KOSIENKOWSKI Transnistrias Foreign Policy

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Continuity and Change in Transnistrias Foreign Policy after the 2011

Presidential Elections*

Marcin Kosienkowski

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland

Working Paper, June 2012

Abstract

The article examines the external activity of Transnistria, a quasi-state that has been outside ofMoldovan control since 1992. The paper presents the policy of the Transnistrian region toward Russia,

Ukraine, Moldova, Western countries and organizations, as well as other breakaway states like

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The main research question is whether

Transnistrias foreign policy has undergone changes and, more generally, what can be expected in this

field following the landmark 2011 presidential elections. Then, Igor Smirnov, Transnistriasseemingly

unshakable leader, unexpectedly failed to be re-elected for his fifth term and was replaced by a young

politician, Yevgeniy Shevchuk. The paper concludes that the strategy driving the quasi-states external

activity has remained unchanged. Primary goals regarding the status of Transnistrianamely keeping

the status quo, which means maintaining the de facto independence of the Transnistrian regionand

its main external partners are still in place. The exception is that Shevchuk would like to establish

positive working relations with Western actors. The most significant change between the departure of

Smirnov and the arrival of Shevchuk is a tactical one. While Smirnovs approach was, in short,

confrontational, excessively self-interested, highly politicized, and partially isolationist in its nature,

the quasi-states foreign policy under the new president has many more positive elements. Shevchuks

approach is more pragmatic, constructive, cooperative, active, and economized. This stabilizes the

situation in the region and gives hope for the activation of the Transnistrian conflict settlement

process. Crucially, the new Transnistrian president may not be as entrenched as his predecessor on the

topic of reintegration with Moldova.

Keywords:Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, European Union, the United States, Transnistrian

conflict

*

The author would like to thank William Schreiber (The George Washington University, Washington, DC),Octavian Milevschi (National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania), andAndrey Devyatkov (Tyumen State University, Russia) for comments on the paper.


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Continuity and Change in TransnistriasForeign Policy after the 2011 Presidential Elections

Marcin Kosienkowski Working Paper, June 2012

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Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, is a quasi-state situated in the

European part of the post-Soviet territory. What differentiates this entity from a state is its

lack of international recognition. This means that under international law, Transnistrias

territory belongs to a recognized state, namely Moldova, although Moldovan authorities have

had no control over the region since the beginning of the 1990s.1Transnistria is a ca. 4,000

km2narrow strip of land inhabited by no more than half a million people, mainly Moldovans,

Russians and Ukrainians; each of these ethnic groups constitutes about one-third of the

population. The quasi-state has its own government located in the city of Tiraspol, an

economy based on industry, a constitution, army, currency, flag, etc. It also takes part in

international relations, mainly in the regional dimension. Critically, despite the fact that

Transnistria is unrecognized and tiny, it conducts a quite active and effective foreign policy,which contributes to its survival. There are five main reasons behind Tiraspols activeness.

First, like it or not, Transnistria is involved in a constant interaction with its parent

state. For instance, Tiraspol and Chiinu have been engaged for two decades in the process

of peacefully resolving their conflict. Another important reason for interaction is that in many

cases the conditions for the quasi-states function depend on the good will of Moldovathe

internationally recognized state, with official rights to the Transnistrian region. For example,

Chiinu can domestically and diplomatically influence conditions of Transnistrias exportswhich has the potential to generate substantial revenues for the quasi-state.

Second, the internationalization of the Transnistrian conflict settlement process

stimulates Tiraspols foreign policy. At present there are five international players

participating in official negotiations. Three of them work as mediators, namely the Russian

Federation (involved in the dispute since its very beginning), the Organization for Security

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE; since 1993),2 and Ukraine (since 1995); Moscow and

Kiev also act as guarantors of achieved agreements. The others operate as observers (since

2005); this includes the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Along with the two

opposing claimants, they form the official 5+2 negotiation format. The internationalization of

the settlement process makes Transnistria engage in a constant contact with negotiation

participants and other interested international players to promote Transnistrian interests.

1The Transnistrian region declared its independence from Moldova on 2 September 1990, however, de facto

independence was fully achieved only two years later, in July 1992, when Transnistria won a brief war with its

parent state; this date should be recognized as the beginning of Transnistrias existence as a quasi-state.2More precisely, this structure held its current name since 1 January 1995, when the Conference on Security and

Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was transformed into an organization.


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Moreover, the fact that this group is diversified has allowed Transnistria for many years to

play on the differences between them to its own benefit.

Third, Transnistria lacks enough internal resourcessuch as money (to pay salaries

and pensions etc.) or means of production (i.e. natural gas), necessary for an economy based

on heavy industryto function properly and simply survive. It means that these resources

must be found outside. It is the Russian Federation which gives Transnistria in-depth support

and can be identified as the principal actor responsible for guaranteeing its continued

function.

Fourth, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic desperately needs open access to the

outside world. It should be mentioned that it has a very open economy, maintaining trade

relations with about one hundred states, of these the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) and non-CIS markets are the most important. The problem is that Transnistria has only

two geographic neighborsMoldova and Ukraine. Given that Tiraspol is in conflict with its

parent state, it is Ukraine which serves as Transnistrias main window to the outside world.

The quasi-state must do its best to keep this window as wide open as possible.

Fifth, Transnistria is tied by historical, political, cultural and social ties to Russia and

Ukraine. Transnistria also feels some kind of unity with the other quasi-states located in the

post-Soviet area, namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. These common identity lay important foundations for enhanced

cooperation between Tiraspol and the aforementioned states and quasi-states.

This article considers the problem of Transnistrias foreign policy. The paper is

supposed to present external activities conducted by the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic

since its appearance in an analytical way rather than give its detailed and chronological

picture . The content of Tiraspols foreign activity had been quite stable for the twenty years

of its existence, under the long-time rule of the quasi-states first president, Igor Smirnov. In

December 2011, however, he unexpectedly lost power. The reason for his defeat was a

popular mandate for revival and renewal in Transnistria. In a reference to this power shift, the

paper seeks to answer whether Tiraspols external activity has undergone changes. It

examines the history of the quasi-states foreign policy under Smirnov region by region, and

then, in general terms, it forecasts what foreign policy developments can be expected under

Yevgeniy Shevchuk, the president who won the most recent election with the slogan

Changes we need!


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The first section of the article examines actors behind foreign policy in the

Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. The second section identifies its main political aim,

which is associated with the quasi-states most important issuethe definition of its legal

status. Crucially, external activity is among the main means used to reach this goal. The next

five sections analyze Transnistrias policy toward the aforementioned actors, namely: Russia,

Ukraine, Moldova, Western players, and the three other quasi-states from the post-Soviet

area. Although the OSCE also includes Eastern European and Central Asian states, it is

grouped with Western actors because of the Western values on which this organization is

based.

Actors behind Transnistrias Foreign Policy

Although Igor Smirnov and his government never had a monopoly on contact between

the outside world and the Transnistrian population and elites, the Smirnov administration

managed to keep a dominant role in the regions external policy. The most serious challenge

to Smirnovs privileged position was issued by the party Obnovleniye (Renewal)sponsored

by economic elites grouped in the company Sheriffwhich took control over the local

parliament in 2005 and managed to get Russias support a few years later (when Moscowbacked Obnovleniyes leader, Anatoliy Kaminskiy, in the 2011 presidential race). However,

Tiraspols external activity was still under the control of Smirnov due to his authoritarian grip

on power and his positions formal prerogatives. Moreover, Obnovleniye did not question

Smirnovs foreign policy, focusing mainly on the internal struggle for power.

