicate the types of institutions, which may offer individual pension schemes, the general forms of products under such solutions and the limits of contributions, if these are subject to a tax relief or are funded by the employer and/or from the state budget. This situation makes it almost impossible for an individual saver to take an optimal decision (Prast, van Soest, 2015).

Where individual persons have different preferences as to the type of financial product, the level of contributions, the period of saving and form of payment of funds, the high complexity of the supplementary pension market is common. All major international analyses and comparative reports on supplementary pension schemes indicate a great variety and considerable deviations in the architecture and operation of the third pillar in the countries subject to analysis (Szumlicz, Żukowski, 2004; European Commission, 2010; OECD, 2012; Oxera, 2013; Berthon et al., 2014; OECD, 2015; Klages, Viver, 2015; Allgayer et al., 2016). Ever more often attention is given to the fact that such international comparability of simplified statistics does not offer a full view of the specific nature of operation of each pension market. The actual complexity of the markets and a broad range of risks, which the savers face, require the involvement of the State and adoption of additional regulations to be observed by the service providers (Paklina, 2016).

Even complex architectural pension systems may operate properly if they are transparent. With respect to the third pillar, this applies to the transparency of the rules of operation regarding supplementary pension schemes, the characteristics of the tax incentives offered or access to information (particularly comparative data) about the individual pension schemes on offer, their investment results and the cost level. In most countries, the official statistics consist in publication of aggregate data concerning the number of schemes/accounts operated, the value of assets or the average amount of contributions and the account balance (OECD, 2012; Oxera, 2013; Berthon et al., 2014; Klages, Viver, 2015; Allgayer et al., 2016). However, there are no official and impartial rankings of public institutions, which would inform individuals about the qualities of the full offer of products, the rate of return and level of cost of each of the available pension products. In this respect, additional pension systems are entirely non-transparent for an individual customer, even though such an aggregate approach to the creation of statistics


facilitates and sometimes even enables comparisons between countries. In this approach, however, the saver’s needs are disregarded. The saver, who is not adequately informed about the third pillar and about products operated within its framework, may not be willing to participate in this part of the system or may take sub-optimal decisions regarding their pension. Hence, a policy of adequate information provided to individuals is essential for proper development of the supplementary pension market.

The articl e presents an analysis of the information policy implemented on the supplementary pension system market in Poland. Deficiencies resulting from failure to satisfy the need for information among the customers will be identified and changes will be recommended in the information policy to be implemented on the Polish pension market. The analysis is based on a review of literature, documents and reports of pension institutions as well as the legal acts, which govern the pension system and the financial market.

Complexity of Polish supplementary pension systemThe pension system in Poland consists of several elements (pillars), of which the

supplementary pension system (employee pension schemes and individual pension accounts) will become increasingly more important in the coming years and decades. This is a consequence of the decreasing replacement rate (on the assumption that the existing pension age is maintained) as a result of pension reform made in 1999. The reform changed the formula for calculation of the pension from a defined benefit (DB) to a defined contribution (DC), where the value of pension depends on the accumulated capital/pension eligibility (paid-in contributions) and the pensionable age. In the near future, the compulsory pension system will supply the base benefit only, which will need to be supplemented with income from additional forms of pension saving, both collective (occupational) and individual.

The third (supplementary) pillar of Polish pension system consists of two elements: the individual part and the part organised by the employer. The Employee Pension Schemes (EPS; pracownicze programy emerytalne—PPE) were the earliest to arise (in 1999) and may operate in the form of a collective (group) unit-linked life insurance (the most popular form), an agreement for contribution payment to an investment fund, an employee pension fund and foreign management. The individual pension schemes may operate in the form of individual retirement accounts (indywidualne konto emerytalne—IKE) established in 2004 or individual retirement savings accounts (indywidualne konto zabezpieczenia emerytalnego—IKZE) implemented in 2012 which differ by the limit of contributions paid and the type of tax incentives offered. These are the only forms dedicated to an individual recipient, which are characterised by exemption from capital income tax and IKZE offers an additional privilege of the possibility to deduct the contribution from the taxable base and preferential taxation at pay-outs.

Despite considerable tax incentives and clear economic benefits from the accumulation of funds in individual pension schemes, IKE and IKZE are not particularly popular among


Poles. At the end of 2017, only 5.8% of professionally active Poles held an individual pension account, and 4.2%—an individual pension security account. Table 1. Architecture of supplementary pension system in Poland

PPE IKE IKZE

Forms

— unit-linked group life insurance

— investment fund

— employee pension fund

— foreign management

— unit-linked life insurance

— investment fund

— account with a brokerage house

— bank account

— voluntary pension fund

Type of incentive

— basic contribution paid by the employer

— exemption from the capi-tal gains tax

— exemption from the capital gains tax

— deduction of contribution from taxable base

— exemption from capital gains tax

— preferential tax on the benefit (10%)

Contribution limit

7% of salary (employer)

450% of average salary (employee)

300% of average salary

120% of average salary

Pension age 60 60 65

Forms of payment

— lump sum

— instalments

— lump sum

— instalments

— lump sum

— instalments

Source: own elaboration.

This situation may result from numerous reasons. One of them is a high level of complexity of the Polish supplementary pension system according to financial products and its providers, especially in individual part. The voluntary character of the third pillar products and their almost non-existent standardisation means that contracts may include a wide variety of entirely different, supplementary options, depending on the saver’s preferences. Even though certain minimum requirements for the offer of IKE and IKZE are stipulated in the law (Ustawa z dnia 20 kwietnia 2004 r. o indywidualnych kontach emerytalnych…), they include a general indication only of the financial mechanism, type of provider, the contribution limits, types of tax incentives, conditions (mainly age-related) for starting and ending the saving, and restrictions on cancellation and transfer fees. The agreements offered on the market do not differ, except for the above-mentioned features, from standard products available outside the third pillar pension market.

Taking into account the desirable qualities of a pension product (Góra, Rutecka, 2013; Rutecka, 2014), namely: simplicity and comprehensibility, transparency, effectiveness (in terms of costs and investment results), proper risk-sharing, protection against longevity


risk, flexibility and tax benefits, products offered in the supplementary pension system in Poland do not currently display most of the aforesaid qualities. The majority of them are neither simple nor comprehensible for the potential buyer. The market is not transparent and it is difficult to evaluate its investment and cost-effectiveness. The products usually lack any investment guarantees and most of them (apart from bonds indexed for inflation) do not guarantee that the real value of the accumulated funds will be maintained. They also do not offer protection against the longevity risk, as third pillar funds are usually paid out as a lump sum. However, the market is flexible, mostly in terms of adjustment of the level of contributions and investment policy to individual needs, also with regard to the possibility to change the pension product and its provider at the stage of accumulation of the funds.

Problematic evaluation of supplementary pension schemesPolish supplementary pension market is non-transparent for the savers and,

consequently, potential and actual savers find it extremely difficult to compare the available products and to select an offer, which suites them most. These problems are additionally enhanced by: • the complicated language used in agreements for individual pension accounts (IKE and

IKZE), their complexity and lack of transparency,• low pension-related awareness and insufficient financial knowledge and competence

of Poles,• inadequate information policy on the pension market.

While a substantial number of Poles (58%) has problems to assess the impact of inflation on real interest rates of bank deposits (Instytut Wolności and Raiffeisen Polbank, 2014), the purchase of a product dedicated to saving funds for old age requires that they compare instruments of much higher level of complexity (unit-linked insurance, a range of investment and pension funds, bank accounts and offers of brokerage houses), which they usually do not understand. It is not only the economic mechanism that is incomprehensible, but also the language of contractual provisions.

The literature in the area offers some works on the research of transparency and comprehensibility of utility texts (e.g. Pisarek, 1969; Broda, Ogrodniczuk, Nitoń, Gruszczyński, 2014), but no exhaustive research has been done on the comprehensibility of provisions of contracts on individual pension products. In Poland, the first attempts at studying the comprehensibility of pension product agreements consisted of analysing several sample IKE and IKZE products (Chłoń-Domińczak, Góra, Rutecka, 2016b). Although the study did not cover the entire market offer, it offered some picture of the level of difficulty of the language used in financial agreements.

The research done by Chłoń-Domińczak, Góra and Rutecka (2016b) showed that the language used in the insurance contracts was comprehensible for people who completed bachelor’s studies, as a minimum (text difficulty class: score 5 on a 7-point scale) and completed minimum 13–15 years of education. The language of provisions


of other agreements (e.g. agreements on IKE/IKZE in the voluntary pension fund) is slightly simpler, comprehensible for people with secondary education or considerable life experience (difficulty class 4). For the sake of comparison, the level of difficulty of articles concerning the pension system, posted on the home page of the mojaemerytura.pl website, are classified as difficulty class 4, and so are the information materials for people interested in pension saving posted on the websites of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego—KNF) and the Financial Ombudsman. The linguistic analysis on its own is, naturally, not sufficient to evaluate the overall level of complexity and comprehensibility of the agreements (the difficulty in terms of substantive contents cannot be assessed), but it may constitute a reference point and an essential aid in wording the provisions of such agreements in the future (Chłoń-Domińczak, Góra, Rutecka, 2016b).

Table 2. The level of comprehensibility of selected IKE and IKZE agreements offered on the Polish market

Class of text difficulty FOG index(FOG Index, textual)

IKE general terms and conditions of insurance 5/7 13.8–15.1

IKZE general terms and conditions of insurance 5/7 13.4–14.9

General terms and conditions of VPF agreement 4/7 11.6–11.7

Key: Class of text difficulty: 1—childish (1–3 grade of primary school), 2—very easy (grades 3–6 of pri-mary school), 3—easy, comprehensible for an average Pole (junior school level), 4—slightly more difficult, comprehensible for people with secondary education or having substantial life experience (secondary school), 5—more difficult, comprehensible for educated people (bachelor’s degree/engineering studies), 6—difficult to read for an average Pole (master studies), 7—very complicated, professional, specialist knowledge required to understand the text (doctoral studies or specialisation in a given field).The FOG index informs about the number of years of education required to understand a text. The analysis was carried out on the basis of general terms and conditions of insurance for IKE, IKZE and VPF offered by selected financial institutions (Aviva TUnŻ S.A., Metlife PTE S.A., PZU Życie S.A., PTE PZU S.A.), using the JASNOPIS application.Source: Chłoń-Domińczak, Góra, Rutecka, 2016b.

The difficulty of the contractual language and negative experience involved in reading the incomprehensible documents, which defines the manner of product operation may give rise to an unwillingness to read agreements in the future, and consequently to resignation from purchasing additional pension products or to the conclusion of inadequate agreements (mis-selling). This may also be the reason why consumers indicate the media, direct contact with the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych—ZUS) or opinions of their acquaintances as the main source of information about supplementary pension systems (ZUS, 2016; Lewicka-Strzałecka, 2016). They do not perceive the documents, which underlie the provisions of agreements,


the official statistics or legal regulations as an adequate and comprehensible source of information.

It is worth pointing out that the consumers in the Polish market find the offers of financial institutions unreliable (Lewicka-Strzałecka, 2016). Most clients believe that they are purposefully misled, that representatives of financial institutions conceal unfavourable aspects of contracts and that “catches” and understatements are used. Only a slightly better opinion about the use of such provisions was expressed by respondents of the banking sector research carried out by TNS Polska in 2014: 18% of the respondents said that banks did not use “catches” and understatements in the agreements offered (TNS Polska, 2014).

