gerber ch07 [Modo de compatibilidad] · PDF fileTitle: Microsoft PowerPoint - gerber_ch07_ ...
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Chapter 7
Commercial
Policy
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Chapter Objectives
• Examine the dollar cost of the effects of tariffs and quotas in the European Union, U.S. and Japan in the agriculture, clothing, and textile industries
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and textile industries
• Analyze the most common reasons for countries to protect certain industries
• Discuss the mechanisms used to provide protection
Introduction: Commercial Policy and Jobs
• This chapter examines the dollar value of the effects of tariffs and quotas in the European Union (EU), Japan, and the United StatesUnited States
• It is important to compare the costs and benefits of trade barriers and examine the most common reasons given for protecting specific industries
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Protection in the European Union, Japan,
and the United States
• Since the end of WWII, average tariff rates around the world have fallen substantially
• By 2002, average nominal rates were 3.9% in US, 3.3% in Japan, 4.4% in EU
• However, all nations have higher levels of protection in
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• However, all nations have higher levels of protection in particular industries they deem “sensitive”
• In addition to tariffs and quotas, many countries provide generous subsidies to some of their agricultural producers, particularly among developed nations
Direct Costs and Jobs Saved in
Agriculture, Clothing, and Textiles
• Since the phase in of the Uruguay Round tariff cuts, average tariffs have fallen 40%—but few sectors are average
• For example, agriculture, clothing and textiles experience
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• For example, agriculture, clothing and textiles experience much smaller reductions in tariffs and quotas (12%, 14%, 14% respectively)
• In addition, all of these sectors in the EU, Japan, and US have significant non-tariff barriers applied to them including large government subsidies in the case of agriculture
TABLE 7.1
EU, Japanese, and U.S. Protection in Three Sectors (Mid-1990s, Millions of US$)
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TABLE 7.1 (continued)
EU, Japanese, and U.S. Protection in Three Sectors (Mid-1990s, Millions of US$)
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TABLE 7.2
Jobs Saved through Tariffs and Quotas
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TABLE 7.2 (continued)
Jobs Saved through Tariffs and Quotas
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Direct Costs and Jobs Saved in Agriculture, Clothing, and Textiles (cont.)
• Trade policy is a grossly inefficient mechanism to create jobs
– It is a non-transparent job-creation program
– It relies on too many intervening variables, and does not
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– It relies on too many intervening variables, and does not go directly to the heart of the problem
– If job creation is the goal, tariffs and quotas are very expensive
-Better job-creation tools: (1) sound macroeconomic polices and (2) flexible labor markets
The Logic of Collective Action
• Given that the costs of tariffs and quotas are high to consumers, why do consumers tolerate them?
• Mancur Olson´s Logic of Collective Action– The costs of tariffs and quotas are borne by a great
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– The costs of tariffs and quotas are borne by a great many people: everyone pays a little for protection
– The benefits of protection is concentrated in a few industries: few benefit a lot from protection
– Thus, there is an asymmetry in the incentives to oppose the policy: those benefiting from protection have much greater incentives than those hurt by it to lobby for it
Table 7.3 Agricultural Subsidies, 2007
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Why Nations Protect Their Industries: The Labor Argument
• The Labor Argument: Protection must be used against imports from countries where wages are much lower
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-Problem: Does not consider differences in productivity between different workforces: As productivity rises, so will wages
Why Nations Protect Their Industries: The Infant Industry Argument
• Infant Industry Argument: Developing countries have nascent industries that must be protected against competition from industrial countries
-Assumes: (1) market forces do not allow for the development of a certain industry and (2) the industry has
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development of a certain industry and (2) the industry has positive externalities—spillover benefits (valuable linkages to other industries or technologies)
-Problems: (1) may increase inefficiency and result in negative linkage effects and (2) technological externalities are difficult to measure—which industries should be protected?
Why Nations Protect Their Industries: The National Security Argument
• National Security Argument: Certainindustries must be protected in order to guard national security (military security, cultural values)
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values)-Problems: (1) Vital mineral resources, for example, can be purchased cheaply abroad during peacetime; and (2) how to assess the effects of, say, U.S. television programs on Canadian culture?
Why Nations Protect Their Industries: The Retaliation Argument
• Retaliation Argument: Another country's trade barriers must be countered with trade barriers
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-Problems: Although retaliation can provide an incentive for trade negotiations, it can also lead to escalating trade wars
The Politics of Protection in the United States
• Protectionist pressures have increased in the U.S.