In the beginning, Transnistrias diplomacy stemmed from civil society, involving

many private individuals sympathizing with an emerging state entity. It resulted from the fact

that the Transnistrian region had had no official status within the Moldavian Soviet Socialist

Republic (MSSR) and was faced with building its state structures from a scratch upon

separation from Moldova. The institutional development of Transnistrian diplomacy started in

late 1991, when the post of the secretary of state was established. It was filled by Valeriy

Litskay whoas it turned outdominated Transnistrias diplomacy for many years. He

became the head of the republican office for external relations in 1993, the official

representative of Transnistria in the negotiations with Moldova in 1994, and the Transnistrian

foreign minister in 2000 (when the state secretary bureau and the office for external relations


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were merged into the foreign ministry). Litskay left his office only in mid-2008 and was

replaced by the 29-year-old Vladimir Yastrebchak.3

The Transnistrian diplomacy under Smirnovs rule can be recognized as both

professional and successful. This was admitted, for example, by Western representatives

observing the Moldovan-Transnistrian negotiations.4 The Transnistrian diplomats were

supported by experienced Russian experts, they learned quickly how to deal with crisis

situations because they worked in time of nearly permanent crisis for their quasi-state, and

finally were led for many years by the same practiced person, Litskay, while Moldova

changed its negotiators and foreign ministers very frequently. The situation has started to

change and became more balanced in the mid-2000s, when Moldovan diplomats began to

cooperate more with their Western counterparts and especially in 2009, when the Alliance forEuropean Integration (AEI) came to power in Moldova and appointed highly professional

diplomats to deal with Moldovas external relations.5

Despite the fact that the new president, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, is not as strong as his

predecessor, he also plays a leading role in Transnistrian foreign policy. To be clear,

Shevchuks real authority is limited by two influential political playersObnovleniye, which

controls the quasi-states parliament, and supporters of the former Smirnov regimebut this

is not so much an interference, because he himself wants to take the opinion of thesegroupings into account, seeking internal political unity. This is most probably why the

Presidents Advisory Council on International Affairs was established in February 2012. It

includes people who previously worked in the Smirnov administration, including two former

foreign ministers, and experts associated with Obnovleniye.6 Although Shevchuks formal

prerogatives have been in some ways limited by introduction of the prime minister post

(previously the president was the head of the government), he is still granted a constitutional

right to determine the guidelines of foreign policy and it was his closest aide, Nina Shtanski,

who became Transnistrian foreign minister and the Transnistrian representative in

negotiations with Moldova.

3Stanovleniye pridnestrovskoy diplomatii,Diplomaticheskiy vestnik Pridnestrovya, no. 1 (2010): 1422.4Authors interviews with various Western diplomats to Chiinu, August 2007.

5Authors interview with a former Transnistrian official, June 2010.6

Ukaz Prezidenta PMR 107 O Konsultativnom Sovete pri Prezidente Pridnestrovskoy MoldavskoyRespubliki po mezhdunarodnym delam, 18 February 2012, http://www.president.pmr-gov.org/zakon/?category=2&id=3798 (accessed 1 March 2012).


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Transnistrian diplomacy has not undergone substantial changes, and importantly the

core of the foreign ministry personnel has been kept.7Special attention, however, should be

paid to the new foreign minister. Nina Shtanski may lack broader experience in international

relations, but the 34-year-old (when nominated) woman with the good looks of a model,

together with the young 43-year-old President Shevchuk, have refreshed the image of

Transnistria in the international arena and eased the tensions surrounding the quasi-state. The

arrival of a new and modern Transnistrian leadership, with its willingness to consult other

Transnistrian power centers and include experienced officials from the Smirnov regime, is a

mixture which might make Transnistrian diplomacy no less professional and effective than it

was under the previous president Smirnov.

Finally, it should be noted that Transnistria is considered by some experts as Russiaspuppet, although this opinion cannot be supported with facts. Many disputes between Tiraspol

and Moscow during the rule of the Smirnov regime, demonstrated that the previous

Transnistrian leader had his own political interests and did not blindly follow Russias

opinion. It is sufficient to say that Smirnov ran for his fifth term in 2011 against Moscows

will. Shevchuk likewise cannot be categorized as a Russian puppet, as Moscow supported a

third candidate other than Shevchuk during the December 2011 presidential elections.

Transnistrias Aim: What Status to Strive for?

Smirnovs aim concerning Transnistrias status is not so easily identified. The

Smirnov regime itself announced many goals over the twenty years of its rule. The most

frequently declared were: gaining independence, or in other words obtaining recognition from

the international community, and/or joining Russia; becoming a part of Ukraine; creating

confederation with Moldova. Additionally, establishing a federation with the parent state was

considered. Moreover, the aims declared in a given period were often contradictory. For

example, Igor Smirnov justified the removal of presidential term limits from the constitution

in 2000 by his promise to the Transnistrian population not to leave his post until Transnistria

received (full) independence.8 All of this took place while the 1993 Transnistrian law on

creating a confederation with Moldova was still in forceit was cancelled only in 2006.

7 Nina Shtanski, Nikogda ne sdavatsya!, interview with Profsoyuznyye Vesti, February 2012, http://

profvesti.org/2012/02/11/7561/ (accessed 20 February 2012).8 Igor Boan, The hostages of Transnistrian regime, e-Democracy.md, 14 March 2006, http://www.e-

democracy.md/en/monitoring/politics/comments/200603142/ (accessed 15 March 2012).


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Furthermore, despite the fact that officially the Smirnov regime followed the will of the

Transnistrian peopleas expressed in a September 2006 referendumto gain independence

and subsequently pursue accession to Russia, the Concept of Foreign Policy of Transnistria

approved a year earlier in 2005 remained unchanged and mentioned only achieving

international recognition. Moreover, the Transnistrian authorities suggested several times over

the five years following the referendum that Transnistria could join Ukraine.

Although there may be some exceptions, particularly in the early stages of

Transnistrias existence, in reality the nominal foreign policy goals were never truly supported

by the Smirnov regime.9 If implemented, they would more or less deprive the Transnistrian

authorities of power. It should be kept in mind that the quite broad scope of their authority

resulted from the fact that Transnistria was an authoritarian entity, where the use ofinternational law was restricted. Moreover, the aforementioned foreign policy course would

limit or eliminate the possibility of the Smirnov regime to derive money from the functioning

of Transnistria, including fraudulent appropriation of assistance funds granted by Russia and

bribes and other benefits from smuggling, a thriving profession mainly due to Transnistrias

unique status. Achieving internationally recognized independence or establishing a

Moldovan-Transnistrian confederation would most likely increase the influence of the

international community in Transnistria and its control over this region. If Transnistria joinedRussia or Ukraine, the Smirnov government would be obliged to obey Russian or Ukrainian

central authorities, and could be ousted if it did not. Finally, a federal solution would mean

that power would be shared with Moldova. It was also not so easy for the Transnistrian

authorities to give up a status quo that they had adapted to very well over the course of twenty

years.

It should be added that the Smirnov regime must have been aware of the fact that its

nominal foreign policy goalswith the exception of the federal solutionwould be

extremely hard, if not impossible, to realize. Achievement of internationally recognized

independence was highly unlikely. Even Russia, Transnistrias patron, has not officially

recognized it. Even if it did, the level of recognition would be rather minimal, as in the case of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and would not change Transnistrias quasi-state status. Russia

was not going to incorporate the Transnistrian region because it would significantly limit its

possibility of influencing the political situation in Moldova. Detachment of Transnistria from

9Cf. Andrey Devyatkov, Political dynamics in Transnistria in context of the conflict situation (unpublished

manuscript, 15 May 2012), Microsoft Word file.


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its parent state would also make Moldova more Latin and less Slavic, which was undesired

both by Moscow and Kiev. Furthermore, the Ukrainian authorities were afraid that its

incorporation of the Transnistrian region would encourage Ukrainian national minorities and

its neighboring states, which formerly possessed many Ukrainian territories, to undermine

Ukraines territorial integrity. Finally, it was clear that Chiinu would never agree on the

establishment of a confederation with Transnistria.

Arguments that the Smirnov regime did not in reality strive for independence, a union

Russia or Ukraine, or a confederation or federation with Moldova are many. The fact that the

Transnistrian authorities nonetheless advertised these goals can be explained in at least three

ways. First, in signaling that the government was leading them to better, more stable and

secure future, these nominal foreign policy objectives legitimized the regime in the eyes of theTransnistrian population. Second, the Transnistrian authorities were sometimes pressured by

Russia to support the idea of reintegration with Moldova. For instance, Mikhail Leontyeva

pro-Kremlin TV journalist and columnistclaimed that Russia literary raped the

Transnistrian authorities to make them sign the Kozak Memorandum,10 a 2003 plan

advanced by Russia to resolve the Transnistrian conflict on a federative basis (in a reality, it

was closer to confederative one). Third, the Smirnov regime declared nominal goals for

opportunist motivations. For example, ideas of Transnistrian independence and Transnistrian-Moldovan confederation were advanced when Tiraspol wanted to block the conflict resolution

with its parent state. Further, as Andrey Devyatkov claimed, based on interviews collected in

Transnistria, the slogan of independence [of Transnistria] would not have gotten such

absolute support [97.1%] during the referendum in 2006, if it were not connected to the

thesis of subsequent entrance to the Russian Federation.11 Conversely, the scenario of

accession to Ukraine appeared exactly as Transnistria lost Russias support. It might be

mentioned that in these circumstances, Transnistria even expressed the intention to conduct

multi-vector foreign policy or closely cooperate with the EU and the US, instead of Russia.12

If the Smirnov regime was not in fact striving to achieve its nominal goals, the

question arises as to its true aims. It is true that the Transnistrian authorities enjoyed the status

quo very much, they were used to it and learned how to benefit under it. Indeed, preserving

10 Mikhail Leontyev, Strannyye otnosheniya, interview with Vremya, 23 January 2009, http://www

.moldovanova.md/ru/publications/show/67/ (accessed 15 March 2012).11

Devyatkov, Political dynamics.12See Vladimir Bukarskiy, Glava pridnestrovskogo MIDza mnogovektornostpolitiki Tiraspolya,Russkaya

liniya, 3 April 2008, http://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=176271 (accessed 12 April 2012); Smirnov: Rossiyanadeyetsya obmenyat Pridnestrovye na dividendy v ES, Rosbalt, 25 April 2011, http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2011/04/25/842977.html (accessed 7 June 2011).