Making decision on supplementary pension products is additionally hindered by the bundle sale (e.g. additional options in insurance agreements, combining the offers of bank deposits and investment/insurance funds), lack of transparency in respect of effectiveness and cost types and levels. Problems with satisfying the need for information among supplementary pension scheme participants are additionally worsened by the fact that the regulatory authority, the legislator and the financial institutions seem to assume that the customer should not have access to full, comprehensive and comparable data about pension products. This aspect was not addressed in any of the legal regulations passed. For example, the regulations currently in force indicate that it is the insurance company that evaluates the situation, the competencies and needs of the customers and selects the relevant financial products for them (Ustawa z dnia 11 września 2015 r. o działalności…, art. 21). The client is not expected to do it. This situation does not contribute to building insurance and pension awareness. No efforts are made to ensure transparency and comprehensibility of the product, and the obligations to inform the client are replaced by the necessity to consult financial institutions. The information policy adopted on the pension market focuses primarily on the needs of the supervision authorities, public institutions as well as the requirements of macro analyses, both domestic and international. As a consequence, an individual participant of pension schemes faces an enormous information gap.

Information policy on the supplementary pension marketThe information policy on the third pillar pension market involves relatively insignificant

obligations, chiefly pertaining to the regular filing of reports with the regulatory authority. Financial institutions must inform about the composition of the investment portfolio, the value of assets and liabilities, the number of operated schemes, and the number, age and sex of savers, as well as the value of contributions and withdrawals from each form of supplementary pension schemes. They are not obligated to comprehensively inform about products before these are launched on the market. Consequently, the third pillar products are not certified in any way in terms of the proposed financial mechanism, usefulness for the purpose of long-term saving, and risk level, or the expected investment effectiveness and fees. Additionally, the supervisory authority only publishes aggregated information


about the market with a list of financial institutions, which operate thereon. The list of available pension products is not published and neither are their core characteristics and investment results. This does not help individual savers move around the market, and they must obtain the information necessary to select and evaluate the pension agreements on their own. Financial institutions provide potential savers with information about the products offered before the conclusion of an agreement, but the form of such information is neither comprehensible nor comparable for an average Pole. Information provided to individuals before the conclusion of an agreement can be found in various documents underlying the provisions of the agreements. These are frequently documents, which describe not only the financial product (e.g. the general terms and conditions of insurance, information prospectuses, key information on products), but also, more elaborately, the rules of operation of financial institutions (statutes, rules for service provision, memoranda, conditions of the issue). Presented below is a list of obligatory documents handed over to potential buyers of individual pension schemes (IKE and IKZE) depending on the type of financial institution (Table 3).

Table 3. Documents handed out to potential IKE and IKZE buyers before conclusion of agreements

Type of financial institution

ZUnŻ TFI Bank Brokerage house PTE

Doc

umen

t typ

e

— general terms and conditions of insurance with appendices

— product sheet

— terms and conditions of unit-linked funds

— essential information for investors

— information prospectus (including the Statutes)

— terms and conditions of maintaining accounts with appendices

— terms and conditions of brokerage services with appendices

— information prospectus (including the Fund Statutes)

Source: own elaboration.

For products offered by an insurance company the general terms and conditions of insurance (GCI) is the essential document, whose scope is specifically defined in the Insurance and Reinsurance Activity Act of 2015 (Ustawa z dnia 11 września 2015 r. o działalności…).

They should be written in a language, which is unambiguous and comprehensible for the policyholder. If any doubts arise or unclarities exist, they are interpreted in favour of the policyholder. However, the practice does not conform to the regulations, which seems to be confirmed by the outcome of research on the difficulty of the language used in such documents. Thus, as long as the supervisory authority does not verify compliance


with the statutory requirements (and impose sanctions for their breach), this provision will remain a dead letter. Pursuant to the Guidelines for insurance companies regarding insurance distribution (KNF, 2014, recommendation 7), with respect to insurance products, the insurance company should also develop the so-called key information on product (karta produktu), which is not, however, an integral part of the agreement. The document must include the purpose of the product, its characteristics, explanation of the mechanism of operation of the product offered, its functions and application as well as information about the investment risk and possible losses. This document is certainly more frequently and willingly read by the potential servicer recipients, as it usually consists of a few pages and is frequently presented in tabular form.

With respect to IKE/IKZE agreements with investment fund companies, the potential buyer receives the statutes of the funds, key information for investors, and the information prospectus, with the set of offer-related documents, which differ depending on the type of the fund (Siwek, Wojakowski, 2016, p. 39).

The key information for investors is the most concise document (in this respect, they are similar to the key information on insurance product) made in a strictly defined format. It contains the minimum scope of information about the fund to be familiarised with so as to make an informed investment. This includes, among other things, the investment policy of the fund, its hitherto results, costs and risks involved in the investment. The information contained in the documents is supplemented in the information prospectus for the fund (which also includes the statutes), the annual and semi-annual financial statements of the fund (sub-fund), and with respect to SFIO (subfundusz inwestycyjny otwarty): the information for clients of an alternative investment fund (Siwek, Wojakowski, 2016, p. 24).

For banks and brokerage houses, the potential buyer of the financial services receives the general terms and conditions of maintaining the accounts with a table of fees and commissions as well as the interest rate table (with respect to banks). It happens that the standard terms and conditions are accompanied with additional conditions of the contract concluded on a promotional basis.

With respect to agreements concluded with Pension Societites (powszechne towarzystwa emerytalne—PTE) for IKE or IKZE in the form of a voluntary pension fund (VPF; dobrowolne fundusze emerytalne—DFE), the client declares that he is familiar with the information prospectus including the statutes of the fund, information about the results of investment activities and the approved annual financial statements of the fund (Ustawa z dnia 28 sierpnia 1997 r. o organizacji…, art. 189).

The aforesaid documents provided by financial institutions differ in format, language and layout. Additionally, the documents are quite sizeable and their language is specialised, which considerably hinders their understanding and comparison. Most financial institutions are obliged to post them on their websites, so that before choosing a specific product, and contacting the selected institution, each client can compare the conditions of contracts, with no pressure from a representative of the financial institution.


The information policy of the financial institutions is also very limited at the stage of the performance of IKE and IKZE agreements. The obligations to inform and the scope of data provided to the savers are rarely defined in the legal regulations, and much more frequently they are subject to procedures established by the financial institutions themselves. The saver usually gets information on an account balance at least once a year, with the majority of pension product providers offering online access to IKE/IKZE accounts.

The life insurance company is obliged to inform about the level of benefits at least once a year, if the said values change throughout the effective term of the agreement (Ustawa z dnia 11 września 2015 r. o działalności…, art. 20 (3)). The frequency of informing about the balance of savings is similar with respect to accounts maintained by investment fund companies. In this case, the information applies to all funds in which contributions paid to IKE/IKZE by an individual are invested.

In banks and brokerage houses, the client usually has constant access to account information, and the institutions which maintain the accounts are not obliged to deliver the balance statements with any specified frequency. The summary information is provided once an instrument is sold, an account is closed and funds are withdrawn/transferred. However, the client is informed about the amount of resources paid in and out and transactions recorded on the account with no indication of the rate of return (gross and net) yielded by the invested funds throughout the effective term of the agreement.

With respect to VPF, the fund sends to each member, at regular intervals but at least every twelve months, a statement of funds deposited on the account, dates of contributions and transfer payments made during this period, and conversion of the contributions and transfer payments into accounting units, the results of the fund investing activity, as well as the rules of the investment policy and the investment objective of the fund, together with indices to which the rates of return accomplished by the fund are compared.

With respect to all the listed forms of individual pension schemes, the saver is informed about the account balance, contributions paid and transactions recorded at the beginning and end of the reporting period. Usually, however, the saver does not get full information about the total sum of contributions made and fees deducted (an aggregate one), the rate of return on investment activity (except for voluntary pension funds), the profit accomplished (nominal and real) or the effective rate of return on the investment (including inflation and fees).

The information gapThe decision to select or change a pension product should be preceded with

an analysis of the most essential (from the saver’s perspective) qualities of the products offered. Currently, the regulatory authority (KNF) regularly publishes the following scope of information about the operation of the third pillar: 1) the


number of schemes/accounts in each form, 2) the list of institutions offering pension accounts, 3) payments to accounts and accumulated assets (average and aggregated), 4) age and sex of the savers, 5) the number of withdrawals, transfer withdrawals and returns.

None of the listed information is useful in the process of selection and assessment of a pension product by the individual saver. To take an informed decision, the saver needs quite different information, the most essential of which includes: a) the list of products on offer and their basic qualities, b) the amount of minimum contribution and the frequency of its payment, c) the level of costs in each product, d) the guarantees limiting the risk, e) information about the investment policy/interest rate and hitherto results on the financial instrument, including nominal and real results. Obviously, some of the information can be found in the terms and conditions of services provided by providers, but it is presented in a complex, incomprehensible manner, preventing comparison.

The lack of essential and comprehensible information and especially the absence of a list of pension products comparable in terms of the said features, sets out the general frames of the information gap, which is observed on the supplementary pension market in Poland. The gap poses an essential threat to the operation of the third pillar: no transparency of the supplementary pension market will be conducive to low pension awareness and low level of universality (participation). No basic knowledge about the operation of pension funds may result in suboptimal choices, redistribution towards financial institutions and ineffectiveness of the entire supplementary pension system. In a situation where none of the institutional participants of the pension market is interested in publishing the information about effectiveness and costs of each of the products, the market will offer products, which fail to meet the clients’ expectations, and those interested in them will move their funds to more effective solutions, because of unavailability of information identifying the products.

ConclusionsThe evaluation of the supplementary pension insurance in Poland poses a problem from

the perspective of an individual saver. The operation of pension plans can currently be assessed only by evaluating the collective data on market growth, the number of schemes, the number of their participants and the assets accumulated therein. “Universality” is assessed, while transparency, comprehensibility, adequacy or effectiveness of the products offered are disregarded. The needs of the savers have been ignored at the stage of design and implementation of the requirements for the information policy. The pension contracts are not only complex in terms of the description of financial mechanisms, investment risk, the fees charged, but they are also written in incomprehensible language. The information provided to individual savers is incomplete, non-comparable and difficult to access, which may lead to sub-optimal decisions, mis-selling and offering ineffective products.


The proper development of supplementary pension system in Poland needs deep changes in information policy. A major challenge is to ensure full comprehensibility of the information provided to pension product recipients, both at the stage of the conclusion of the agreement and execution of its provisions. Even the most comprehensive information is useless if is unreadible. The regulatory body should enforce the obligations of clarity and comprehensibility, stipulated in the laws. Some linguistic tools should be employed to assess the provisions of agreement addressed to individuals on a broader basis, and sanctions should be imposed for agreements which are totally incomprehensible. Such agreements should be eliminated from the market.

The most essential information, which is not regularly communicated to an individual saver at the moment, is the information about the costliness and investment effectiveness of pension schemes. Each financial institution should regularly calculate and publish the ratio of overall cost incurred by the client during a saving period. They should also regularly inform the clients about nominal and real rates of return (including fees charged) as well as the nominal and real amount of profit/loss over the total saving period.

Information about investment results and costs should also be sent to the regulatory authority so that it can publish a list of pension products offered on the Polish market and provide savers with information required to select a product and assess its operation. Such a list could also be available on websites of other institutions: Financial Ombudsman or the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy.