– Political reforms: reduced Congress’s past insulation from industry lobbyists
– The end of the Cold War: reduced U.S. willingness to
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– The end of the Cold War: reduced U.S. willingness to sacrifice domestic political considerations for geopolitical alliances
– The rise of the newly industrialized countries (NICs): increased competitive pressures on U.S. industries
– The growth of the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s: spurred fears of the loss of competitiveness
The Politics of Protection in the United States: Main Mechanisms
• Protection is obtained through (1) direct action by the president (e.g., VERs) or (2) four types of legal procedures
– Countervailing duties
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– Countervailing duties
– Antidumping duties
– Escape clause relief
– Section 301 retaliation
The Politics of Protection in the United States: Main Mechanisms (cont.)
• In the case of these four legal procedures, a firm or industry petitions the federal government to initiate an investigation into foreign country or foreign firm practices
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foreign country or foreign firm practices
• Let's analyze each of the four procedures in greater detailL
Countervailing Duties
• Countervailing duty: A tariff that is granted to a U.S. industry that has been hurt by a foreign country’s subsidizing its firms– Subsidies allow foreign firms to sell their products at lower
prices; countervailing duty seeks to counter the effect of the
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prices; countervailing duty seeks to counter the effect of the subsidy
– Problem: defining subsidy is subjective
– Uruguay Round defined subsidies as (1) a direct loan or transfer, (2) preferential tax treatment, (3) the supply of goods or services other than general infrastructure, or (4) income and price supports
Antidumping Duties
• Antidumping duty: a tariff levied on an import that is selling at a price below the product’s fair value
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-Problem: Defining fair value is subjective; antidumping duties are thus a source of tension between countries
Antidumping Duties (cont.)
• According to the WTO: Dumping occurs when an exporter sells a product at a price below the one it charges in its home market
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-Problem: Comparing domestic and foreign market prices is difficult due to differences in the price of transportation, wholesale, and other add-ons
Antidumping Duties (cont.)
• There are three methods to determine whether a good is being dumped:
1. Comparing the price in third-country markets
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2. Estimating the cost of production
3. Estimating the foreign firm’s production costs (dumping occurs if the foreign firm is not selling at a price that provides a normal rate of return on invested capital)
Antidumping Duties (cont.)
• In order for antidumping duties to be allowed, the country claiming dumping must show that the dumping has caused material injury to its firms
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injury to its firms
-If dumping occurs without material injury, antidumping duty is not allowed
Antidumping Duties (cont.)
• Problems: Economic theory and legal definitions are not in agreement
– If a firm is not earning above average profits somewhere, it cannot maintain a price somewhere else that is below the cost
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that is below the cost
– Firms often sell below costs • May sell at below costs in order to penetrate a market
• May go for extended periods selling at prices that do not cover fixed costs as long as the costs of variable inputs (labor and materials) are covered
Antidumping Investigation
• U.S. firms can initiate antidumping actions by filing a petition with the International Trade Administration (ITA) in the Department of Commerce
• If ITA finds dumping (or subsidization in the case of countervailing duty) occurred, the U.S. International Trade
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countervailing duty) occurred, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) conducts an additional investigation to determine whether the dumping has posed substantial harm to the domestic industry
• The relative success of U.S. firms in proving foreign dumping has induced a growing number of firms to file petitions with ITA
Escape Clause Relief
• Escape clause relief: Temporary tariff on imports to allow a domestic industry to escape the pressure of imports and thus obtain a period of adjustment
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– Refers to a clause in the U.S. and GATT trade rules
– Initiated when a firm or industry petitions the USTIC directly for relief from a surge of imports
– The petitioning firm or industry must show that it has been harmed by imports and not some other factor (e.g., poor management)
Section 301 and Special 301
• Section 301: A section of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act that requires the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to take action against any nation that persistently engages
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against any nation that persistently engages in unfair trade practices
– U.S. defines the meaning of unreasonable and unfair trade practices
– Action is launched by a request for negotiations with the country in question
Section 301 and Special 301 (con’t.)
• Special 301: Requires the USTR to monitor property rights enforcement around the world
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-In 2005, the USTR surveyed 90 countries and identified 52 as lacking adequate enforce or denying market access
Table 7.4 Economic Sanctions since World War I
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