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the de facto independence of Transnistriain other words the status of a quasi-stateshould

be identified as a persistent goal of the regime. However, it seemed that the Smirnov regime

wanted to pursue an improved status quo. Transnistria, for example, desired to be

recognized by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus,13which would bring significant benefits for the

Transnistrian region, such as the enhancement of its security and the facilitation of foreign

trade, at virtually no cost to the quasi-state. It also seemed that while keeping its de facto

independence, Transnistria also wanted to be treated as a virtual territory of Russia, which

meant becoming an established client of socioeconomic, educational and other benefit

programs financed by the Russian budget. Finally, it seemed the Smirnov regime was content

for the time being to settle for international recognition of Transnistrias de facto status and to

leave the formal definition of its international statusin other words the full settlement of theTransnistrian conflictto future generations. If wisely managed, this postponed status

could allow Smirnov to maintain to the twenty-year status quo and simultaneously legally

guarantee the Transnistrias existence for the foreseeable future.

As a candidate for president in the December 2011 elections, Yevgeniy Shevchuk was

in favor of this policy of postponing Transnistrias formal status. To be sure, he said that

recognition of Transnistrias independence would be the most effective means of the conflict

resolution, but he also suggested that it was an unrealistic outcome, since the internationalparticipants of the conflict settlement process are against such a solution.14 Another time,

Shevchuk underlined that Tiraspol was bound by the international commitments signed by

Smirnovnamely the 1997 Primakov Memorandum and 2003 Kozak Memorandumto

establish a common state with Moldova.15 Later on, when it was closer to the election, he

announced that he would follow the peoples decision in the 2006 referendum to gain

independence for Transnistria and subsequently join Russia. His opponents accused him of

intending simply to surrender the quasi-state and merge it with Moldova, but this possibility

13Prezident Pridnestrovya: Nam dostatochno priznaniya Rossii, Ukrainy i Belorussii, REGNUM, 31 August

2010, http://www.regnum.ru/news/1320628.html (accessed 14 March 2012).14

Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Nikakaya dolzhnosti privilegii ne stoyat togo, chtoby ne pytatsya ostanovitstranu otskatyvaniya v propast , interview with Voyennoye obozreniye, 13 June 2011, http://eshevchuk.ru/ru/content/%C2%ABnikakaya-dolzhnost-i-privilegii-ne-stoyat-togo-chtoby-ne-pytatsya-ostanovit-stranu-ot-skaty (accessed15 June 2011). See also Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Prezhde, chem kuda-to voyti, nado znat, kak ottuda vyyti,interview with Sobesednik.ru, 27 July 2012, http://sobesednik.ru/politics/evgenii-shevchuk-prezhde-chem-kuda-voiti-nado-znat-kak-ottuda-vyiti (accessed 2 January 2012).15

Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Otvety na voprosy blogerov i chitateley sayta storonnikov, 16 June 2011,http://eshevchuk.ru/en/content/evgenii-shevchuk-otvetil-na-voprosy-blogerov-i-chitatelei-saita-storonnikov (ac-cessed 2 January 2012).


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could be ruled out. Finally, when Shevchuk became the president, he confirmed his devotion

to peoples will as expressed in the referendum.16

Shevchuk may truly strive for the international recognition of Transnistria and its

accession to Russia. He seems far more responsive to public opinion than Smirnov. Moreover,

as a native Transnistrian, he appears to care more about regionsfate than its previous leader.

He was born in Rybnitsa, a city located in the northern part of nowadays Transnistria, and

spent half of his life in the de facto independent Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, while

Smirnov only came to Transnistria in 1987, when he was already 46 years old, and eventually

started treating the quasi-state as a business rather than as his homeland. Shevchuk,

conversely, may identify Transnistria with the latter.

However, Shevchuk must also be aware of the fact that his declared goal is almostimpossible to achieve. It is sufficient to say that there are more and more signals the Russian

Federation would like Transnistria to reintegrate with Moldova. Despite some

countermeasures taken by Moscow, Chiinu is moving further toward a closer integration

with the EU and cooperation with Romania. In this light, a rational solution for Russia would

be to not postpone reintegration, because Transnistria could provide Russia with a share in the

reunified state. That is why it seems Shevchuks actual aim concerning the status of

Transnistria is the same as Smirnovs endto keep the present status quo, in other words topreserve the de facto independence of the Transnistrian region. But unlike the Smirnov

regime, Shevchuk is motivated neither by desire to retain exclusive power in Transnistria nor

by a willingness to derive money from functioning of the quasi-state. As it was mentioned,

Shevchuks real authority has already somehow dispersed. Besides, he seems to be still

devoted to the issues announced during his successful presidential campaign, stating that all

Transnistrians should stand equal in the eyes of the local law and promising to curb the

rampant corruption thriving under the Smirnov regime.17 Further, the status quo allows

Shevchuk to keep and enhance statehood of Transnistria, his homeland; the mentioned

improved status quo would be even more appreciated. Declaring his goal to be international

recognition and union with Russia simply allows him to avoid accusations of high treason,

stabilize the political situation, reach internal unity and focus on reforms aimed at economic

revival of Transnistria.

16 Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Ya nikomu ne sobirayus sdavat Pridnestrovye!, interview with Komsomolskaya

prawda, 26 December 2011, http://kp.ru/daily/25810.5/2789897/ (accessed 2 January 2012).17

William Schreibers and authors interview with Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Tiraspol, 2 March 2012. See also:William Schreiber and Marcin Kosienkowski, Cautious Optimism for Transnistria, New Eastern Europe, 5April 2012, http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/277 (accessed 5 April 2012).


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Finally, it cannot be excluded that Shevchuks position on Transnistrias status will be

altered in the future, for example, under influence of Moscow or when the majority of the

Transnistrian population changes its mind and relinquishes the idea of Transnistrias

independence and/or accession to Russia. Moreover, Klmn Mizseithe former European

Union Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova (20072011)hopes Shevchuk

will simply realize that only . . . through reintegration into a Moldova that itself is integrating

with Europe, his beloved region will be able to raise economically in order to improve the

welfare of the population, impoverished in two decades of self-isolation.18 But Chiinu

should create all necessary conditions for reintegration securing Transnistrias interests in a

sufficient degree.

Transnistria and Russia

The Smirnov regime identified Russia as a priority of the quasi-states foreign policy.

The main aims of the Transnistrian authorities toward Russia were to prevent Moscow from

forcing Transnistria to reintegrate with Moldova and to ensure further Russian support,

allowing the Transnistrian region to survive as a quasi-state. Of course, Tiraspol would have

been happy if Transnistria were recognized by Russia, but this was unachievable and did notcome true. A complimentary task was developing cooperation with the Russian regions. First,

agreements were signed as early as at the beginning of the 1990s and the number of Russian

partner regions reached more than thirty in the 2000s.

The problem for the Smirnov regime was that officially Moscow always supported the

territorial integrity of Moldova. Such a declaration was evidenced as early as in the agreement

ending the war between Moldova and Transnistria, which was concluded by the presidents of

Russia and MoldovaBoris Yeltsin and Mircea Sneguron 21 July 1992. Over the

following twenty years, Moscow made some attemptsalbeit with varying intensityto

orchestrate conflict resolution by merging Transnistria with its parent state against Tiraspols

will. To conclude, reintegration under the appropriate conditions could strengthen Russian

influence, mainly in Moldova, but also in Ukraine, the Black Sea region, and the Balkans.