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Chłoń-Domińczak, A., Góra, M., Rutecka, J. (2016b). Jakie zmiany regulacyjne mogłyby wpłynąć na podniesienie poziomu przyszłych świadczeń emerytalnych? Warszawa: IGTE.

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szy inwestycyjnych—porównanie zagadnień prawnych i organizacyjnych. Poradnik klienta usług finansowych. Warszawa: UKNF.

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Potrzeby, możliwości i problemy ewaluacji dodatkowych planów emerytalnych z punktu widzenia indywidualnego odbiorcy

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja zakresu informacji (ilościowych i jakościowych) dotyczą-cych produktów emerytalnych niezbędnych do dokonania oceny ich funkcjonowania przez indywidualnych oszczędzających, a następnie porównanie tego zakresu z publikowanymi obecnie danymi o dodatkowym rynku emerytalnym oraz informacjami przekazywanymi klientom przez instytucje finansowe. Badanie oparto na analizie dostępnej literatury, dokumentów i raportów instytucji emerytalnych oraz aktów prawnych regulujących system emerytalny i rynek finansowy. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizy w ostatniej części artykułu wskazane zostały możliwości dalszych zmian w polityce informacyjnej oraz wystę-pujące ograniczenia, które wynikają z charakteru oferowanych produktów oraz poziomu skomplikowania systemów dodatkowych.

Słowa kluczowe: system emerytalny, dodatkowe zabezpieczenie emerytalne, pracownicze programy emerytalne, indywidualne konta emerytalne, indywidualne konta zabezpieczenia emerytalnego

FORUM: EVALUATION METHODS IN PENSION POLICY

Metody ewaluacji w polityce emerytalnej — debaty

WprowadzeniePrezentujemy poniżej pierwszą z trzech debat, jakie zostały przeprowadzone 23 marca

2018 roku podczas ogólnopolskiego seminarium nt. „Metody ewaluacji w polityce emery-talnej”. Jego organizatorem był Zakład Teorii i Metodologii Polityki Społecznej Instytutu Polityki Społecznej Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwersy-tetu Warszawskiego. W każdej z debat — prowadzonych przez moderatorów — wzięli udział zaproszeni referenci oraz zgromadzeni na sali goście konferencji.

Debata I — „Adekwatność systemu emerytalnego”Uczestnicy dyskusji panelowej: dr hab. Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, dr hab. prof. PŁ

Filip Chybalski, dr Alicja Jajko-Siwek, dr hab. prof. UW Ryszard Szarfenberg — moderator.

Ryszard Szarfenberg

Ogólny temat naszego panelu to adekwatność systemu emerytalnego. Zagadnienie to jest bardzo interesujące, szczególnie w kontekście teorii, metodologii ewaluacji jako takiej. Stawiam hipotezę, że ewaluacja świadczeń pieniężnych, albo tych polityk społecznych, których produktem są świadczenia pieniężne, jest słabo rozwinięta. Typowe ewaluacje są przeprowadzane na programach, projektach, których produkty nie są świadczeniami pieniężnymi. Panelistom zostały przesłane cztery pytania. Pierwsze z nich dotyczy tego, jak polityka społeczna definiuje adekwatność świadczeń. Istotny problem w kontekście teorii ewaluacji polega na odniesieniu adekwatności do standardowych kryteriów ewaluacyjnych: skuteczności, efektywności, użyteczności i trafności.

Drugie pytanie, a właściwie trzy pozostałe pytania dotyczą operacjonalizacji, czyli pomiaru. Jak mierzyć adekwatność w kontekście możliwości finansowych? Czy stopa zastą-pienia jest wystarczającą miarą adekwatności czy też powinniśmy przejść na wielowymia-rowe indeksy syntetyczne? A w kontekście możliwości finansowych w ewaluacji istnieje

120 Forum: Evaluation methods in pension policy

dość rozwinięty obszar ewaluacji ekonomicznej, czyli wyznaczania relacji między kosztem a skutecznością czy między kosztami a korzyściami. Pytanie, czy o systemach emerytalnych również możemy myśleć w ten sposób myśleć. Kwestia finansowania systemu pojawiła się wcześniej i wyraźniej niż zagadnienie adekwatności. Kolejny punkt to pytanie, jak mierzyć ubóstwo emerytalne, zmieniające się w czasie. Przechodzimy więc do jednego z wymiarów tej adekwatności, bo system świadczeń emerytalnych który pozostawia wielu emerytów w ubóstwie, nie będzie oceniany pozytywnie. Trzeba tu pamiętać, że system emerytalny to nie całość świadczeń przeznaczonych dla osób starszych. W związku z czym nasuwa się ogólniejsze zagadnienie, mianowicie kwestia, czym są świadczenia emerytalne w kon-tekście świadczeń adresowanych dla osób starszych. Przykładowo, czy zasiłek z pomocy społecznej jest częścią systemu emerytalnego czy też nie jest, ale jeżeli już nie jest, to czy należy go wyłączyć z oceny polityki świadczeniowej adresowanych do osób starszych. Mówimy o tym dlatego, że powinniśmy się zastanowić, czy ubóstwo emerytalne to jest część ubóstwa osób starszych, czy jest to zmieniające się w czasie ubóstwo emerytalne, a więc można przewidywać, że emeryt w pierwszym okresie emerytalnym jest mniej ubogi albo w ogóle nie jest ubogi, a ubóstwo pojawia się później, w dalszym przebiegu emerytury. Ostatnie pytanie dotyczy pomiaru czegoś, co jest równie enigmatyczne, jak adekwatność. Jak mierzyć solidarność międzypokoleniową w systemie emerytalnym? Solidarność to bardzo interesujące pojęcie, ale jest jeszcze sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniowa. Mamy tutaj do czynienia z wieloma interesującymi zagadnieniami. Między innymi głoszona jest teza, że sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniowa polega na tym, że rodzice inwestują swoje pieniądze w edukację dzieci, po to, żeby dzieci, jako osoby dorosłe, mając kapitał ludzki, sfinansowały system emerytalny.

Na wypowiedź każdy z uczestników dyskusji ma 15 minut. Dziękuję, zapraszam panią profesor Chłoń-Domińczak.

Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak

Bardzo dziękuję za zaproszenie i możliwość udziału w dyskusji. Pytania są faktycznie ciekawe i wymagające refleksji. Problem, w jaki sposób określić adekwatność systemów emerytalnych, istnieje od czasu, kiedy cel, jakim jest adekwatność świadczeń, stał się ele-mentem otwartej metody koordynacji polityki społecznej w Unii Europejskiej.

Adekwatność z perspektywy polityki społecznej to ważne zagadnienie systemowe. W tym kontekście warto nawiązać do tego, w jaki sposób określamy główne cele polityki emerytalnej, do czego nawiązują chociażby profesorowie Nicholas Baar i Peter Diamond w swoich książkach. Te cele to, po pierwsze, wygładzenie konsumpcji w przebiegu życia, po drugie — ochrona przed ubóstwem. Adekwatność systemu emerytalnego możemy mierzyć w tych dwóch kontekstach. Z jednej strony, trzeba określić, w jakim stopniu instrumenty szeroko rozumianej polityki emerytalnej, nie tylko system bazowy, ale także te instrumenty, które możemy zaliczyć do szeroko rozumianej polityki zabezpieczenia emerytalnego, są efektywne jako instrumenty wygładzenia dochodu w przebiegu życia. Z drugiej zaś strony, trzeba ustalić, w jaki sposób te instrumenty pozwalają na ochronę

121Debate I — Adequacy of the pension system (non-reviewed material)

przed ubóstwem osób starszych, które już nie są w stanie pracować. Na pewno w tych dwóch kontekstach należy mierzyć adekwatność.

W mojej ocenie trudno jest precyzyjnie zdefiniować adekwatność, na przykład jako określony procent mediany dochodów ludności, bo w zależności od kraju, w zależności od kontekstu, w zależności od sytuacji bardzo różnych pokoleń, w różnych krajach poziom dochodów i oczekiwania dotyczące konsumpcji są różne. Jest to jedna z przyczyn, dla których trudno jest zdefiniować adekwatność systemów emerytalnych.

Jak wyglądały dochody osób na emeryturach i jak one mogą wyglądać w przyszłości? To jest, moim zdaniem, bardzo istotne zagadnienie, zarówno obecnie, jak i w nadcho-dzących dekadach. Systemy emerytalne w sposób ciągły podlegają zmianom związanym z regulacjami, które są wprowadzane w różnym kierunku, w zależności od preferencji politycznych, które to zmiany mają wpływ na to, jak będą wyglądały emerytury w przy-szłości. W związku z tym pomiar adekwatności to jest na pewno pomiar, który powinien być dokonywany w odniesieniu do obecnych świadczeń, ale także z uwzględnieniem tego, co może się stać w przyszłości.

Jeżeli chodzi o dochody osób, które już są na emeryturze, istnieje relatywnie niewiele instrumentów, które mogą sytuację znacząco zmienić, oczywiście poza świadczeniami typu zasiłek stały czy różnego typu świadczeniami pieniężnymi przeznaczonymi dla osób ubo-gich. Inaczej wygląda sytuacja, gdy chodzi o przyszłość. Jeżeli wiemy, że system emerytalny nie będzie gwarantował adekwatnego dochodu, zachodzi pytanie, jakie działania można wdrożyć, żeby tę sytuację zmienić. Zmiany mające miejsce w polskim systemie emerytal-nym, w tym zmiana wieku emerytalnego, a szczególnie obniżenie wieku emerytalnego kobiet, oczywiście będą rodziły skutki w postaci niższych świadczeń w przyszłości, biorąc pod uwagę to, w jaki sposób system emerytalny w Polsce jest skonstruowany. Niższy dochód z pracy w przebiegu życia, związany z krótszym okresem aktywności zawodowej, oznacza relatywnie niższe świadczenia w przyszłości. Dlatego też bardzo ważne jest to, żeby starać się zmierzyć wpływ zmian wdrażanych w polityce publicznej z perspektywy dzisiejszej, czyli na przykład poziomu ubóstwa lub dochodów osób starszych dzisiaj, ale równie ważne jest zrozumienie procesów, które będą miały miejsce w przyszłości. Już dzisiaj są dokonywane projekcje wysokości emerytur w przyszłości. Są to na przykład oceny systemów emery-talnych, które są przygotowywane przez OECD, czy też raport dotyczący adekwatności emerytur, który jest publikowany przez Komisję Europejską raz na trzy lata. Chciałabym jednak zwrócić uwagę — że projekcje będące podstawą tych szacunków uwzględniają dosyć wystandaryzowane założenia dotyczące przebiegu życia osób, które będą korzystać z emerytur w przyszłości. Zakładają one, że ktoś wchodzi na rynek pracy, mając lat 25, pracuje nieprzerwanie do osiągnięcia wieku emerytalnego i będzie dostawał emeryturę. Oznacza to, że porównujemy między sobą systemy emerytalne w sytuacji de facto nie-istniejącej — pełnej kariery zawodowej. Relatywnie niewiele osób ma za sobą ścieżkę kariery zawodowej bez żadnych przerw. Projekcje te uwzględniają również scenariusze krótszej aktywności: co będzie, jeżeli nastąpi dłuższa, na przykład dwuletnia, przerwa ze względu na bezrobocie, trzyletnia przerwa na opiekę nad dzieckiem i tym podobne. Nadal jednak to nie odzwierciedla w pełni typowych ścieżek przebiegu życia, które obserwujemy


wśród Europejczyków. Wspólnie z profesor Ireną Kotowską, z profesorem Markiem Górą, doktor Igą Magdą, doktor Anną Ruzik-Sierdzińską i doktorem Pawłem Strzeleckim prze-prowadziliśmy analizy, które bazowały na odtworzonych ścieżkach przebiegu życia osób, które były respondentami badania SHARE (badania zdrowia, zatrudnienia i procesów przechodzenia na emeryturę w Europie). Analizy te pokazały, że uwzględnienie różnic w przebiegu życia zawodowego, które wynikają z płci, w tym zróżnicowania osiąganych zarobków, ale także przerwanych ścieżek zawodowych lub pracy w niepełnym wymiarze, dowodzi, że rzeczywistość jest inna niż te założenia, które przyjmujemy.

