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Afghanistans Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to NormalcyBarnett R. Rubin. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006. $10.00. 56 pp.

In 2001, a combination of US Special Operations and CIA forces, airpower and Afghan

indigenous forces overthrew the Taliban regime in less than threemonths. Some individuals

involved in the operation argued that it revitalised the American way of war. Afghanistan

establishedthe

groundwork

for

ademocratic

political

system,

which

included

presidential

electionsin2004andparliamentaryelectionsin2005.Afghanwomenenjoyedfargreaterfreedom

than during the Taliban period, andmillions of children, including girls, returned to school.

However, this initialsuccess transitioned intoaprolongedcounterinsurgencycampaignas the

Taliban, forces loyal toJalaluddinHaqqani andGulbuddinHekmatyar, foreign fighters, local

tribes,andcriminalorganisationsbeganasustainedefforttooverthrowtheAfghangovernment.

In Afghanistans Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy, Barnett Rubin argues thatAfghanistanhas thepotential tobeadisastroussituation if intelligent,measuredstepsarenot

taken.Onthesecurityfront,hearguesthatseveralstepsarecritical.OneisfortheUnitedStates,

which hasmore leverage in Islamabad than itsEuropeanpartners, to encourage the Pakistan

government to isolate and end the Talibanled insurgency. This shouldbe part of abroader

strategythat

includes

minimising

provocative

activity

by

India

in

Afghanistan,

settling

the

AfghanPakistaniborderdispute and establishing regional consensus onAfghanistan.On the

governancefront,Rubinargues thatAfghanistanneedstomakejudicialreformaprioritysince

the lack ofjudicial reform hasbecome abottleneck for security, governance, and economic

development.This includesdealingwithcorruption insuchplacesas theSupremeCourt.The

US andAfghan governments should also support greater fiscal reform, including improving

bordercontrols(forrevenuecollection)andstatebanks(forexpenditures).

Ontheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentfront,hearguesthatthemaincounternarcoticsgoal

shouldbe to reduce the absolute and relative size of the opium economywhilemaintaining

positivegrowththatfavoursthepoorintheoveralleconomy.Thisshouldinvolveanalternative

livelihoods policy that includes comprehensive rural development in such areas as electric

power,water,roadsanddebtrelief.Healsoarguesthatinternationaldonorsshouldfocusmore

onbuilding indigenous financial capacity. More than 75% of all aid to Afghanistan goes to

projects directly implemented or contracted by international organisations. This mode of

delivery,Rubinnotes, isselfdefeating.Thebestmechanismsforsuchdirectbudgetarysupport

mightbewiththeAfghanistanReconstructionTrustFundmanagedbytheWorldBankandthe

twofundsmanagedbyUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme:theLawandOrderTrustFund

forAfghanistanandtheCounternarcoticsTrustFund.

Theproblems inAfghanistanare indeedgrave.Afghaninsurgentgroupshaveusedsupport

from the international jihadi network, wealthy Arabs and some in Pakistans InterServices

Intelligence tobuild apowerbase inPashtun tribal areasofAfghanistan andPakistan.These

groups have constructed increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices, including

somewithremotecontroldetonators.Theyhavealsoconductedacampaignofsuicideattacks.

Therewere

more

suicide

attacks

in

Afghanistan

in

2006

than

in

the

rest

of

Afghanistans

recorded

historycombined.Thecultivationandproductionofopiumin2006wasthehighestever.

Rubin is perhaps themost authoritative scholar onAfghanistan in theUnited States.This

short policy paper offers a litany of useful recommendations.He succinctly covers themost

significantcausesofinstabilityinAfghanistantoday,includingtheroleofneighbours(especially

Pakistan),corruptionand faulty internationalaidpractices.Healso includesseveral intriguing

suggestions, suchasbringing themosquebased traditionalvillageadministrationanddispute

settlementproceduresunderstatecontrol.Sincethesermon,orkhutba,isamajormeansthrough

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