These provisions should legalize and/or enhance Russias military, political, economic, and

cultural presence in all of Moldova, while limiting the presence of other external players

18Klmn Mizsei, Transnistria and the elusive settlement,Info-Prim Neo, 23 February 2012, http://www.info-

prim.md/?x=93&y=44660 (accessed 23 February 2012).


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there, such as Romania, NATO or the EU. Another Russian condition of conflict settlement

was that any unified constitution should guarantee a strong degree of influence for the pro-

Russian Transnistrian elements.

The fact that Transnistria was able to survive thanks to Russias assistance was

admitted overtly, even by Igor Smirnov.19 Importantly, the support was comprehensive,

encompassing political, economic, military, and social activity. Moscow brought Transnistria

under a protective umbrella in the international arena. Russia also provided the quasi-state

with the natural gas crucial for its industry, although Tiraspol paid only some of it or did not

pay at all, which led to its astronomical debt of about $3 billion owed to Gazprom at the end

of 2011. Further, Russia kept its soldiers in the Transnistrian regiona peacekeeping

contingent and the Operational Group of Russian Forceswhich substantially enhancedTransnistriasmilitary security. Finally, it granted all Transnistrian pensioners extra money.

These are only examples of Russias assistance to the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

Crucially, this supportespecially at the political and economic levelswas restricted by

Moscow when it was dissatisfied with Smirnov and particularly when it wanted to make

Tiraspol reintegrate with its parent state or simply negotiate with Chiinu on the conflict

settlement. As a result of such instances, Transnistrias socioeconomic situation would often

worsen dramatically.The Smirnov regime took several steps to convince Russia to support Transnistrias de

facto independence. First, it emphasized that Moscow should protect and endorse a region

persistently connected with Russia since the end of the eighteenth century, when it was

conquered by the Russian commander Aleksandr Suvorov and merged with the Russian

Empire. Furthermore, Smirnov also claimed that Moscow should also protect and endorse

Transnistrian people heavily Russified and having a deep sense of togetherness with

Matushka Rossiya, despite the fact that Transnistria is a multi-ethnic region.20 Tiraspol

underlined that this sense of community was confirmed in the 2006 referendum, when the

Transnistrian regions inhabitants voted for independence and subsequent accession to Russia.

As more and more Transnistrians acquired Russian citizenshiptotaling 160,000 at the end of

2011the Smirnov regime argued Moscow should help its citizens and defend them and their

homeland from Moldova by all means.

19Svetlana Gamova, Amerikanskaya PRO kakpodarok Pridnestrovyu, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 March 2010,

http://www.ng.ru/cis/2010-03-03/1_pro.html (accessed 10 April 2012).20 See, for example, Yelena Tolmachevskaya, Rossiya i Ukraina vo vneshnepoliticheskoy strategii

Pridnestrovya (masters thesis, Transnistrian State University, 2010), 37.


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Second, the Transnistrian authorities presented Transnistria as an outpost of Russian,

and in a broader sense, Slavic civilization in this part of Europe. The Transnistrian political

scientist, Nikolay Ostrovskiy, even said: Transnistria has always been, and we hope that it

will still be, a mental and civilizational part of Russia, both in terms of its ethnic composition

and historical traditions, culture, language. In this sense, Transnistria is even more Russian

than, say, Moscow or Kaliningrad.21 On the other side of the Dniester River lay Western

civilization. It was pointed out that Transnistrias reunification with Moldova would bring an

eradication of Russian culture, language, mentality, etc. on the Dniester, which would be a

substantial loss for Russia. That is one reason why, in the opinion of the Smirnov regime,

Moscow was obliged to preserve Transnistrias statehood.

Third, the Smirnov regime presented Transnistria as the last military stronghold of

Russia in Southeastern Europe. Its role was only to increase in 2004, when Moldovas

neighbor Romania joined NATO, and when Ukraine was strengthening its cooperation with

this organization. NATO was considered by Moscow to be an enemy in the post-Soviet area

and this allowed the Transnistrian authorities to paint the quasi-state as a barrier to

aggressive Western expansionism,enhancing Russias security. In 2010, for example, the

Smirnov regime suggested a deployment of medium-range Iskander missiles in Transnistria,

in response to Romanias intentions to have elements of a US anti-missile shield on itsterritory, thus underlining the quasi-states geostrategic importance for Moscow.22

Fourth, the Smirnov regime took steps to establish close personal relations with

Russian officials and politicians of various levels. Smirnov himself noted that whenever a

Russian official left office it negatively affected Transnistrian-Russian relations, since the

Transnistrian side had to win favor with the successor.23 These Russian officials, together

with representatives of the Russian elite, formed the Transnistrian lobby in Russia,

representing and defending Transnistrias interests there. Their motivations varied: political,

patriotic or economic; in many cases they were simply bribed by the Smirnov regime.24

Fifth, in the first half of 2000s, the Transnistrian authorities took action to

economically bind Russia with Transnistria even further. During privatization, the lions share

21Nikolay Ostrovskiy, Rossiya, opyat brosayet na proizvol sudby i ukhodit, kak eto uzhe bylo v 1991 godu,

AVA.MD, 5 June 2008, http://ava.md/02-pridnestrove/0797-nikolai-ostrovskii-rossiya-opyat-brosaet--na-proizvol-sudbi-i-uhodit-kak-eto-uzhe-bilo-v-1991-godu.html (accessed 16 April 2012).22 Smirnov: Pridnestrovye ne protiv rossiyskikh raket, Interfax, 15 February 2010, http://www.interfax.ru/txt.asp?id=123748 (accessed 15 April 2012).23 Igor Smirnov, Zhit na nashey zemle(Tiraspol: Liter, 2005), http://president.pmr-gov.org/index.php?option=

com_content&task=view&id=192&Itemid=113.24 See, for example, Theodor Tudoroiu, The European Union, Russia, and the Future of the Transnistrian

Frozen Conflict,East European Politics and Societies26, no. 1 (2012): 150.


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of Transnistrian industry, including its main factories, was sold to Russian companies. Since

Chiinuhad never recognized the privatization as legally valid, Russian businessmen found

their property investments relying on the de facto independence of Transnistria. It was a

guarantee that Russian companies, not only the Russian authorities, would defend

Transnistrias interests.

Sixth, when Moscow pushed Transnistria toward Moldova and limited its assistance to

the quasi-state, the Smirnov regime would resort to histrionics. The Transnistrian authorities

appealed to Russian public opinion and nationalist politicians for support, accusing any

Russian official who acted in favor of merging Transnistria with Moldova of betraying

Russias interests.25They also announced their intention to enhance cooperation with Ukraine,

including possibly joining this state.Overall, the Smirnov regimes policy toward Russia can be recognized as quite

successfulit helped shape Moscows Transnistrian policy in the direction desired by

Tiraspol. Dmitriy Trenin, a Russian expert, called it a case of the tail wagging the dog.26 In

reality, Transnistria came close to reintegration with Moldova only once, when the

aforementioned Kozak Memorandum was due to be signed by Chiinu and Tiraspol; but

then-Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin withdrew his support at the last moment under

heavy pressure from the West. Russian assistance to Transnistria has never been restricted tothe level which would constitute an existential risk for Transnistria. The soft-power conflict

that broke out between Tiraspol and Moscow in 2011 was connected with Smirnovwho

decided to battle for his fifth term as president against Moscows willbut did not target

Transnistria itself.

Yevgeniy Shevchuk also declares that Russia is a strategic partner for Transnistria and

seeks to improve cooperation with this state.27 The new president made his first trip to

Moscow only four days after his inauguration. Shevchuks initial goal has been to inform

Moscow that there will be no U-turns in Transnistrias foreign policy.28Although Shevchuk

established good working relations with Russian officials when he was the speaker of the

Transnistrian parliament (20052009) and the head of the Obnovleniye party (till 2010),

25See, for example, Ilya Galinskiy, Kremlevskiye mechtatelislishkom otkrovenno simpatiziruyut planam po

unichtozheniyu Pridnestrovya, REGNUM, 31 May 2011, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1410863.html(accessed 6 June 2011).26Dmitriy Trienin, Opasnost na Dnestre, Transnistrian Digest, no. 18 (2006): 2122. Authors interview withDmitriy Trienin (the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center), Moscow, 7 November 2007.27 Polnaya versiya inauguratsii prezidenta PMR Yevgeniya Shevchuka, 30 December 2012, http://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=mktmdKguT0k&feature=related (accessed 4 January 2012).28Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Pridnestrovye budet vmeste s Rossiyey, interview with Rossiyskiye vesti, 4 January

2012, http://e-shevchuk.livejournal.com/44360.html#cutid1 (accessed 19 January 2012).