Kobiety mniej intensywnie uczestniczą w rynku pracy właściwie we wszystkich krajach. Co ciekawe, obserwujemy to także w krajach uważanych za modelowe w zapewnianiu równego dostępu kobiet do rynku pracy, takich jak Szwecja czy Niemcy. W krajach tych często sposobem na godzenie pracy z życiem rodzinnym jest praca kobiet w niepełnym wymiarze czasu pracy. Co oczywiście ma konsekwencje dla przyszłych emerytur i luka wysokości emerytur w Szwecji wynosi około jednej czwartej. W Polsce też zaobserwowa-liśmy ścieżki zawodowe kobiet związane ze znacznym zmniejszeniem aktywności zawo-dowej, chociaż częściej jednak kobiety pracowały na pełnym etacie. Nadal, ze względu na niższy wiek emerytalny i zarobki, emerytury kobiet są niższe. Luka płci w emeryturach, związana z różnym przebiegiem aktywności zawodowej w przebiegu życia, nie jest dobrze oceniona i mierzona w dyskursie czy to badawczym, czy tym bardziej politycznym, jeżeli chodzi o miarę adekwatności systemów emerytalnych.

Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, to, jak wyglądają ścieżki aktywności zawodowej, ma ogromne znaczenie dla emerytur i to też bardzo wyraźnie widać przy próbie symulacji, jaką na przykład przeciętny Polak osiągnąłby emeryturę, gdyby jego kariera zawodowa przebie-gała w Szwecji. Byłaby ona znacznie niższa, dlatego że przeciętny Polak pracuje mniej niż przeciętny Szwed. W związku z tym adekwatność systemów emerytalnych jest konse-kwencją podejmowanych decyzji i także polityki w obszarze rynku pracy, która pozwala na mniejszą lub większą aktywność na rynku pracy, przekładającą się na emerytury zgodnie z teorią rzeczonego wygładzania dochodu w przebiegu życia. Tak więc, teoria adekwatności w kontekście możliwości finansowania, w mojej ocenie, powinna właśnie łączyć te aspekty przebiegu życia i różnych ścieżek przebiegu życia, które zmierzają do określonej emerytury w przypadku consumption smoothing.

Kolejna rzecz, o której chciałam powiedzieć, to jest adekwatność z punktu widzenia ochrony przed ubóstwem i instrumentów, które temu służą. W polskim systemie emery-talnym tym instrumentem jest przede wszystkim emerytura minimalna. Jest to świadcze-nie przyznawane osobom, które miały odpowiednio długi staż pracy (20 lat — kobiety, 25 lat — mężczyźni). Emerytura minimalna w nowym systemie emerytalnym jest dofinan-sowywana z podatków, z budżetu państwa. Jest to więc świadczenie, którego wysokość teoretycznie nie musi być ustalana tak, jak jest dzisiaj, czyli zgodnie z zasadami walory-zacji wszystkich innych świadczeń. Dwa lata temu emerytura minimalna była w większym stopniu dofinansowywana, niż wynikałoby to ze wskaźników waloryzacji. Jest to w mojej ocenie ten instrument, który powinien dokładnie podlegać monitorowaniu, w jakim stop-niu wysokość świadczenia emerytalnego daje możliwość ochrony przed ubóstwem. Jeżeli


nie daje, to oczywiście emerytura minimalna powinna być ustalona na takim poziomie, żeby ten cel systemu emerytalnego osiągnąć.

Kolejne pytanie dotyczy tego, jak mierzyć ubóstwo emerytalne zmieniające się w cza-sie. Musimy planować instrumenty obecnie, próbując ocenić to, jak decyzje, które są podej-mowane dzisiaj, wpłyną na dochody emerytów i wydatki systemów emerytalnych za 20, 30, 40 lat. Perspektywa dynamicznego mierzenia sytuacji bieżącej i przyszłej jest absolutnie konieczna, bo dziś wdrażane są rozwiązania, które mogą zmienić sytuację w przyszło-ści. Oczywiście tego typu analizy powinny być prowadzone na bieżąco. W swoim czasie, kiedy wprowadzana była reforma emerytalna, pojawił się postulat utworzenia instytucji Aktuariusza Krajowego, która by regularnie prowadziła analizy sytuacji systemu eme-rytalnego, zarówno od strony finansowej, jak i od strony adekwatności świadczeń. Tego typu — stała, regularna — ocena systemu emerytalnego na pewno jest potrzebna. Tak się dzieje w Wielkiej Brytanii, gdzie funkcjonuje urząd Government Actuary’s Department. Podobnie w Stanach Zjednoczonych, gdzie corocznie publikowany jest tak zwany Trustees’ Report, w którym prezentowane są projekcje sytuacji systemu emerytalnego, a także ren-towego i ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych, co pozwala na prowadzenie dyskursu wokół stabilnej, regularnej, spodziewanej przez wszystkich oceny.

Ostatnia kwestia, jaką chciałabym poruszyć, dotyczy tego, jak mierzyć solidarność mię-dzypokoleniową w systemie emerytalnym. Solidarność międzypokoleniowa jest kluczowa w systemie emerytalnym. Każdy system emerytalny, bez względu na to, jak on jest skon-struowany, opiera się, de facto, na relacjach między pokoleniami w zakresie, tak czy ina-czej sformułowanej, sprawiedliwości międzypokoleniowej, czy to przez regulacje prawne, czy też przez różnego rodzaju systemy, instytucje, które wokół systemu emerytalnego powstają. Z pewnością wszystkie rozwiązania, które są wprowadzane w systemie emery-talnym, powinny uwzględniać sprawiedliwość i równowagę międzypokoleniową. Sprawie-dliwość międzypokoleniowa jest bardzo trudna do osiągnięcia w Polsce, bo w przeszłości system nie w pełni ją zapewniał, sprawiedliwości międzypokoleniowej w istocie nie było. Bazując na dywidendzie demograficznej, w przeszłości wprowadzono szereg rozwiązań, dzięki którym te pokolenia, które obecnie korzystają z systemów emerytalnych, są uprzy-wilejowane w stosunku do każdego kolejnego pokolenia. I trzeba to bardzo wyraźnie powiedzieć, że jest tak nie tylko w Polsce. Stąd też bardzo trudno odnosić miarę solidar-ności czy sprawiedliwości międzypokoleniowej do przyszłych pokoleń, biorąc pod uwagę to, jak wyglądał system emerytalny. Na pewno to, na co warto patrzeć, to nie tylko trady-cyjne miary, jakich na przykład używamy w demografii, czyli mierzące relacje międzypo-koleniowe, ilościowe, wyznaczające współczynnik obciążenia demograficznego. One nam pokazują pewne tendencje, które są bardzo ważne i które będą miały w przyszłości wpływ na solidarność i sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniową. Warto też zwrócić uwagę na to, jak instytucje i systemy przekładają się na ekonomiczne transfery pomiędzy pokoleniami. Taką miarą wynikającą z narodowych rachunków transferów jest metoda oceny dochodów, konsumpcji i transferów pomiędzy pokoleniami, która mierzy zagregowany deficyt życia w relacji do zagregowanego dochodu w przebiegu życia w oparciu o bieżące systemy. Ta miara dla Polski pokazuje, że mamy bardzo duże obciążenie ekonomiczne w relacji do


obciążenia demograficznego. Zagregowane dochody z pracy są niższe niż w wielu innych krajach. Polacy wcześniej się wycofują z rynku pracy, czyli dochód z pracy per capita osób do 50. roku życia bardzo szybko spada, co przy wysokich transferach (relatywnie do wynagrodzeń) rodzi znaczące obciążenie ekonomiczne. W Szwecji, która ma dużo wyższe współczynniki obciążenia demograficznego, obciążenie ekonomiczne jest znacznie niższe, pomimo że jest to system w o wiele większym stopniu postrzegany jako społecznie ade-kwatny, ale także jest to system, w którym aktywność zawodowa jest bardzo wysoka, co pozwala na utrzymanie bardzo dobrej relacji między pokoleniami.

Filip Chybalski

Proszę państwa, postawione pytania faktycznie są bardzo trudne. Nie ma tu jednoznacznych odpowiedzi, prostych rozwiązań, więc pozwolę sobie rozpocząć od kwestii zdefiniowania adekwatności emerytalnej. Jeżeli mówimy o adekwatności w systemie emerytalnym, to od razu pojawia się pytanie: system emerytalny adekwatny względem czego? Jaki w ogóle jest benchmark? Uważam, że odpowiednim punktem wyjścia do dyskusji nad adekwatnością systemów emerytalnych jest trójwymiarowe podejście do niej, zastosowane w otwartej metodzie koordynacji, o czym mówiła profesor Chłoń-Domińczak. Pierwszy wymiar, czyli ochrona przed ubóstwem, jak uważam, będzie zyskiwać na znaczeniu kosztem wygładzania konsumpcji. Drugim wymiarem jest właśnie wygładzanie konsumpcji, a trzecim — pewne równouprawnienie czy sprawiedliwość pod względem płci w systemie emerytalnym. Przy czym ten trzeci wymiar jest pochodną dwóch pierwszych, czyli ubóstwa, czy ochrony przed ubóstwem i wygładzania konsumpcji, a pytanie o równouprawnienie w ramach otwartej metody koordynacji dotyczy tego, w jakim stopniu udaje się ten cel pewnej równości dochodowej emerytów w przekroju obu płci zrealizować. Zacznijmy od ochrony przed ubóstwem. Jaki tu benchmark można by zastosować? Tym najbardziej powszechnym jest faktycznie 60% mediany dochodów, ponieważ warto opierać się na wskaźnikach, które są gromadzone przez OECD czy przez Eurostat, dzięki czemu możemy dokonywać pewnych porównań międzynarodowych. One są kluczowe dzisiaj, bo analiza, ocena, ewaluacja systemu emerytalnego, bez odpowiednich odniesień do tej adekwatności czy stabilności systemów emerytalnych w innych krajach, jest w ogóle niemiarodajna. Więc mamy 60% mediany dochodów jako granicę ubóstwa. I to jest miara bardzo niedoskonała. Dla przykładu, kiedy analizowaliśmy adekwatność systemów emerytalnych w latach 2005–2013, tym, co nas uderzyło, były wysokie stopy zagrożenia ubóstwem w Szwajcarii. Trudno sobie wyobrazić szwajcarskiego emeryta żyjącego w biedzie. Skąd się te wysokie wskaźniki zagrożenia ubóstwem w Szwajcarii brały? No stąd, że jest tam relatywnie duże zróżnicowanie dochodów populacji emerytów i z tego powodu duża część emerytów miała dochody poniżej 60% mediany dochodów w całej populacji. Ale też łatwo sobie wyobrazić pewną hipotetyczną sytuację, że wszyscy emeryci żyją w skrajnej nędzy. Dla przykładu, załóżmy, że w Polsce emerytura nie przekracza 200 zł i wszyscy otrzymują świadczenie na poziomie 200 zł, a tym samym stopa zagrożenia


ubóstwem będzie wynosić 0, bo nie będzie emeryta, którego świadczenie byłoby na poziomie niższym niż 60% mediany. Można zatem zapytać, jaka miara jest bardziej obiektywna, bardziej miarodajna i, wydaje się, mająca lepsze zastosowanie także do regulowania emerytury minimalnej, o której mówiła profesor Chłoń-Domińczak, bo emerytura minimalna jest głównym narzędziem walki z ubóstwem wśród emerytów. Taką miarą jest na przykład wskaźnik deprywacji materialnej. Mamy w tym wypadku zdefiniowanych dziewięć potrzeb i wskaźnikiem tym mierzymy odsetek populacji emerytów, którzy ze względów finansowych nie są w stanie zaspokoić przynajmniej trzech spośród tych potrzeb, a w przypadku wskaźnika pogłębionej deprywacji materialnej przynajmniej czterech spośród nich. Te potrzeby to na przykład odpowiednie ogrzewanie mieszkania, opłacenie rachunków związanych z mieszkaniem, posiadanie telewizora kolorowego, odpowiednie odżywianie się, możliwość sfinansowania 7-dniowego wyjazdu na urlop wypoczynkowy raz w roku — tak te potrzeby definiuje Eurostat. To jest miara o wiele bardziej obiektywna, o wiele bardziej precyzyjna i przywracająca Szwajcarię do pierwszej trójki krajów z najmniejszym ubóstwem, podczas gdy stopa zagrożenia ubóstwem sugerowałaby poniekąd, że to ubóstwo wśród emerytów szwajcarskich jest relatywnie wysokie. W przypadku wygładzania konsumpcji, czyli drugiego wymiaru adekwatności, o wiele trudniej jest zdefiniować benchmark. Tym benchmarkiem zazwyczaj są dochody w okresie aktywności zawodowej, bo podstawową miarą oceny stopnia wygładzania konsumpcji jest stopa zastąpienia. Można ją mierzyć dla danych wzdłużnych, dla danych poprzecznych, dla generacji czy kohort, dla populacji. Najpierw odniosę się do tej najpowszechniej chyba stosowanej przez Eurostat miary, jaką jest zagregowana stopa zastąpienia. Pominę stopę zastąpienia szacowaną przez OECD, dlatego że to jest faktycznie prognoza lub projekcja. Zatem zagregowana stopa zastąpienia to stopa odnosząca się do obecnych dochodów emerytów. Nie jest to oczywiście miara doskonała. Uważam bowiem, że na system emerytalny, jakkolwiek byśmy go definiowali, powinniśmy patrzeć szeroko, bo generalnie chodzi o to, aby ocenić szeroko pojętą sytuację materialną populacji emerytów, czyli osób w okresie poprodukcyjnym. Nieważne, czy te świadczenia nazywamy emeryturami czy też nazywamy je w jakiś inny sposób. Nieważne, czy te świadczenia są wypłacane z systemu zarządzanego przez państwo, zarządzanego publicznie, czy są to świadczenia wypłacane z instytucji sektora prywatnego. Ważne jest, jaki poziom dochodu ten system zapewnia. I ta zagregowana stopa zastąpienia jest oparta, po pierwsze, na dochodach brutto, po drugie — tylko na dochodach emerytalnych. To są jej wady jako miary szeroko rozumianej adekwatności w wymiarze wygładzania konsumpcji. Czy istnieje alternatywa? Alternatywą jest relatywna mediana dochodów, która po pierwsze uwzględnia dochody netto, po drugie — wszystkie dochody do dyspozycji gospodarstwa domowego emerytów, w relacji do analogicznych dochodów populacji w wieku 0–65. Jeżeli porówna się już sam pakiet informacyjny, mam na myśli materiał liczbowy zawarty we wskaźnikach zagregowanej stopy zastąpienia i relatywnej mediany dochodów, okazuje się, że oczywiście korelacja między nimi jest znacząca, ale współczynnik korelacji nie jest bliski wartości jeden, co sugeruje, że informacje zawarte w tych dwóch wskaźnikach nie są identyczne i nie są w pełni powielane. Jeżeli chcielibyśmy poszukać takiej syntetycznej miary


adekwatności systemu emerytalnego, to mimo że zazwyczaj za tę miarę przyjmujemy stopę zastąpienia, okazuje się, że wielowymiarowo pojmowaną adekwatność systemu emerytalnego obejmującą również ubóstwo o wiele lepiej reprezentuje właśnie mediana relatywnych dochodów. Ona mierzy to lepiej, w większym stopniu oprócz dochodów uwzględnia także ubóstwo, a odnosimy się do niej rzadziej niż do stopy zastąpienia. I trzeci wymiar, czyli zróżnicowanie dochodów między płciami. W tym przypadku, moim zdaniem, bardzo trudno jest zdefiniować benchmark. Oczywiście, na pierwszy rzut oka wydaje się, że sytuacją idealną jest sytuacja, kiedy stopa zastąpienia w systemie emerytalnym dla kobiet i mężczyzn jest równa i stopa ubóstwa czy stopa zagrożenia ubóstwem dla kobiet i mężczyzn też jest równa. Ale nie możemy abstrahować od tego, że jednak mamy zróżnicowany wiek emerytalny i bardzo zróżnicowane okresy aktywności zawodowej. Czy benchmarkiem faktycznie powinien być brak różnic, czy też benchmarkiem powinno być powielenie różnic z okresów aktywności zawodowej w okresie emerytalnym? Oczekiwanie, że tym benchmarkiem będzie zero, to pewna utopia. Na razie nie ma przesłanek, aby tak myśleć, aczkolwiek tendencja do podwyższania i zrównywania wieku emerytalnego, na przykład w krajach OECD, jest niezaprzeczalna, to się dzieje mniej więcej od początku tego wieku. Faktycznie, ustawowy wiek emerytalny oraz efektywny wiek emerytalny dla kobiet i mężczyzn podnosi się i staje się coraz bardziej zbieżny. My tutaj, mam na myśli Polskę, idziemy ewidentnie pod prąd. Chodzi o adekwatność w kontekście możliwości finansowania i o solidarność czy sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniową. Jak mierzyć sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniową? Chodzi generalnie o to, żeby system emerytalny nie zaburzał pewnej równowagi międzypokoleniowej. Trudno tę równowagę oczywiście zdefiniować. Co jest warunkiem zapewnienia adekwatności w długim okresie? Warunkiem zapewnienia adekwatności w systemie emerytalnym w długim okresie jest jego stabilność finansowa. O ile bowiem brak stabilności finansowej można rekompensować w krótkim okresie wzrostem długu publicznego, w długim okresie jest to po prostu niemożliwe. I teraz, jeżeli zaczynamy mówić o stabilności finansowej systemu emerytalnego, to faktycznie wprowadzamy kryterium efektywności do systemu emerytalnego. Stabilność systemu emerytalnego jest również wielowymiarowa. Po pierwsze, chodzi o relację wydatków emerytalnych do PKB, jedną z podstawowych miar systemu emerytalnego, aczkolwiek ona nie jest do końca porównywalna w przekroju międzynarodowym, co podkreśla zresztą Eurostat. Więc tę relację — wydatki emerytalne do PKB — trzeba jeszcze odnieść do uwarunkowań demograficznych, czy na przykład do stopy obciążenia demograficznego. Oczywiście im mniejszy udział wydatków emerytalnych w relacji do PKB, tym ten system efektywniejszy. Po drugie, chodzi o to, ile kosztuje nas zapewnienie adekwatności, czyli ile pokolenie pracujące płaci za to, żeby nie było ubóstwa wśród emerytów. Ile pokolenie pracujące płaci za to, żeby udało się wygładzić konsumpcję w cyklu życia? To jest drugi wymiar tej efektywności systemu emerytalnego. Trzeci wymiar, powiązany z tym drugim, moim zdaniem kluczowy, to jest oddziaływanie systemu emerytalnego na rynek. Mamy ogromny problem, zresztą nie tylko my, z nienadążaniem efektywnego wieku emerytalnego za oczekiwaną długością trwania życia osób w wieku


okołoemerytalnym. Ale to się skądś wzięło. To się wzięło z polityki pełnego zatrudnienia, realizowanej w krajach Europy kontynentalnej w latach 70. i 80., ponieważ wtedy uważano, że wypychanie osób starszych z rynku pracy rozwiąże problem bezrobocia wśród młodych. I tę politykę realizowano w latach 70., 80., po czym, głównie w Europie kontynentalnej, okazało się, że ta polityka zbankrutowała. Ona się okazała zupełnie nieskuteczna i nieefektywna. Ale, niestety, te mechanizmy wypychania czy zachęcania do przechodzenia na wcześniejsze emerytury i obniżony wiek emerytalny pozostały. Konieczność jego podwyższania jest w świetle przesłanek ekonomicznych i demograficznych oczywista, ale w świetle przesłanek politycznych nie jest to już tak oczywiste. Faktycznie, jest po prostu ogromnym wyzwaniem. Za to dzisiaj płacimy, za tę politykę z lat 70., 80. Oczywiście, niektóre kraje były odporne na tę politykę. Świetnymi przykładami są Islandia i kraje skandynawskie, które minimalizowały politykę przechodzenia na wcześniejsze emerytury. W Islandii wskaźnik zatrudnienia w populacji 55–64 jest na poziomie 80%, w Polsce — ponad 40%. Wskaźnik zatrudnienia w populacji 65–74 w Islandii jest na poziomie 30%, w Polsce — poniżej 10%. To jest przepaść, ale ustawowy wiek emerytalny w Islandii od 50 lat wynosi dla kobiet i mężczyzn 67 lat. W Norwegii jest podobnie, oni obniżyli ten wiek z 70 do 67 lat, ale mają fundusz oparty na przychodach ze sprzedaży ropy naftowej. Ostatnio ten fundusz zanotował kolejny raz wysoką stopę zwrotu, a aktywa zakumulowane w tym funduszu w przeliczeniu na jednego Norwega wynoszą ok. 700 tys. złotych.

W jaki sposób mierzyć sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniową? Niestety, nie ma odpowie-dzi na to pytanie i teraz realizujemy projekt, którego tytuł brzmi „Sprawiedliwość między-pokoleniowa w porządkach państwa dobrobytu: międzynarodowe studium porównawcze”. No i oczywiście zaczynamy od definiowania sprawiedliwości międzypokoleniowej. A teraz zastanawiamy się nad tym, jak ją mierzyć, na przykład w systemie emerytalnym. Naturalnie mamy do czynienia ze zjawiskiem wielowymiarowym. Nie ma jednego wskaźnika, który by pozwolił to zmierzyć, ale uważam, że niezłą aproksymantą takiej równowagi międzypo-koleniowej w systemie emerytalnym może być efektywny wiek emerytalny. Nie ustawowy, tylko efektywny, bo celem jest podnoszenie efektywnego wieku emerytalnego. Ustawowy wiek emerytalny jest, co najwyżej, narzędziem do realizacji celu, jednym z wielu. Więc to może być jedna miara. Drugą miarą może być stopa zastąpienia analizowana w ujęciu dynamicznym, czyli patrzymy, co się dzieje ze stopą zastąpienia w systemie emerytalnym w czasie, jak zmienia się jej wartość. Na tej podstawie jesteśmy w stanie ocenić, w jakim stopniu jest zachowana sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniowa w wymiarze dochodów emery-talnych. I — po trzecie — miara demograficzna, np., stopa obciążenia demograficznego, ale definiowana w sposób bezpośredni, czyli jako relacja populacji emerytów do populacji osób w wieku produkcyjnym. Jest to miara prosta, ale kluczowa. Ona pokazuje praktycz-nie, jaka jest relacja międzypokoleniowa. Gdyby abstrahować od czynników politycznych, łatwo sobie wyobrazić sytuację, w której stabilność systemu emerytalnego w długim okresie jest zachowana, tym samym utrzymana jest adekwatność w systemie emerytalnym — pod jednym warunkiem, takim, że ustawowy wiek emerytalny mamy ściśle powiązany właśnie z tą relacją. Dziękuję bardzo.