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Russia was unsure of his intentions as president; after all, Moscow had supported another

candidate, who was perceived as a loyal politician, during 2011 Transnistrian presidential

elections.

Transnistrias main foreign policy goals with regard to Russia clearly have not been

changed. The current Transnistrian leaderas his predecessorwants Moscow to continue

giving Transnistria comprehensive, vital assistance. According to official announcements, of

the main topic of the Transnistrian-Russian diplomatic meetings was socioeconomic support

to the quasi-state. The primary problem the new president faced was that Russia did not give

Transnistria the $300 million in assistance that it had promised during 2011 electoral

campaign. Due to Shevchuks efforts,however, Moscow announced in mid-March 2012 that

it would grant the quasi-state $150 million.29

Then, in late April 2012, it promised to give $30million to stabilize the Transnistrian ruble.30 It seems likely that Shevchuk eventually

managed to win Moscows heart.

Beyond continuing to receive assistance from Russia, Tiraspol would also like to

prevent Moscow from compelling Transnistria to merge with Moldova.

Where Transnistrias policy toward Russia differs under Shevchuks rule from the

Smirnov period is in the quasi-states exclusive use of positive methods of policy

implementation. The Transnistrian authorities only speak highly of Russia and underlineTransnistrias inseparable links with Russia, mentioning the numerous Russian citizens living

in the region and the results of the 2006 referendum.31 Additionally, to gain some political

points and preserve previous Russias policy toward his quasi-state Shevchuk appealed to

Russian citizens living in the Transnistrian region to vote for Vladimir Putin in the March

2012 Russian presidential elections.32Furthermore the new president of Transnistria wants the

entity to be involved in Eurasian cooperation organized by Russia and accompanied by

Belarus and Kazakhstan, such as the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union, and

the Common Economic Space.33Critically, Transnistria tries to present itself as a responsible,

29Svetlana Gamova, Moskva vydelila Pridnestrovyu 150 millionov, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 March 2012,

http://www.ng.ru/cis/2012-03-16/100_pridn.html (accessed 17 March 2012).30 Rossiya vydelila Pridnestrovyu $30 mln dlya stabilizatsii mestnoy valyuty, gazeta.ru, 27 April 2012,http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2012/04/27/n_2315693.shtml (accessed 27 April 2012).31

Nina Shtanski, Bednost bolezn Pridnestrovya, interview with Georgia Times, 11 March 2012,http://www.georgiatimes.info/articles/72981.html (accessed 10 April 2012).32Yevgeniy Shevchuk prizval pridnestrovtsev, imeyushchikh rossiyskoye grazhdanstvo, progolosovat 4 martaza Vladimira Putina, Olvia-press, March 2012, http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol28-03-12.htm (accessed 12March 2012).33

Glava gosudarstva: Yevraziyskiye ustremleniya Pridnestrovya eto osnova natsionalnoy idei,Ofitsialnyy Sayt Prezidenta PMR, 6 June 2012, http://president.pmr-gov.org/index.php?option=com

_content&task=view&id=3437&Itemid=1 (accesssed 6 June 2012).


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reasonable, and trustworthy partner, not as an ungrateful suppliant, a party unwilling to

negotiate, or a troublemaker, as the quasi-state may have previously been seen in Moscow on

many occasions.

It should be noted that such an approach suggests that if Transnistria were pressed by

Russia to reintegrate with Moldova, the Transnistrian authorities could finally agree. But

Shevchuk would probably do his best to secure his regions interests in the highest possible

degree.

Transnistria and Ukraine

Under Igor Smirnov, Transnistrias foreign policy goal with regard toUkraine was toensure its benevolent neutrality and, when needed, to have it as an ally in disputes with

Moldova. The Smirnov regime understood that if Kievwhich officially supports Moldovas

territorial integritytruly took Chiinus side, then Transnistrias existence would be put in

serious risk. The importance of Ukraine to the quasi-state resulted from the fact that it was

Transnistrias window to the outside world, from its role as a mediator and a guarantor of the

conflict settlement negotiations, and more generally from its position as an influential actor in

the region. Ukraine was supposed to serve as a counterbalance to Russias influence inTransnistria and Moldova, when Moscows policy went against Tiraspols interests. It should

be noted, however, that during the periods when the Smirnov regime had an understanding

with Moscow, relations with Ukraine were put to the side. A complementary, but also

significant aim of Tiraspol toward its Eastern neighbor was to develop cooperation with the

Ukrainian regions, particularly Odessa and Vinnytsya, which are adjacent to Transnistria.

Implementation of Tiraspols policy toward Ukraine was in many cases similar to its

Russian policy.34 First, the Smirnov regime reminded Kiev on many occasions that the

Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic was nearly a third inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians, many

of whomup to even 100,000held Ukrainian passports. Tiraspol claimed that quasi-states

reintegration with Latin Moldova would pose a direct threat to these peoples identity, while a

de facto independent Transnistria would guarantee the preservation of their Ukrainian and

Slavic character; thus the quasi-state should be supported or at least tolerated by Kiev. In

34 See Vladimir Yastrebchak, Gde interes Kiyeva k pridnestrovskomu uregulirovaniyu? Zerkalo nedeli, 12

June 2010, http://zn.ua/LAW/gde_interes_kieva_k_pridnestrovskomu_uregulirovaniyu-60386.html (accessed 6June 2011); Ilya Galinskiy, Politika i natsionalnyye interesy Ukrainy v pridnestrovskom uregulirovanii,

REGNUM, 31 May 2011, http://www.regnum.ru/news/1346612.html (accessed 7 June 2011).


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truth, the Smirnov regime conducted a relatively favorable policy toward the Ukrainians

living in the Transnistrian region. At least formally, Ukrainian served as one of the three

official languages in Transnistria, along with Russian and Moldovan (written in Cyrillic),

while in Moldova there was only one official languageMoldovan (written in Latin script).

Second, Transnistria tried to play Ukraines sentimental attachment to the

Transnistrian region, Kievs distrust of neighboring Romania, and Ukrainian national pride.

Tiraspol reminded the authorities that the Transnistrian territory used to belong to the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic until 1940, when it was included into the Moldavian

Soviet Socialist Republic. This was one argument why Kiev should not be indifferent to

Transnistrias fate. Tiraspol also tried to fuel Ukraines unspoken fears of Romania, claiming,

for example, that Bucharest harbored designs on Ukrainian territories, namely NorthernBukovina and Southern Bessarabia, which belonged to Romania in the interwar period. At the

same time, Transnistria presented itself as a friendly state and an ally against Bucharests

expansionist policy. Further, when the Smirnov regime was brawling with Moscow, it

offered Ukraine the chance to provide wide-ranging support for the quasi-state, giving Kiev

an opportunity to increase its position in the region. When Ukraine, after being pressed by

Moldova and the EU for several years, finally in March 2006 introduced new customs

regulations at the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border requiring Transnistrias export goods to becleared in Moldovan customs, the Smirnov regime labeled the move a test of Kievs loyalty to

the West, claiming the move undermined Ukraines sovereignty.35

Third, Tiraspol used the economic factor, including the close economic links between

Transnistria and Ukraine, which were established as early as the Soviet period. Smirnov

himself worked in Soviet Ukraines heavy industry for many years.If bilateral trade turnover

was relatively low, it was still important for the adjacent Ukrainian regions. Transnistrian

grocery stores were dominated by Ukrainian products. Furthermore, Ukraine earned money

on the transit of Transnistrias foreign trade. It was especially beneficial for the nearby

Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Transnistria was also an important transit corridor for goods

conveyed from Ukraine to Moldova and further into the Balkans and also for commerce

flowing via Ukraines Danube ports. There was also Ukrainian investment in the quasi-state.

All of these economic factors allowed the Smirnov regime to emphasize that any action taken

by Kiev or other regional actors against Transnistria would automatically hinder Ukrainian

35

Authors interview with Andrey Safonov (a Transnistrian political scientist and the editor-in-chief of anindependent newspaper Novaya gazeta), Tiraspol, 23 June 2011. See also Vladimir Yastrebchak, Itogi goda voblasti vneshney politiki Pridnestrovya,Diplomaticheskiy vestnik Pridnestrovya, no. 2 (2010): 8.