Alicja Jajko-Siwek

Przede wszystkim serdecznie dziękuję za zaproszenie mnie do uczestnictwa w dyskusji. Chciałabym przedstawić podejście indywidualne, to znaczy z punktu widzenia indywidual-nego uczestnika systemu emerytalnego. Patrząc z tej strony, wydaje się, że taką kluczową miarą służącą do pomiaru adekwatności musi być miara, która spełnia trzy warunki. Po pierwsze powinna to być miara, która będzie prosta do obliczenia. Po drugie — miara, która będzie możliwa w ogóle do obliczenia poprzez posiadanie odpowiednich danych, i wreszcie, po trzecie — miara, która będzie łatwa w interpretacji z punktu widzenia indywidualnego uczestnika systemu. Myślę, że wobec takich wymagań idealną miarą jest jednak stopa zastąpienia. Uważam, że miary syntetyczne są doskonałe do porównywa-nia systemów. Natomiast kapitał emerytalny, który jest sam w sobie dobrą miarą, jest zbyt skomplikowany obliczeniowo dla indywidualnej osoby, która chciałaby oszacować swoje dochody emerytalne i ocenić je w kontekście innych osób. Patrząc na trzy aspekty adekwatności, to jest: ochronę przed ubóstwem, wygładzenie konsumpcji w cyklu życia i solidarność międzypokoleniową, należałoby jednak stopę zastąpienia zróżnicować. W odniesieniu do ubóstwa odpowiednią miarą byłaby relacja emerytury do przeciętnego wynagrodzenia. Pozwoliłaby ona na porównanie świadczenia emerytalnego danej osoby w kontekście innych osób. W zakresie możliwości zachowania wcześniejszego standardu życia, czyli wygładzenia konsumpcji, najlepszą miarą jest natomiast relacja własnej eme-rytury do własnych wcześniejszych wynagrodzeń. W przypadku badania redystrybucji wła-ściwym odniesieniem dla indywidualnej emerytury jest także wynagrodzenie przeciętne.

Idąc dalej, ważne jest również wskazanie punktów krytycznych, benchmarków, pozwa-lające określić, jaki poziom stóp zastąpienia oznacza adekwatność. W kontekście ochrony przed ubóstwem, rolę taką zdecydowanie może pełnić emerytura minimalna, o której mówiła pani profesor. Uważam, że relacja emerytury minimalnej do przeciętnego wyna-grodzenia mogłaby być dobrym punktem odniesienia. Oczywiście, trzeba poziom tego benchmarku monitorować w czasie. Natomiast odnosząc się do kwestii zachowania na emeryturze wcześniejszego standardu życia, warto spojrzeć na oczekiwania społeczne w zakresie poziomu świadczeń emerytalnych. Badania ankietowe na ten temat przepro-wadził między innymi doktor Radosław Kurach z Wrocławia. Widać z nich wyraźnie, że ludzie oczekują wysokich stóp zastąpienia. Spodziewają się, że późniejsze emerytury w około 70% zastąpią wcześniejsze wynagrodzenia. Stopy zastąpienia podawane powszech-nie przez ZUS za ubiegłe lata są właśnie zbliżone do tych wartości.

W dalszej kolejności, dysponując zróżnicowanymi typami stóp zastąpienia oraz posia-dając odpowiednie wartości krytyczne, warto w ramach oceny adekwatności dokonać cha-rakterystyk osób, które takie świadczenia adekwatne uzyskują. W tym celu sięgnęłabym do różnego typu wielowymiarowych metod statystycznych, szczególnie metod eksplora-cyjnych, które pozwalają na „przeszukanie” dużych zasobów stóp zastąpienia. Metody te pozwolą zbadać charakterystyki wielu osób ze względu na różnorodne czynniki, i to nie tylko ilościowe, takie jak dochody czy liczba posiadanych dzieci, ale także specyficzne, jakościowe, takie jak chociażby stan zdrowia czy typ gospodarstwa domowego. Tym samym


pozwolą one uchwycić pełne spektrum działania wszystkich tych czynników w kontekście adekwatności. Metody eksploracyjne mają także zdolności predykcyjne, co oznacza, że sklasyfikują osoby uzyskujące adekwatne świadczenie, a ponadto pokażą, czyje emerytury będą adekwatne w przyszłości. Oczywiście warto sięgnąć także po analizę korespondencji. Należy również pamiętać, że metody eksploracyjne są odporne na braki danych, które nie-wątpliwie w takich badaniach wystąpią. Natomiast analizując zachowanie na emeryturze wcześniejszego standardu życia, należałoby wykorzystać metody wzdłużne. Najbardziej pomocna może być tutaj analiza sekwencji cyklu życia, pokazująca, jakie sekwencje zda-rzeń, jakie stany doprowadzają do uzyskania adekwatnego świadczenia emerytalnego.

Przeprowadziłam wstępne badania adekwatności, stosując powyższe metody dla danych panelowych z badania SHARE 50+ w Europie. Korzystałam z danych przekrojowych z czwartej i z szóstej rundy badania oraz z danych rundy trzeciej, czyli SHARELIFE. Uzy-skałam interesujące rezultaty. Jeżeli chodzi o charakterystyki przekrojowe, w kontekście ubóstwa, to polski system emerytalny sprzyja adekwatności emerytur uzyskiwanych przez mężczyzn, którzy funkcjonują w małych, jednoosobowych gospodarstwach domowych lub w takich gospodarstwach domowych, które już zostały opuszczone przez dzieci. Ponadto istotną zmienną dla adekwatności jest stan zdrowia. Uzyskiwaniu adekwatnych emerytur sprzyja dobry i średni stan zdrowia.

Natomiast, jeżeli chodzi o ścieżki życia prowadzące do adekwatnych świadczeń eme-rytalnych, wyniki wskazują, że wymagania formułowane wobec osób pragnących uzyskać odpowiednio wysokie emerytury nie są zbyt wygórowane. Mianowicie wystarcza już, na przykład, edukacja trwająca do 20., 21. roku życia. Ponadto wystarcza 35 lat stażu pracy. Podobnie jest w kwestii wieku przejścia na emeryturę. Dostateczne jest osiągnięcie wieku 55–58 lat. Typowe dla osób z adekwatnymi świadczeniami jest posiadanie dwojga dzieci. Nie są to zatem zbyt wysokie wymagania. Spełnienie ich pozwalało na uzyskanie emerytury na poziomie adekwatnym, odpowiednio wysokim. Ciekawe jest, że wyraźnie zarysowuje się wśród typowych trajektorii znacząca grupa kobiet, które uzyskały adekwatne świad-czenia i nie miały dzieci. Można powiedzieć, że ceną za adekwatną emeryturę jest dla kobiet brak dzieci, rezygnacja z macierzyństwa. Prawidłowość ta jest jednak wyraźnie widoczna tylko w przypadku kobiet, natomiast nie widać jej w przypadku mężczyzn. Z drugiej strony, mamy liczną grupę mężczyzn uzyskujących adekwatne świadczenia, którzy zakładali rodziny wielodzietne. Można byłoby powiedzieć, że wielodzietność stymulowała mężczyzn do bardziej wysilonej pracy, która zaowocowała później także emeryturą ade-kwatną.

Chciałabym jeszcze zwrócić uwagę na kwestię redystrybucji w ramach systemu eme-rytalnego. Doskonałym narzędziem do oceny redystrybucji są drzewa decyzyjne. Drzewa klasyfikacyjne pomagają we wskazaniu zakresu oraz kierunku redystrybucji — i to zarówno międzypokoleniowej, jak i wewnątrzpokoleniowej. Natomiast poziom tej redystrybucji, jej wysokość, można świetnie określić przy użyciu drzew regresyjnych. W Polsce redystrybucja emerytalna — to przepływy od mężczyzn do kobiet. Natomiast jej wysokość jest znikoma.

Na koniec poruszę temat teoretycznych stóp zastąpienia, oszacowanych dla typowych trajektorii życia. Po nałożeniu wspomnianych wcześniej metod eksploracyjnych na teore-


tyczne stopy zastąpienia, możliwe byłoby określenie, jaki wpływ miałyby zmiany systemu emerytalnego na grupę świadczeniobiorców uzyskujących adekwatne świadczenia.

Podsumowując, uważam, że podejmowanie ewaluacji adekwatności świadczeń emery-talnych przy użyciu metod statystycznych jest bardzo obiecujące.

Dziękuję.

Ryszard Szarfenberg

Bardzo dziękuję panelistom za wystąpienia. Pojawiło się w nich wiele interesujących zagadnień. Jest co najmniej pięć wymiarów adekwatności, co uświadomił nam profesor Chybalski. Jeśli chodzi o emeryturę minimalną, to pamiętam hasła z lat 80. mówiące, że emerytura minimalna nie powinna być niższa niż minimum socjalne emeryckie. Nie są one zrealizowane do dzisiaj. Jeżeli szukamy jakiegoś standardu, to może minimum socjalne obliczone dla emerytów mogłoby być takim standardem.

Zofia Czepulis-Rutkowska

Bardzo się cieszę, że w ogóle mogę uczestniczyć w tej wymianie poglądów. I bardzo mi się podoba temat „Metody ewaluacji w polityce emerytalnej”. Oczywiście rozmawiamy o tych wszystkich wymiarach od wielu lat. O adekwatności, o wieku emerytalnym i również o systemach dodatkowych emerytalnych. Tracimy trochę z pola widzenia zmiany, które zachodzą. Na przykład, jesteśmy tak głęboko przekonani do tego, że należy system ewalu-ować, czyli oceniać, w związku z rynkiem pracy. A już 30, 40 lat temu była taka koncepcja, której autorem był chyba pan Szmidt, która właśnie mówiła o tym, że rynek pracy już nie może być punktem odniesienia w ocenie polityki społecznej w ogóle. Więc ja bym bardzo ostrożnie podchodziła do łączenia systemu emerytalnego z rynkiem pracy. Bardzo się cieszę, że pani profesor Chłoń-Domińczak poruszyła kwestię zmiennych biografii, to jest bardzo cenny wkład. Ale jest tak, że ciągle mówimy o tej nierówności kobiet. A przecież ten system emerytalny, który ciągle mamy, to jest wytwór historyczny, który po prostu powstał w innych okolicznościach rynku pracy, rozwoju przemysłu, i my musimy zawsze o tym pamiętać. Ja przynajmniej staram się od tego wychodzić, że to jest twór historyczny, czyli musimy go tak widzieć. Co się w tej chwili dzieje w debacie nad systemami emery-talnymi na całym świecie, w Unii Europejskiej? Trochę się odchodzi od otwartej metody koordynacji, którą sama się bardzo zajmowałam, miałam sporo publikacji na ten temat. W tej chwili raczej jest zainteresowanie filarem socjalnym, bo właśnie te kryteria z otwartej metody koordynacji ciągle są ważne, ale już widać, że powinno to być troszkę zmienione. Kończąc, powiem, że rynek pracy to jest właściwie ten podstawowy punkt zainteresowania. Jak się zmienia rynek pracy? No, rynek pracy zmienia się po prostu niesamowicie. Podam tylko przykład zatrudnienia na platformach wiertniczych czy pracy w firmie Uber, bo to są rzeczy, o których się mówi. I teraz powinniśmy od tego zacząć. Na koniec dodam tylko taką uwagę, że dodatkowe systemy emerytalne wszędzie tracą, a my chcemy je wprowadzać i o nich ciągle mówimy. Dziękuję bardzo.