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economic interests. Tiraspols campaign intensified when Ukraine introduced the previously

mentioned customs regulations in 2006. Transnistrias rhetoricbecame harsher and included,

along with economic factors, accusations of imposing a blockade on Transnistria aimed at

triggering social disorder in the quasi-state.

Fourth, the Smirnov regime strove to establish links with Ukrainian officials and

representatives of the political and business elite, which under most circumstances were

renewed following political turnover. Smirnov made the mistake of not engaging with a

successor at least once. In 2004, during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Smirnov supported

the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych and overtly opposed Viktor Yushchenko, perceived as a

pro-Western politician, but who in the end became the Ukrainian president. This deteriorated

Transnistrian-Ukrainian relations and finally induced Smirnov to reach out to Yushchenko,the more so as the latter proposed a Transnistrian conflict settlement plan in spring of 2005.36

Very often relations were established following a simple procedure. For example, once

Transnistrian officials took part in a conference about Transnistria on the Ukrainian Black

Sea, where they met representatives of regionspolitical and business elite. This channel was

used by the Transnistrians to meet the local Ukrainian authorities. In many cases Ukrainian

officials, politicians, and businessman who acted within Ukraine in favor of Transnistria were

somehow involved in Transnistrian smuggling, personally benefiting from this practice.

37

The Smirnov regimes policy toward Ukraine can be recognized as quite effective.

Due to Tiraspols activities, Ukraine kept a stance of benevolent neutrality and sometimes

even supported Transnistria. There was only one major failure, limiting quasi-states de facto

independence, when Chiinutook control of Transnistrian exports in 2006, thanks to Kievs

help. But it should be noted that Ukraine, pushed by Tiraspol, refused to do this for a several

years. It is likely that even president Yushchenko in mid-2005 gave a verbal order not to

introduce a new custom regime at the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border.38Moreover, although

Moldova also wanted to control Transnistrias imports, this did not happen because Kiev

declined.

Like Smirnov, the new Transnistrian president, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, puts Ukraine

behind Russia. This has not been changed by the fact that Shevchuk is an ethnic Ukrainian,

who studied at the Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

36Authors interview with Andrey Safonov, Tiraspol, 16 September 2009.

37See, for example, Christopher J. Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in

Moldova.A Report from The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Legal Studies Research PaperSeries #06-0045 (New York: St. Johns University School of Law, 2006), 9293.38

See Oazu Nantoi, Republic of Moldova: Past and Present,The Institute for Public Policy in Chiinu, 2007.


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between 2002 and 2003 and was previouslyperceived by Kiev as our man.39Yet Shevchuk

also considers Ukraine an important Transnistrian partner. That is why he paid his second

foreign visit to Kiev two weeks after his inauguration. It should also be mentioned that the

first meeting between Shevchuk and the Moldovan prime minister, Vlad Filat, took place two

weeks later in the Ukrainian city of Odessa.

Transnistrias aim toward Ukraine under the new president is the same as in the case

of the predecessor. The difference is that Shevchuk pays attention to the positive dimension of

bilateral interaction. He declares that he wants to establish good-neighborly, constructive,

pragmatic, and mutually beneficial relations that reach a higher level of cooperation and

understanding between Transnistria and Ukraine.40This means that bilateral relations may be

unburdened of previous ills, such as Tiraspols excessive self-interest, zigzags, negativeemotions, and elements of confrontation. This new potential was seen, for example, when

Nina Shtanski, Transnistrian foreign minister, clearly stated that Transnistria did not want to

join Ukraine.41 Furthermore, although Shevchuk claims that Transnistrias economic

potential is oppressed artificially from the outside, referring to the current export regime of

Transnistrian goods (under the control of Moldova, Ukraine, and the EU), he bears no grudges

against Kiev. Instead, he seeks changes in cooperation with the actors involved in the

Transnistrian conflict settlement process, including Ukraine.

42

Shtanski stated in late April 2012 that the active good-neighborly policy toward

Ukraine has started gaining momentum.43 But in reality there are no palpable signs of

substantially strengthening cooperation between Tiraspol and Kiev. As in the Smirnov period,

the relationship seems to have been put to the side, especially when compared to interaction

with Russia. However, even if Transnistrian-Ukrainian relations are not intensively

developed, they are calmer. This will certainly be appreciated by the Ukrainian authorities,

who seek a more stable situation at their south-western border. Thus, Kievs benevolent

neutrality toward Tiraspol is likely to be kept.

39 International Crisis Group, Moldovas uncertain future, Europe Report 175, 17 August 2006 (Chiinu &

Brussels: International Crisis Group), 10, note 66, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/175_moldova_s_uncertain_future.pdf (accessed 10 January 2012).40

Yevgeniy Shevchuk, Pridnestrovye zagnalo sebya v iskusstvennuyu izolyatsiyu ot vneshnego mira, Zerkalonedeli, 20 January 2012, http://zn.ua/POLITICS/evgeniy_shevchuk_pridnestrovie_zagnalo_sebya_v_iskusstvennuyu

_izolyatsiyu_ot_vneshnego_mira-95987.html (accessed 28 January 2012).41

Nina Shtanski, Vneshnyaya politika Pridnestrovskoy Moldavskoy Respubliki, REGNUM, 4 April 2012,http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1517132.html (accessed 4 April 2012).42

Schreibersand authorsinterview with Shevchuk.43Nina Shtanskis Facebook page, 21 April 2012, https://www.facebook.com/nina.shtanski (accessed 21 April

2012).


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Transnistria and Moldova

The Smirnov regimes foreign policy goals related to Moldova were to preserve its

independence from the parent state and to strengthen its own statehood. To reach these aims,

Tiraspol conducted a policy of retarding, exploiting, retaliating and weakening.

Transnistria attempted to retard progress in the Transnistrian conflict settlement

negotiations. The fundamental task of talks was to find a peaceful solution while maintaining

Moldovas territorial integrity. This has always been accepted by all of the participants except

for Tiraspol, because it ran completely contrary to its interests. Various means were used to

slow down the negotiations. Transnistria claimed that no substantial decision could be madebecause of Moldovan and Russian presidential or parliamentary elections and other important

political events. Initially, the Smirnov regime also accepted arrangements to withdraw its

consent at the last moment. Tiraspol put forward unrealistic demands, such as recognition of

Transnistrias independence by Chiinu, as a prerequisite for further talks, and finally, it

broke off the negotiations when Moldova had the upper hand. This occurred, for example,

when a new customs regime on the Ukrainian-Transnistrian border was introduced in March

2006. Even if some document was signed, Tiraspol tended to interpret the resolutions in ownfavor, in a manner unacceptable to Moldova. For example, the provision of the Memorandum

on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and

Transnistria (the so-called Primakov Memorandum) of 8 May 1997 states that the Parties

shall build their relations in the framework of a common state [obshcheye gosudarstvo in

Russian] within the borders of the Moldavian SSR as of January of the year 1990, which was

interpreted as an announcement of the creation of a confederation.44

When Chiinu took a benign approach toward Transnistriamainly in the period

between the end of the 1992 war and first months of the Moldovan Party of Communistsrule

in 2001the Smirnov regime tried to exploit the situation and gain as many concessions from

Moldova as possible, while offering almost nothing in return. Initially, Tiraspol was interested

in security guarantees and recognition of its equality with Chiinu within the conflict

settlement process, because it was afraid that the quasi-state could be attacked again or forced

to accept a solution without its consent. Later, emphasis was placed on socioeconomic

44

See Igor Boan, The negotiation process as a way to postpone the solution, in MoldovaTransdniestria:Working Together for a Prosperous Future. Negotiation Process, ed. Denis Matveev et al. (Chiinu: Cu dragPublishing House, 2009), 11634.


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problems important to the function of Transnistria. Tiraspol exploited the fact that Moldova

was usually ready to make concessions unilaterally. Even if both parties committed

themselves to make some concessions, the Transnistrian sidein contrast to the Moldovan

counterpartoften did not fulfill its obligations. Interestingly, the Moldovan authorities did

not seek to revise this policy of unilateral concessions to any great extent (even when they

tried to correct this weakness, their efforts usually failed).45 This can be explained by

Chiinus willingness to show goodwill, but also by corruption and incompetence among

Moldovan officials.46

For example, when Tiraspol conducted a 24 December 1995 Referendum on the

adoption of its second constitution, defining Transnistria as a sovereign, independent state,

the Moldovan central government withdrew from the negotiations on the Transnistrianconflict settlement. But as early as 7 February 1996, the Moldovan government decided to

sign the Moldovan-Transnistrian protocol on customs issues, in which Transnistria obtained

very beneficial autonomy in the conduct of its exports thanks to the right of using Moldovan

customs seals. However, it ignored its own obligations, for example, when it blocked the

creation of joint Moldovan-Transnistrian customs posts on the border between Transnistria

and Ukraine, which Chiinu was unable to control. Only on 1 September 2001, did the

Moldovan central authorities introduce new customs stamps and withhold them fromTransnistria (but even this did not solve the problem, because Ukraine allowed Transnistrian

goods to enter its territory with the old stamps for the next few years).47Thus, by exploiting

the parent state, Transnistria enhanced its de facto independence.