Adam Szulc

Muszę powiedzieć, że po trzech wystąpieniach, skądinąd bardzo ciekawych, w dalszym ciągu nic nie wiem na temat adekwatności systemów emerytalnych. Pierwszy powód jest natury lingwistycznej, bo wyznaję przesąd, że nazwy są istotne. Problem polega na tym, że słowo „adekwatny” jest zapewne tłumaczeniem z angielskiego słowa adequate, które po angielsku oznacza coś innego, na przykład mówi się adequate English, co oznacza: angielski poprawny. W języku polskim trzeba powiedzieć adekwatne do czego, na co zwrócił uwagę pan profesor Chybalski. Adekwatność można rozumieć na co najmniej dwa sposoby. Pierwszy, to adekwatność do potrzeb, i tu się otwiera cały wachlarz metod, choćby na temat mierzenia poziomu życia — jest bardzo bogata literatura, to zresztą najbliższy mi temat i jedynie niektóre metody zostały wymienione z nazwy. Drugi rodzaj adekwatności, to adekwatność do możliwości, czyli zasobności systemu emerytalnego. To są rzeczy, które oczywiście nie są zgodne ze sobą, nawet raczej należałoby powiedzieć, że są sprzeczne ze sobą. Jeszcze można mówić o sprawiedliwości, którą ja bym jednak rozumiał w ten sposób, że sprawiedliwość polega na tym, że jak się zabierało komuś pieniądze, pod przy-musem zresztą, to wypadałoby je oddać przynajmniej częściowo. To jest realizowane, ale w sposób arbitralny. Skoro można podwyższyć emerytury, to emerytury również można arbitralnie obniżyć. Są jeszcze kryteria polityczne, o których na szczęście nie mówiliśmy, mianowicie ustala się jakiś polityczny cel, na przykład, że kobiety powinny otrzymywać taką samą emeryturę, jak mężczyźni. Ja nie wypowiadam się, czy to jest słuszne czy nie, ale to jest arbitralny cel polityczny. Parę słów właśnie na temat słowa „arbitralność”. Otóż te rozwiązania, które, jak mówię, zostały wymienione głównie nazwy z uwagi na brak czasu, wszystkie opierają się na pewnych arbitralnych założeniach. Weźmy taki najprost-szy miernik ubóstwa dochodowego — 60% mediany, metoda utrwalona przez Eurostat, przez OECD, ale dlaczego 60, a nie 64, albo 57%? Na to pytanie nie ma odpowiedzi i tak jest, odnoszę wrażenie, we wszystkich podejściach, które tu zasygnalizowano. Wystąpiło na przykład pojęcie wygładzenia dochodu, ewentualnie konsumpcji, chociaż tu trzeba się zdecydować, czy dochodów czy konsumpcji. Można oczywiście podejść do tego ambitnie, oszacować funkcję dochodu permanentnego zgodnie z teorią Friedmana, co się jeszcze chyba nikomu nie udało w sposób zadowalający. Ale można podejść od drugiego końca, czyli najprościej, jak się da. Takim najprostszym rozwiązaniem jest stopa zastąpienia, ale czy 70% średniej pensji to jest wystarczająco, czy może 60%? A może 52%? Czyli chyba mniej więcej tyle, ile jest obecnie. Emerytura traktowana jest, niestety również na tej sali, jako element polityki społecznej i jako świadczenie. Świadczenie to jest coś, co państwo może przyznać, ale może odebrać. Ale dobrze by było, żeby emerytury jednak nie ode-brało, bo to jest coś, co się najpierw zabrało, i — jak mówiłem — wypadałoby oddać. Więc jeżeli my zaczniemy mówić, że emerytura jest świadczeniem, czyli łaską państwa, tak dosadnie to określając, no to politycy na pewno to podchwycą. Dziękuję.


Kamila Bielawska

Zdecydowałam się poprosić o głos, kontynuując wątek, który się pojawił w wypowiedzi mojego przedmówcy, czyli adekwatności emerytury do potrzeb świadczeniobiorcy. W więk-szości miar, które są stosowane obecnie, zarówno tych, które były przywołane z raportów OECD, jak i tych z raportów Komisji Europejskiej, koncentrujemy się na ustalaniu oceny tej adekwatności poprzez stopę zastąpienia w momencie osiągnięcia uprawnień emerytal-nych. Możemy robić dalsze symulacje, co by było, gdyby ktoś odroczył decyzję przejścia na emeryturę, jak bardzo to wpływa na jego stopę zastąpienia, ale wydaje mi się, że coraz częściej będziemy musieli pochylić się nad problemem, czy tylko będziemy to zabezpie-czenie emerytalne oceniać w kontekście wysokości otrzymywanych świadczeń w momencie rozpoczęcia pobierania emerytury czy też w odniesieniu do zaspokojenia zmieniających się z wiekiem potrzeb. Myślę, że wszyscy wiemy, że potrzeby w okresie emerytalnym zmieniają się w czasie. Możemy o tym dyskutować, koncentrując się wyłącznie na ocenie dostępu do świadczeń pieniężnych, ale również możemy myśleć o tym, aby tę kwestię uzupełnienia adekwatności w stosunku do potrzeb rozważyć poprzez inne instrumenty, na przykład przez dostęp do usług materialnych, które mogą być w różny sposób dostarczone emery-tom. Mam tu przede wszystkim na myśli usługi związane ze zdrowiem.

Ryszard Szarfenberg

To problem opieki długoterminowej. Ubezpieczenie pielęgnacyjne w Niemczech zaadresowało ten problem. Chodzi jednak o to, że ubezpieczenia pielęgnacyjnego zapewne nie włącza się do systemu emerytalnego. Powracamy zatem do kwestii definicji jego granic.

Tomasz Lasocki

Sądzę, że warto odróżnić uprawnienia senioralne, powiązane z osiągnięciem pewnego wieku, od uprawnień emerytalnych. Te ostatnie oprócz kryterium wieku powiązane byłyby z wcześniejszą pracą — wkładem w system. Taka była jedna z rekomendacji w podsumowa-niu zorganizowanego przez ZUS przeglądu emerytalnego. Ustalając adekwatność świad-czeń względem potrzeb z perspektywy dogmatyki prawniczej, zwróciłbym uwagę na artykuł 67 ust. 1 Konstytucji, zgodnie z którym zakres zabezpieczenia społecznego określi ustawa. Zabezpieczenie społeczne powinno być pojmowane jako stan zaspokojenia podstawowych potrzeb socjalnych, stan przeciwny wykluczeniu społecznemu. Zabezpieczenie społeczne można obiektywizować, wskazując na pewne minima w oparciu o ogólne statystyki, albo też można wykorzystać podejście subiektywne, zgodnie z którym jednostka po zakończeniu aktywności zawodowej powinna zachować swój dotychczasowy poziom życia. Pierwsze ujęcie będzie prowadziło do spłaszczania wkładu i świadczeń na przykład w postaci eme-rytur obywatelskich, zaś drugie właściwe jest dotychczasowemu systemowi emerytalnemu. Odnosząc się natomiast do adekwatności świadczeń względem wniesionego wkładu, można ogólnie stwierdzić, że nasz system zdefiniowanej składki jest adekwatny, ponieważ zgro-


madzone aktywa emerytalne zostaną równomiernie rozłożone w czasie i wypłacone do czasu śmierci. Jednakże ujednolicenie wskaźnika średniego dalszego trwania życia dla kobiet i mężczyzn sprawia, że przyznawane świadczenia nieczęsto będą wypłacane przez okres równy rzeczywistemu korzystaniu z emerytury. Należy bowiem zauważyć, że żyjąc statystycznie dłużej, bogatsi zdążą wybrać zgromadzony wkład z nawiązką dzięki bied-niejszym — umierającym wcześniej, a przez to obniżającym omawiany wskaźnik. Dotyczy to również ujednolicenia współczynnika dla obojga płci. Kryterium aktuarialne traci tym bardziej na znaczeniu w kontekście dopuszczenia stosowania przez ustawodawcę tablic średniego dalszego trwania życia właściwych momentowi osiągnięcia wieku emerytalnego, a nie momentowi realizacji prawa.

Ryszard Szarfenberg

Poproszę uczestników naszego panelu o krótkie podsumowanie i ustosunkowanie się do wypowiedzi innych uczestników dyskusji.

Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak

Podsumowując bardzo bogatą dyskusję, należy powiedzieć, że trudno jest zastosować jedną miarę do ewaluacji tego, co w polityce emerytalnej się dzieje, jeżeli chodzi o ade-kwatność świadczeń. Na pewno szukałabym pewnego pakietu wskaźników, które odnoszą się do tego, co jest związane z wygładzaniem dochodu czy raczej — co ważniejsze — z wygładzaniem konsumpcji. Oczekiwania konsumpcyjne na starość są oczywiste i dotyczą zarówno zdrowia, jak i po prostu konsumpcji związanej z życiem codziennym oraz z zaspo-kajaniem innych potrzeb.

Wysokość emerytur jest silnie związana z rynkiem pracy, a zatem patrzenie na to, co się dzieje w przebiegu życia zawodowego, jest bardzo istotne. Tak jak było powiedziane, nie do końca od nas zależy, ile zarabiamy w wieku dorosłym. I zależy to także od cech, które nabyliśmy w okresie dzieciństwa i młodości, osiągniętego statusu społeczno-ekono-micznego. Efektywna polityka publiczna powinna wyposażać osoby w takie cechy, które już na starcie dają im większe szanse. Dlatego, moim zdaniem, efektywny i stabilny system emerytalny zaczyna się od edukacji dzieci, od momentu, kiedy one idą do żłobka czy do przedszkola, kiedy zaczyna się budować ich kapitał społeczny i kapitał ludzki. Polityka publiczna ma wpływ na to, w jaki sposób ten kapitał ludzki jest kształtowany, po to, żeby wyrównywać deficyty, które narastają często od najmłodszych lat. Taka całożyciowa per-spektywa w myśleniu o systemie emerytalnym jest absolutnie kluczowa — i to jest chyba najtrudniejsza rzecz do przekazania w dyskusji emerytalnej. O adekwatności świadczeń nie możemy mówić z perspektywy tego, jakie emerytury mają dzisiejsi świadczeniobiorcy, czy tego, ile będą dostawali za pięć, dziesięć lat, tylko musimy rozważyć, co zrobić, żeby — powiedzmy — za czterdzieści lat przyszli świadczeniobiorcy otrzymywali adekwatne świadczenia. Wymaga to już dzisiaj inwestycji w dzieci. Ewaluacja systemu emerytalnego powinna zaczynać się od zbadania, w jakim stopniu dzisiaj dzieci mają szansę na to, że


w przyszłości będą godnie zarabiać, długo intensywnie funkcjonować na rynku pracy, dzięki czemu będą mieć adekwatne emerytury, i stąd te relacje międzypokoleniowe też tutaj są bardzo ważne.