When Chiinu pursued a confrontational policy toward the quasi-statemainly in

almost the entire period of Communist rule between 2001 and 2009involving the heavy use

of sanctions and unilateral decisions on matters concerning Transnistria, the Smirnov regime

took a retaliatory approach. During this period Tiraspol, for example, imposed a 100 percent

custom duty on Moldovan goods, engaged in a telephone warof communications jamming

with Moldova, prevented Moldovan farmers from accessing land located in territory under

Transnistrian jurisdiction, harassed Moldovan schools using Latin script that were located in

Transnistria, took control over the Transnistrian section of the Moldovan railway company,

blocking it when necessary, arrested some Moldovan policemen and officials working in

45See Boan,11621.46

Authors interview with Oazu Nantoi (Program Director at The Institute for Public Policy), Chiinu, 19November 2008.47

Boan,11921.


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Bendery, a town controlled by the Transnistrian authorities, tried to seize by force the

Dniester River infrastructure belonging to Moldova, and even accused Chiinuof genocidal

intentions toward Transnistrians, the list goes on and on.48

The Smirnov regime cut off many links with Moldova despite the significant

economic and social costs. It even imposed a self-blockade when Moldova introduced a new

customs regime in March 2006, in order to blame Chiinu for blocking Transnistria. All of

these undermined the economic basis of the quasi-state, which was already weak. On the

other hand, it should be noted that Tiraspol managed to withstand Moldovan pressure,

consolidate the support of the local population for Transnistrias independence, and convince

the Moldovan central authoritiesboth the Communists and later the AEIto soften their

policy toward the quasi-state.The Smirnov regime was disinterested in strong Moldovan authorities. When there

were several competing power centers in Chiinumainly in the 1990s (after the war) and

since mid-2009, when the AEI coalition came to powerthe Moldovan elites treated the

Transnistrian conflict as a side issue and were more willing to accept compromise approaches.

But when the Moldovan authorities were consolidated, as during the rule of Communists

between 2001 and 2009, Transnistria came under consistent and direct pressure. This induced

the Smirnov regime to influence the political situation in the parent state to prevent aconcentration of power in the hands of any single political force, although Tiraspols

opportunities to do so were not extensive. This process included, for example, providing PR

for the Moldovan opposition.49Transnistrian security services may have also been involved in

inciting civic unrest in Chiinu on 7 April 2009, after allegedly fraudulent Moldovan

parliamentary elections.50Incidentally, it can be added that paradoxically the Smirnov regime

was quite satisfied when the Moldovan authorities were more pro-Western and less pro-

Russian, like the AEI government. They were handily labeled pro-Romanian nationalists by

Tiraspol and used to fuel the anti-Moldovan/Romanian and pro-independence propaganda

machine.51

48See Stuart Hensel,Moldova Strategic Conflict Assessment(London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006).

49Andrey Safonov, Transnistria: A Policy of Denial, Containment, and Separation from Moldova, inMoldova:

Arena of International Influences, ed. Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber (Lanham, MD: LexingtonBooks, 2012), 26971.50 Witold Rodkiewicz, ed., Transnistrian Conflict after 20 Years (Warsaw & Chiinu: Centre for Eastern

Studies & IDIS Viitorul, 2011), 5, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Transnistrian_Conflict_after_20_Years.pdf (accessed 1 December 2011).51

Safonov, Transnistria, 26971.


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Yevgeniy Schevchuks primary aim concerning Moldova is the same as that of

Smirnov: to maintain Transnistrias independence from Chiinu and to strengthen

Transnistrian statehood. However, as in case of new presidents policies toward Russia and

Ukraine, the methods have changed to become more pragmatic and cooperative.

Shevchuk wants Transnistrian-Moldovan relations, including the 5+2 negotiations, to

be dedicated chiefly to socioeconomic problems, but not to reaching a political solution to the

Transnistrian conflict. He explains this policy in the following way: With twenty years of

experience in negotiations on political issues, today we offer our partners the tactics of small

but concrete steps in the fields of economy, transport, communications, this is exactly what, in

our opinion, can minimize artificial barriers to the development of the economy and contact

between the two banks. It means that this can form a real platform of confidence for thefuture, more complex political debates! . . . In this we see the untapped potential of our

cooperation.52 He also underlines that socioeconomic cooperation would be mutually

beneficial, useful first of all to the ordinary people living both in Transnistria and Moldova.

Crucially, focus on this kind of cooperation, would ease the functioning of the quasi-state.

This, in turn, would enhance its statehood.

At least in general terms, however, Shevchuks approach fits Moldovas policy

regarding the Transnistrian conflict settlement, which was worked out before he came topower. The AEI is also in favor of a small steps policy. It wants to (re-)build and strengthen

ties between Moldova and Transnistria, enhancing mutual confidence and security.

Furthermore, the AEI intends to win over inhabitants and politico-economic elites from the

quasi-state, for example, by resolving common socioeconomic problems which affect the day-

to-day life of ordinary people and raising the standard of living in Transnistria. Chiinu

believes as well that joint work with Tiraspol on practical issues will, in the future, create

conditions that will allow political problems to be dealt with. Furthermore, it seems that the

ruling coalition would also like to delay the conflicts final resolution. The coalition is an

internally incoherent structure and its ability to jointly elaborate conflict settlement provisions

would be doubtful. The AEI also realizes that a prompt reunification with the pro-Russian

Transnistria could hinder the Europeanization process of Moldova. Additionally, the more

pro-Western parties of the AEI are afraid that Transnistrias population would support their

52

Yevgeniy Shevchuk, V budushchem vozmozhno obsuzhdeniye ekonomicheskogo obyedineniya sMoldaviyey, interview with ITAR-TASS, 27 February 2012, http://www.itar-tass.com/c153/352789.html(accessed 27 February 2012).


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opponents, for example the pro-Russian Moldovan Party of Communists, in elections within a

unified state.53

Shevchuk has translated his words into action quite quickly. The first steps undertaken

by him as the new president were to make it easier for Transnistria citizens to cross the quasi-

statesborder and to abolish the 100 percent import duty on Moldovan goods imported to the

Transnistrian region. He has also been eager to meet with Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad

Filat. There have been several meetings between these two leaders within a period of just four

months and they seem to have established a very good working relationship. Furthermore,

Tiraspol has become actively involved in the 5+2 negotiations, which resumed in late 2011

after a break of several years.54 Crucially, Transnistria under Shevchuk is ready to make

substantial compromises. For example, it agreed in late March 2012 on the common,Transnistrian-Moldovan customs clearance of Transnistrian goods in the quasi-states

territory, in order to resume full railway freight transportation through Transnistriawhich

had originally been halted in 2006strongly facilitating the external economic activity of

Transnistrian companies.55 It is highly unlikely that Smirnov could agree to such a

concession.

Despite this cooperative attitude, Tiraspol does not avoid applying pressure on

Chiinu. For example, Shevchuk warned the Moldovan authorities that if his initial stepsaimed at facilitating the movement of people and goods were not reciprocated by Moldova,

the process of normalization of bilateral relations may be suspended or even broken.56 He

probably counted on the fact that Chiinuwould not dare to overtly neglect the Transnistrian

conflict settlement and feel obliged to turn its words into action. He probably also hoped that

Moldova would be pressed by its Western partners, appreciating the regions new prospects,

to make mutual concessions.

It can be said that Transnistrias policy toward Moldova has found success. In mid-

April 2012 Chiinu agreed, after initial reluctance, to equal status between the conflict

parties in the negotiating process and consented that socioeconomic problems be the first and

53For an overview of the Alliance of European Integrations policy on Transnistria, see Marcin Kosienkowski,

The Alliance for European integration and the Transnistrian conflict settlement, Sprawy NarodowocioweNationalities Affairs 38 (2011): 2332.54 See William Schreiber, Tiraspol warms up, Eastern approaches (blog), The Economist, 17 April 2012,http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/04/transdniestria-talks (accessed 17 April 2012).55 Pervyy poezd poshel, Europa Liber, 30 April 2012, http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/245646

41.html (accessed 30 April 2012).56Svetlana Gamova, Tiraspolberet pauzu, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 March 2012, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2012-

03-01/2_tiraspol.html (accessed 1 March 2012).


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the widest dimension of the 5+2 talks.57Moreover, soon after railway freight transportation

through the quasi-state was resumed. Filat and Shevchuk announced that bilateral cooperation

on socioeconomic matters would be further developed.58 It is supposedly a beneficial

approach for both sides and it may substantially contribute to confidence building between the

conflict parties, but its quick, direct, and palpable results are favorable mainly to Transnistria.

Transnistria and the West

The Smirnov regime intended to keep normal relations with the West,59 however, it

seems that the relationship was treated as a necessary evil by Tiraspol.60 This problem

appeared in earnest in the mid-2000s, when the Western actors intensified their involvementin the Transnistrian conflict settlement process.

On the one hand, it appeared that Smirnov did not need to maintain interaction with

the West, because the quasi-state was clearly defined as a part of the Russian world and

preferred to function within this space. Moreover, Tiraspol found political contacts with

Western actors somehow inconsistent with Transnistrias pro-Russian geopolitical choice and

thus undermined its loyalty to its sponsorRussia. The Smirnov regime was also very

suspicious of the West, seemingly still devoted to the Cold War vision of the world. TheWestern actors were perceived as wanting insidiously, and even by means of force, to oust the

pro-Russian and authoritarian government and destroy Transnistrias statehood.61 Tiraspol

was afraid mainly of the US which was, in the Tiraspols eyes, the mastermind of Western

activity in the region. The Transnistrian authorities believed that Washington controlled the

OSCE mission in Chiinu, because since 1995 its head had always been an American,62and

that the US highly influenced the policy of the EU, because the EU was considered to be a

57

Irina Ivashkina and Olga Paterova, Istina v Vene, Kommersant.md, 19 April 2012, http://www.kommersant.md/node/7709 (accessed 21 April 2012).58

Pervyy poezd.59 Authors interviews with Ilya Galinskiy (the director of the Institute of History, State and Law of theTransnistrian State University, Tiraspol, 22 June 2011) and Vitalii Andrievski (a Moldovan political analyst andthe head of the informational-analytical portal AVA.MD, Chiinu, 22 November 2011).60 Authors interview with Maksim Kuzovlev (Transnistrian journalist and political analyst), Chiinu, 21

November 2011.61

Alyona Getmanchuk et al., Scenarios for the Development of the Transnistria Conflict: Challenges toEuropean Security (Kiev: Institute of World Policy, 2011), 8991.62 Authors interview with Ilya Galinskiy, Tiraspol, 15 September 2009. Interestingly, some Moldovan andRomanian experts perceive the OSCE Mission to Moldova as openly pro-Russian and pro-Transnistrian. See, forexample, Mihai Gribincea, The Russian policy on military bases: Georgia and Moldova(Oradea: Editura Cogito,

2001), 2078; Vladimir Socor, New Broom at U.S.-Led OSCE Mission in Moldova,Eurasia Daily Monitor,13 September 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32032&tx_ttnews[backPid]=177&no_cache=1 (accessed 28 April 2012).


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weak structure or only a set of rules.63 Generally, the policy of Transnistria under Igor

Smirnov toward the Western countries had strong elements of isolationism.

On the other hand, contact with the Westfor many years represented in the region

mainly by the OSCEwas treated as a sort of legitimization of Transnistrias statehood. It

was also an opportunity to make Western representatives (who maintained working

relations with Transnistria)sympathetic or at least neutral in Tiraspols conflict with

Chiinu. The West strongly supported Moldovas territorial integrity and recognized the

Transnistrian region as an authoritarian entity, so its attitude toward Transnistria was rather

negative from the very beginning. Furthermore, in the late 1990s, the quasi-states external

trade with non-CIS countriesand chiefly Western partnerscame up to more or less the

same level as trade with traditional CIS markets. Maintaining normal relations wassupposedly in favor of maintaining this valuable trade exchange. Finally, in the late 2000s, the

EU made an offer to finance socioeconomic projects in Transnistria, which was met with

interest by Tiraspol, which was facing severe consequences from the global financial crisis. 64

Because of treating relations with the West as a necessary evil, Transnistria rather did

not advance its own proposals or initiatives, but only reacted to the Western actors policy.

Importantly, the Smirnov regime restricted and selected the Wests activity on Transnistrian

territory. First of all, it was against taking steps in the politico-military field which wasreflected, for example, by its obstructing OSCE inspections of the Transnistrian peacekeeping

contingent.65 Admittedly, Tiraspol accepted the EU proposal for the realization of

socioeconomic projects in the Transnistrian region, but the Smirnov regime wanted the

assistance to be granted not via Chiinubut directly to the quasi-state, administered by the

Transnistrian authorities, focused on select issues like healthcare and environmental matters,

and finally given without any preconditions. Such restrictions were made because the

Smirnov regime was afraid that the Western funding might be used to form a pro-Western

fifth column in Transnistria and build an excessively positive image of the West among the

Transnistrian population to the detriment of Transnistrian statehood, or that it could come

with conditions detrimental to the quasi-states de facto independence.66

63Authors interviews with Maksim Kuzovlev (Chiinu, 24 June 2011) and Safonov (23 June 2011).64

Authors interviews with Mikhail Kushakov (the vice-rector of the Transnistrian State University, Tiraspol, 22June 2011), Kuzovlev (24 June 2011), and Victor Chiril (the executive director of The Foreign Policy

Association of Moldova, Chiinu, 23 November 2011).65Authors interviewwith a Western military diplomat Chiinu, August 2007.

66Getmanchuk, 8991.


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Additionally, the Smirnov regime did not try significantly to improve the very poor

image of Transnistria in the West, where the quasi-state was perceived, for example, as an

open-air Soviet museum, the black hole of Europe and a hotbed of weapons deals (to some

extent not without reason). Such ignorance in Western public opinion was admitted even by

the Transnistrian foreign ministry.67If Tiraspol indeed took steps to correct this, they involved

rather a primitive, Soviet-style propaganda about Transnistria as a fully democratic state

inhabited by happy people, whose existence was put to risk by Moldovan fascists. The

weakness of this information was that it was simply not true and, for example, one trip to the

region was enough to ruin this image. Conversely, anti-Western elements were used by the

Smirnov regime in its internal propaganda machine. All in all, relations between Transnistria

under Smirnov and the West were quite difficult.As far as Yevgeniy Shevchuk is concerned, he declares that Tiraspol not only wants to

keep normal relations with the Western actorswhich Smirnov intended but did not

achievebut also declares his will to develop them. He would like to establish a positive

working relationship with the Western players to secure the quasi-states interests. When

asked how he perceived the relations of Transnistria with the West, the new Transnistrian

president answered:

After Romania joined the European Union, the West is practically our neighbor. We are interested in

good-neighborly and mutually beneficial relations with EU member states along the lines of economic

cooperation. We seek assistance from equal partners in solving the human problems that have resulted

from twenty years of international non-recognition. We also seek to continue our tradition of

cooperation with Eastern neighbors. We want to be understood. There should not be a formula that the

West is always right and Transnistria is always wrong. We want to develop a stable state that can cast

off all the clichs that have arisen in recent years. We want Transnistria to be seen as a calm member

of the international community.68

When he was asked about the democratic transition process after the departure of the

authoritarian president Smirnov, a problem in which the West is very interested, Shevchuk

replied:

67

Oleg Yelkov, Rol SMI vo vneshney politike i formirovanii obraza gosudarstva v mezhdunarodnommassovom soznanii,Diplomaticheskiy vestnik Pridnestrovya, no. 3 (2011): 4448.68

Schreibersand authorsinterview with Shevchuk.


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We do have democratic priorities. We want our partners taking part in negotiations [on the

Transnistrian conflict settlement] to understand that democratic transformation should not be based on

extending poverty, but on extending economic opportunities. Our economic potential has been

downgraded by outside actors. We are not asking for handouts. However, our citizens have a right totwenty first century standards of living, they should not face hurdles put in place by certain Moldovan

politicians. EU structures were also involved in unfairly controlling our border with Ukraine. This had

a serious impact on our economic opportunities.69

Shevchuks position regarding relations of Transnistria with the West can be complemented

by Nina Shtanski, Transnistrian foreign minister.

KOSIENKOWSKI Transnistrias Foreign Policy

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