Warto również oceniać, kim są ci, którzy mają wysokie emerytury dzisiaj, a także ci, którzy mają niskie emerytury. Z jednej strony jest to efektem podejmowanych decyzji indywidualnych, z drugiej strony wynika to z potencjału, z którym wchodzimy na rynek pracy. Tutaj także jest przestrzeń dla polityki publicznej.

Filip Chybalski

Przede wszystkim chciałem się odnieść do wypowiedzi pani doktor Czepulis-Rutkow-skiej, ponieważ ja się zupełnie z tym nie zgadzam. Trzydzieści, czterdzieści lat temu, kiedy faktycznie uprawiano politykę pełnego zatrudnienia poprzez wypychanie ludzi na wcze-śniejsze emerytury, można było, prowadząc politykę emerytalną, abstrahować od rynku pracy, a to z tego powodu, że uwarunkowania demograficzne były zupełnie inne niż dzisiaj. Wiem, że na sali są demografowie, więc proszę wybaczyć, jeśli jakieś błędy terminologiczne popełnię, ale w moim odczuciu uwarunkowania demograficzne są nam dane, przynajmniej w krótkim okresie. Profesor Cieślak uczyła mnie, że krótki okres w prognozach demogra-ficznych to okres do pięciu lat, aczkolwiek dzisiaj to trochę mniej, bo chociażby migracja pokazała, jak szybko uwarunkowania demograficzne mogą się zmieniać. Ale te uwarun-kowania generalnie są nam dane i jeżeli ja mam być optymistą i przyjąć, że program 500+ okaże się programem skutecznym, efektywnym, poprawi nam „demografię”, to muszę brać pod uwagę, że dopiero za dziewiętnaście, dwadzieścia lat te dzieci „z 500+” wejdą na rynek pracy. Dzisiaj na rynek pracy już nie ma kto wejść, a nie ma innego sposobu na finansowanie emerytur niż z podziału bieżącego PKB. Jak wspominał pan profesor Szar-fenberg, mamy dwa lub trzy nakładające się pokolenia i to środkowe pokolenie zawsze finansuje i emerytów, i dzieci. I to odbywa się na zasadzie wzajemności, gdyż później, gdy to pokolenie staje się pokoleniem emerytów, jest finansowane przez swoje dzieci, wtedy już w wieku produkcyjnym, a wcześniej, kiedy się kształciło, było finansowane przez swoich rodziców. Problem polega na tym, że zostały zachwiane proporcje między tymi pokoleniami. Żeby budować prawidłowe proporcje, utrzymać je na jakimś racjonalnym poziomie, gwarantującym stabilność finansową systemu emerytalnego, a bez tej stabilności nie będzie adekwatności, trzeba realizować ideę sprawiedliwości międzypokoleniowej. Żeby ją zrealizować, potrzebujemy właśnie odpowiedniego odsetka populacji na rynku pracy. Bez zachowania rozsądnych proporcji nie da się tego po prostu zrealizować i nie można dzisiaj, moim zdaniem, rozmawiać o systemie emerytalnym i abstrahować od rynku pracy. Dziękuję bardzo.

Alicja Jajko-Siwek

Zacznę od krótkiej uwagi w kontekście wypowiedzi pana profesora. Myślę, że adekwat-ność, którą mamy obecnie w systemie emerytalnym, jest to głównie adekwatność zwią-


zana z możliwościami systemu. Nas interesowałaby jednak przede wszystkim adekwatność związana z potrzebami, a potrzeby, każdy indywidualnie, powinien kształtować stosownie do wkładu, który wniósł. Nie można potrzeb rozważać bez powiązania z wkładem do systemu. Natomiast ewaluacja adekwatności jest niezbędna. Głównie po to, aby wykazać, czy zaspokojone są potrzeby obecnych emerytów, ale nade wszystko po to, aby wskazać, jakie działania może jeszcze podjąć osoba należąca do systemu w trakcie pracy zawodowej, aby w przyszłości uzyskać adekwatne świadczenie. Wiedza uzyskana dzięki takiej ewalu-acji mogłaby zachęcić ubezpieczonych do indywidualnych działań w celu wypracowania odpowiedniego świadczenia. Dzięki takiej wiedzy możliwe byłoby też odpowiednie kształ-towanie polityki społecznej poprzez kierowanie zachęt do osób, które powinny i mogą samodzielnie dążyć do wypracowywania adekwatnych emerytur.

Ryszard Szarfenberg

Dziękuję bardzo wszystkim uczestnikom dyskusji. W związku z Państwa wypowiedziami chciałbym zapytać, co to znaczy „mieć wkład do”. Czy społeczeństwo, czy tylko rynek pracy określa, że mamy ten wkład? Artykuł, o którym wcześniej wspomniałem, mówi o synte-tycznym wskaźniku adekwatności, gdzie jest kilka wymiarów, a dla każdego wymiaru są po dwa wskaźniki. Kolejna kwestia — to ubóstwo relatywne. Trwa dyskusja, czy to w ogóle jest wskaźnik ubóstwa, ponieważ, jak mi się wydaje, większość ekonomistów twierdzi, że to jest raczej wskaźnik nierówności niż ubóstwa. Włączenie wskaźnika ubóstwa absolutnego powoduje, że musimy się odwoływać w Polsce do minimum egzystencji albo do minimum socjalnego. Wydaje mi się, że przy syntetycznych wskaźnikach musimy większość tych dyskusji pominąć, gdyż koncentrujemy się na uzyskaniu syntetycznej miary, która będzie wielowymiarowa, będzie łączyła wiele konstruktów, które składają się na adekwatność emerytalną. Dziękuję bardzo.

INFORMACJE DLA AUTORÓW

Redakcja przyjmuje oryginalne artykuły naukowe mające następujący charakter:1) omówienie i analiza wyników własnych badań empirycznych — na podstawie źródeł wywo-łanych i/lub zastanych,

2) opracowanie monograficzne,3) artykuł przeglądowy (analiza literatury przedmiotu, dokumentów prawnych itp.),4) artykuł polemiczny,5) glosa lub komentarz prawniczy.

STRUKTURA ARTYKUŁU NADSYŁANEGO DO REDAKCJI

Autor (imię i nazwisko)Uczelnia lub inne miejsce pracy

(instytucja, dla której autor zgłasza afiliację)[po nazwie instytucji należy umieścić odsyłacz do przypisu dolnego, w którym należy podać

adres afiliowanej instytucji oraz adres elektroniczny Autora]

Tytuł artykułu (po polsku)Tekst zasadniczy artykułu, w tym: • Wprowadzenie (zawierające m.in. informacje o charakterze artykułu, celach badawczych,

wykorzystanych źródłach, zastosowanych metodach badawczych; konieczne jest także podanie źródeł finansowania badań)

• Podrozdziały artykułu (poszczególne części artykułu nie są numerowane)• Zakończenie (podsumowanie, wnioski końcowe itp.)BibliografiaStreszczenie (od 8 do 16 wierszy) ………………… [tekst streszczenia po polsku]W streszczeniu prosimy zawrzeć następujące informacje: przedmiot analizy/problem badaw-czy podejmowany w tekście; zastosowana metoda analizy i/lub źródła danych; najważniejsze wnioski z przeprowadzonych badań/analiz; zarys struktury tekstu.Streszczenie nie powinno powtarzać ani parafrazować tytułu artykułu. Powinno być napisane prostymi zdaniami. Należy je pisać w trzeciej osobie. Streszczenie powinno zawierać słowa kluczowe.Słowa kluczowe: (po polsku; minimalnie 3, maksymalnie 5)

Summary Tytuł artykułu po angielsku.Tekst streszczenia po angielsku — tłumaczenie streszczenia przygotowanego po polsku.Key words: (tłumaczenie na język angielski słów kluczowych podanych po polsku)

PRAWA AUTORSKIE

Autorzy publikowanych w czasopiśmie opracowań nie otrzymują honorarium. W przypadku zakwalifikowania tekstu do publikacji, z autorem podpisywana jest umowa o nieodpłatne przeniesienie praw autorskich na rzecz wydawców czasopisma. Jej podpisanie przez autora jest warunkiem skierowania tekstu do druku. Zakres wykorzystania publikowanych utworów określany jest zgodnie z ustawą z dnia 4 lutego 1994 roku o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych.

SZCZEGÓŁOWO O WYMAGANIACH FORMALNYCH I REDAKCYJNYCH ORAZ O PROCEDURZE RECENZOWANIA

PISZEMY NA STRONIE INTERNETOWEJ CZASOPISMA.

NASI RECENZENCI W 2018 ROKU

dr Ewa Bacia — Technische Universität Berlin

dr Rafał Bakalarczyk — badacz niezależny

prof. dr. hab. Marek Bednarski — Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych UW

dr Kamila Bielawska — Uniwersytet Gdański

prof. Maciej Cesarski — Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

dr Eva Duda-Mikulin — University of Bradford

prof. dr hab. Marek Góra — Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

prof. Mirosław Grewiński — Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna im. Janusza Korczaka w War-szawie

prof. dr hab. Romuald Jończy — Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

dr Łukasz Jurek — Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

dr Stanisław Kamiński — Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

prof. Arkadiusz Karwacki — Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

dr hab. Tomasz Kaźmierczak — Wydział Stosowanych Nauk Społecznych i Resocjalizacji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

prof. dr hab. Elżbieta Kryńska — Uniwersytet Łódzki

prof. Jerzy Krzyszkowski — Uniwersytet Łódzki

prof. dr hab. Anna Michalska — Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

dr Janina Petelczyc — Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwer-sytetu Warszawskiego

dr Aneta Piekut — University of Sheffield

prof. dr hab. Zdzisław Pisz — Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

prof. dr hab. Piotr Sałustowicz — Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences/Uniwersytet SWPS

prof. dr hab. Barbara Smolińska-Theiss — Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej im. Marii Grzegorzewskiej w Warszawie

prof. dr Christian Schweiger — Technische Universität Chemnitz

dr Dariusz Stańko — OECD/Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

prof. dr hab. Bogusława Urbaniak — Uniwersytet Łódzki

dr Barbara Worek — Uniwersytet Jagielloński

dr hab. Kamil Zawadzki — Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

dr Maria Zrałek — Wyższa Szkoła Humanitas w Sosnowcu

prof. Cezary Żołędowski — Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

Recenzje przygotowywane są w trybie, w którym autor (zy) i recenzenci nie znają nawzajem swoich tożsamości (tzw. double-blind review process). Do oceny każdej publikacji powołuje się dwóch niezależnych recenzentów. W przypadku rozbieżnych recenzji artykułu, redakcja może powołać trzeciego recenzenta. Recenzenci dokonują oceny na specjalnym formula-rzu recenzyjnym, co zapewnia kompletność i porównywalność ocen. Formularz recenzji jest do wglądu na stronie internetowej czasopisma.

Problemy Polityki Społecznej 44(1) · kwartalnik #44 (1)/2019 warszawa 2019 uniwersytet warszawski...

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